Using a unique, hand-collected sample of 169 firms in the Caribbean region, this paper explores an interrelationship between business group (BG) control, institutional factors and firm-level transparency in offshore financial centres. Our analysis shows that BG control is positively associated with the degree of information disclosure in these generally secretive jurisdictions. This relationship is moderated by the contingency factors associated with formal and informal institutions on various levels, such as the firm belonging to offshore financial services multinational enterprise industry and the quality of formal institutions in a specific jurisdiction.

This paper undertakes a horse races style comparison of the efficacy of a range of multifactor asset pricing models in explaining the cross section of stock returns in African securities markets. Valuation factors used include size, book-to-market value, momentum, operating profit, asset growth or investment, liquidity and investor protection. Using monthly returns of 375 blue chip firms from 8 African equity markets over 23 years, we undertake a horse-race style comparison of various classes of augmented CAPM models. We show that both the Fama & French (2015) five factor and Fama & French (2018) six factor framework yield the highest explanatory power. Analysis of costs of equity and optimized portfolio opportunity set simulations reveal substantial differences arising and borne by practitioners from the contrasting application of different asset pricing models underscoring the timely importance of our study.

We explore differences in the levels of dispersed ownership that lead to a returns-based free float hedging factor in addition to size, which augments the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in explaining the cross-section of stock returns. Using the S&P 1500 stocks in the US between 1985 and 2023, the results support the advantages of free float within a three-factor CAPM including size over alternative models based on liquidity, book-to-market value, and momentum. We argue that this yields a useful means for hedging effectively against the risks associated with the fundamental underlying likelihood of expropriation in a specific firm based on its ownership structure.

Our study develops a contextually embedded institution-theoretic model of the major influences precipitating entrepreneurial founders’ leadership succession. Drawing on a unique sample of 184 listed firms from 10 national securities markets across the Caribbean region, we find that both business group (BG) and private equity (PE) ownership are associated with an increased likelihood of founder retention. The results also show that firms’ adoption of shareholder value corporate governance negatively moderates the BG main effect, while positively moderating its PE counterpart. We argue that this is reflective of a simpler lifecycle in emerging economies centred on one major transition, namely the transition from internal to external resource provision.

Research question/issueThis is a study of the relationship between business angel retained ownership in investee firms across the Caribbean region and their informational asymmetry costs captured in bid-ask spreads.Research findings/insightsWe find business angel ownership to be associated with a reduction in transaction costs or bid-ask spreads. However, this is reversed leading to increasing transaction costs following moderation by whether the investee firm has a subsidiary located within an offshore jurisdiction and separately if the investee firm adopts higher levels of Anglo-American shareholder value corporate governance.Theoretical/academic implicationsWe undertake a novel application of incomplete contracting theory in theorizing the influence of ownership of business angels on the transaction costs of their investee firms. We extend and contribute to theory development through consideration of the presence of investee firm's subsidiary located in offshore financial centers within the firm's corporate network and the degree to which it adopts Anglo-American shareholder value corporate governance. In the former, we argue business angels are more prone to collaborate with firm insiders to the detriment of outside minority investors given the enhanced opacity and shift in incentives. In the latter, we argue the incongruity between business angels, insiders, and outside minority expectations regarding the adoption of shareholder value governance also leads to elevated transaction costs.Practitioner/policy implicationsBusiness angel finance is widely lauded as a potential source of development capital within regional and developing economies with the potential to rejuvenate otherwise moribund entrepreneurial ecosystems and business sectors. Our study yields important findings relevant for practitioners in formulating development policy nurturing the development of indigenous economies through enhanced business angel participation. It also considers the moderating influence of firm's adoption of Anglo-American shareholder value corporate governance and whether the firm has a related party located in an offshore financial center, something of profound importance in regions comprising offshore financial centers.

Research Question/IssueThis is a study of the relationship between business group ownership and constituent firms' adoption of Anglo-American shareholder value governance in African firms at the undertaking of an initial public offering (IPO). Research Findings/InsightsWe find business group ownership to be associated with lower Anglo-American corporate governance adoption by constituent firms. However, this association is reversed in the institutional context of higher tribalism, while correspondingly being exacerbated in the context of lower tribalism. Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWe theorize that the influence of business group ownership on firms' adoption of Anglo-American corporate governance is better understood when considering the institutional context. We highlight how informal cultural institutions are heterogeneous and thus shape the indigenous political economy and impact business groups. Specifically, we argue institutional contexts with higher tribalism are associated with more in-group favoritism and nepotism. This association makes it critical for business group constituent firms to escape the constraints of the political economy of tribalism when attracting outside funding, leading to a higher inclination to adopt Anglo-American governance. Contrastingly, in lower tribalism contexts, there is more universal trust across societies and an increased availability of domestic funding. Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsGiven the proliferation of business group ownership within economies worldwide, the study provides a useful framework with which to gauge the influence of business group ownership on a constituent firm's adoption of Anglo-American governance best practice. In particular, the study emphasizes that the interdependence of formal institutional architecture and tribalism-both fundamentally associated with the demographic shape and with the incentive structures embedded within the underlying national political economy-calls for careful considerations when making national corporate governance recommendations.

Question/issue This is a study of the relationship between nonexecutive director personal ownership and firm's bid ask spreads in listed firms from across the Caribbean offshore securities exchanges. Research findings/insights We report that bid ask spreads increase with nonexecutive ownership. However, this result is reduced (negatively moderated) in the context of higher formal institutional quality and also if the territory has a fixed exchange rate regime but exacerbated (positively moderated) if the firm is located within an offshore jurisdiction. Theoretical/academic implications The results regarding the influence of nonexecutive director ownership on firm liquidity-based transaction costs, namely, market estimates of bid ask spreads, are interpreted in terms of the contingency of this relationship on the wider institutional context. The effectiveness of nonexecutive directors is highly contingent upon the specific institutional context. Higher formal institutional quality and the presence of a strong macroeconomic tie between territory and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) country lead to a reduction in these costs, while offshore financial centers lead to their increase. We argue that this highlights a shortcoming of agency theory's more limited view of institutions. Practitioner/policy implications The results support regulator's focus on board of director composition and in particular nonexecutive remuneration in the form of ownership. Given the increasing dominance of Anglo-American governance, firms worldwide are increasing the proportions of nonexecutive directors on their boards. However, their role is acutely context specific which is reflected in the relationship between their personal ownership and the liquidity-borne transaction costs of the firm as a whole.

Based on resource dependence theory we argue for an influence of business groups (BGs) on the board composition of constituent offshore financial multinational enterprises (FMNEs). Using a unique sample of 171 Caribbean FMNEs in an inter-island BG setting, we find BGs' control in constituent firms to be indicative of the importance of the internal financing and intermediation within the group network. This control leads to a higher proportion of lawyers hired to the boards of directors in BG-constituent firms and supports the argument that lawyers provide skills in complex offshore regulatory frameworks that facilitate BGs' optimal tax management. Furthermore, we observe that an increased adoption of shareholder rights governance by BG-constituent firms is associated with increased engagement with outside resource providers, increased potential conflicts of interest and hence a need for hiring more lawyers. Our interpretation is that offshore FMNEs have a need for more lawyers, whose legal skill is critical to the competitive advantage of FMNEs.

Using a unique sample of 171 listed firms in the Caribbean region, this paper explores the influence of post-entry ownership of foreign MNEs on the board composition of subsidiaries. Our findings reveal higher ownership is a means of enhancing the security of property rights while simultaneously creating a liability of foreignness. This causes subsidiaries to externally contract for resources, leading to the hiring of more lawyers and fewer accountants. The opposite is true for progressively lower levels of foreign MNE ownership. Firms' adoption of shareholder rights governance amplifies these findings, while state formal institutional quality reverses them.

This paper uses the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) in forming illiquidity estimates for South Africa, Kenya, Morocco, Egypt and London. These are used within an augmented CAPM framework to form risk firm illiquidity premiums in addition to premiums attributable to firm size. The evidence suggests that London and Johannesburg have the lowest cost of equity followed by Morocco and Egypt. While Kenya has the highest cost of equity the costs associated with a Main board listing are less than one third than those encountered on the fledgling Alternative Investment Market raising policy questions concerning the development of alternative markets

My study contrasts the influence of firm level adoption of shareholder value governance against that of formal institutional quality on listed firm’s bid ask spread in a unique sample of eight Caribbean offshore stock exchanges. Using panel data from 146 listed firms from 2004 to 2017 my findings reveal the importance of Worldwide Governance Indicator dimensions of corruption control and regulatory quality in explaining firm’s bid ask spreads. Furthermore, formal institutional quality is consistently statistically superior in explaining firm’s bid ask spreads than firm level governance adoption. My findings emphasise the importance in considering political economy in offshore financial markets.

Ceding ownership to outside investors provides a control dilemma for founders. In less developed capital markets with weaker formal institutions, we argue that retained founder director ownership can lower the transaction costs of external capital. Our argument rests on incomplete contracting and institutional theory, particularly highlighting the elevated status of the founding entrepreneur. Based on a longitudinal study of 179 listed Caribbean firms, we find that retained founder ownership reduces information asymmetry vis-à-vis outside minority investors. The reduced information asymmetry is even stronger for firms with a related party/subsidiary within a tax haven, and for firms with strong shareholder rights

This paper undertakes a comparison between five multifactor variants of the capital asset pricing model, where this is augmented by size, book to market value, momentum, liquidity and a new investor protection metric based on the product of institutional quality in a country and the proportion of free float shares, which captures the impact of controlling block holders. Using monthly returns of 909 blue chip firms from 16 Middle East & North African equity markets for 16 years, we show that a two factor CAPM augmented with a factor mimicking portfolio based on the investor protection metric yields the highest explanatory power. Analysis of Kalman filter time varying investor protection betas reveals investor protection premiums in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Tunisia and corresponding discounts in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Dubai and Abu Dhabi.

This study outlines how the corporate governance of emerging market firms is influenced by corporate affiliation and institutional embeddedness. We argue that the stronger the business group affiliation, the less likely is the emerging market firm to adopt shareholder value enhancing corporate governance, and that this relationship is moderated by institutional quality and tribalism. Based on189 initial public offerings (IPOs) from 22 African countries between 2000and 2016, we find a significant negative relationship between business group ownership and IPO firms’ quality of corporate governance. We also find this relationship to be significantly negatively moderated by country-level institutional quality and positively by indigenous tribalism. The result adds to the understanding of barriers to a convergence towards one uniform global corporate governance model.

A major feature of development policy modelled on neoclassical notions of financial market integration is that a wide array of smaller markets can benefit from integration by pooling resources and attracting foreign capital to supplement otherwise low levels of domestic investment. However, evidence from Namibia and South Africa suggest that the smaller markets become regulatory price-takers and to maintain the benefits from integration, face prohibitively high costs. We find evidence that the current policy initiatives of regional integration impose costs on smaller, less developed exchanges, which are ultimately borne by local firms seeking cost-effective sustainable external finance.

We integrate the institutional perspective with research on the governance role of private equity firms in an investigation of Founder-CEO successions in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in emerging markets. Using a unique, hand-collected and comprehensive sample of 191 firms having undertaken IPOs in 21 markets across the African continent between January 2000 and August 2016, we apply instrumental variable (IV) Probit methodology and find that higher levels of private equity ownership are positively associated with the probability of the founder's retention as CEO, especially in the context of low-quality formal institutions. Further, in societies with high tribalism, higher private equity ownership is associated with an increased likelihood of founder retention. Voids in the institutional architecture underscore the importance of the founder as a key organizational resource for the firm and a source of institutionalized legitimacy, which in turn confers on the firm an ability to access required resources.

A new governance index is constructed, which forms the basis of a new governance valuation factor, defined as the product of the firm governance index and the country institutional quality. Using monthly returns of 4,714 blue chip firms from 35 OECD equity markets for 17 years, our tests of variants of the augmented-CAPM, show that a two factor CAPM augmented with a factor mimicking portfolio based on our new governance metric yields the highest explanatory power in multi-country samples. In general, our results indicate variations in abnormal returns on portfolios that reflect returns differences between democratic (strong) and dictatorship (weak) governance sorted deciles not explained by existing augmented CAPMs. This confirms the importance of differences in governance and that minority investors should seek a premium to compensate for potential welfare losses and a means of hedging these losses within a conventional asset pricing framework. We argue that this is representative of the revealed preferences of insider controlling groups within firms towards expropriating minority outsiders

We argue that the corporate governance of emerging economy IPO firms is influenced by firm-specific institutionally embedded block ownership groups. Applying an extended institutional logic perspective and using a mixed-effects ordered probit model, our findings from 190 IPO-firms from 22 African countries 2000–2016, support the notion that five major block owner categories (corporate, private equity, non-executive, business group, state) exerts very different influence on African firms’ degree of adoption of Anglo-American corporate governance measures. We find that the influence from the various block owner groups is significantly moderated by institutional quality and tribalism, but to different degrees and directions across block owner groups. Our contextually embedded firm-specific results support the criticism of a one-hat-fits-all global and uniform corporate governance model.

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing and unresolved debate in the international business (IB) literature with respect to what drives or impedes multinational company (MNC) success in emerging markets, focusing specifically on the impact of institutional conditions on subsidiary performance. Design/methodology/approach - In the understanding that greater attention to different institutional settings and their diversity has much to offer theory-building in the IB area, this panel study examines the influence of institutional distance on the return on assets (ROA) of 399 foreign subsidiaries in a previously understudied host market, that of Brazil during the period from 2008 to 2011. Regression analysis was carried out on panel data using weighted least squares as estimator. Findings - Similar to research conducted in other national contexts, results revealed significant correlation between institutional distance and firm performance measured by ROA. Unlike previous research, however, these correlations were positive: the greater the institutional distance, the better the performance. Both normative distance and regulatory distance positively influenced ROA, raising questions with regard to the concept of institutional distance, its operationalization and influence. Originality/value - The paper is of value in showing the institutional distance and the performance of foreign subsidiaries with a positive relationship in an emerging market (Brazil) using a panel perspective rather than the more usual sectional perspective.