
Slower responses in older age are often taken as evidence for cognitive decline, yet they may also stem from representational changes shaped by lifelong learning. Building on the information-accumulation perspective on aging, we argue that behavioral change across the lifespan can arise from representational systems continuously updated through learning from the environment. This view predicts that aging may bring both benefits and costs: Performance improves when task demands are congruent with accumulated knowledge but declines when they conflict. We provide convergent evidence for this account across three studies, each comprising the following components. First, in tasks requiring participants to access word meanings (i.e., when task demands were congruent with representation), we found that older adults (70-80 years old) exhibited faster semantic processing speed than younger adults (18-25 years old), a finding that cannot be explained by decline-based accounts. Second, we traced this processing advantage to systematic changes in older adults' conceptual representations inferred from semantic rating tasks. Third, using learning simulation models, we demonstrated how such representational changes could emerge naturally from cumulative language experience. Replications across different samples, task requirements, and word stimuli strengthen the robustness of these findings. Finally, we identified a boundary condition: When learned representations contain information incongruent with task demands, older adults' greater learning experience not only attenuates their representational changes but also reduces processing-speed advantage. Altogether, our research challenges the explanatory framework of cognitive aging that emphasizes decline and compensation, advancing a more balanced view grounded in representational development and lifelong learning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
Stereotypes are a foundational construct in psychological science, often defined as beliefs concerning characteristic group attributes. We present a cognitive-ecological theory of social perception that predicts and explains why such characteristic attributes are likely negative, that is, why most stereotypes are negative. The theory assumes that, cognitively, people characterize groups by attributes that distinguish them from other groups. Ecologically, positive social information is more frequent (i.e., positivity prevalence), and negative social information is more diverse (i.e., negativity diversity). If negative attributes are less frequent and more diverse relative to positive attributes, then they must be more likely to distinguish one group from another. Consequently, the attributes people see as characteristic of a group are likely to be negative. We illustrate the predicted stereotype negativity across two studies and two existing data sets. We then formalize the theory and illustrate it with simulations showing that rare attributes can be highly diagnostic of group membership while applying to only a minority of group members. Thus, the theory explains why most stereotype content is likely negative, despite the well-documented positivity prevalence, and why stereotypes may be diagnostic and comparatively accurate, despite being descriptively inaccurate. The theory explains stereotype negativity without requiring motivational derogation, essentialist group differences, or a general negativity bias, and it clarifies when positive stereotypes should occur. We also discuss the theory's relation to dimensional models of stereotype content and consequences for interventions aimed at reducing stereotype negativity.
Here we present a model of sequence learning and recall based on the idea that the function of memory is to maintain an up-to-date representation of the environment that can be used to guide future perception and action. The representation of the environment is considered to be a prior which is combined with information in short-term memory to construct a posterior representation. That posterior representation drives recall and, in turn, is used to update the priors. This prediction-update cycle is a form of Bayesian filter. We apply the model to data from Hebb's (1961) task in which participants learn sequences over repeated presentations in an immediate serial recall task. The model is shown to simulate a wide range of data on the Hebb effect including the ability to learn multiple lists at once, the effect of list spacing, the differential impact of variation in the beginning versus end of lists, learning from response errors, interference between similar lists, and the effects of repetition on forward and backward recall. The model's ability to account for these phenomena follows directly from its basic computational principles.
Person-organization (PO) fit turns on the idea of compatibility between people and organizations, but fit research has typically approached compatibility through a limited set of assumptions. Most PO fit research adopts a correspondence ontology, treating fit as a measurable alignment between individual traits and features of the organization. Drawing on constructivist psychology and interpretivist theory, this article distinguishes the established correspondence ontology of PO fit, expressed as aligned fit, from a constitutive ontology, expressed as constructed fit. I argue that PO fit theory rests on two distinct and often unacknowledged ontologies, each with its own epistemological foundations and methodological implications. Correspondence-based approaches explain fit as attribute alignment between person and organization, whereas constitutive approaches explain fit as the lived capacity to sustain a workable sense of self in organizational life through interpretation, identity work, and affective experience. A process model is developed for each ontology, illustrating how they generate distinct explanatory pathways linking organizational participation, experience, and outcomes. Recognizing these ontological differences allows researchers to specify more precisely what their studies seek to explain when they invoke the language of fit. The article advances a pluralist research agenda that preserves theoretical coherence while expanding the explanatory scope of fit research. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).