ABSTRACT The article evaluates the social functions of rural teachers and attempts to identify the internal noneconomic resources necessary to solve pressing social issues associated with rural life (including problems connected with alienation, alcoholism, and unemployment). The study tests the hypothesis that rural teachers are active participants in rural life. This work is based on the methodological resources of rural sociology, the sociology of education, and approaches formed within the framework of problems associated with social well-being and the quality of life. Using the results of a study based on semistructured interviews conducted in the rural areas of Altai Krai and the Altai Republic (N = 124), the social functions of teachers and their specific roles as professionals were determined. In addition, the article analyzes the role of rural teachers to ensure the resilience of rural residents. Resilience has been correlated with certain values and norms rooted in rural life (family, health, work, etc.), and rural teachers are often involved in preserving these values and norms. They provide support and assistance in solving specific social problems (raising children, overcoming difficult life situations, socializing adults and children, etc.). The active participation of teachers in the integration of the village community is also discussed. It was possible to identify which activities initiated by rural teachers are aimed at consolidating rural residents and encouraging their participation in the diverse life of their home villages. All study participants stated that the integration of the village community is a necessity. A description of how teachers interact with public authorities and organizations is given. The example of Altai Krai and the Altai Republic shows that as a professional group, rural teachers actively participate in solving village problems, while acquiring the status of “village defenders.”
The article analyzes parental values in Russia and 33 other countries, and considers how these values have changed from 1990–1991 to 2017–2020. Russian dynamics are analyzed via seven waves, while the international dynamics are assigned two waves. We used a combination of data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Study and discovered that in 1990 the Russian value agenda regarding children was highly survival oriented. By 2017–2020 certain changes had occurred: Russians no longer accented survival values (e.g., hard work, thrift, and obedience), with the exception of religiosity, which has markedly increased; self-expression values (e.g., independence and imagination) became more popular, while humanistic values lost much of their importance for Russians. In 33 countries, humanistic values remained as popular as in 1990, while survival values became less important. The change in Russian parental values runs parallel to the change in Russian personal values.
This article summarizes the results of a study that developed and analyzed the typology of Russian regions based on criteria intended to evaluate the quality of human potential. Prior to this work, ten clusters of this typology were studied, and exceptions to falling into clusters with neighboring regions (which was typical for most regions) were considered separately. Although among the qualitative characteristics of human potential not a single one reflected the territorial location of the regions, in the typology they were distributed precisely on a geographical basis. Unobservable factors, whose effects on human potential were mediated by study-driven indicators, played a decisive role in the clustering of regions. This result led us to consider the research of L.N. Gumilyov, which focuses on how the geography of territories, landscapes, and climates form human potential. In many ways, geographical conditions determine the economic activities that form the corresponding skills and abilities of a given population. With the exception of four small clusters, the typology of regions, based on the characteristics of human potential, corresponds to the composition of the federal districts. Three of the four smaller clusters had a pronounced natural resource orientation and one had the financial advantages of Russia’s two capital cities. This implies that the administrations of the federal districts could be engaged to improve the quality of human potential. The protracted process of giving administrative status to the federal districts can be completed by setting them the important social task of developing and implementing a strategy for improving the qualitative characteristics of the population.
《社会学研究》开设"马克思主义社会学专栏" "专题研究" "论文" "研究述评"等栏目.本刊热诚欢迎国内外学者投稿.1.《社会学研究》官网()为本刊唯一投稿渠道,编辑部不再接受电子邮件及邮寄纸质投稿.2.本刊刊登社会学各分支学科的学术论文和研...>>详细《社会学研究》开设"马克思主义社会学专栏" "专题研究" "论文" "研究述评"等栏目.本刊热诚欢迎国内外学者投稿.1.《社会学研究》官网()为本刊唯一投稿渠道,编辑部不再接受电子邮件及邮寄纸质投稿.2.本刊刊登社会学各分支学科的学术论文和研究述评等,不刊登国内外已公开发表的文章(含电子网络版).学术论文以15000-22000字为宜.
In the sociology of religion, there are many approaches to measuring religiosity. Most of the methodological literature focuses on operationalizing the concept—determining important aspects of religiosity and selecting the right indicators. At the same time, little attention has been given to the reverse operation—the construction of a common descriptor of religiosity. We consider three approaches to this problem: 1) using individual indicators; 2) constructing a general descriptor of religiosity on the basis of several indicators with the application of summation, averaging, and the principles of the strongest or weakest answer or factor analysis; and 3) constructing a typology based on several descriptors by identifying relatively homogeneous groups of religiosity using cluster analysis or latent class analysis. The strengths and weaknesses of each approach are discussed. In the case of multiple social forms of religiosity, the latter approach is most productive. The article presents the typology of Orthodox Russians, built using hierarchical cluster analysis based on data gathered by the Orthodox Monitor all-Russian survey (2011). The typology is based on four indicators: faith in God, frequency of church attendance, frequency of attending religious services, and the frequency of making confession and taking communion. Nine groups were identified using our analysis.
Russia today faces acute demographic problems, which have been the focus of government policy and media attention. Since studies of population migration are a special topic of demography that requires a separate analysis, the article focuses on the problems of natural population change. In the scientific literature, the study of Russia’s demographic problems represents a distinct perspective. The experts are well versed in the subject and can address nuances that are overlooked “from the outside.” Many social scientists are critical of the government’s attempts to solve Russia’s demographic problems. Government achievements are often downplayed because they have not been completely successful. First, although Russia’s mortality rate has declined for most of the twenty-first century, it is still high when compared to most European countries. Second, although Russia’s birth rate is higher than in most European countries, it is still below the world average. These two facts have both positive and negative interpretations. Nevertheless, all demographic projections indicate that Russia’s population will continue to naturally decline in the coming decades. To solve this problem, it is necessary to research new approaches and develop new demographic policies, which are possible only through the combined efforts of all Russian demographers, despite their theoretical and practical disagreements. The national project Demography and related programs can help address these problems only if the proposed policies are scientifically studied and adapted to real Russian conditions.
Abstract The article applies a sociological approach to the study of different generations. The author, who has previously studied Millennials, now divides the generation into two age groups. The author identifies a special group of “3S” Millennials (standing for “smartphones,” “social networks,” and “slowing economy”) who have come of age during the period since 2008, which has been characterized by the long decline of the Russian economy and the massive spread of new technologies and digital user services. Data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey of the Health and Economic Welfare of the Population conducted by the National Research University Higher School of Economics (1994–2018) are used. The study shows that while Millennials are different in many ways from other generations, members of the generation also differ from each across multiple social characteristics. Part one of the article, which is published in this issue, shows that younger 3S Millennials started using new digital technologies at an earlier (adolescent) age and also continue to use them more often. They are better educated and also have more educated parents. They are more likely to delay important decisions associated with adulthood (marriage, first pregnancy and childbirth, and entry into the labor market). Many intergenerational and intragenerational differences remain significant even after introducing standard control variables and when neighboring generations are adjusted to a similar median age.
This article aims to evaluate the social duties of rural teachers, and is linked to an attempt to identify internal non-economic resources to help solve pressing issues associated with village life (including the problems of alienation of fellow villagers, the spread of alcoholism, unemployment, etc.). We set out to test the hypothesis that a rural teacher serves as an active participant in village life. This work is based on the methodological resources of village sociology, sociology of education, as well as approaches formed within the framework of problems associated with social well-being and quality of life. The results obtained from a study based on a semi-structured interview conducted in rural areas of the Altai Territory and the Altai Republic (N = 124) allowed for determining both the social functions of teachers and how they’re linked to the specifics of the profession. In addition the article analyzes the role of the village teacher in ensuring the resilience of the villagers. Resilience has been found to be associated with values and norms rooted in village areas (family, health, work, etc.), and often the village teacher is involved in preserving these values and norms. They provide support and assistance in solving a specific social problem (raising children, overcoming difficult life situations, socializing adults and children, etc.). The issue of active participation of teachers in the integration of the village community is also raised. We were able to identify which activities initiated by the village teacher are aimed at consolidating the villagers and their participation in the diverse life of their native village. All participants of the study stated that the integration of the village community is a necessity in this day and age. Such a function of teachers as interacting with authorities and public organizations was also identified. The example of the Altai Territory and the Altai Republic shows that village teachers as a professional group actively participate in solving the village’s problems, acquiring the status of a defender of the village.
ABSTRACT An occasion for discussing the 25th anniversary of the socioeconomic development of post-Soviet Russia is the publication of a collective monograph edited by O. Shkaratan and G. Yastrebov, titled How New Is the New Russia? Its conceptual and polemical nature is clearly indicated by the title. The authors answer this question in the negative. No, contemporary Russia continues to reproduce the same basic institutions of power-property, firmly rooted in Russian civilization going back to the 13th century. In the new book, the influence of previous “oriental-despotic” development is considered in terms of the social structure and dynamics of contemporary Russian society, which the authors of the monograph describe as a neo-etacracy. The overall analytic result produced by the study is complex. The idea inherent in the book’s title is fully realized. The book shows that the old “rules of the game” continue to operate in the new Russia even after the “death” of the Soviet Union: The reproduction of power-property is conceptually substantiated, and the connection between the development of the mechanisms of social mobility and social polarization is empirically corroborated. However, the goal of connecting the reproduction of power-property with the empirical data on social life in post-Soviet Russia is more ambiguous. The book has a number of new arguments supporting the idea that in Russia the “state is still stronger than society.” One of the most original and well-designed concerns a survey question about which patients would receive preferential treatment in a hospital. However, there remains a lack of comprehensive evidence. This is primarily because the book is based on sociological research done with “ordinary people” and largely excludes the representatives of the “state-class.”
This article examines the problems of the rise and consolidation of authoritarian regimes in former Soviet countries. The authors analyze the reasons why the transition to democracy failed in these newly independent states, including the absence of a strong tradition of civil society and the fact that the anti-communist revolution that took place in the Soviet Union in 1991 was not preceded by a "revolution of values." An important reason for the suspension of transitions to democracy was that the new ruling elite, which held a monopoly on power and property in former Soviet countries, had no interest in further market and democratic reforms. In their analysis of reasons for the stability of authoritarian regimes, the authors focus mainly on factors like the roles of the institution of power-property, of the nomenklatura as the ruling class, and of the patronage state. At the same time, this article looks at factors that could limit the development of authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet Union; these factors include competing political identities in society, the balance of power between regional elites, and the de-nomenklaturization of the political elite. The authors note that the main problem on the path of the transition to democracy is the absence of political and social actors interested in such changes.
ABSTRACT This article assesses the likelihood that the objectives for replacement of the population established by the President of the Russian Federation in the May 2018 Decree [1] (hereinafter the “Decree”) can be achieved. For each of the objectives, the author outlines the current situation, current trends, and the most likely outcomes. He surfaces the factors that either contribute to a solution to the indicated problems or aggravate them. In particular, any growth in or even simple maintenance of the current number of births will be hindered by the constantly decreasing number of women of active reproductive age (25–39 years of age) that has been observed since 2015. Women in this age range account for four-fifths of all births. 1 1. The study was performed with the financial support of RFBR, project no. 19-011-00626.All of the indicators that have not been footnoted in the article were calculated based on the Rosstat database: http//cbsd.gks.ru [2]. The number of women in this group will decline from 17.9 million in 2015 to 15.0 million in 2024 and then to 12.0 million in 2030. The task of reducing mortality from diseases of the circulatory system and from cancer will be hampered by the aging of the population; the inability of many members of the population to quickly break bad habits, such as smoking and regularly consuming alcohol to excess; the poor quality of consumed food and alcohol; and so on. In addition, in the future, as life expectancy (LE) increases in Russia, those who have been cured of diseases associated with other major causes of death will eventually begin to die from diseases of the circulatory system or from cancer. These diseases are the leading causes of death in countries with high LE. The author draws the following basic conclusions: It will be practically impossible to achieve the goal of “increasing the population of the country” (in accordance with the Decree) by reproduction alone in the near future. It will be necessary to achieve a balance by both increasing the birth rate and encouraging migration in order to solve the general demographic problems facing Russia (ensuring the growth of the country’s population; optimizing the distribution of the population across its territory in order to serve not only the economic but also the geopolitical interests of the state; compensating for volatile shifts in the country’s demographic structure; and so on).
ABSTRACT This article considers the institutional trust of Russia’s humanitarian intelligentsia, describes its underlying qualities, characterizes the structure of institutional trust, reveals the essence and prerequisites of its occurrence, and analyzes the elements of institutional structure. The intelligentsia demonstrates a very high level of trust in the Russian president, but the attitudes and motives of this trust differ significantly (the difference between true supporters and passive observers). Trust in the military reflects the intelligentsia’s recognition of its merits and role in ensuring the security of the state. Complete trust in the church indicates the intelligentsia’s identification with its values and goals. The intelligentsia’s low level of trust in political institutions is part of a contemporary international trend—a sense of injustice, the belief that things will not improve, and incredulity about the future undermine trust in the state. Trust of the police and the courts is low, largely due to widespread prejudice, low awareness of their activities, and rare interactions with them. The intelligentsia’s trust in television and the press is very limited; however, television remains the main source of news, while an important alternative is the Internet. The low level of institutional trust among members of the humanitarian intelligentsia is combined with conservatism, paternalism, and civic and political passivity, and is more likely an indication of disappointment and alienation than an active criticism of Russian institutions.
ABSTRACT This article examines the development of self-employment as a new way of working. It is noteworthy that self-employment is a broad concept that is no longer adequately understood by either current regulations or prevailing public opinion, which reduces the effectiveness of state policy governing citizens who have decided to go into business for themselves. Therefore, society fails to appreciate the importance of the institution of self-employment for the socioeconomic development of the country. The authors provide detailed evidence that the modern development of the institution of self-employment is an objective process that is a consequence of changes to the structure of the modern economy: Services have grown to occupy an ever greater share of gross domestic product, workers have gained increased mobility on the labor market, innovations and digital technologies have been introduced on a massive scale, new incentives to work have appeared, workers are being asked to demonstrate ever greater competencies, and there is increasing pressure to optimize production costs. This article focuses on an analysis of the state of the labor market for self-employed workers in Russia. It is noted that despite positive growth in the indicators, legal self-employment in Russia remains extremely underdeveloped. It still needs to develop in order to satisfy the requirements of the national economy, and the types of standards adopted by developed countries do not yet fully exist in Russia. In order to provide expanded opportunities for citizens to go into business, reduce the unemployment rate, reduce the size of the informal economy, and develop the country’s economy, we need to increase the efficiency of regulation by the state. It should be aimed at establishing the legal status of self-employed workers based on a multifunctional criterion, as well as solving certain tactical and strategic objectives. The first set of goals is to establish administrative, property, informational, and financial support measures for the self-employed. The second set of goals is to develop a new economic environment in the country, which will motivate people to practice legal self-employment.
This article makes a case that the scale and intensity of labor immigration to Russia from both Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries and developed European Union (EU) countries will drop. From the position of economic theory, it analyzes the level and dynamics of migration flows from the East and the West by country of origin, assesses the impact of Europe’s migration crisis on the Russian labor market, and offers methods for evaluating the quality of immigration capital. Finally, it identifies a direct correlation between immigration and the average salaries of neighboring countries within international blocs and forecasts how the situation will develop on the European labor market.
ABSTRACT This article presents the results of a survey of scientific researchers and academic instructors that questioned the expert respondents about the field they would advise their children and grandchildren to enter and which of these career paths would be the most suitable (promising) for the rising generation in 5, 10, 15, and 20 years. If they recommended a scientific, engineering, or technical career, then a follow-up question was asked about which new areas they would recommend and which scientific disciplines they thought would be the most relevant in 5, 10, 15, and 20 years. The results of the survey showed that the respondents prefer that their children and grandchildren choose a career in science, health care, education, or culture and the fine arts, although a fairly large number of the answers exhibited a preference that their children enter engineering. It is notable that finance came in near the bottom of the list, beating out only trade and agriculture among the least popular fields. We analyzed the survey responses across various dimensions, including gender, geographical location, and other criteria. Apparently, the selected priorities reflect the hopes of the respondents that their priorities for the economy will win out eventually and their understanding of the role that science should play in society, since they justified their responses by stating that by pursuing careers in scientific research, young people would be able to benefit Russia. They also reported that they thought Russian society could benefit from more specialists in culture and fine art, teachers and educators, and service personnel in the armed forces. Respondents indicated that they believed that there was a fairly significant gulf between the values and preferences of scientific researchers, educators, instructors, and employees of cultural heritage institutions, on the one hand, and popular opinion, on the other.
ABSTRACT The article explores the problem of the discrepancies between the careers that the Russian education system currently prepares students for and the needs of the labor market. Employers on the labor market and educational institutions cannot function effectively without an established mechanism for social exchange. However, the reality of the current situation is such that the current educational services market exists almost entirely independently of the labor market. A document-based content analysis has allowed us to identify key problems for the Russian labor market. These include a shortage of certain specialists, which is particularly glaring in certain fields; a high level of youth unemployment; a lack of demand for certain highly trained specializations and thus the inability of the country to effectively compete on the international market; and Russia’s lagging position in the technology field. The education system also faces a number of problems. Some of the most pronounced ones include the brain drain of qualified and talented workers abroad; the insufficient funding of the research community; the decline in the prestige and quality of education; and the development of shallow thought patterns among young people that have resulted from the problem of fragmented culture. All attempts by the state to ease this crisis situation have not moved past creative window dressing. They have avoided addressing the fundamental roots of the problem. Our analysis has revealed a basic discrepancy between the types of subjects that educational institutions currently teach students and the needs of the labor market. Educational institutions have proven themselves unable to flexibly respond to changes on the labor market, and they have ignored its demands. In fact, most Russian schools do not subscribe to a unified system to help children choose a future career path. Schools use a formal approach to providing vocational guidance for young people: At best, students take one-time tests and receive brochures from for-profit institutions of higher education. If a unified, systematic model for career counseling were developed based on a mutually beneficial cooperative relationship, we would be able to establish an effective mechanism for social exchange between educational institutions and the labor market.
The article presents the results of a series of sociological studies conducted by the author in the cities of the Republic of Bashkortostan in 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2010, 2014 years. In 2014, for comparison, a survey was made of about 300 students in secondary schools of the city of Moscow. The object of the study was urban older adolescents (14-17 years). The article presents detailed data on dynamics of preferences in the choice of life goals and professional orientations. There are differences by gender in the choice of professions, the lack of differences in the distribution of respondents' views on the place of residence and nationality, the absence of differences in preferences of adolescents in the cities and the capital of the Republic of Bashkortostan. We observed no differences for most items and the presence of very weak differences only for some items preferences of teenagers Bashkortostan from the goals of adolescents in Moscow. It is revealed that urban teenagers throughout the research period are dominated by healthy traditional values and life goals. So, on the first places in the ranking of goals in life are answers "to have a good profession and to have a nice family, children, find a big love," "to have a lot of friends." Only in recent years the position strengthened of the answers to open business enterprise" (2014: 4th place in the rating) and "to become strong and independent" (in 20145th place in the rating). The goal "to have an apartment, a lot of things, a car"; "have a lot of money", is also experiencing fluctuations in the range of 20-40% in the long twenty-year period. At the same time teenagers are attracted by more and more creative activities in art, science; this desire has grown over the years, starting with the 12th place in the ranking in 1993 to 9th place in 2014. Percentage of Teens that see their goals as is to "fight evil, for justice" (6 to 10% in different years) remains stable. However, very chaotic and prone to random factors, far from objective social needs are personal preferences experiencing, in addition, serious dynamics by years, among boys and girls who want to be an entrepreneur, businessman. Interest for the profession of engineer, designer, completely lost, is just beginning. All this confirms the need for targeted public career guidance and directed work on the formation and forecasting of the labour market.
Research comparing students at the end of the Soviet period with those a decade later shows that the optimism tends to be more combined with pragmatism, individualism, and egoism. Youth who before were more likely to diverge on issues of personal and private concerns versus more abstract issues of justice and ideology have become more similar over time, with a greater emphasis on private individual concerns.
