The living organism raises a distinctive epistemological problem: biology presupposes wholeness, purposiveness, and self-generation, yet these cannot be derived from interactions among independently identifiable parts. I argue that the classic opposition between mechanism, vitalism, and organicism reflects different responses to this difficulty-how organisms become intelligible objects of knowledge. Building on Kant's analysis of teleological judgment, I offer a systematic epistemological reading of Goethe's morphology and Steiner's interpretation of it. Goethe's conception of plant metamorphosis is presented as a morphological construction: not the subsumption of data under fixed concepts, but the use of transformable 'living concepts' that reconstruct a formative process, analogous to (yet distinct from) mathematical construction in physics. Steiner further developed this idea by claiming that productive reconstruction can disclose not only lawful organisation but the organism's self-generating activity, that is its formative force. In dialogue with Fichte's notion of intellectual intuition, I propose that reenacting organic formation in thought establishes a structural correspondence (not identity) between productive cognitive activity and organic self-formation. The result is neither ontological nor methodological vitalism, but an epistemology of organicism which complements, rather than replaces, causal-mechanistic analysis.
This paper develops a relational perspective in the philosophy of chemistry. It argues that chemical entities should not be understood as self-subsistent substances endowed with fixed intrinsic properties, but as historically situated and processual realities whose identities emerge through networks of relations. These relations are not limited to intramolecular interactions, but also involve experimental practices, representational tools, technological infrastructures, environmental conditions, social uses, and temporal trajectories. Grounded in Whitehead's process philosophy and in contributions from Schummer, Bensaude-Vincent and Harr & eacute;, the paper proposes a threefold framework of relationality: ontological, epistemological, and socio-environ mental. At the ontological level, chemical substances are conceived as nodes in dynamic networks of reactivity and transformation; at the epistemological level, chemical knowledge is shown to depend on situated practices of modeling, experimentation, and representation; at the socio-environmental level, chemical entities acquire multiple modes of existence beyond the laboratory. The case of amphetamines illustrates how chemical substances are created, stabilized, circulated, and transformed within scientific, industrial, cultural, and ecological contexts. The paper concludes that a relational philosophy of chemistry offers a more adequate framework for understanding the contingency, plurality, and ethical implications of chemical entities in the world.
Network theory is a novel approach to mental disorders, conceptualising them as causal relationships between symptoms. Despite its extensive prevalence and the significant research that has been inspired by its core ideas, limited critical inquiry has been conducted to assess its explanatory power and theoretical coherence. This paper aims to address this gap by critically examining three theoretical assumptions endorsed by proponents of network theory: (1) mental disorders can be seen as mereological sums; (2) intentionality unlocks the causal role of symptoms; and (3) symptoms are linked in the same way causally. Our examination indicates that all three assumptions should be reframed or adjusted. Firstly, although the part-whole relationship can be construed as constitutive of mental disorders, it is not fully able to capture the nature of symptom relationships. Secondly, although the intentional contents of psychiatric symptoms provide explanatory value, theory advocates cannot affirm the unique causal role of intentional contents. Finally, the practice of a uniform causal relationship conceals an important distinction between how one symptom causally impacts another symptom. Symptoms can directly activate another symptom or indirectly lower its threshold value. We recommend that the network theory differentiates between structural causation and triggering causation in its network model.
This paper aims to shed light on an aspect of Kuhn's philosophy of science which has not received much attention, namely, the role of interpretation in science. We argue that in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn employs the notion of interpretation in the theoretical sense and claims that scientists routinely interpret observations and data during normal science, but emphatically denies that revolutionary science is interpretive in any way. In his later writings, he starts using it in the hermeneutical sense and holds that it is revolutionary rather than normal science that is hermeneutically interpretive. After we explain the differences and similarities between the two senses, we discuss the sources of this shift and its consequences for his mature philosophy. Understanding the role of interpretation in Kuhn's overall philosophy suggests a new line of research that can shed new light on his influence on the social sciences.
I propose a contextualised conception of proportionality, which requires bringing the concrete context of answering/raising a particular causal inference question into the picture when assessing proportionality. So, the new formula is this: a cause-variable C is proportional to an effect-variable E relative to a given context T. This conception is bolstered by a brief exposition of recent scientific practice in causal feature learning. Moreover, it gets further support by showing how it readily and elegantly resolves a threat posed by Franklin-Hall (2016. "High-Level Explanation and the Interventionist's 'Variables Problem'." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (2): 553-577). Finally, I discuss why my approach fares much better than some others.
In contemporary biology and philosophy of biology, there remains a lack of consensus regarding the nature of natural selection. Over recent decades, a wide variety of interpretations and approaches to natural selection have been proposed. In a recent paper, Wei (2024, "Natural Selection, Mechanism and Phenomenon." International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 37:37-50.) critically examines current mechanistic accounts of natural selection. For this purpose, he focuses on a particular aspect of the mechanistic approach: a mechanism is always a mechanism for a phenomenon. Wei introduces two criteria that the phenomenon assigned to natural selection should fulfil and, on this basis, evaluates phenomena previously considered. Contrary to P & eacute;rez-Gonz & aacute;lez and Luque (2019, "Evolutionary Causes as Mechanisms: A Critical Analysis." History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 41:13.), Wei argues that the increase in the frequency of fitter traits cannot be considered the phenomenon for which natural selection is responsible. The aim of this paper is to analyse and engage with Wei's critique. We contend that his arguments face significant challenges and do not substantially weaken the assignment of increasing the frequency of fitter traits.
There is an ongoing debate about how to understand the nature of natural selection, and one view holds that it can be characterised as a mechanism. Wei (2024) argues that this characterization is problematic, since it is difficult to attribute an appropriate phenomenon to natural selection. P & eacute;rez-Gonz & aacute;lez and Luque object to Wei's arguments and contend that they fail to challenge their proposal that natural selection is responsible for increasing reproductive success. In this paper, I reply to their critique and show that many of their objections rest on misinterpretations of Wei's original paper and are ultimately unconvincing.
The 'Sixth Report-Reproducibility and Research Integrity' (UK House of Commons Science, Innovation and Technology Committee 2023. 'Sixth Report-Reproducibility and Research Integrity') ('The Report') recommends measures designed to tackle an alleged 'reproducibility crisis' in scientific research. Our systematic analysis of the content of this report revealed that its findings and recommendations are consistent with the scientific literature, including the acknowledgement that conclusive evidence demonstrating the existence of a 'reproducibility crisis' is lacking. Though conceding that there is currently no way to determine the size of the crisis or whether it even exists, The Report nevertheless proposes actions to tackle the alleged crisis. However, without a quantitative understanding, the efficacy of the proposed measures cannot be verified. Hence, the current approach towards the alleged reproducibility crisis, here exemplified by The Report, does not adhere to the standards that would normally applied to the scientific method. An evidence-based approach requires the establishment of a quantitative understanding of whether data variability in the research literature exceeds technically achievable levels of reproducibility. If it does, the resulting understanding will enable the design of actions, whose success can be monitored. Our findings emphasise that the research environment requires the same level of rigour and scrutiny as the scientific experiments themselves.
This article compares the transformation of two distinct strands of twentieth century philosophy under two politically repressive regimes. It begins by presenting the suppression of the Lvov-Warsaw School by the Soviet regime. Then, it turns to the persecution of logical empiricists in the US during the McCarthy era. While Stalinist repression forced the philosophers into ideological conformity, McCarthyite pressures contributed to the depoliticisation of philosophy of science. In both cases, political repression distorted scientific priorities. It is argued that cases like these represent extreme forms of the central case of 'epistemic intimidation'.
This paper provides an historical exploration of the inception and evolution of sociophysics, by surveying the historical and methodological debate between determinism and indeterminism within the discipline. It specifically delves into Newton's scientific approach, from its theoretical underpinnings, to its practical applications to social and behavioural sciences. The aim is to assess whether its deterministic approach can effectively describe the interactions in complex social contexts despite the unpredictable nature of human behaviours. Lastly, it engages in the philosophical debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism, which defines the possibility of the existence of free will and individual responsibility, and has therefore fundamental repercussions, particularly from a sociological, behavioural and psychological perspectives. Taking into account the historical dimension of sociophysics, this approach aims to examine and address the fundamental philosophical challenges.
Maher [2004. "Bayesianism and Irrelevant Conjunction." Philosophy of Science, 71:515-520] attempts to resolve the paradox of irrelevant conjunction by arguing that the explicandum underlying the paradox is different from that of Bayesian confirmation theory. However, his solution remains inconclusive as he fails to specify the explicandum that underlies the paradox. In this article, we argue that pursuit worthy confirmation (pw-confirmation) is the explicandum in the case of the paradox. Given background information K, evidence E pw-confirms hypothesis H, meaning H is confirmed as being worthy of pursuit. When many find the confirmation of irrelevant conjunction unintuitive, their notion of confirmation is neither incremental confirmation (i-confirmation) nor absolute confirmation (a-confirmation), but rather pw-confirmation. Following & Scaron;e & scaron;elja, Kosolosky, and Stra ss er [2012. "Rationality of Scientific Reasoning in the Context of Pursuit: Drawing Appropriate Distinctions." Philosophica 86:51-82], the article distinguishes between two phases of pursuit worthiness and proposes a Bayesian definition for both phases. We demonstrate that irrelevant conjunctions are not eligible to be considered as candidates for initial pursuit. Often in practice, hypothesis testing can be conceived only as a part of a pursuit. Paradox is a conflation of two explicanda: i-confirmation and pw-confirmation. The standard Bayesian approach fails to tackle the paradox as it does not recognise pw-confirmation as a distinct category of confirmation. While developing a theory of pw-confirmation, we argue that a Bayesian definition of pw-confirmation can address some of the concerns Kuhn raises about scientific rationality.In addition to critically analyzing the standard Bayesian solution to the paradox, we also examine the limitations of Schurz [2022. "Tacking by Conjunction, Genuine Confirmation and Convergence to Certainty." European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12:1-18], Bandyopadhyay, Brittan, and Taper [2016. Belief, Evidence, and Uncertainty: Problems of Epistemic Inference. Springer], and Chandler [2007. "Solving the tacking problem with contrast classes." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58:489-502] solutions.
This essay will investigate the spatial ontology debate with regards to those quantum gravity theories that posit non-spatiotemporal elements from which spacetime emerges. Whereas substantivalism and relationism both fail to capture the ontology of these non-spatiotemporal theories, such as causal set theory or loop quantum gravity, the largely neglected property theory of space (spacetime) stands out as the best ontological classification, and it also accords with the standard ontological division into substances, properties, and relations. In addition, the property theory will be shown to offer advantages over other alternative approaches, such as structural realism or spacetime functionalism.
This paper examines the philosophical foundations of Goethe's morphological studies, in particular his concept of the 'archetypal plant', which can be described as the dynamic principle of a living surface that governs plant formation through alternating processes of expansion and contraction. The Austrian philosopher Rudolf Steiner claimed that Goethe's approach offers a scientifically grounded approach to understanding organic form and development through what may be termed empirically based, productive intellectual intuition, namely the mental reconstruction of an organism's formative principle and laws. Here it is shown that Goethe's rational organicism, as elaborated by Steiner, provides a conceptual and methodological framework that suggests a solution to the long-standing problem of understanding organismic properties like autopoiesis, autonomy and agency. Yet, Goethe struggled to identify a comparable principle for animals. Steiner argued that animal life is determined by a psychological principle-a non-physical centre of sensation and movement that structures the organism in relation to its environment-and that this, too, can be grasped in productive intuition. The paper reconstructs the animal archetype by delineating its essential features: the relations between its interior and exterior, realized in sensory, nutritive and motor functions. The study concludes that Goethe's rational organicism can server as a methodological complement to the organicism of the current philosophy of biology.
The making of mistakes by organisms and living systems generally is an underexplored way of conceptualising biology and organising experimental research. We set out an informal account of biological mistakes and why they should be taken seriously in biological investigation. We then give an indirect defence of their importance by applying the concept of mistake-making to three kinds of activity: timing, calculation, and communication. We give a range of examples to show that mistakes in these kinds of behaviour can be found across a diversity of scales and systems. We also suggest ideas for empirical research that naturally arise from these cases. The reality and potential for mistake-making across such a wide range of biological entities shows that it is not a purely human phenomenon. Getting it wrong seems to be central to biology as a whole, and to be a potentially productive organising principle for generating novel research questions and experimental hypotheses.
This paper argues for the following conditional: if mathematical intuitionism is a scientific revolution, then there is a world change. It contends that the intuitionistic mathematical revolution brings about an ontic world change. The paper presents examples of mathematical types and tokens that change within the intuitionistic mathematical revolution. It also addresses Michael Dummett's semantic view regarding the realism vs. anti-realism dispute in mathematics. Contrary to Dummett, I argue that the metaphysical realism vs. anti-realism dispute precedes the semantic one. Thus, the intuitionistic mathematical revolution cannot merely be a semantic revolution.
Primitivism about the direction of time is the thesis that the direction of time does not call for an explanation because it is a primitive posit in one's ontology. In the literature, primitivism has generally come with a substantival view of time according to which time is an independent substance. In this paper, we defend a new primitivist approach to the direction of time-relational primitivism. According to it, time is primitively directed because change is primitive. By relying on Leibnizian relationalism, we argue that a relational ontology of time must be able to distinguish between spatial relations and temporal relations to make sense of the distinction between variation and change. This distinction, however, requires the assumption of a primitive directionality of change, which ushers in the direction of time. Relational primitivism is attractive for those who want to avoid substantivalism about time but retain a primitive direction of time in a more parsimonious ontology.
A conflict between evidence for causation and the metaphysical requirement of spatiotemporal distinct causal relata arises if the results of experiments commonly described as 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' are taken to demonstrate ontological determination dependencies between parts and wholes or their respective behaviours. It has been argued that the problem can be circumvented if experimental results are interpreted in terms of relationships between variables measured and manipulated at separating scales. I argue that scale separation fails in the case of biological phenomena due to the small number of molecules and molecular events underlying these phenomena, which makes it impossible to completely disentangle micro and macro-scale behaviours. I defend instead a causal mediation interpretation according to which experiments assess the effects of interventions targeting the composition and exposure of biological systems. Under this interpretation, causal relata are ontologically distinct fractions or parts of biological systems, thus avoiding the oddity of part-whole causation.
This paper examines the philosophical discourse surrounding the role of models in bioinspired disciplines, focusing on biorobotics as a case study. I address the ongoing debate on the distinctions between 'model of' and 'model for' within the context of biomimetics, a field that seeks inspiration from nature to address different scientific and technological goals. I will develop the argument that in biorobotics it is quite impossible to indicate what a model per se is. Instead, a bio-inspired model, such as a robot, can be seen as a 'model for' or a 'model of', depending on the epistemic activity and scientific and technological game (in the sense of Wittgenstein) this is part of. By doing so, I contribute to the broader discussion on modelling practices as well as to exploring the epistemology of biomimetics. First, I outline biomimetics' peculiarities and address mimetic symmetry, the challenge of integrating bio-inspired technologies into biological systems. Second, I recall the distinction between 'model for' and 'model of'. Third, I examine biorobotics' modelling practices. Fourth, I explore the interconnection of 'model for' and 'model of' in biorobotics. Fifth, using the notion of technological game (Wittgenstein) and epistemic actions (Chang), I investigate reconsider the mimetic asymmetry problem.
