This paper employs the framework of "strategic asset-liability-toxic asset" and integrates sensitivity and vulnerability dimensions from interdependence theory to construct a strategic net return model. It examines the evolving structure of U.S. dependence on Taiwan and highlights Washington's shifting strategic evaluation. Since the Cold War, the United States has regarded Taiwan as a key strategic asset in its geopolitical and technological architecture, forming dependencies across security, politics, and economics. Entering the 2020s, China's rise and growing cross-Strait tensions have raised U.S. strategic maintenance costs, reduced marginal returns, and increased risk exposure, prompting a redefinition of Taiwan as a potential strategic liability. This paper observes that Washington has responded by promoting de-dependencization through supply chain reshoring, diversified military deployments, and strategic ambiguity-signaling an increased possibility of China and the United States compromising on the Taiwan issue and the risk of Taiwan falling into a passive position.
Since Donald Trump's return to the White House, his administration has introduced controversial domestic and foreign policies, particularly protectionist measures such as reciprocal tariffs, sparking debates on U.S.-China relations and alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. This article raises a central question: How is the United States, under Trump's leadership, accelerating the restructuring of the global political and economic order? Are these transformations contingent outcomes driven by individual leadership, or do they reflect deeper structural dynamics? It argues that these shifts extend beyond Trump's leadership style and reflect enduring structural forces. Despite its relative decline, the United States retains significant hegemonic power, with its strategic objective being the preservation of dominance. Washington's pressure on China and other states represents a preemptive adjustment to counter decline and reshape the international order in its favor. Thus, while Trump's leadership influences tactical decisions, structural forces are the primary drivers of U.S. policy shifts.
The necessity for defense cooperation between Korea and the United States and the policy demand for concluding an RDP Agreement are steadily increasing. However, concrete discussion and preparation for this remain insufficient. Addressing this issue, this study aims to identify the matters requiring prior discussion and preparation for the conclusion of an RDP Agreement, assess the impact on the legal and institutional framework, and suggest directions for its refinement. To this end, the study: 1) analyzed existing RDP Agreements through text-mining and clauseby-clause review to identify the provisions requiring review, 2) assessed the impact on Korea's laws and regulations, and 3) suggested directions for the improvement of the legal system. The research findings are as follows: First, the concluded RDP Agreements are categorized into four groups. Among these, Group 1 (Luxembourg, Italy, Poland, Finland, Czech, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Slovenia) was identified as the benchmark treaty templates group. Second, it was found that 46 provisions require review for the future conclusion of the RDP Agreement. Third, it was found that 46 provisions affect Korea's laws and regulations. Fourth, Korea's laws and regulations must be improved in a direction that implements the principle of "reciprocity" of the RDP Agreement while protecting Korea's defense industry ecosystem.
The intensifying technological competition between the United States and China has emerged as a defining feature of contemporary international relations, with profound implications for the global governance of emerging technologies. This study examines the fundamental ideological and structural differences between democratic and authoritarian approaches to Artificial Intelligence (AI) governance, analyzing how this competition shapes the formation of international norms, standards, and institutions. Drawing on regime theory and comparative institutional analysis, this research develops a systematic typology that distinguishes democratic AI governance models-characterized by multi-stakeholder participation, rights-based regulation, and transparency requirements-from authoritarian models that emphasize state-led development, sovereignty-based regulation, and centralized control. The study employs mixed methods combining qualitative content analysis of policy documents, comparative case studies of multilateral negotiations, and quantitative assessment of governance maturity indicators. Analysis of three critical cases-ISO/IEC AI standardization, UN Global Digital Compact negotiations, and OECD AI Principles development-reveals how ideological differences translate into competing institutional strategies. Findings demonstrate three major structural changes in global AI governance. The first is the shift from consensus-based to contested standard-setting processes, with the United States leveraging traditional technical organizations while China increases participation in alternative forums. The second is the fragmentation of regulatory approaches along democratic-authoritarian lines, reflected in divergent emphases on privacy protection versus state sovereignty. The third is the emergence of parallel cooperation mechanisms, as value-based coalitions supplement universal multilateral institutions.
This article examines the main trends and changes in Russian-Chinese economic relations following the outbreak of the full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine in 2022. The primary focus of this study is on the adaptation strategies of China and Russia to the new geopolitical and geoeconomic realities, particularly the development of legal frameworks for bilateral economic relations, the creation of mechanisms to circumvent sanctions, the management of currency risks, and the use of diverse financial instruments, among other aspects. The findings show that, despite the apparent deepening of economic cooperation in different areas, a significant imbalance persists between the two countries, which fosters growing mutual distrust and hampers further development of their relations.
In the context of intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition in the Indo- Pacific, the security of the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait are inextricably linked. A simultaneous two-front crisis in these subregions would pose a grave threat to regional stability, as China and North Korea could coordinate to exploit vulnerabilities in the United States and allied postures-triggering a "strategic balloon effect" that undermines deterrence. However, the current framework for trilateral security cooperation among the Republic of Korea (ROK), the United States, and Japan lacks both a pre-coordinated response mechanism and clear operational guidelines for managing concurrent contingencies. These structural gaps hinder the alliance network's ability to effectively deter or respond to a twofront crisis. While establishing a formal unified command structure, that includes the Korean Peninsula Theater and the Taiwan Strait Theater, remains politically and historically unfeasible, this paper proposes a "de facto one-theater" strategy to strengthen trilateral operational security cooperation without formal integration of theaters. This strategy focuses on diplomatic coordination to institutionalize a shared threat perception of a potential two-front crisis, conducting joint exercises tailored to simultaneous contingencies with a view to enhancing trilateral interoperability, and expanding multi-domain cooperation-particularly in nuclear, cyber, and space domains-to develop integrated operational capabilities. By advancing these measures under a de facto one-theater framework, the ROK, United States, and Japan can close critical response gaps, develop a coherent and unified response strategy, and establish a more credible deterrent posture against the growing threat of a coordinated two-front contingency in the Indo-Pacific.
India's space diplomacy has become a crucial component of its foreign policy, solidifying its role as a notable player in global geopolitics. Through its comprehensive space program, managed by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), India has forged vital alliances that foster regional and global collaboration. Initiatives such as the South Asia Satellite (SAS) and joint missions with other spacefaring nations demonstrate India's commitment to leveraging space technology for developmental and humanitarian purposes, enhancing its soft power. Although no national space law has been enacted in India, its growing influence features two notable aspects. First, India collaborates with developing and developed nations, improves its space governance, promotes capacity-building initiatives, and strengthens its strategic partnerships. Second, India's defense and security policies have evolved, particularly following its Anti-Satellite Tests (ASAT), which have created a potentially uncomfortable situation in the region. This study explores India's journey from soft power to global power and the changing dynamics in the region following the Indian ASAT test. The research offers recommendations, including bilateral agreements with China and Pakistan, and advocates for a legally binding treaty on ASATs to ensure peaceful space exploration.
Russo-Chinese military and security cooperation is grounded in their strategic partnership, with their perceptions of U.S. threats serving as the core driver of this deepening relationship. Since the 2014 Ukraine Crisis, Russia-facing Western sanctions and strategic isolation-has actively sought to strengthen its security collaboration with China. By contrast, China has adopted a flexible approach to cooperation, motivated by the need to counterbalance the United States while maintaining its strategic autonomy. This partnership, based on balance-of-threat considerations, has not only overridden mutual threat perceptions between Moscow and Beijing but also accelerated their strategic convergence. Since 2018, Russo-Chinese military and security cooperation has undergone a qualitative transformation. However, following the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War, divergences in expectations between the two sides have become increasingly apparent-Moscow tends to favor alliance-building to secure clearer support from Beijing, while Beijing prefers flexible alignment to avoid being drawn into Russia's conflicts. While the two states are expected to continue cooperating to counter the United States, their loose "quasi-alliance" structure and high degree of strategic autonomy remain sources of uncertainty. Although the scale and frequency of Russo-Chinese joint exercises in the Asia-Pacific have expanded markedly, Russia is unlikely to directly intervene in a Taiwan Strait contingency in the near term. Nevertheless, the deepening of cooperation in missile early warning, satellite navigation, and electronic warfare will enhance the People's Liberation Army's operational capabilities, posing potential challenges to Taiwan's security. Taiwan should closely monitor shifts in the threat perceptions of Russia and China toward the United States to assess future trends in their cooperation and to formulate appropriate response strategies.
After denuclearization, a question arises in an increasingly turbulent international environment: Can regional denuclearization be sustained? Established research, including studies on security assurances, rational transactions, and norm diffusion, does not systematically address this question. This study argues that achieved regional denuclearization is not static, but rather exhibits dynamic robustness. Since institutionalization processes typically accompany formal regional denuclearization, the institutional logic derived from the regional denuclearization regime provides a possible explanation for this dynamic robustness. Benefit projection and institutional competition are the two independent variables originating from the relevant actors and institutional environment dimensions, respectively. Benefit projection alters the legitimacy of the regional denuclearization regime, thereby influencing its lock-in effect on actors. Institutional competition alters the resilience of the institutional network centered on the regional denuclearization regime, thereby affecting the state of regional denuclearization norms within the regional nuclear order. Under the combined influence of these independent variables, regional denuclearization robustness manifests in four degrees. This study validates the hypotheses by analyzing the dynamics of denuclearization robustness in Southeast Asia and Central Asia after the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones.
The global defense supply chain is currently facing a series of significant challenges. These challenges can be attributed to several factors, including the escalating technological competition between the United States and China, the ongoing war in Ukraine, and the increasing prevalence of economic protectionist measures. In this rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape, South Korea has emerged as a significant actor by expanding its defense exports to member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This study explores how South Korea can enhance the stability and scalability of its defense supply chain through strategic cooperation with the alliance. The analysis employs the PMESII framework, which encompasses political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure factors. Two decision-making tools were applied to the research process. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was employed to ascertain the relative priority of the strategic elements, while the Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) method was utilized to identify the cause-and-effect relationships among them. The results indicate that while there are advantages, such as the rapid delivery capability of NATO standard-compliant weapon systems, there are still challenges, including dependence on foreign parts and the need to maintain diplomatic balance. In response, a strategic plan centered on diplomacy, intelligence, military preparedness, and economic support is proposed.
Since the inauguration of the Trump administration's second term in January 2025, a new normal in the international order has taken shape, leading to a level of global security uncertainty greater than at any point since the end of the Cold War. As the Ukraine war has shifted into a prolonged war of attrition lasting over three years, Russia-facing the limits of its war-sustaining capabilities-has signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with North Korea and has received North Korean troop deployments and large-scale military support. North Korea, by sending combat troops to the Russian Kursk front, has not only accumulated practical combat experience but also maximized its military benefits by verifying and improving the performance of its domestically developed advanced weapons systems. With North Korea's nuclear and conventional military threats, the variable alliance policies of the new U.S. administration, and changes in the nature of future warfare following the Ukraine war, the ROK military now faces multiple crises, making the establishment of effective response strategies an urgent task. Accordingly, this study explores the main features and implications of the Russia- Ukraine war-which has moved into an armistice negotiation phase following the inauguration of the Trump administration's second term-and proposes response strategies for the ROK military that reflect anticipated changes in the operational environment on the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea is intensifying its space development efforts, including satellite reconnaissance launches and the advancement of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology. Despite North Korea's assertion that its space development is for peaceful purposes, the international community considers it a military-oriented endeavor. This study defines "space militarization" not merely as the military use of space technology, but as a complex phenomenon that can serve both deterrent and provocative roles depending on the strategic context. To analyze this, we examine the phenomenon by exploring existing security dilemma theory, the offense-defense balance theory, and nuclear posture optimization models. We also consider the dual-use nature of satellite technology, which may contribute to deterrence stability while simultaneously increasing strategic ambiguity. We present four scenarios forecasting future security dilemmas on the Korean Peninsula. Our findings suggest that, although certain dual-use technologies may reduce misperception and support deterrence, the overall trend of North Korea's space militarization is likely to exacerbate the security dilemma. We recommend establishing global space governance and developing comprehensive space policies, laws, and institutions to effectively manage these emerging challenges.
Since the visit of U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in August 2022, China has intensified its military pressure on Taiwan. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has increased its presence around the Taiwan Strait's median line, and China has conducted multiple large-scale military exercises, such as Joint Sword 2023, Joint Sword 2024A, and Joint Sword 2024B. However, as demonstrated by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, despite China's military ambitions, logistical challenges and technological advances in warfare could complicate a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. Hence, several observers have speculated that these drills involving the PLA Navy and the Chinese Coast Guard in multiple operational zones are rehearsals for a de facto blockade of Taiwan. Nevertheless, the literature has rarely questioned whether such a strategy is truly low-cost and effective for China and has often assumed that a de facto blockade would be enforced. By contrast, the present study examined the challenges, vulnerabilities, and regional implications of such a de facto blockade strategy for China, addressing its feasibility in cross-strait competition. This study argues that a Chinese blockade would pose considerable economic, operational, political, military, and legal challenges and could rapidly escalate to war.
In the situation of the deployment of North Korean troops to the Russo-Ukrainian War and the subsequent capture of North Korean soldiers by Ukrainian forces, this research raises important questions about the future of North Korean soldiers, particularly those who have expressed a desire to seek asylum. The study explores the implications of international humanitarian law, concluding that North Korean soldiers qualify as lawful combatants and, if captured, would be classified as prisoners of war (POWs). In addition, the research argues that forcibly repatriating these POWs to North Korea would contravene the principle of non-refoulement, as such an action would expose them to potential human rights violations upon return. As a result, this research emphasizes the importance of respecting the free will of North Korean POWs and asserts their eligibility for refugee status, unless they fall within the exclusion clauses of the 1951 Refugee Convention. With North Korea's formal acknowledgment of its troops' deployment to the conflict, the issue of North Korean POW repatriation is entering a new phase. The research calls for the international community to prioritize human rights over political considerations when addressing the fate of North Korean POWs, advocating for policies that respect their free will and right to asylum.
This study provides quantitative content analysis of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea, signed in 2024, and its military implications. The study argues that, although the treaty was formally proclaimed as a comprehensive strategic partnership, its content has clearly gravitated toward a military and security cooperation agenda. In turn, this cooperation has been underpinned by extensive military rapprochement that was ignited by the war in Ukraine, fundamentally constitutes the partnership's essence and independent basis, operating as a direct manifestation of power maximization and security competition. While the public discourse has largely fixated on the treaty's mutual defense clause, a holistic textual analysis reveals that the entire document is designed to codify and institutionalize a comprehensive military framework. To properly understand the motivations behind the treaty, one should look beyond the declared rhetoric of "strategic partnership" that is just a diplomatic facade. The rapprochement between Russia and North Korea is best understood through the lens of offensive realism as a product of a cold and pragmatic strategic calculus.
This study explores strategies to enhance South Korea's Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) within the context of the evolving geopolitical landscape and the "New Space Era." By analyzing the MDA policies of the United States, Japan, China, India, and Singapore, the research identifies best practices in governance, technological integration, and operational mechanisms. Key findings highlight the importance of satellite-based technologies, centralized data fusion, and multilateral cooperation. The study emphasizes tailored approaches for South Korea, reflecting its unique security challenges, including contested waters, illegal fishing, and regional power dynamics. While the small-N case study methodology provides valuable insights, it limits generalizability, underscoring the need for future research employing large-N statistical analyses. Detailed, policy-focused studies are recommended to operationalize findings and strengthen South Korea's MDA framework for sustainable maritime security and regional stability.
Although the concept of a stabilizer is frequently referred to in the study of international political economy and hegemonic stability theory, its broader conceptualization across the realm of international relations is yet to be fully explored. This study addresses the theoretical underdevelopment of this concept, in particular in terms of its limited capacity to account for the diverse ways stabilizers manifest in global politics. To increase the conceptual clarity and analytical utility of the stabilizer, this paper defines its essential characteristics, identifying key actors in a stabilizer, delineating its core functions, and specifying its operative conditions. To substantiate this framework, this study presents case analyses that involve hegemonic powers, middle-tier powers, and lesser states. First, this study demonstrates that the United States has maintained its global hegemony primarily through its military and economic power while it simultaneously performs the role of a hegemonic stabilizer at both the global and regional levels through managing the balance of power and balance of threat dynamics and by exercising multiple deterrence strategies. It examines the ways that middle-tier and lesser powers contribute to stability by means of strategic diplomacy, normative leadership, and regional mediation. With this analysis, the paper broadens the theoretical and empirical understanding of the stabilizing agency in international relations.
This study examines how Kim Yo-jong's official statements function as strategic instruments in North Korea's statecraft, shaping foreign policy toward the United States and South Korea. By analyzing a corpus of 52 statements (March 2020- November 2024) through semantic network analysis, the research maps the cooccurrence of key terms to identify shifts in Pyongyang's diplomatic rhetoric across different leadership contexts. The methodology combines quantitative text analysis-measuring term frequency, centrality, and clusters-with qualitative interpretation of political signals, offering a novel approach at the intersection of data analytics and security studies. The findings reveal distinct rhetorical phases corresponding to changes in the United States and South Korean administrations. During the Trump-Moon period, Kim Yo-jong's discourse blended conciliatory overtures (emphasizing "peace," "agreement," and "dialogue") with sharp warnings, reflecting a strategy of conditional engagement. In contrast, under the Biden-Yoon period, her statements converged into a predominantly adversarial narrative, emphasizing security threats, sanctions, and military deterrence. Notably, personalized references to U.S. leadership (e.g., mentions of President Trump) virtually disappeared, replaced by intense criticism of the Yoon government in Seoul-signaling a tactical pivot to target South Korea as the primary adversary when direct U.S. engagement waned. These rhetorical shifts underscore that Kim Yo-jong's public statements are deliberate barometers of North Korea's strategic priorities, aligning messaging with the regime's evolving security concerns and diplomatic objectives. Consequently, this research highlights the value of monitoring North Korea's official rhetoric as an early-warning tool for defense analysts and policymakers. Understanding the semantic patterns in Kim Yo-jong's statements can inform more calibrated diplomatic and deterrence strategies by revealing Pyongyang's shifting focus and red lines. Finally, by textually mining a total of 52 statements issued over the past five years, beginning with Kim Yo-jong's initial remarks toward the end of Trump's first term, this study aims to uncover security-related strategic insights into North Korea's future policies toward South Korea and the United States.
This study examines Russia's strategic use of food resources as instruments of its hybrid warfare and economic statecraft targeting Ukraine and the West. To trace the origins and evolution of Russian food warfare, this article analyzes Putin's food security strategy in conjunction with five key tactical components: food embargoes, legalized food security policy, grain deal, food weaponization campaigns, and grain diplomacy. Over the past decade, amid Western sanctions and the Russia- Ukraine War, Putin's global food power narrative and accompanying strategies have sought to strengthen Russia's food self-sufficiency, while expanding its geopolitical influence through food trade and aid. This study highlights how the Russian authoritarian regime legitimizes its economic statecraft through food, positioning it as a strategic asset to consolidate domestic control and cultivate external alliances with other authoritarian states.
The need for defense cooperation between South Korea and Japan has recently gained emphasis, driven by a shared recognition of common threats, such as North Korea's nuclear missile provocations and China's attempts to change the status quo. However, despite this shared understanding of shared threats, the respective geostrategic environments surrounding the two countries and their political dynamics are likely to pose substantial obstacles to bilateral cooperation. To address these challenges, this study proposes a functional and incremental cooperation approach. Functional cooperation represents a realistic alternative for two countries to institutionalize a quasi-alliance structure aligned with their alliance with the United States. Even in the absence of favorable conditions and without a formal alliance, it enables collective deterrence between two nations with a history of adversity. Policy commitment to such bilateral cooperation is a critical factor in fostering a stable security environment in the region in the future.
