In recent decades, there has been a return of the myth, both as a renewed work on it and as a religious recovery. This return has surpassed demythologization, highlighting the power of mythical images and narratives. However, this entails risks, such as the return to dogmatisms and fundamentalisms. Today, there is therefore a tendency towards remythologization, which, after overcoming demythologization, delivers us to the power of images and narratives in a naive way. This phenomenon occurs in parallel with the failure of secularization and the return of religions to the world stage. Paradoxically, it is science and technological progress that become new myths, offering us a new narrative and nourishing our imagination. This essay offers a philosophical analysis of the contemporary myth of Artificial Intelligence.
The idea of demythologization seems obsolete today. Contrary to what seems to be an established fact, in this paper I aim to argue that what Bultmann called Entmythologisierung continues to point to a fruitful theoretical project. However, this implies two further theses: a) the possibility of fully valorizing demythologization as a conceptual resource requires that it be solidly situated on the Heideggerian ground from which, in a more or less direct way, it comes; b) the way Heidegger understands the relationship between philosophy and theology, centered on the idea of Korrektion, must itself be 'corrected' in some of its fundamental points.
Myth, even where it is not sought after nostalgically, enthusiastically or romantically-blindly and naively or dogmatically, in the spirit of reaction and counter-Enlightenment-offers in its essence and structure more of the same old, same old, prone as it is to indefinite repetition, a return of the irrepressible, of mimesis and mimicry. This may well be its enduring lesson. Myth, therefore, stands in need not only of scholarly inquiry-just as demythologizing philosophy and, no less crucially, theology or, indeed, politics, is an ongoing and, at moments, increasingly urgent task-it must also and, perhaps, far more deeply and widely be constantly probed, that is, tested and contested. As such, the ever-renewed "attempt at a mythology" forms rather than informs thought and human agency. Myth is the latter's timeless foil and perennial temptation, rather than its fundamental origin and ultimate telos.
This article aims to demonstrate that Bultmann's demythologisation efforts are not sparked by the historical context determined by science and technic, but rooted more deeply into a unique concept of truth-one which is at play in the Old Testament. Since this concept cannot be reduced to scientific objectivity or philosophical elucidation, the idea whereby demythologisation is a theological transposition of Heideggerian destruction is called into question.
The paper explores the continuing relevance of demythologization (Entmythologisierung) for contemporary theology and society. Building on the work of Rudolf Bultmann, the author shows how demythologization not only remains a core hermeneutical approach within theology, but also acquires strong political significance in an era shaped by digitalization, new forms of mythmaking (e.g., conspiracy theories), and a shifting role of religious discourse. This analysis highlights the necessity of a "theo-political" engagement that defends truth and responsibility in the public sphere.
The thematic and problematic binomial science/myth occupies an important place within the first historical formulation of the demythologising project and in the historical-exegetical, philosophical and theological debates that were provoked by this project. This contribution aims to revisit the theme from an essentially theoretical perspective. It begins by proposing an interpretation of scientific research and its technological outcomes in terms of a special expression of human existential engagement within the physical-naturalistic and socio-cultural scenarios within which the human adventure unfolds. An understanding of myth is then developed as one of the itineraries through which human beings attempt to confront the mystery that unfolds when the question of the global sense of the human condition is radically posed. Finally, various modes of approaching myth are analysed, such as the demythologising and the phenomenological-hermeneutical. A quick reflection on the theme of revelation concludes the discourse.
The essay poses the question of the demythization of science starting from the confrontation between Castelli and Bultmann in the early 1960s at the start of the Roman Colloquia on Demythization. Bultmann argues that modern science has demythologized the facts narrated in the Bible and imposes a new interpretation of the meaning of the kerygma. Castelli opposes the idea of the connection between kerygma and historicity of the facts narrated and interprets demythization as a conditioning by science on the rhythms of life. It is on this latter aspect that future demythization must be realized. In the second part of the essay, the question of the demythization of science is posed from the phenomenon of science denialism: the existential dimension as an identity factor that conditions the acceptance of scientific truths, conspiracy as a surrogate for lost narrative identities, and the recovery of trust as an antidote to denialism repropose elements of that confrontation.
The article defends the thesis of a similarity between Primo Levi and Emmanuel Levinas about three important themes: 1. both authors consider Greek science and philosophy and Biblical religion as the main sources, to which they give universal validity, of our Western culture; 2. both authors underline the primacy of ethics, grounded in prophecy, over the knowledge of nature and the meditation on being, grounded in human reason alone; 3. both authors think that science and philosophy, if detached from the prophetical ethics, run the risk of becoming productions of a mythical imagination, which does not make any distinction between nature and spirit, God and history, phenomena and noumena. The article analyzes these three themes in Primo Levi's writings. The conclusion points out how a thinking which intends to unify religion and philosophy, Jerusalem and Athens, should take on a narrative style (which includes the vocatives) and at the same time a non-subjectivistic form.
The essay offers a new perspective on Barth's Romerbrief. It aims to challenge interpretations that consider this work secondary (or even unsuccessful) within the entirety of Barth's thought, especially when compared to the accomplished structure of his Dogmatik. The article scrutinizes Barth's critique of the analogia entis in the Dogmatik to reveal how, in the Romerbrief, Barth addresses the more fundamental question of being-in-the-world and explores the connection between the Seinsfrage and Revelation.
This contribution proposes a discussion on the anthropological factors - emotional and cognitive - that hinder the adoption of suitable and effective responses to the threat that climate change poses to the present and especially future health and human condition. In other words, it reflects on what Amitav Ghosh has called the great blindness and which we could describe in terms of an inadequate perception of the radical threat to future generations that results in the omission of a duty to them. The reasons for this failure to recognise this lie not so much in the intrinsic characteristics of the threat - the certain but indeterminate nature of the long-term outcomes of the phenomenon, the enormity of the effects, etc. - but rather, on the one hand, in the fact that the threat is a threat to the future generations, and on the other hand, in the fact that it is a threat to the future generations. - but rather, on the one hand, in the emotional and cognitive distortions stemming from the costs (in terms of consumption and freedom) that combating climate change would force us to bear; on the other, in a difficulty in imagining realistic and comprehensive solutions to the problem that translates into denial.
In this paper, I aim to investigate the nuanced role that writing, i.e. the act of articulating and conveying arguments and concepts through textual communication, plays within Kant's philosophy, particularly in shaping the concept of philosophy and elaborating ways to participate in it. Central to my argument is the assertion that the issue of writing stands as a linchpin for comprehending the exceptionalism inherent in philosophy: the way in which inquiry in philosophy is somehow epistemologically different from inquiry in other disciplines. I show how such a specificity is inextricably intertwined with the ways philosophy is (not) learnt. By scrutinizing Kant's project to substantiate philosophy's capacity to foster freedom, I contend that a comprehensive exploration of the role of writing is imperative. Through this lens, the interplay between dichotomous concepts - private/public, scholastic/cosmic, and Bildung /science - emerges as pivotal in elucidating philosophy's exceptional- ism and showing how it is linked to the broader Enlightenment-era inquiry concerning participation in critical, emancipatory endeavours.
Interweaving hazards in environmental crises can be framed as a wicked problem as well as an opportunity for the interdisciplinary contribution of philosophical analysis on risk. Due to nonlinear mechanisms and contextual variations, this shows the importance of inquiring about contrasting assessments of vulnerability and the demand for comprehensive collective actions in coping with climate risks. The article examines how to address overlapping ecological and social risks, focusing on decision-making in the context of local energy transition projects through the lens of collective epistemic responsibility. By analyzing disciplinary accounts and exploring the links between assessment and decision-making further research directions for collective risk prevention strategies will be outlined, and some implications for interdisciplinary investigation on risk and expertise will be sketched.
Risk increasingly permeates technology regulation, as exemplified by the EU's General Data Protection Regulation and Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act. Nonetheless, contrary to common distinctions between an objective stage of risk assessment and a normative one of risk management, I argue that risk governance is normative throughout; hence, it should accordingly integrate normative considerations. To achieve this integration, this paper adopts a normative perspective on AI risk governance in particular. It examines AI-induced risk from the dominant approach of consequentialism, highlighting its limitations in conditions of uncertainty. It suggests virtue ethics as an alternative yet overlooked approach to AI-induced risk and concludes with implications of this approach for research, policy and practice.
Chaos and entropy are critical concepts for understanding our contemporaneity. Instead of the necessity and pre-stabilised harmony of the cosmos and the world, on which classical and modern metaphysics still rest, everything << collapses >>, becomes << curved >>, and evaporates in << black holes >>; only event horizons remain from an astrophysical point of view. The assessment of the risk of action corresponds to contemporary philosophical theories of probabilism, which have become scientifically binding and indelible in the media. Probability became the basic word for the expectation of the coming future as a risky event in the meteorological discourse of storm and hurricane forecasters, only after which does so-called nice weather follow. In this article, the author tries to articulate the fundamental assumption that the technosphere as autopoiesis becomes, at the same time, a matrix of new action in the system and environment of human-non-human communication and a model for the possible management of chaos, contingency, and technological singularity as the main concepts of contemporaneity.
In recent decades, discussion about "risk society" has been allotted considerable attention both in studies and among the critically minded public. This article examines risk society in terms of a totalizing society-power of a social subjectivity that erases the world horizon and proves to be nihilistic in its empowerment. Society, as self-establishing, not only follows the course of modernity, which in its unrelenting drifting gets nowhere but also, within its own totalization, risks anticipation of the same. In this connection, the notions of "reflexive modernisation" in Ulrich Beck, of "liquid modernity" in Zygmunt Bauman, and of the "self-production of social systems" in Niklas Luhmann have been particularly adopted for critical discussion. "Risk society" as an "operational concept" presupposes the apparatus of ecosociology, which links eco-nomics, eco-logy and eco-technology and has taken over the executive function of control, so that everything has the power to function.
The algorithmic turn has given rise to high-performance image generation systems (artificial images, deepfakes, fake images). This scenario is intertwined with the risks, dangers and threats posed by these systems, as well as the uncertainty surrounding their consequences for individuals and society as a whole. Bias, loss of control over one's own data, identity theft, opacity about data use, are just a few emerging ethical issues. Public ethics strategies can play a crucial role in guiding public opinion and citizenship towards awareness and co-responsibility, among all stakeholders from creators to governments (which must implement specific regulations) to users. Such strategies aim to mitigate the uncertainty and fear that these risks cause in individuals, equipping them to become more informed and critical in their engagement with these technologies.
Traditionally, adolescence has always been associated with a culture of risk. Nowadays, the Internet has radically changed the contexts, opportunities, and ways of expressing risk. In literature we find many studies discussing the assumption of risky behaviors on social media from a cognitive-behavioral point of view, but we lack a suitable conceptual framework to analyze it. In addition, a philosophical reading is also important in order to design an ethical training pragmatics. This analysis is complex, as risk is ambivalent and always refers back to uncertainty. Furthermore, as Verbeek argues, digital platforms are not simple tools, but have become means through which the subjective perceptive experience is created and mediated, with important ethical implications. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to investigate the expressions and meanings of risk exhibited online and how social media responds to the relationship between risk and uncertainty. The final objective is to understand how social media changes the perspective we take on moral responsibility and its impact in relation to new generations. Not only do we need to question whether social networking technologies are inherently moral or immoral because of the political significance we attach to them, but we also need to reconsider how we understand and define our own moral sensibilities. Technologies mediate not only our perceptions, but also our praxis, introducing a novel set of considerations to the question of morality that animates the study of technology and its effect on our lives. We are at a turning point if we want to continue "being human in an Hyperconnected era".
The aim of the research proposed here is a phenomenological informed diagnosis of the way in which authoritative economic theories understand risk and how their way of understanding risk relates to the notion of an open future. Inasmuch as the future appears as a phenomenon that involves risk, it is essentially related to the persistence of uncertainty. In the light of the claim to certainty that informs the economic approach to risk the conceptualisation of the future is particularly delicate. Risk, in its essential reference to the future, is configured as a motive for investment, transaction and credit. Thus, in the context of economic theories, the future is conceived through probability calculations cited by order of preference, thanks to which future risk is anticipated. However, we must be clear about the following circumstance: by translating the risk of a present future into the certainty of a future present, these calculations mask the risk associated with economic decisions, and, consequently, the essence of the future itself. In this way, they create an image that is stated in terms of purely fictitious certainties, and thus, in the final analysis, they create a fictitious future, which ends in a set of computable risk. In other words, replacing the uncertainty of the present future with the certainty of a calculable future present amounts to the abolition of the future itself and consequently to criticalities at the heart of modern economic science that result in an unpreparedness of economic theories to inhabit an evolving risk -landscape.
