Abstract In this paper, I argue for a revised account of two fundamental conceptual structures in late antique Platonism: the scale of virtues ( βαθμοί τῶν ἀρετῶν ) and the scale of inspired madness ( βαθμοί τῶν μανίων ). Both structures are invoked by Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonists between the 5th-6th centuries CE , serving to organize discussions of ethics and epistemology, metaphysics, hagiography, and reading curricula. I focus on apparently contradictory evidence for the highest tiers of the scale of virtues, as well as its relationship to the inspirations or maniai , drawing on Hermias ( c .410-450 CE ), Damascius ( c .462-after 538 CE ), and Olympiodorus ( c .500-after 565 CE ). While many interpreters have reasonably found these latter testimonies irreconcilable, I argue that all three witnesses share a consistent view with one another and with Proclus (412-485 CE ). I conclude that the stages of virtue and inspiration may be pictured as parallel scales, which transform the human soul ( psychē ) in comparable ways, although inspiration reaches further. The Porphyrian sage might be compared to a painter, alternating attention between her intelligible model ( paradeigma ) and the ‘canvas’ of her habits, in order to adapt the latter to the former. The post-Iamblichean sage strives to act in the very moment that she receives intelligible illumination, like a dancer moving to the music of inspiration.
Abstract This article examines the function of disgust in Plato’s Laws and Republic , through two examples—the story of Leontius in the Republic and the description of ignoble comic dance in the Laws . It argues that disgust is an aesthetic (in the sense of αἴσθησις , sensory perception) and moral phenomenon, which is crucial to the Laws ’ and Republic ’s accounts of human motivation, self-control, and virtue. Specifically, disgust functions as a method of social and political control. This is possible because both dialogues view attraction and repulsion as reactions to what we love and hate, and aesthetics and ethics as fundamentally intertwined—every musical tune, dance step, word, and theatrical performance makes an ethical statement. Therefore, to educate citizens in virtue, they must experience, and learn to love, morally good art. Scholarship tends towards intellectualising this mimetic relationship, suggesting that after children are capable of reasoning about what is right, wrong, beautiful, and ugly, such reasoning takes priority in our judgements—we know what is good, so we love it, and find it beautiful. However, this view underplays the continued importance of aesthetic reactions throughout human life, and specifically the role of less pleasant aesthetic reactions, like disgust. As embodied, rational creatures, our reactions and judgements are determined and guided by reason and aesthetic impressions. This article proposes that, as a powerful psycho-physiological response, disgust is a critical tool of aesthetic and so moral boundary-reinforcement. Central to this argument is Plato’s consistent use of terms like ἀηδής and δυσχέρεια , which both convey visceral repulsion and moral rejection of their objects.
In this study, we aim to analyze the notions of "pragmatic" and "commatic" we encounter in what we highlight to be a process of canonization of style appropriate to each content and theological level since Porphyry. This research is divided into three parts: primarily, we investigate the sense in which the Neoplatonists use the adjective "commatic", which includes on the one hand (i) defining what the Neoplatonists mean by "unity of meaning", and on the other hand distinguishing between a "woven" and continuous style and a "disjointed" and broken style, collecting the stylistic criticisms made by the Neoplatonists of the ancient texts; then (2) we seek to establish the areas of application of the "commatic" style in Neoplatonic discourse, distinguishing on the one hand inspired and ethical discourse, and on the other hand clear and sharp dialectical discourse, bordering on that which eludes philosophical demonstration, namely, the alpha sigma alpha phi epsilon iota alpha; finally (3), we aim to study the "pragmatic" style associated with each theological content in order to highlight its corresponding style and vocabulary. The present research stems from the need to show how behind the lexical and structural choices of the Neoplatonic writings there is a precise theory of style, produced by a process of aesthetic canonization that emerges clearly as early as Porphyry's rhetorical fragments and from Neoplatonic exegetical activity on rhetorical works, as well as from an innumerable amount of references to a rhetorical tradition on the period and its parts, the commata and cola, which the Neoplatonists, as this study aims to show, master and apply on their own structuring and formalization of theological content.
The purpose of this paper is i) to focus on the last section of the In Parmenidem, analyzing Proclus' reflection on the relationship between the First God and what he calls the "axioms of contradiction", accompanied by an attempt to harmonize in a subordinate sense the Aristotelian perspective with the Platonic one; 2) to analyze the reception of this idea in Nicholas of Cusa, the first Latin author to be systematically influenced by the In Parmenidem. It will be possible to show how Cusanus develops a perspective that, on the one hand, finds its explicit antecedent in Proclus and, on the other, how he radicalizes Proclus' perspective, developing theoretical tensions that we can find unsystematically in Proclus' own thought. Proclus is aware that the Principle of all reality and of science itself must be conceived as in itself unknowable. At the same time, he seeks to save the ability of human knowledge to describe reality. Starting from an idea of the relationship between God and the laws of contradiction close to that of Proclus, Cusanus develops an epistemology that, on the one hand, recognizes the principle of contradiction as the ultimate principle of reason and, on the other hand, comes to the conclusion of a separation between thought and reality outside thought.
The purpose of this paper is to re-evaluate the position and role of Plato's Charmides by analysing its second part. In this section, Critias tries to explain s8phrosun & ecirc; as a form of knowledge that is self-referential in the sense that it is a type of knowledge of all other forms of knowledge without being knowledge of the objects of those other forms. Plato remains doubtful about the feasibility and usefulness of such a concept, as he believes that all types of knowledge must be about something else, separate from the forms of knowledge themselves. He also thinks that such formal knowledge, if it indeed exists, is of little interest. This paper also aims to demonstrate that the Charmides belongs to a group of dialogues in which Plato discusses other people's proposals, similar to what happens in the Theaetetus. In the case of the Charmides, this is very likely the project that we will later see developed in Aristotle's PosteriorAnalytics.
This article suggests a novel approach to the study of the argumentative structure of Proclus' Elements of Theology (ET). Instead of studying it through the prism of the Elements of Euclid (EG), this novel approach proposes an evaluation of ET's argumentative structure based on Proclus' reflections about the genre of stoichei & ocirc;sis and the methods of dialectic and geometry. Thus, I argue that studies under the suggested form of evaluation should standardize the conceptual framework of their analyses about the features of ET's argumentative structure, explicating their relevance for the interpretation of the text's system of logical relations. Moreover, this article presents some examples of editorial enhancements made by editors of ET clarifying the argumentative structure of the text. With these examples, I will show how these enhancements help us clarify the argumentative structure of ET.
This article discusses the problem of the ineffable in Damascius’ treatises De principiis and In Parmenidem . I argue that the ineffable—which is the ultimate principle proposed by Damascius—is also the theme that underlies the whole frame of the reality, in his perspective. Each level of reality that he discusses comes into play on the background of the original attempt to suggest the ineffable principle. Each of them—One, unified, soul, material forms, matter and sensible realm—tries to approximate and suggest the previous level and thus, eventually, the ineffable itself. Consequently, each level of reality develops its own degree of ineffability, and therefore presents itself to our mind in an aporetical manner. It is impossible for our mind to reveal in an exhaustive and noncontradictory fashion even the levels closest to us. The aporiai that are specific for every part of reality are eventually consequences of the original aporia of an absolute and unique principle that governs everything.
The concept of friendship in the ancient world was an important one to Suzanne Stern-Gillet. In her review of Penner and Rowes’ study, Plato’s Lysis , she suggests that the best way to understand the Lysis is to take a step-by-step reading of the dialogue. Only in reading each stage of Plato’s argument can one understand Plato’s point: she says, “a Platonic dialogue is not a series of discrete arguments, as analytic interpreters still too often tend to assume, but a unitary and sustained piece of reasoning which is all of a piece with the literary vehicle in which it is presented.” This paper will look at the dialogue in parts—analyzing each section of the work—in order to understand Plato’s point on friendship. For, it seems that the difficulty in reading the work lies in uncovering the Lysis ’ sophisticated dramatic unity as well as interpreting the conclusion of the dialogue in context, where Socrates proclaims to have made no progress in understanding the nature of friendship. It is this final aporia , as well as Socrates’s statement early in the dialogue that he has never had a friend at all, that makes finding a positive statement on friendship so difficult. Is the Lysis a discussion of friendship in human life or is it a conversation about friendship which draws us to an even higher form of friendship? It seems that the Lysis is a dialogue on eros , of which philia is one kind. The key to understanding the force of philia is in the relationship between knowledge and desire.
When Odysseus makes his trip to meet the souls of the famous dead, he encounters the “shade of Heracles,” while “Heracles himself” is dining with the gods. This passage has inspired many poets and philosophers. A notable case is Plotinus who generally uses the term eidôlon along with other terms to define the “image of the soul” which is responsible for basic forms of ensoulment. The Homeric passage complicates matters: “Heracles himself” stands for the so-called undescended soul, but the “shade of Heracles” seems to encompass more than the lower forms of ensoulment—the eidôlon of Heracles thinks, remembers and talks. Plotinus’ take on the story is unique. Instead of allegorizing the story in a general fashion, he seems driven to explain all its details, not from some general need for exegesis but because these challenge his ideas on the undescended soul, the image of the soul and the concept of self.
This paper concerns the translation of Plato’s Palinode and in particular, Phaedrus 247d8-e1, where the soul is said to see and feast upon the Forms of Justice, Temperance, and Knowledge. The paper looks forward to the passage’s reception as revealed in Plotinus’ expanded contemplation of it in Ennead V .8, On Intelligible Beauty , and then in Ficino’s subsequent translation of and Commentarium on the Phaedrus , the final versions of which were published after Ficino’s translations of the Enneads . Both of these Neoplatonist philosophers understood the Hyperouranian topos , site of the soul’s encounter with the Forms, as a contemplative landscape, wherein the mind, that is, the soul, as a knowing subject, comes to rest in its object, the Form, realizing its unity with this object by discovering the very ground of the soul, namely Nous, or Intellect. The soul, in Plotinus’ parlance, reverts to ( epistrephetai ) intellect ( nous ), thereby discovering its deeper or truer identity. The intellect, from the viewpoint of Plotinus, is a One-Many, a unity that contains within itself and as itself, the Forms, the real beings, which it eternally contemplates. For Plotinus and for Ficino after him, the erotic longing of the soul for beauty is also a path to self-knowledge, as the soul discovers true beauty within itself. In this paper, we advocate for a reading of Plato’s Phaedrus that can be said to navigate the reader toward such a search for intelligible beauty, namely, within him or herself. The paper builds on Suzanne Stern-Gillet’s work, especially her studies of Plotinus’ own treatment of Plato’s Phaedrus . In particular, her essay, one of the last studies she authored, “The double Hamartia of the Soul IV 8 [6] 5.14-37,” spurred our own meditations on Plotinus’ readings of Plato’s Palinode in the Phaedrus .
This article challenges some common modern conceptions of Plotinus’ ethics and suggests a more positive view on the basis of an ancient paradigm of self-relatedness that runs from Plato through Aristotle to Plotinus with different emphases in each, but that is often misunderstood. Following Stern-Gillet’s rejection of some modern views that Plotinus’ ethics is egoistical, impractical, and world renouncing, we argue that while self-directedness is primary in the ancient tradition, there flows from this an intrinsic correlation between self-directedness and care for others. Negative views of Plotinus' ethics do not take account of Plotinus’ understanding of energeia or activity which pre-includes praxis and transforms external action into focused energeia . In other words, self-relatedness in the context of divine inspiration, as in Socrates’ second speech in Plato’s Phaedrus , is for Plotinus a psycho-somatic activity, but rooted in the psyche and in principle intelligible, genuinely capable of unifying intelligible and sensible in a form that can be really attentive to both practical and contemplative concerns simultaneously. From this perspective, Plotinus’ ethics includes not only care of the self and others, but also, we maintain, broader ecological and cosmic concerns.
When Odysseus makes his trip to meet the souls of the famous dead, he encounters the "shade of Heracles," while "Heracles himself" is dining with the gods. This passage has inspired many poets and philosophers. A notable case is Plotinus who generally uses the term eid6lon along with other terms to define the "image of the soul" which is responsible for basic forms of ensoulment. The Homeric passage complicates matters: "Heracles himself" stands for the so-called undescended soul, but the "shade of Heracles" seems to encompass more than the lower forms of ensoulment the eid6lon of Heracles thinks, remembers and talks. Plotinus' take on the story is unique. Instead of allegorizing the story in a general fashion, he seems driven to explain all its details, not from some general need for exegesis but because these challenge his ideas on the undescended soul, the image of the soul and the concept of self.
This article challenges some common modern conceptions of Plotinus' ethics and suggests a more positive view on the basis of an ancient paradigm of self-relatedness that runs from Plato through Aristotle to Plotinus with different emphases in each, but that is often misunderstood. Following Stern-Gillet's rejection of some modern views that Plotinus' ethics is egoistical, impractical, and world renouncing, we argue that while self-directedness is primary in the ancient tradition, there flows from this an intrinsic correlation between self-directedness and care for others. Negative views of Plotinus' ethics do not take account of Plotinus' understanding of energeia or activity which pre-includes praxis and transforms external action into focused energeia. In other words, self-relatedness in the context of divine inspiration, as in Socrates' second speech in Plato's Phaedrus, is for Plotinus a psycho-somatic activity, but rooted in the psyche and in principle intelligible, genuinely capable of unifying intelligible and sensible in a form that can be really attentive to both practical and contemplative concerns simultaneously. From this perspective, Plotinus' ethics includes not only care of the self and others, but also, we maintain, broader ecological and cosmic concerns.
Although the text of this argument seems to present itself as a tight logical argument, it has what we might call dangling threads. Commentators, beginning in antiquity, have taken these to be invitations to speculation. The result is an array of contradictory analyses about, e.g., the subdivisions of the arguments and, then, how the subdivisions are related to one another, and to the conclusion. In this article, I will offer a new analysis, in which I will distinguish two sub-arguments: one dealing with the principle of motion and one dealing with the principle of becoming; then I will show how the two sub-arguments are related. I will argue that to understand this whole argument, and the way the two sub-arguments fit together, we must assume a conception of motion that differs in important ways from our contemporary conception of motion.
This paper concerns the translation of Plato's Palinode and in particular, Phaedrus 247d8-el, where the soul is said to see and feast upon the Forms of Justice, Temperance, and Knowledge. The paper looks forward to the passage's reception as revealed in Plotinus' expanded contemplation of it in Ennead v.8, On Intelligible Beauty, and then in Ficino's subsequent translation of and Commentarium on the Phaedrus, the final versions of which were published after Ficino's translations of the Enneads. Both of these Neoplatonist philosophers understood the Hyperouranian topos, site of the soul's encounter with the Forms, as a contemplative landscape, wherein the mind, that is, the soul, as a knowing subject, comes to rest in its object, the Form, realizing its unity with this object by discovering the very ground of the soul, namely Nous, or Intellect. The soul, in Plotinus' parlance, reverts to (epistrephetai) intellect (nous), thereby discovering its deeper or truer identity. The intellect, from the viewpoint of Plotinus, is a One-Many, a unity that contains within itself and as itself, the Forms, the real beings, which it eternally contemplates. For Plotinus and for Ficino after him, the erotic longing of the soul for beauty is also a path to self-knowledge, as the soul discovers true beauty within itself. In this paper, we advocate for a reading of Plato's Phaedrus that can be said to navigate the reader toward such a search for intelligible beauty, namely, within him or herself. The paper builds on Suzanne Stern-Gillet's work, especially her studies of Plotinus' own treatment of Plato's Phaedrus. In particular, her essay, one of the last studies she authored, "The double Hamartia of the Soul Iv 8 [6] 5.14-37," spurred our own meditations on Plotinus' readings of Plato's Palinode in the Phaedrus.
