
Abstract The possibility of distinguishing good from bad reasoning – the precondition of any normative role for logic – has been challenged by a cluster of skeptical arguments in recent philosophy of logic. While much attention has focused on the gap between logical knowledge and ordinary reasoning highlighted by Harman and Russell, this paper identifies three additional arguments against logical normativity that have received insufficient scrutiny: one concerning the inherent limitations of formal evaluation methods, one concerning the pragmatic indeterminacy of illogical behavior in natural language communication, and one rooted in the early-twentieth-century doctrine of the ‘feeling of logicality’ directly opposed by Charles S. Peirce. The paper pursues two sequential aims: first, to show that skepticism about the logical normativity of reasoning is deeper and more historically entrenched than contemporary discussions suggest; second, to reconstruct Peirce’s theoretical framework – centered on the distinction between logica utens and logica docens , the tripartite account of good reasoning, and the method-based criterion of validity – and to demonstrate that it provides a unified response to all four skeptical challenges.
Abstract Bernard Williams’s account of regret contains a lacuna with respect to the appropriate emotion for contributors to feel in response to faultless group harms. While he delineates ‘agent-regret’ for agents faultlessly causing harm and ‘spectator-regret’ for observers, neither suffices for individuals who unintentionally or unforeseeably contribute to harms resulting from group actions. This paper investigates the fitting emotion for such cases. I contend that contributors occupy ‘as-if positions’ in that they are quasi-agents in virtue of their own contributions and quasi-spectators owing to others’ roles. This dual standpoint generates a ‘biperspective’ that calls for a distinct form of regret, which is reducible to neither agent-regret nor spectator-regret but synthesises elements of both. I term this distinct form ‘biperspectival regret’. Taking the appropriateness of emotions to depend on their formal objects, I formulate the formal object of biperspectival regret as the ‘comparative disvalue of group harm to which one faultlessly contributed’. Because this formal object corresponds to the defining features of faultless group harms, I argue that biperspectival regret is the warranted emotion for contributors to experience in such scenarios.
Let me take up the second of the two questions first, about whether the asymmetries associated with a representative system might answer to values other than tempering inferiority. As Beitz observes, my stance is already pluralistic. In addition to claims against inferiority, there are also rights against invasion and claims to improvement. So, it remains open to me to grant that representative institutions reflect a compromise between noninferiority and other values. The idea would be, in other words, that the move from direct to representative democracy involves some cost in terms of inferiority, but this is compensated for by the gain in noninvasion and improvement, as well as perhaps still other values. Indeed, the move from direct to representative democracy, while involving a cost in terms of inferiority along one dimension, may alleviate inferiority along another dimension, such as if representative democracy leads to better protections against discrimination.
Niko Kolodny’s The Pecking Order includes a ‘book-length treatment’ of the idea of an ‘equal say’ (6) that is ubiquitous in commonplace talk and philosophical reflection about democracy. 1 In this commentary I concentrate on the account of political representation that forms a main part of the ‘treatment’. That account places democratic representative institutions within a larger framework animated by the thought – a ‘positive conjecture’ – that we have non-derivative claims against being placed in ‘untempered relations of inferiority’ (126) with individuals who wield the power and authority of the state. The principal challenge is to identify conditions under which we might regard these relations as sufficiently tempered to be unobjectionable. Kolodny’s book offers a doctrine of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary tempering factors’ whose satisfaction is claimed to render hierarchical social relations like those that constitute political representation acceptable, or as much so as we might reasonably expect.