The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which the ethics of social consequences-as developed by Vasil Gluchman-can be considered as a continuation of certain secular tendencies present in Marxist-Leninist ethics and philosophy before 1989. The article focuses on comparing the philosophical and ethical elements of both concepts, particularly in the areas of normative foundations, the social dimension of morality, and approaches to humanism. The ethics of social consequences emerged after 1989 in a secular and post-ideological space and is characterized by consistent normativity and an emphasis on the social consequences of human action. In this paper, I claim that despite significant differences in aims and ideological grounding, certain thematic and methodological parallels can be identified between these two concepts, revealing structurally comparable features within secular ethical thinking in Slovakia.
The leitmotif of the paper is the issue of the direction of the research on history of philosophy in Slovakia up to and after 1989. The paper critiques both methodological dogmatism as well as interpretative schematism, which presents the history of philosophy in Slovakia only through the prism of "the battle between materialism and idealism," or later "the battle" of Marxist philosophy and so-called philosophical revisionism, where materialism and mainstream Marxism are always presented as the more progressive and scientific. In relation to this, the paper also analyzes the methodological issue of so-called "receptiveness" of philosophy in Slovakia from the 17th century until the end of the 20th. The conclusion of the article outlines the importance of democratic changes in Slovakia after 1989 while emphasizing the area of research on the history of Slovak philosophy, its contemporary evaluation and interpretation (philosophical pluralism, interpretative pluralism, etc.).
The study examines the ethical thought of the Lutheran theologian Igor Kiss (1932-2018), focusing on the relationship between continuity and transformation in his work before and after 1989. It analyses how key normative categories developed across changing contexts. The interpretative framework is shaped by Kiss' engagement with Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms and by his understanding of natural law (lex naturalis) as a principle of love, justice, and humanity. Through a diachronic analysis of selected texts, the study reconstructs the emergence of Kiss' ethical position from historical and theological reflections to a systematic social-ethical conception. Particular attention is paid to freedom and responsibility, the anthropological grounding of ethics in the idea of imago Dei, and the translation of theological norms into publicly communicable language. The article argues that 1989 did not mark a normative break in Kiss' thought but an expansion of its argumentative horizon culminating in humanized deontology.
This article aims to highlight the distinctive place of Milan Zigo's work within the Slovak philosophical landscape. More precisely his legacy presented in the journal Filozofia before and after events of the year 1989. These journal contributions are the textual basis for the reflection of the motif of the constant and, at the same time, what could be perceived as uncertain in his legacy. The constant and the uncertain are grasped on several levels of meaning. As dangerous in the sense of the need to face ideological circumstances, but also in the sense of the awareness that there are members of the philosophical community who try to avoid this vulgarization. Stability is understood as that which M. Zigo, as a philosopher, did not give up on. The work details the oscillation between these positions in Zigo's critical reflection on the philosophical legacy of I. Hru & scaron;ovsk & yacute;.
The study examines the concept of the "contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous" in the context of Slovak and Czechoslovak history, with a special focus on the revolutionary year 1989. Building on Reinhart Koselleck's theory of temporal layers and Ernst Bloch's notion of Ungleichzeitigkeit, the article argues that Czech and Slovak history cannot be understood within a single homogeneous present, but only as an interplay of multiple temporalities. Using a constructivist methodology and Hayden White's narrative theory, it analyses how center-periphery relations, generational experiences and different regimes of memory produce conflicting interpretations of the Velvet Revolution. The study shows that these divergent narratives are not marginal deviations, but the normal outcome of structurally nonsimultaneous historical experiences. In conclusion, it reflects on how such temporal plurality shapes values, political attitudes and the ongoing contestation of the meaning of 1989 in public memory.
In his works Pavel Tich & yacute; relied on the concept of the empirically bare individual, which was based on the denial of empirical omniscience. A critical discussion developed among his followers, in which various proposals were put forward: bare individuals do not exist; instead, they are a concept, a construct, or a property. In 1991, Robert Stalnaker, in his critique of anti-essentialism, came up with the concept of analytical essentialism. The identity of the individual and its cognition remained a neuralgic point. We propose the hypothesis that if we reject the assumption of analytical omniscience, a non-contradictory solution is to distinguish between completely bare individuals as bearers of identity on the one hand and space-time particulars on the other, which are rich in properties. Complete anti-essentialism applies to individuals, and partial essentialism with the application of supplementary conventions relating to their empirical identity applies to their counterparts - particulars.
Rawls' concept of individual autonomy emphasizes rational decision-making in creating a just social order behind the veil of ignorance. Rawls considers the individual as a rational actor of the social contract and proceeds from a hypothetical construction, which is, however, empirically unverifiable. He does not take into account the complexity of human values, while adhering to exhaustively defined primary goods, which Rawls, however, selectively models according to the principles of his previously modeled concept of a well-ordered society. Rawls' understanding of autonomy in Kant's intention will be criticized in the text. Rawls model of individual autonomy is determined by the utilitarian understanding of the realization of the social good. In this context, the article solves the problem of individual autonomy to make decisions in the heteronomy of social interests and the needs of a well-ordered society, as well as the problem arising from normative conflicts between the deonto-logical and utilitarian traditions.
The article examines the nature and functions of certain idealizations in logic. It compares them with idealizations that appear in theories and models of empirical sciences. Building on the work of Colyvan (2013) and Russell (2023), it shows in what sense idealizations of logic are deliberately accepted false statements. One source of the falsity of idealization assumptions in logic is the representational inconsistency with the reality of the empirical system. The second source of falsity is the comparison of the epistemic status of a statement (formula) in one logical system with its status in another logical system. The article also notes the idealizations that we (implicitly) accept when applying a certain logical apparatus to natural language.
This paper responds to the criticism raised by Ivo Dragoun against my earlier article on the division of philosophy into analytic and Continental. In the original paper, I argued that this division is problematic for factual, methodological, and power-related reasons. Dragoun attempts to challenge all three lines of argument. In this reply, I systematically reconstruct and critically assess his objections. I argue that the semantic defense of the notion of "Continental philosophy" remains unsatisfactory, that the methodological justification of the division faces persistent difficulties, and that the power dimension of the classification cannot be easily neutralized. I conclude that Dragoun's critique does not undermine the original arguments and that the thesis concerning the inadvisability of the analytic-Continental division remains defensible.
According to a Subjectivist theory of X, reference to belief in the existence of X enters essentially into a full account of what the existence of X consists in. A Subjectivist theory doesn’t claim that X is a ‘merely subjective’ phenomenon; it’s a theory of what the existence of X consists in as a matter of objective fact. A Commitment theory of X is a theory of X that holds that we are inescapably committed to believing in the existence of X. It may also be a Subjectivist theory of X and hold that our commitment to belief in the existence of X is part of what makes it the case that X exists. This paper aims to specify the character of Subjectivist and Commitment theories, before suggesting that Kant may be said to have held a Subjectivist and indeed Commitment theory of freedom.
G. E. M. Anscombe famously argues that our self-knowledge of intentional action (“practical knowledge”) is both non-observational and yet concerns happenings in objective reality. This combination seems to present a strong tension. Recently, Adrian Haddock offered a novel account of the role of observation in practical knowledge, claiming that such knowledge is a unity of self-knowledge (non-observational) and other-knowledge (observational), both of which are indispensable. Yet Haddock’s view faces several problems. This paper suggests that Sartre’s phenomenology resonates deeply with Haddock’s account and provides a rich resource for addressing his problems. Through Sartre’s discussions of self-consciousness, intentionality, and perception-action unity, we gain a deeper understanding of how observation functions within practical knowledge. This account shows that observation is not merely an aid (as Anscombe suggests) but a constitutive part of practical knowledge.
The article examines the nature and functions of certain idealizations in logic. It compares them with idealizations that appear in theories and models of empirical sciences. Building on the work of Colyvan (2013) and Russell (2023), it shows in what sense idealizations of logic are deliberately accepted false statements. One source of the falsity of idealization assumptions in logic is the representational inconsistency with the reality of the empirical system. The second source of falsity is the comparison of the epistemic status of a statement (formula) in one logical system with its status in another logical system. The article also notes the idealizations that we (implicitly) accept when applying a certain logical apparatus to natural language.
In his works Pavel Tichý relied on the concept of the empirically bare individual, which was based on the denial of empirical omniscience. A critical discussion developed among his followers, in which various proposals were put forward: bare individuals do not exist; instead, they are a concept, a construct, or a property. In 1991, Robert Stalnaker, in his critique of anti-essentialism, came up with the concept of analytical essentialism. The identity of the individual and its cognition remained a neuralgic point. We propose the hypothesis that if we reject the assumption of analytical omniscience, a non-contradictory solution is to distinguish between completely bare individuals as bearers of identity on the one hand and space-time particulars on the other, which are rich in properties. Complete anti-essentialism applies to individuals, and partial essentialism with the application of supplementary conventions relating to their empirical identity applies to their counterparts – particulars.
This paper responds to the criticism raised by Ivo Dragoun against my earlier article on the division of philosophy into analytic and Continental. In the original paper, I argued that this division is problematic for factual, methodological, and power-related reasons. Dragoun attempts to challenge all three lines of argument. In this reply, I systematically reconstruct and critically assess his objections. I argue that the semantic defense of the notion of “Continental philosophy” remains unsatisfactory, that the methodological justification of the division faces persistent difficulties, and that the power dimension of the classification cannot be easily neutralized. I conclude that Dragoun’s critique does not undermine the original arguments and that the thesis concerning the inadvisability of the analytic–Continental division remains defensible.
Following J & oacute;hann P & aacute;ll & Aacute;rnason's occasional distinction between the imaginative Central Europe of novelists and philosophers and the historical region of East-Central Europe, this article uses the example of this region to discuss the relationship between public debates (including essays and novels) about the past and professional historical discourse. It explains the irreducibility of the diverse polycentric perspectives of Central Europe and the risks of its originally Western-centric construction in the 19th century, as manifested in the present day.
In philosophy, the term upsilon pi omicron kappa c iota & micro;c nu omicron nu literally means "underlying thing," which in Latin is "subiectus," but in fact it means something which can predicate other things but cannot be a predicate of others, which in to the opinion of many interpreters, there is a very close link between German idealism and twentieth-century existentialism. Kierkegaard attended Schelling's lectures in Berlin in 1841 - 1842, where he became familiar with Schelling's late philosophy in detail, and from this he developed his own concept of existentialism. The paper will show how, by transcending the notions of upsilon pi omicron kappa c iota & micro;c nu omicron nu and the subject, an existential philosophy emerges that will become a dominant feature of European culture in the twentieth century.
Many transhumanists hope near-future developments in various medical and engineering fields will eventually lead to the end of human and conceptual issues here that must be addressed, but a more fundamental problem for visions of something approximating immortality concerns the enthusiasm for these visions itself. Even if it were possible to extend human lives indefinitely, are lives that last (potentially) forever really worth wanting? We consider some key arguments in what has come to be known as the "desirability of immortality" debate. The arguments of greatest interest are those focusing on the relationship between time and value. After briefly sketching them out, we contrast them with Henri Bergson's account of time as duration. When one relies on Bergson, and related ideas in Martin Heidegger's work, it becomes clear that the absence of death need not render an immortal life meaningless, as some philosophers believe.
Rawls’ concept of individual autonomy emphasizes rational decision-making in creating a just social order behind the veil of ignorance. Rawls considers the individual as a rational actor of the social contract and proceeds from a hypothetical construction, which is, however, empirically unverifiable. He does not take into account the complexity of human values, while adhering to exhaustively defined primary goods, which Rawls, however, selectively models according to the principles of his previously modeled concept of a well-ordered society. Rawls’ understanding of autonomy in Kant’s intention will be criticized in the text. Rawls’ model of individual autonomy is determined by the utilitarian understanding of the realization of the social good. In this context, the article solves the problem of individual autonomy to make decisions in the heteronomy of social interests and the needs of a well-ordered society, as well as the problem arising from normative conflicts between the deontological and utilitarian traditions.
