Umberto Eco in The Search for the Perfect Language explores the ‘dream of a perfect language’ that has sought to recapitulate the lost perfection of Adam’s original language. Humanity is seen as forgetful of the preternatural knowledge once contained in a transparent language that perfectly identified essences. Eco’s historical narrative of this pursuit, labeled “a series of failures,” is examined first. Then, Leibniz’s Adamicism is explored, which asserts that a language can be Adamic if it mirrors the natural and non-arbitrary qualities of Adam’s language. Cross-culturally, Sanskrit realism and Plato’s natural-name thesis support this, emphasizing the connection between words and meanings. Following this, the criteria for linguistic perfection (◊P) are established, relying on five necessary assumptions (A) concerning ontology, epistemology, accessibility, translatability, and intersubjectivity. This paper defends reconstructing an ideal language without seeking to return to the forever lost mother tongue. Instead, it assesses the potential for our current system-of-signs to regain semiotic realism and represent reality accurately. A thought experiment justifies returning to semiotic realism, examining the potential of revealing the hidden phenomenology of logos – the universal reason underlying all languages. Conclusively, this project rejects empirical nominalism and explores accessing the preternatural knowledge of necessary and immutable ideas, lost after the fall and Babel’s catastrophe.
The interview given by Adam Hlobus (Uladzimir Vyachaslavavich Adamchyk, born September 29, 1958), a Belarusian writer, poet, artist, and publisher. He began publishing poetry in 1981 (in the newspaper Literature and Art and the magazine Maladosts). He is the founder of the Society of Young Writers “Tuteyshiya” (1986–1988). Selected books: Park (poetry, 1988), Loneliness at the Stadium (short stories, 1989), Death Is a Man (1992), Crossroads (1993), Damavikameron (1994), Just Don’t Tell My Mom (1995), Koidanava (1997), New Damavikameron (1998), Post Scriptum (1999), Texts (a collection of all previous books, 2000), Braslav Stigmata (2001), Notebooks (2003), Home (2005), coParticipants (2006), Letters (2006), Fairy Tales (2007), Convolutus (2008), Castle (2008), PLAY.BY (2009), Krutahory Fairy Tales (2010), New Sky (2010), Sayings (2012), Names. Literary Portraits (2013), Fairy Tales for Adults (2013), Portraits (2014), Stories about Minsk and Its Surroundings (2015), Reverse Perspective (2016), Family (2017), Capital Fairy Tales (2018), Features (2019), Angel (2021), Snowflake (2022), Our Neighbor Karatkevich (2025).
The purpose of this study is to examine the interaction of flexible working perception with digital and agile organizational cultures and the effects of this interaction on technology use from the perspective of employees. The research was carried out with data collected from 382 employees operating in different sectors (technology, finance, education, health) on the European Side of Istanbul. The data were collected using structured questionnaires and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), item-total correlation, Cronbach Alpha methods, correlation analysis and path analysis method were used within the scope of validity and reliability studies of the scales. In the study, a positive and significant relationship was found between the variables of flexible working and digital and agile organizational culture and technology use, while the perception of flexible working had a positive and significant effect on the perception of technology use. The study also concluded that digital and agile organizational culture has a significant effect on the perception of technology use. According to the results of the study, the perception of flexible working and digital and agile organizational cultures have a positive and significant effect on employees’ use of technology.
This paper proposes an analysis of sport from an analytic-philosophical point-of-view. The authors argue that although a definition in the traditional sense (per genus proximum and differentiam specificam) – conceived as analytic, synthetic, or regulative – is rather impossible, a conceptual description, using some key intuitions, can be achieved. These intuitions are suggested by taking into account phenomena such as physical culture and its properties, Olympic games and their regulations, or the popularity of sport as perceived by direct spectators and indirect observers, particularly on television. Various examples suggest that sport is a complex phenomenon, generally consisting of the actions of people, subordinated to rules that govern how sport actors behave. Hence, a normative aspect of sport must be taken into account in any conceptual analysis of sport. If the traditional manner for defining a concept is considered unavailable, then Wittgenstein’s strategy of analysis, via the notion of family resemblance, is recommended. The authors show that this can also be applied to the concept of sport. After mentioning Renford Bambrough’s interpretation of Wittgenstein, the authors propose to treat the name sport as referring to a mereological collection of parts, unified by several factors and forming a family resemblance.
For a long time, it was believed in Assyriology and related disciplines that šumma sentences, or grammatical conditionals, which appeared in cuneiform texts and tablets of astrology, exorcism, law, extispicy, oneiromancy, medicine, and divination, were linguistic expressions of logical conditionals. F. Rochberg (2010; 2016) extended this belief, suggesting that they are even material conditionals. Andrew Schumann (2017; 2020; 2021) followed this, claiming that, as a result, we can trace the origin of symbolic logic in cuneiform writings, through which it moved to Greece. In this paper, after presenting this approach, I will challenge it by showing that šumma/IF sentences and similar constructs in cuneiform literature are arguments or implications that suffer from the same confusion between conditional and implication that Quine (1953/1966) highlighted when criticizing C.I. Lewis.
This article proposes a minimalist concept of autonomy that is consistent with determinism, but negates fatalism. Drawing on Nicolai Hartmann’s stratified ontology, it argues that autonomy is achieved not by suspending physical laws, but by introducing new, higher-level determinations unique to individual entities. The tension between general laws and individual autonomy is resolved by emphasizing the unique properties and individual laws that apply to each entity. The article also explains how this minimal autonomy makes sense of setting goals and attempting to achieve them, demonstrating that even within a deterministic framework, individuals can have meaningful influence over their actions and outcomes.
The interview given by Gershon Trestman (born July 29, 1947, Minsk), a Russian-language Belarusian and Israeli poet, prose writer, publicist, and playwright. He is a member of the Union of Writers of Israel, the Commonwealth of Russian-Speaking Writers of Israel “Stolitsa,” and the International Federation of Russian Writers. His work has been recognized with the Yu. Stern and Yu. Nagibin awards, as well as a gold medal for “outstanding achievements in literature and the arts” from the California Academy of Sciences. Selected works: The One Who Crossed the River (Tel Aviv, 1996); Golem, or Faust’s Curse (Moscow, 2007); A Small Country with a Great History (Israel, 2008, foreword by Avigdor Lieberman); The Great History of a Small Country (Israel, 2011); The Scroll of Esther (Jerusalem, 2013); The Land of Olive Guardians (Jerusalem, 2013); The Israeli Knot: The History of the Country – The History of Confrontation (Book-Sefer, 2014); The Land of Olive Guardians (Jerusalem, KKL-JNF, 2014); Job (Minsk, New Wineskins, 2014); ... Where There Are No Coordinates. Poems and Epics (Jerusalem, 2017); The Book of Non-Being (Minsk, Logvinov, 2019); Alphabet for Elderly Children (Jerusalem, 2023).
Many moral realists have employed a strategy for arguing for moral realism by claiming that if epistemic normativity is categorical and that if this epistemic normativity exists, then categorical normativity exists. In this paper, we will discuss that argument, examine a way out, and respond to the objections people have recently raised in the literature. In the end, we conclude that the objections to our way out will do little in the way of motivating those who already do not believe in categorical normativity, thereby severing the power the aforementioned parity argument is designed to possess.
In contemporary American cinema, the representation of women remains disproportionately limited despite significant social movements advocating for diversity and equality. This study examines the depiction of women in top-grossing films of 2018, contrasting those directed by men with those directed by women, to understand the influence of gender dynamics on cinematic portrayal. Analyzing the top five highest-grossing live-action movies directed by each gender, this research utilizes critical mass and critical actor theories to evaluate the impact of female filmmakers on the representation of women both on and off-screen. Findings reveal that films directed by women feature higher percentages of female characters and crew members in key roles, yet face substantial budgetary and box office disparities compared to their male-directed counterparts. Despite some progress, the film industry continues to exhibit systemic biases, necessitating further structural changes to achieve genuine gender equality in cinematic storytelling. This study underscores the need for increased opportunities and resources for female filmmakers to foster a more inclusive and diverse cinematic landscape.
The paper is devoted to the problem of describing reality in the language of mathematics and logic in connection with intellectual intuition. The question raised is how the basic requirements of mathematical theory and logic will change if some of the multiverse models of modern physics are taken as the basis. Mathematics is considered in the context of various historical approaches. It is shown that some of the well-known requirements of a formal theory (such as consistency) may begin to play a different role if the multiverse hypothesis is accepted. In the framework of theories based on the idea of multiple worlds, the logical consequence, the natural law of Duns Scotus, the law of excluded middle, and other well-known facts of classical logic which in some cases cause controversy due to their intuitive unacceptability are resolved. The paper discusses an approach based on paraconsistent logics: such logics can be considered the first to correspond to multiverse theories.
This paper critically examines the claim that Utah is “the most sexist state” in the United States, as suggested by a WalletHub report ranking it lowest in “Women’s Equality.” Utilizing an economic analysis from the Austrian School perspective, this study scrutinizes the data, metrics, and conclusions of reports by the Utah Women & Leadership Project (UWLP). The analysis focuses on distinguishing statistical disparities from sexism, proposing that observed gender inequalities in Utah are largely influenced by cultural and economic factors, particularly the state’s high marriage rate and traditional gender roles. Contrary to the notion that sexism predominantly drives gender disparities, the paper argues that personal choices and subjective value theory play significant roles in shaping these outcomes. The study highlights the importance of considering cultural context, individual preferences, and the marital asymmetry hypothesis when interpreting gender-related data, challenging the assertion that Utah’s gender disparities are primarily due to sexist attitudes. The findings suggest that Utah’s gender gaps in areas such as income and workforce participation are more accurately attributed to the state’s unique cultural and economic landscape rather than pervasive sexism.
The Warsaw School of Logic (WSL) was the famous branch of the Lviv-Warsaw School (LWS) – the most important movement in the history of Polish philosophy. Logic made the most important field in the activities of the WSL. The aim of this work is to highlight the role and significance of the WSL in the history of logic in the 20th century.
In this paper, I analyze the shift in Twardowski’s views between his early psychologistic theory of logic and his later anti-psychologistic theory. In particular, I point out that the interpretation suggesting that this change merely involves Twardowski enriching his ontology with products encounters a certain problem in light of his earlier views. To present this problem more precisely, I discuss the foundations of Twardowski’s theory of products, focusing on aspects relevant to the issue of psychologism. Based on this, I reconstruct Twardowski’s theory of logic and highlight where he identified the fallacy of psychologism. I contrast this reconstructed theory with Twardowski’s earlier views at key points and demonstrate that the difference between his early psychologistic theory and his later anti-psychologistic theory is a matter of a shift in emphasis rather than a significant change in the theoretical system itself, and that Twardowski himself understood it as such.
The article presents interpersonal relations and mutual influences between German logician Heinrich Scholz and Polish scholars, first of all Jan Łukasiewicz. The background for presenting these relationships consists of reflections on the development of logic in Poland and various conceptions of how to apply logic to philosophical issues. Firstly, Jan Łukasiewicz’s program of logicisation of philosophy and his search for allies is presented. Secondly, the forms of cooperation between Łukasiewicz and Scholz, as well as contacts between the latter and other Polish scholars are sketched. Finally, forms of Scholz’s help to Polish friends during the tumultuous period of World War II are examined. The article provides also some reflections on the approach to logic in various European centers of analytic philosophy and historical comments on the continuity of philosophical and logical schools.
This article explores the domain of legal analysis and its methodologies, emphasising the significance of generalisation in legal systems. It discusses the process of generalisation in relation to legal concepts and the development of ideal concepts that form the foundation of law. The article examines the role of logical induction and its similarities with semantic generalisation, highlighting their importance in legal decision-making. It also critiques the formal-deductive approach in legal practice and advocates for more adaptable models, incorporating fuzzy logic, non-monotonic defeasible reasoning, and artificial intelligence. The potential application of neural networks, specifically deep learning algorithms, in legal theory is also discussed. The article discusses how neural networks encode legal knowledge in their synaptic connections, while the syllogistic model condenses legal information into axioms. The article also highlights how neural networks assimilate novel experiences and exhibit evolutionary progression, unlike the deductive model of law. Additionally, the article examines the historical and theoretical foundations of jurisprudence that align with the basic principles of neural networks. It delves into the statistical analysis of legal phenomena and theories that view legal development as an evolutionary process. The article then explores Friedrich Hayek’s theory of law as an autonomous self-organising system and its compatibility with neural network models. It concludes by discussing the implications of Hayek’s theory on the role of a lawyer and the precision of neural networks.
Classical logic is based on an underlying view of the world, according to which there are elementary facts and compound facts, which are logical combinations of these elementary facts. Sentences are true if they correspond to, in last instance, the elementary facts in the world. This world view has no place for rules, which exist as individuals in the world, and which create relations between the most elementary facts. As a result, classical logic is not suitable to deal with rules, and is therefore unsuitable to deal with legal reasoning. A logic that is more suitable should take into account that law is a part of social reality, in particular a part that consists of constructivist facts, and that rules play a central role in law. This article gives a superficial description of how social reality exists and of the place of law and legal rules in it. It uses this description to argue that traditional techniques to reason with and about legal rules provide a better logic for law than classical logic. These techniques can be accommodated in a logic that treats rules as logical individuals.
This paper investigates the basis arguments of so-called legal logic and their relation to logic in its standard meaning. There is no doubt that legal arguments belong to logic in the wide sense (sensu largo), but their reduction to schemes of formal logic (logica sensu stricto) is a controversial issue. It can be demonstrated that only some legal arguments fall under explicit rules of formal logic, that is, having a deductive character. Most such reasoning is fallible, and its correctness depends on appealing to extra-logical principles taken from legal norms. For instance, if we say, “If it is permitted more, then it is permitted less” (argumentum a maiori ad minus), we assume that the concepts expressed by the words “more” and “less” are already defined.
The concept of legal gap is tackled from a number of logical perspectives and semantic methods. After presenting our own goal (Section 1), a first introduction into legal logic refers to Bobbio’s works and his formalization of legal statements (Sections 2 and 3). Then Woleński’s contribution to the area is taken into account through his reference to the distinction between two juridical systems (viz. Common Law vs Civil Law) and the notion of conditional norms (Section 4). The notion of reason is also highlighted in the case of Raz’s legal logic, thereby leading to a future connection with von Wright’s logic of truth and an analogy made with an anti-realist reading of truth-values and norms (Section 5). Our personal contribution is introduced through a reflection on how logic should deal with the logical form of norms (Section 6), before entering a number of crucial definitions and distinctions for the concepts of norm, legal statement, and promulgation (Section 7). The final point is a proposed semantics for legal statements, which is both many-valued and gap-friendly (Section 8). A distinction between a number of requirements for permission and forbiddance leads to a set of non-classical juridical systems in which non-permission and forbiddance are not equivalent with each other any more; this does justice to Woleński’s former distinction between Common Law and Civil Law, also leading ultimately to a non-classical square of legal oppositions in which several legal operators may collapse into other ones (Section 9).
