近年来,作为新兴发展中国家的印度尼西亚积极参与全球气候治理进程,逐渐引起世界关注.印度尼西亚积极参与全球气候治理既有减少自然灾害风险、降低国内经济损失等客观因素的影响,也有追求大国地位、推动可持续发展的综合考量.在始终坚持"共同但有区别的责任"的原则下,为提高治理成效,印度尼西亚在国内积极出台政策法规,推动机构改革,同时加强与东盟国家和国际社会的气候治理合作.当然,印度尼西亚参与全球气候治理也面临着多个方面的限度:政策协调不足、缺乏统一领导的制度障碍、经济发展与环境保护的悖论以及治理意愿和能力的不匹配.未来印度尼西亚仍需多措并举,在现有合作机制下探索全球气候治理新路径.
纵观欧洲一体化的发展历史,欧洲内部不同国家基于不同目的组成各种形式的次区域组织.随着区域主义的发展,次区域组织的重要性也愈发凸显.其中,有的次区域组织意在加入北约与欧盟,有的意在欧盟内部获得主导地位.然而,部分次区域组织在成功入盟后仍然存在,且对欧洲一体化的发展带来不同影响.本文主要研究欧洲次区域组织在欧洲一体化进程中的作用是什么,并在此基础上试图通过安全稳定、经济收益与政治话语权等三个关键因素对这一问题进行解释,从而进一步了解欧洲一体化进程中区域化发展特点,以及这种进程对全球化以及国际格局的潜在影响.
韩国舆论高度关注中美关系.在中美竞争加剧、中美关系恶化的情况下,韩国学界、政界和媒体对中美关系的看法,从价值取向上表现出了对美式自由民主价值观的普遍认同;从政策取向上呈现出两个主要特征:一是倾向于相信"中国威胁论",二是倾向于追随美国.总体而言,"亲美"势力占据优势,"友华"势力处于比较明显的不利地位;而且,二者之间自觉不自觉地共享一些重要的决策前提,比如美国的影响力、韩国社会蔓延的反华情绪和联合国对其"发达国家"身份的认可给韩国精英及民众带来的心态变化等.韩国舆论的这些特征可以从舆论这一层面帮助我们理解当前的中美韩关系和韩国的对外政策,为相关决策提供特定角度的参考.
越南的海洋国际合作主要包括伙伴型竞合、争夺型竞合、适应型竞合三种类型.文章系统分析越南开展海洋合作的国际背景与国内政策主张,全面梳理越南与南海域外及周边国家开展海洋合作的概貌,搭建基于SWOT的竞合分析框架,研判各类型合作中的优势、劣势、机遇及威胁.分析显示,越南与域外大国的海洋合作增加了南海问题的复杂性;越南与中国等域内国家开展的海洋合作总体有益于南海的和平稳定.研究丰富了海洋合作理论和国际关系中的竞合理论,为加强中越在南海的合作、促进两国关系良性发展以及今后中国与其他南海周边国家开展海洋合作提供参考.
自新冠疫情暴发以来,世界政治经济格局发生改变,全球治理的不稳定性和不确定性进一步增加.作为新兴经济体的代表和南南合作的平台,金砖国家通过推动全球经济治理体系改革、构建全球经贸伙伴关系、利用数字防疫技术推动数字经济发展,组建金砖国家新开发银行并启动紧急贷款援助机制、吸纳新成员,从多个方面参与全球经济治理,实现发展中国家互利共赢.但金砖国家仍然处于非正式合作阶段,缺乏深化合作的长期机制,面临着内部不一致性、机制化障碍和逆全球化思潮等尖锐挑战.面对百年变局和世纪疫情的叠加影响,金砖国家应开展新型"金砖+"模式,加强区域中心运作,由侧重经济治理的非正式机制转向政治、经济与卫生治理并重的全方位协调机制.
The AUKUS proposal was originally developed by the Morrison government in Australia. The secret decision-making of AUKUS initiative is, first and foremost, led by Scott Morrison, and then coordinated by the Department of Defence in line with the-whole-of-government principle, and built on the presupposed tradition of bipartisan consensus. The announcement of AUKUS sheds light on the Australian government’s strategic determination to balance China on the one hand, and its renouncement to hedge the risk associated with America ’ s possible strategic retrenchment from the Indo-Pacific region on the other. It is supposed to elevate Australia’s strategic status and role within the U.S.-led alliance system recently organized in a new form of "nodal defence" —a hybrid category that combines bilateral, mini-lateral and multilateral initiatives. As a result, the AUKUS agreement may motivate Australia to strengthen its political-strategic interoperability with the US, Japan and the United Kingdom,which could further complicate China’s peripheral strategic environment.
This paper analyzes how time cognition of the leading global power and the rising power influence power transition. It assumes that state is still the main actor in international relations, the power transition occurs between the major powers of the international system,and the leading and rising powers in the process of power transition should consider the question of time, in which they plan and adjust their behaviors. This paper argues that the leading and rising powers’ expectation and cognition of timing determine, to a large extent, their interactions and hence the outcomes. Expectation of time refers to the subjective expectation of how long the leading and rising powers foresee it will take to complete the power transition,which determines whether a power will choose a conflictual or a competitive strategy. As it tests how well the leading and rising powers perceive and deal with danger and opportunity in the transition period, timing cognition determines whether a power chooses strategic stability or strategic adjustment. Taking the Anglo-American power transition and Anglo-Germany power transition as examples, this paper explores the role of time cognition in the process of power transition.
The Biden administration frequently convenes issue-based summits and creates complementary new mechanisms to form new tool for U.S. foreign policy. The issue-based summits aim to compete with China,focus on valuesbased diplomacy and circumvent the constraints of international mechanisms.They create negative impact on China-U.S. relations.
Since the Nixon administration,the U.S. has maintained a high level of interest in Arctic issues. In general,the development of U.S. Arctic policy over the past 50 years can be divided into three stages:incipient,exploratory and established. During this process,three aspects,namely,changes in the external environment,internal national factors,and the law of development,have jointly driven the development and evolution of U.S. Arctic policy. First,the U.S. Arctic policy evolved and developed against the backdrop of increasing global warming and geopolitical competition in the Arctic region;at the same time,some special events such as the Cold War and the“Russian flag incident”were determinant to the change of the policy Second,the U.S. domestic political system and economic development laid the foundation for the policy change;the State of Alaska,key individuals and other actors also played important roles in the process of U.S. Arctic policy formulation and implementation. In addition,from the perspective of the evolution of the policy itself,policy evolution is not simply a change from old to new;U.S. Arctic policy is influenced by pre-existing policies and practices,with a strong emphasis on national security,Arctic scientific research,and environmental protection.
After a long struggle between open and closure,it is finally decided that the global marine commons are common heritages of all mankind. With the advancement of science and technology as well as the improvement of human’s ability to exploit the ocean,solving and preventing the“tragedy of the commons”in the marine commons and establishing a fair and reasonable global governance system for the marine commons become major concerns of the international community. This paper summarizes the key elements of global ocean commons governance,analyzes the predicaments in ocean commons governance,and proposes that the effective governance of global ocean commons should mainly focus on building a governance mechanism that combines market governance,government governance and autonomous governance.
Important changes are taking place in the US’ security strategy,naming an increasing attention to“Gray Zone”,tendency to regard all areas involving great power competition as“Gray Zone”,the use of alliances to contain competitors,and the use of the so-called“Integration Deterrence”strategy to compete for“Gray Zone”. The reason for such changes is that the United States believes that the“threat”of competitors in the“Gray Zone”directly challenges and infringes the rights and interests of the United States. In time of great power competition,the United States regards China and Russia as its main competitors,and tries to generalize the“Gray Zone”to the fields of geopolitics,military,economy,law,diplomacy,and information networks. It uses“Integrated Deterrence”to contain the competitors. However,the“Integrated Deterrence”has drawbacks and defects such as the dispersion of forces and the difficulty in internal coordination within the alliance.
Since 2017,the U.S. has initiated technology competition with China.The key pillar of U.S competition strategy is to strengthen export control on China,in an attempt to keep China from acquiring advanced technology from U.S. From 2017 to 2022,the U.S. export control policy against China has its unique characteristics. Firstly,the export control of strategic technologies to China is strengthened. Those items classified as strategic include semiconductor,supercomputer,artificial intelligence and quantum science. Secondly,the controlled targets are expanded,which include Chinese firms,research institutions,universities,Chinese citizens and U.S. citizens. Thirdly,the interconnection of controlled measures is strengthened. The U.S. export control on China is connected with U.S. investment review policy towards China. It is also connected with multilateral export control policy towards China. As U.S.-China strategic competition has become normalized,the U.S. will continue to strengthen its export control on China.
After the result of the Brexit referendum was confirmed in 2016, the United Kingdom proposed a "Global Britain" strategy, and the policy of "tilt to the Indo-Pacific" is the key to achieving the strategy. Britain’s involvement in the "Indo-Pacific" is a gradual process since2016, and is essentially a re-expansion of its global strategy. Specifically, it began deepening ties with "Indo-Pacific" countries through trade and diplomacy, and seeking long-term existence. Britain has abandoned the conventional military means of the last century, and instead used a combination of diplomatic, development and military means to achieve the goal of intervention. It takes geopolitical dispute of the "Indo-Pacific" as the breakthrough, and diplomatic means as the center, and makes development assistance and military presence to serve its diplomatic goals. The "Indo-Pacific" is already at the center of the vortex of great power political competition, and Britain’s intervention has also had important political impacts, namely consolidating the transatlantic partnership on the one hand, and disrupting the regional security order of the "Indo-Pacific" on the other.
From 2017 to 2022, the United States often betrayed its allies. This paper finds that in the context of the relative decline of the United States ’ strength, the United States will choose to deal with the alliance based on the importance of its allies, proximity and domestic interests. Against the background of intensified competition between China and the United States, the United States tends to abandon those allies that have little significance in constraining China, while increasing its investment in strengthening the relationship with those allies which can help containing China. This paper selects three case studies, including the relationship between the United States and NATO, the withdrawal of the United States from the Iran nuclear agreement, and the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, to prove the law of the United States’ behavior in betraying its allies.
The Biden administration’s South China Sea policy inherits the core logic of the Trump administration’s policy, meanwhile it has included new trends and features in its South China Sea policy through a combination of diplomatic layout, security strategy planning, military force utilization and struggle for "compliance" with international law. Its focus is on maintaining the "rules-based maritime system" in favor of the United States, as well as on the sea power struggle with China in the context of power shift. The fundamental goals are to maintain and strengthen the US-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, to maintain the balance of regional power in favor of the US and its allies, and to prevent China from becoming the hegemon in East Asia. It is foreseeable that the strategic competition between China and the United States in the South China Sea will persist. China should maintain its strategic focus,lay out plans and make preparations in advance.
崛起国和霸权国在什么条件下走向合作,在什么条件下走向冲突?本文提出关系螺旋理论,认为螺旋发展方向决定崛起国和霸权国的互动方向.行为威胁度是关系螺旋发展的自变量,决定螺旋发展方向;权力差距是关系螺旋发展的干预变量,影响螺旋形成的速度和规模.历史上,不同的崛起国和霸权国关系以不同的起点,经历螺旋互动...>>详细崛起国和霸权国在什么条件下走向合作,在什么条件下走向冲突?本文提出关系螺旋理论,认为螺旋发展方向决定崛起国和霸权国的互动方向.行为威胁度是关系螺旋发展的自变量,决定螺旋发展方向;权力差距是关系螺旋发展的干预变量,影响螺旋形成的速度和规模.历史上,不同的崛起国和霸权国关系以不同的起点,经历螺旋互动,走向两种结局之一.本文通过对雅典-斯达巴案例的过程追踪和对美-英、日-英关系螺旋的比较分析,以检验以上两个假说的可靠性.崛起国和霸权国的关系并非处于热战或冷战的"冲突宿命",双方的地位承认、秩序维护乃至于权力和平转移仍有实现可能.
In recent years,the foreign policies of Central and Eastern European countries have become increasingly differentiated,including their policies towards China. There are many reasons for this,from the perspective of their policy on China,different countries or different ruling parties have different considerations on geopolitical security,economic interests and values. In terms of security,the“external ring countries”bordering Russia or Ukraine have a stronger need to rely on the West,especially on NATO. In terms of economic interests,countries with weak trade tie with China are more prone to be radical towards China;In terms of values,the“west ring countries”are more proactive than the“southeast ring countries”;from the perspective of ruling parties. In most of the Central and Eastern European countries with right-wing populist ruling parties, attitude towards China have been more radical,while countries which have joined the EU have stronger populist parties. Amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict,the“external ring countries”have a significantly stronger demand for NATO,which will further increase the difference between them and other Central and Eastern Europe countries in their policy on China.
20世纪60至70年代,当中国在社会主义阵营中变得更加孤立时,中罗关系却进一步发展.本文为这种特殊关系的形成提供了两个解释:20世纪60年代初,中苏关系和罗苏关系同时恶化,中罗两国有反对苏联大国沙文主义的共同战略利益,为此两国相互提供政治支持,促成两国关系的友好;20世纪70年代,除了继续共同反对苏联,中罗两国在对美政策上形成了共识,由此推动两国关系进一步发展.
2000年以来,中日关系呈现出以频繁、剧烈变动为特征的极不稳定状态.本项研究发现,战略偏好差异是中日关系陷入互动困境的关键原因.对东北亚地缘的不同认知使中日形成各自地缘目标,进而产生各自互动中的行为偏好,中日总体偏好分别为维持现状、改变现状导向.偏好差异导致关系剧烈恶化,而偏好受战略环境制约,国家在短期内若无法实现其最优目标则会寻求低层次目标的满足,双边关系易于发生快速剧烈转圜.中日关系的这一特殊现象反映了双方深层次共同利益共识的匮乏,故而难以建立更深入的政策协调和政治互信.破解这一困境的关键在于共同利益的培植和地区治理意识的强化,总的来看中日关系的中短期前景仍不乐观.
Since the outbreak of COVID-19 in early 2020,the vaccine cooperation between China and Southeast Asian countries has achieved some results. Generally,the governments of Southeast Asian countries holds a positive attitude towards China’s vaccine aid. However,Southeast Asian countries have different reactions to China’s vaccine aid,which can be roughly divided into two types according to the degree of dependence on China’s vaccine aid,namely strong dependence and weak dependence. The former includes Cambodia,Myanmar,Laos,Indonesia,the Philippines,Malaysia and Thailand,and the latter includes Singapore,Vietnam,Brunei,and East Timor.
