Although only a recently introduced term of art, philosophical enquiry under the rubric of 'normativity' has quickly become a major industry. A date-range search of the Philosopher's Index for titles with the word returns zero results before 1980,1 three results for the '80s, 76 results for the '90s and (to date) 218 results for the 2000s.2 Philosophical appeals to normativity are also exceptionally widespread. In addition to the subjects traditionally considered 'normative'—ethics, practical reason, political and legal philosophy and epistemology—it is increasingly common for philosophers to maintain that normativity is essential in the analysis of subjects as diverse as truth, meaning, probability and psychological attitudes like belief. This article is therefore unavoidably selective and idiosyncratic in the issues and literature it addresses, focusing on some recent developments in metaethics on the nature of normativity. The explosion of work under this rubric doesn't signify a newly discovered frontier, however. 'Normativity' is merely a new label for one of the oldest and most central of philosophical problems, previously approached through a variety of terms including 'value', 'good', 'ought', 'justification', 'rationality' and 'obligation'. So why has this new word been embraced so quickly and widely? The answer is that philosophers are interested in a phenomenon or character taken to be shared by the topics picked out by these terms, but only imperfectly and incompletely picked out by any of them. Normativity is what distinguishes the value side of the 'fact/value distinction', but since many writers believe in normative facts this distinction is problematic. It also distinguishes the ought side of the 'is/ought distinction', but many paradigmatically normative statements—like those ascribing goodness—involve an 'is' rather than an 'ought'. Hence it is common for contemporary writers, like Judith Jarvis Thomson (2008), to explain what they mean by 'normativity' by ostension, in the tradition of Wittgenstein (1997/1930), inviting us to notice the common character shared by various normative notions. The embrace of the term, then, is a consequence of the need for some convenient and efficient way to refer to this important yet hitherto nameless character.
原《侵权责任法》制定以前,一些单行法中就已经存在大量有关高度危险责任抗辩事由的规定,原《侵权责任法》在吸收借鉴单行法中有关高度危险责任规定的基础上制定了"高度危险责任"一章,《民法典》侵权责任编第八章"高度危险责任"基本继承了原《侵权责任法》的规定.《民法典》总则编第八章"民事责任"与侵权责任编第一章"一般规定"规定了 8项一般性抗辩事由.在现行法律体系下,高度危险责任的抗辩事由存在适用上的冲突问题,侵权责任编和单行法存在冲突时应优先适用侵权责任编的规定,除高度危险责任的一般条款外,一般性抗辩事由不能适用于侵权责任编第八章,侵权责任编第八章确立了"危险程度越大,抗辩可能性越小"的价值构造,其内部存在层次分明的责任体系,应以侵权责任编第八章的规定作为高度危险责任抗辩事由的适用准则.
人工智能技术的迭代发展对现有法律制度的冲击越来越大.现有学说大多从法律规制层面分析人工智能法律主体资格的实质,但这一研究路径很难形成有效的理论支撑.本文从人工智能的运行机理入手,从技术源头揭示其基本属性:运算能力、交互功能、按照预设规则运行、自主学习并独立运行.研究通过对比指出,现阶段的所谓人工智能技术仍处于准人工智能阶段,现有技术往往只具备上述基本属性的前3个特征,并不具有自主能力,进而从人本主义出发,对目前人工智能的法律主体问题加以分析,并结合人工智能持续高速发展的现实,重点关注数据产权定性、数据使用规则、人工智能研发规范引导几方面的法律规制.
最高人民法院《关于审理银行卡民事纠纷案件若干问题的规定》第4条至第15条构建了银行卡盗刷的三层责任分配.在第一层责任分配,针对伪卡盗刷与网络盗刷,发卡行均应先行偿付,不存在完全免责说的适用余地.相对应,持卡人可以主张资金偿还请求权以及损害赔偿请求权.持卡人就资金偿还请求权,仅需要提出初步证据,并就损害赔偿请求权承担证明责任.发卡行就授权支付承担证明责任.在第二层责任分配,发卡行可基于持卡人违反附随义务主张损害赔偿,以实现责任分担,但应该参考《电子商务法》第57条第2款后句关于非授权支付的主旨,抬高持卡人的过错标准至重大过失.发卡行的损害赔偿请求权范围受到与有过失、违反减损规则之限定.在第三层责任分配,发卡行对收单行或特约商户享有追偿权,但是,需顾及委托人损害赔偿请求权与不当得利返还请求权二者的适用.发卡行、支付机构等主体对盗刷人的追偿权,应属于侵权损害赔偿请求权.
自然法思想具有两种历史维度:法与自然的区分以及普遍主义和世界城邦的观念,两者均源于古希腊.法与自然的区分源自古希腊的礼法与自然的二元区分.这一区分在神话叙事中已见端倪,米利都的自然哲学家与赫拉克利特将其发展为统一的观念,这种统一观念又被悲剧作家所打破,并在智术师的思想中彻底分裂.苏格拉底的哲学上的爱欲思想则在礼法与自然之间作了弥合并建立了两者之间的新关系.而古希腊的政治上的爱欲思想则促使家庭联合为城邦,城邦发展为帝国,帝国再进一步发展为普遍主义与世界城邦的观念,并最终与前一个维度结合,共同形成了自然法思想的基础.
