This essay will explore historical and conceptual analogies between emergent theories of space in the early modern and contemporary periods, where an emergent space (spacetime) theory regards space as an emergent property or effect of a nonspatial (non-spatiotemporal) substance or substances. While emergent spacetime hypotheses are the dominate methodology in contemporary quantum gravity research, it will be demonstrated that the basic metaphysical presuppositions underlying Kant's precritical monadology are roughly analogous to those assumed in various modern conceptions. In addition to demonstrating that contemporary emergent space ontologies are not a unique development, since there are early modern historical precedents, the main goal of the essay is to reveal the lessons that both camps can draw from each other on possible lines of development, especially as regards the "spatial presence" problem-that is, whether nonspatial elements illegitimately presuppose spatial concepts. Whereas the spatial presence problem presented a major obstacle to Kant's monadology, the evolution of contemporary physics provides resources that have the potential to resolve that issue.
Although "experimentation" as a philosophical topic is typically seen as a product of the 1980s, reflections on experimentation have a longer history. This longer history can be read as a hotbed of different ways in which the aim of philosophy of science was understood. This article illustrates this through an examination of Hugo Dingler and Gaston Bachelard, embodying different conceptions of what philosophy of science should aim for, and how reflecting on experimentation is part of that project. Dingler invokes the role of experimentation to stress the closedness of science, highlighting how abstract theories are always grounded in practical and material practices. Bachelard, in contrast, puts experimentation at the center of his philosophy to stress the openness of science, allowing him to appreciate the dynamism and novelty found in scientific practices. The article also explores the legacies of both Dingler and Bachelard, highlighting how also in these histories the disagreements about why we should engage with philosophy of science are at the center. Therefore, to understand the history of philosophy of experimentation, we need to write a history of the aims of philosophy of science.
We document the evolution of Karl Marx's take on infinitesimals. We contrast his initial favorable stance with later criticisms and examine the differing perspectives of Marx and Friedrich Engels on the subject. Marx's favorable assessment was based on his study of Sauri's textbook. Later, influenced by Boucharlat's textbook, Marx reversed his position to an unfavorable stance, describing belief in infinitesimals as a 'chimera'. Marxist scholar Guglielmo Carchedi claims that "Marx differentiates with the eyes of the social scientist, of the dialectician" but fails to note dialectician Engels's endorsement of infinitesimals. Struik linked Marx to Abraham Robinson but missed the fact that the link passes via-Pierre de Fermat. As such, there may be an affinity, as per Struik, between Marx's comments on the calculus and Robinson's nonstandard analysis, but the kernel of such an affinity resides in the techniques already found in the context of Fermat's adequality. To adapt Carchedi's metaphor, we could say that Marx may have differentiated with the eyes of adaequo of Fermat. The first editor who worked on some of Marx's mathematical manuscripts in the mid-1920s was Emil J. Gumbel, although he is not mentioned in either the 1933 or the 1968 Soviet edition of Marx's mathematical manuscripts.
Among the many intellectual roots of Otto Neurath's thought, the Enlightenment is a crucial reference, but the significance of the French Enlightenment (Lumi & egrave;res) remains largely unexplored. Neurath, however, consistently engaged with this tradition, and within it, Denis Diderot emerges as a key figure. Evidence of Neurath's reading of Diderot spans decades, from early mentions of his literary works to his encyclopedic writings, up to annotations of Diderot's Letter on the Blind found in his exile library. Diderot's encyclopedism-classification without a rigid system, collaborative nature, evolving structure, and the social relevance of this endeavor-deeply resonated with Neurath's scientific world-conception and his view of unified science. More than a passing reference, Diderot's encyclopedism provided both an epistemological and editorial model for Neurath's International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. In this article, I analyze Neurath's explicit references to Diderot to reconstruct this reception: the ways of referencing, their timeline, his manner of approach, the motivations underlying Neurath's interest, and their meaning. I outline a shared intellectual attitude, committed to an empirical, critical, and antidogmatic approach to knowledge across disciplinary boundaries. This rapprochement between Neurath and Diderot illuminates an unexamined but foundational connection between the Lumi & egrave;res and logical empiricism.
It is a widespread view that Rudolf Carnap, after his physicalist turn around 1930, was a logical behaviorist and an antirealist or eliminativist about experience until the end of his career. I contend that both views are false. I argue that Carnap was never a logical behaviorist in the now-customary sense of the term. Whether he was a logical behaviorist in another sense is a disputed issue. My view is-in opposition to Sean Crawford, Thomas Uebel, and Ramon Cirera-that Carnap was a logical behaviorist in the early 1930s, in the sense the term was used in the logical empiricist tradition. I also argue that Carnap was never an experience eliminativist, contrary to Paul Feyerabend's and Daniel Kuby's more recent claims. Nevertheless, I suggest that Carnap's physicalist position regarding experience may be characterized by the thesis of "experience idleness" and was similar in relevant respects to the latter-day reductionist materialist approaches of Jack Smart and David Armstrong. Finally, I explore the reasons why Carnap gave up logical behaviorism and how this change was essentially connected with changes in his views regarding knowledge of other minds and the cognitive significance of phenomenal language.
