ABSTRACT In my (2020) I defended an intentionalist understanding of Chomskyan linguistics whereby standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”) such as words, phrases and phonemes don’t exist, but are “intentional inexistents” merely represented in our brains. Reviewers complained this was in tension with “externalist” theories of representation that require externalia as causes of internal representations. I argue that this requirement can be met by the kind of idealization to which Chomskyan theories appeal, which, like the idealized dispositions that regularly appear in physical sciences, can be understood along the lines of Quine’s (1960) invocation of Weierstrass’s “delta-epsilon” strategy for defining a limit in calculus. Where such a strategy is available in a domain, it would seem to render the externalist/internalist distinction there explanatorily otiose.
ABSTRACT Noam Chomsky’s contributions to the study of language span over seven decades. His work is often attributed the status of scientific revolution (Miller 2003). He is especially accredited with resetting the agenda in theoretical linguistics towards the investigation of an idealised state of the mind/brain (Chomsky 1965) interpreted as an innate, internalised system or an I-language (Chomsky 1986). Chomsky’s philosophical defence of this view has generally been along naturalistic lines, i.e., the most tractable scientific way to study language involves treating it as a domain-specific state of the human brain (Chomsky 2000). In this article, I explore an alternative interpretation of Chomsky’s philosophical contributions to language in terms of the emerging field of conceptual engineering. First, I distinguish between naturalism and conceptual engineering. Even though the two approaches can be complementary, I suggest that the latter involves an overt ameliorative or normative element (Cappelen 2020; Haslanger 2000). I then show that certain aspects of Chomsky’s oeuvre are better suited for a conceptual engineering interpretation (i.e., I-language) while others align more closely with his naturalism (i.e., biolinguistics).
ABSTRACT Noam Chomsky and his colleagues have proposed that human languages are basically designed for construction of inner thoughts so that individual humans can plan ahead, thus giving selectional advantage to the species. The sound part of language in this view is ancillary, it is meant only for the externalization of thought. Call it a ‘thought-only’ view of language. We challenge this view by showing that the thought-only conception of language cannot accommodate the referential function of languages. We probe the issue with a focus on what philosophers call Singular Terms that enable a language-user to pick out, identify, and draw attention to an individual object. The presence of singular terms in a human language not only gives a shape to human thoughts about individuals, it ensures that such thoughts are shared between conspecifics. Since such sharing cannot be accomplished without explicit articulation, the sound of singular terms is essential for human language, it is not ‘ancillary.’
Abstract The long-running disputes between Chomsky and Quine were manifold—sometimes deep and important, but other times, it seems, involving misunderstanding. They are both ‘theorists of language’, but I suggest that Quine came to cede some ground—or could have ceded some ground—without conceding the role he thinks is played by language in Naturalized Epistemology, which is perhaps the fundamental Quinean project. Very roughly: Chomsky is interested in psychology, namely the psychology of how humans manage to speak (or rather to become linguistically competent); Quine can cede that territory to Chomsky, for he is interested ultimately in certain aspects of the finished product, namely those aspects of language which embody knowledge.
ABSTRACT This paper examines Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument in relation to Chomskyan generative grammar, focusing on selectional restrictions. While Wittgenstein views meaning determining rules as context-dependent and socially embedded, Chomsky treats linguistic rules as computational and internal to the mind. I argue that Wittgenstein’s critique does not apply to most syntactic rules but poses a challenge for selectional restrictions, which rely on world knowledge. If lexical features depend on external factors, selectional restrictions cannot be purely internalist. To preserve internalist semantics, I propose a modification of Pietroski’s (2018) model in which meaning rules function automatically, eliminating interpretative choice. This approach reconciles internalism with linguistic flexibility while maintaining its explanatory power within a generative framework.
ABSTRACT Chomsky’s linguistic theorizing is underwritten by a subtle and powerful vision of scientific methodology. One key aspect of this methodology involves the division between phenomena which can cue scientists into core properties of the target of scientific interest, for Chomsky the human language faculty, and observations which are confounded by interactions between this and other, nontarget, systems. This methodology most (in)famously surfaces in appeals to the distinction between competence and performance. This paper argues that proper interpretation, and application, of this distinction places strong constraints on the interpretation of linguistic theories, ruling out prominent alternatives to Chomsky’s cognitivist approach.
In the literature, one finds no shortage of discussion on reasons to deny the truth of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), and with them, reasons to reject the rationalist systems associated with it. In this paper, I develop the thought that there is a hitherto unexplored dimension along which the PSR can be evaluated that has substantive consequences for how we understand both the principle and the rationalisms derived from it. A principle, I argue, can be endorsed, used, or have its truth validated by a system of thought; and these roles can be played independently of one another. Bearing this three-fold distinction in mind, we can come to see that there are actually a much larger variety of ways in which one can be a rationalist (or fail to be a rationalist), and in which one can be in the business of (or not be in the business of) the PSR. To draw out the value of recognizing these different roles, I explore the system of Buddhist thinker N & amacr;g & amacr;rjuna, who, it has recently been suggested, appears to endorse the PSR.
In this dialogue, You (Michael Della Rocca) and Me (Filippo Casati) discuss the relation between their philosophical positions, and the relevance of those positions for contemporary thinking as well. In the first part of the conversation, You and Me speak about their uncompromising commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). You believes that the PSR entails a radical form of monism according to which there are no relations whatsoever; Me believes that the PSR entails the existence of a contradictory entity which explains the existence of everything else. In the (logical) interlude, You and Me explain how their uncompromising commitment to the PSR challenges (classical) logic, although such a challenge has very different consequences. Me is an illogicist (i.e., he rejects classical logic because he endorses another kind of logic, the paraconsistent one); You is an alogicist (i.e., he rejects classical logic because he rejects logic tout court). In the last part, You and Me argue that their philosophical positions are viable, representing views which have been systematically and unwarrantedly ignored in the contemporary debate about the paradoxes generated by the PSR.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is a cornerstone of rationalist metaphysics, yet many of its consequences remain underexplored. I argue that among these underexplored consequences is a striking variety of neutral monism, construed as the thesis that all entities share the same fundamental modal base. My argument proceeds in three stages. First, I motivate a commitment to attributes, metaphysically necessary properties that ultimately explain an entity's modal profile. Second, I argue that the PSR supports the claim that every entity must instantiate every attribute. Third, I draw out the metaphysical implications of this conclusion: I show that it rules out substance dualism, versions of reductive and nonreductive physicalism, and idealism in favour of a neutral monist ontology.
The issues raised by Parmenides's deployment of monism and the principle of sufficient reason often become increasingly acute and interesting the more literally we take Parmenides. Here I explore taking Parmenides Fr. 8, 42-45 literally-"As there is an ultimate limit, it is complete, in all ways like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere, equivalent in all ways from the centre. For it must not be any larger or any smaller here or there." I argue that it generates an interesting sufficient-reason critique of pre-Parmenidean cosmogony and poses ongoing problems for matter theory and cosmogony.
This paper explores the debate between F.H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell that helped to ignite the tradition of analytical philosophy in the English-speaking world. Bradley forcefully argued for existence monism. Russell equally forcefully argued for existence pluralism. My surprising contention is that the Jewish intellectual tradition has the resources to integrate both sides of their debate without contradiction.
In this paper I argue against the view that essences are related to the things that have them as properties those things cannot lose without losing their identity. If things have their essences, regresses develop and unravel the ontology. Both Modal Essentialism and Kit Fine's Definitional Essentialism are open to such regresses. By contrast, I advocate a type of essentialism according to which things do not have essences and are not qualified by their essences, but rather, they are constituted by their essences.
Can three metaphysical wrongs make a right? Monism, idealism, and panentheism each sit well outside the contemporary mainstream. I argue that, suitably combined, they form a mutually supporting triad. The key move draws on a form of idealism according to which bodies are merely representational objects of mental representation. Applied to panentheism, this yields the view that everything besides God exists wholly in God as the object of a divine idea. That proposal specifies the elusive "in" relation of panentheism while preventing the world's limitations and evils from bleeding into the divine nature. In turn, panentheism supplies idealism with a single divine mind to anchor its dependence claims, and together these commitments amount to a nonmereological form of priority monism. I close by examining whether the view can distinguish actuality from mere possibility and secure genuine finite subjectivity.
In The Parmenidean Ascent, Michael Della Rocca presents a fascinating case for what he calls Strict Monism, which is the thesis that there are no distinctions. In this paper I shall explain why I do not believe in Strict Monism. I shall first explain Strict Monism in detail, and then I shall explain why it is false. If a thesis is false, whatever arguments have been provided for it must fail in one way or another, and so I shall also explain why and how the arguments provided for Strict Monism fail. Finally, I shall comment on the significance of my conclusions and I shall point out, among other things, that we do not have any reason, at least at the moment, to think that any version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason entails Strict Monism.
The trans-temporal and trans-spatial nature of climate change demands an understanding of past, present, and future environmental change. This knowledge comes through scientific, cultural, and other sources. While environmental aesthetics has been contributing to this endeavor through progress on 'intergenerational aesthetics', and 'future aesthetics', a problem arises when we consider that aesthetic experience is usually articulated through present, first-hand perceptual encounters in the world. To address this gap, I argue that imagination's powers of creativity, individual, and collective imaginings provide a valuable tool for accessing 'unreachable' aesthetic qualities, or qualities that are not present to first-hand perception of the world. I show how environmental aesthetic experience and the role of imagination function to complement and enrich scientific and other resources, thus supporting the comprehension of environmental change now and into the future.
From a traditional environmental ethics perspective, rights of nature are linked to debates about nonanthropocentrism because they give legal force to the idea that nature has intrinsic moral value. However, we claim that the emergence of Indigenous-led rights of nature initiatives shows that intercultural respect is also an important aspect of this issue. Supported by an example involving an Indigenous nation in Peru, we explain how intercultural respect encourages greater engagement between Western and Indigenous philosophies. On this basis, we advance an argument that a river can be a living being with interests of its own. We also explain how intercultural respect is helpful for understanding the relationship between rights of nature and climate change. In general, our contention is that rights of nature should be understood in the context of efforts to counteract the disrespect of marginalized groups commonly found in environmental injustices.
Although concerns about large-scale implementation of Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) are well known, the ethical implications of 'nature-based' forms remain underexplored. Depending upon their implementation, these projects may benefit or harm local communities and biodiversity, risks that may be obscured by framing them as 'natural'. We examine 'nature-based' CDR by contrasting three conceptions of the capabilities approach that may be extended to nonhumans. While two of these conceptions face justificatory challenges arising from widespread environmental pluralism, we build upon Amartya Sen's conception to propose a deliberative model of climate justice. This model calls for participatory processes to determine which nonhuman entities are recognized as subjects of justice, ensuring that CDR decisions reflect the full range of environmental values at stake in each context.
Philosophers have widely debated and defended nonanthropocentric environmental ethics. However, nonanthropocentrism rarely features in philosophical climate ethics, which has been largely anthropocentric in focus. In contrast, Indigenous peoples throughout the world have offered a diverse array of arguments for climate action-arguments intent on achieving impact at scale-but that hinge on nonanthropocentric environmental ethics, often in relation to Indigenous peoples' own institutions for taking care of the environment, or 'caretaking institutions'. These arguments contain claims, based on nonanthropocentric ideas, about how climate action can be scaled up through Indigenous caretaking institutions. Additionally, one of the successful measures some Indigenous peoples have taken to scale up climate action is to carve out formal spaces in national and multilateral institutions for philosophizing about nonanthropocentric ethics and climate action. Climate ethicists should consider the contribution Indigenous peoples are making in developing nonanthropocentric ethics for climate action, both for developing philosophical approaches and for the actual mitigation of climate change 'at scale'.
This paper outlines central challenges that climate change presents for environmental ethics, and some important responses to it. We briefly introduce key ideas from environmental ethics and note the importance of nonanthropocentrism to the history of environmental ethics. We point out that while philosophers have previously engaged with the impacts of climate change, their primary focus has typically been on intra- and intergenerational justice between humans. More recently, however, environmental ethicists have developed wide-ranging responses to climate change, recognizing that its pervasive nature makes defending traditional values (such as wildness) and strategies (such as setting aside reserves) difficult in practice. We conclude by outlining divergent ways of developing environmental ethics in the light of climate change.
Several theorists have argued that ecological systems and wildlife populations should be engineered to improve wild animal welfare, promote justice for wild animals, or maximize resources for people. These views are transformational, rather than deferential towards ecological and evolutionary processes. In this paper I advocate for deference in ecosystem management on environmental values, species/organism impartiality, and humility grounds. I defend deferential views against critiques from proponents of transformation to improve animal welfare, and argue that macroscale anthropogenic change, including climate change, strengthens rather than undermines the case for deference. Although not a comprehensive argument against transformation in general or transformation to improve wild animal welfare in particular, the considerations that support deference generate a substantial presumption against transformationalism.
