Dennett's theory of the self as a center of narrative gravity (cNG) stands out as a rare instance of human exceptionalism within a philosophy otherwise characterized by a deep commitment to the notion of evolutionary continuity. According to cNG, though all living organisms possess a minimal or biological self, only human beings -through their use of language- create the kind of self-representations necessary for the possession of a richer, socially constructed, narrative self. Dennett points to this uniquely human trait of narrative self-representation as the means by which we generate a self that is different in kind from the selves of all other animals. In this paper I suggest that we can resolve this tension between cNG and evolutionary continuity by (1) reconsidering the notion of narrative as it plays a role in Dennett's theory of self, and (2) acknowledging that the same social pressures Dennett cites as the impetus for our development of a self-concept are present for many other animal species as well. If other animals can also think in narrative terms, then cNG need not be understood as an endorsement of human exceptionalism. I conclude that expanding cNG in such a way that it can include the selves of both human and some non-human animals is appropriate in light of both the evidence of highly complex social worlds of several non-human animal species and the central role that evolutionary continuity plays in Dennett's overall
Daniel Dennett conceives language as an adaptive strategy of "Gregorian systems", creatures designed by evolution to accumulate and transmit knowledge and tools. In this context, words are "mental tools" that can be manipulated and used to generate intelligent behavior. On the other hand, a body of research has identified effects of written language on different cognitive domains. This paper explores, based on Dennett's evolutionary approach to mind and language, what might be the distinctive features of the literate mind, and in what sense these might justify considering it a subtype of the "Gregorian mind".
I argue that Daniel Dennett makes two important contributions to thinking philosophically about the notion of self. First, his narrative conception of the self (self as the "center of narrative gravity"). Second, his concept of 'real patterns' which, when applied to the self, forces us to rethink the idea of self as a center of narrative gravity. If we understand the self as a self-pattern, then it is more than a center of narrative gravity. Self-narrative is only one factor in the self-pattern although it plays two important roles: (a) as one among other elements of the self-pattern it contributes to self-constitution; (b) self-narrative reflects all the other significant factors that make up the self-pattern. Accordingly, as Dennett himself suggested, self-narrative "is a much more complicated concept" than an abstract center of gravity.
This note examines four recent translations of Spinoza's Ethics, which constitute a significant editorial milestone in Spinozist studies and merit careful reflection. The discussion is organized into two sections. The first highlights the noteworthy 'editorial' features of these editions, including introductions, notes, and commentaries that enhance their scholarly value. The second focuses on the translation work itself, with particular attention to one aspect of the translation of the first part of the Ethics: the vocabulary of difference. This analysis seeks to illuminate a certain vulgate concerning the text's very wording.
Since Dennett (Content and Consciousness) introduced the personal-subpersonal distinction, it is used in various disciplines. Although there is a relative consensus on the idea that the distinction is fundamentally located at the explanatory level, there are philosophers who have used it as an ontological distinction to refer to states and processes. Some consider this to be an "abuse" of the distinction and that it leads to confusion between different uses of it, and even to assimilate it to another very close distinction such as the doxastic-subdoxastic one. In this paper, I will first clarify the distinction and show that Dennett has always defended a similar conception of it. Secondly, I will defend that some attempts to clarify the distinction not only fail to shed light on it but do nothing but obscure its usefulness by dictating correct and incorrect uses, and leaving aside the plurality of phenomena for which it was postulated. Finally, I will offer certain generalizations under which I consider the typical phenomena for which the distinction was formulated fall, and will give an example showing how useful it is in exposing the weakness of a philosophical argument.
The notion of original intentionality, as one that has used to understand the phenomenon of meaning or mental content, has been important in the analytic tradition. Daniel Dennett sets out to present his theory of this notion in a constructivist-naturalist manner, taking Charles Darwin's theory as a central reference. While this represents a positive aspect of his explanatory model of meaning and intentional phenomena, a detailed analysis shows that there are fundamental aspects of his proposal that drift into eliminativism, which generates some explanatory shortcomings. My purpose will be to account for these difficulties and, in light of this analysis, propose an alternative research path that seeks to preserve the virtues of his approach, including some central theoretical elements that allow us to avoid, on the one hand, its negative consequences and, on the other hand, to show the importance of defending a robust notion of original intentionality.
This article explores Giordano Bruno's philosophy as a forerunner of modernity, focusing on his infinite-centered metaphysics within the prisca theologia framework. Bruno advances a vision of divine immanence that diminishes Christian transcendence, portraying God as intrinsic to the infinite universe yet distinct from it. He views humans as a microcosm bridging the finite and the infinite, capable of pursuing deification through rational contemplation of nature. His rejection of Aristotelianism and Revelation, coupled with his emphasis on reason and nature as paths to the Absolute, establishes him as a "matutinal" thinker anticipating modern philosophy. The ethics of "heroic furor" elevates freedom and knowledge as routes to human perfection, shaping an anthropology centered on the pursuit of the immanent divine.
El presente trabajo propone una revisión crítica de cuatro recientes traducciones de la Ética de Spinoza. Estas publicaciones constituyen un acontecimiento editorial importante en los estudios spinozistas sobre el que es necesario reflexionar. El trabajo será dividido en dos secciones. En la primera, se dará cuenta del notable aparato crítico con que fueron dotadas estas publicaciones: introducción, notas y comentarios, que son también lo que da su valor científico a este tipo de trabajo. En la segunda, se considerará el trabajo de traducción propiamente tal. Al respecto, me centraré en un solo aspecto de la traducción de la primera parte de la Ética, a saber, el vocabulario de la diferencia. Con ello espero dar cuenta de una cierta vulgata relativa a la letra misma del texto de la Ética.
Desde que Dennett introdujo la distinción personal-subpersonal en Content and Consciousness, esta se ha utilizado en diversas disciplinas. Aunque hay consenso en que la distinción se ubica principalmente en el nivel explicativo, algunos filósofos la han empleando como una distinción ontológica para referirse a estados y procesos, lo cual algunos consideran un abuso que genera confusión, incluso asimilándola a la distinción doxástica-subdoxástica. En este trabajo, primero clarificaré la distinción, mostrando que Dennett la ha defendido como una idea similar. Luego, argumentaré que algunos intentos de aclararla no solo fracasan en iluminarla sino que también la oscurecen, al definir usos correctos e incorrectos y omitir la pluralidad de fenómenos para los que fue propuesta. Finalmente, ofreceré generalizaciones sobre los fenómenos típicos para los cuales fue formulada, ilustrando su utilidad mediante un ejemplo que revela la fragilidad de un argumento filosófico.
La noción de intencionalidad original, como una que busca comprender el fenómeno del significado o entendimiento, ha sido importante en la tradición analítica. Daniel Dennett se propone dar su teoría sobre tal noción en una manera constructivista-naturalista, tomando como referente central la teoría de Charles Darwin. Y si bien esto representa un punto positivo de su modelo explicativo sobre el entendimiento, un análisis detallado muestra que hay aspectos fundamentales de su propuesta que derivan en un eliminativismo, lo que genera algunas insuficiencias explicativas. Mi propósito será dar cuenta de tales dificultades y, a la luz de este análisis, proponer un camino alterno que busca conservar las virtudes de su enfoque, incluir algunos elementos teóricos centrales que nos permiten evitar sus consecuencias negativas y mostrar la importancia de defender una noción robusta de la intencionalidad original.
Comenzamos caracterizando la concepción “funcionalista homuncular” de la mente de Dennett, tal como es descrita en su obra temprana. A continuación, la comparamos con la bosquejada en From Bacteria to Bach and Back. Argumentamos que los cambios recientes en la posición de Dennett han producido cierta tensión en su visión de las descomposiciones funcionales. Supuestamente, las descomposiciones funcionales basadas en la postura intencional terminan en un nivel inferior, no inteligente, que puede explicarse mecánicamente. Sin embargo, puesto que Dennett cree ahora que las neuronas podrían tener que ser descritas en términos intencionales, no queda claro si nuestras explicaciones de las funciones cognitivas van a casar con nuestras explicaciones de la conducta de neuronas y redes. Exploramos las consecuencias de esta tensión para la teoría de Dennett y para la neurociencia cognitiva en general.
Este trabajo presenta las principales tesis de la metafísica de Giordano Bruno, que adecuadamente se clasifica dentro del género de concepciones sobre la totalidad que recibe el nombre de neoplatonismo. Sin embargo, al interior del neoplatonismo pueden diferenciarse dos subgrupos con cierta claridad: el pagano, representado por autores como Plotino, Proclo y Jámbico, por ejemplo, y el cristiano, cuyos paradigmas más conocidos son Dionisio el Areopagita, san Agustín y Escoto Eriúgena, entre otros. Muchas veces Giordano Bruno vacila en algunos de sus planteamientos, pero si se considera que el cosmos es infinito, como Dios, entonces parece plegarse más al modelo pagano.
Daniel Dennett concibe al lenguaje como una estrategia adaptativa de los “sistemas gregorianos”, criaturas diseñadas por la evolución para acumular y transmitir conocimientos y herramientas. En este contexto, las palabras son “herramientas-mentales” que pueden ser manipuladas y utilizadas para generar comportamientos inteligentes. Por otro lado, un conjunto de investigaciones identificó efectos del lenguaje escrito en distintos dominios cognitivos. Este trabajo explora, apoyándose en el enfoque evolutivo de la mente y del lenguaje de Dennett, cuáles podrían ser los rasgos característicos de la mente alfabetizada, y en qué sentido estos podrían justificar considerarla un subtipo de “mente gregoriana”.
Dennett’s theory of the self as a center of narrative gravity (CNG) highlights human exceptionalism amid a philosophy emphasizing evolutionary continuity. CNG suggests all organisms have a basic self, but only humans use language to create complex, socially constructed selves. Dennett sees this narrative self as uniquely human. I propose that we can reconcile CNG with evolution by rethinking narrative's role and recognizing that social pressures influencing human self-concept are also present in many animals. If animals can think narratively, CNG doesn't necessarily imply human exceptionalism. Expanding CNG to include some non-human animals aligns with evidence of their complex social lives and Dennett’s emphasis on evolution.
I argue that Daniel Dennett makes two important contributions to thinking philosophically about the notion of self. First, his narrative conception of the self (self as the “center of narrative gravity”). Second, his concept of ‘real patterns’ which, when applied to the self, forces us to rethink the idea of self as a center of narrative gravity. If we understand the self as a self-pattern, then it is more than a center of narrative gravity. Self-narrative is only one factor in the self-pattern although it plays two important roles: (a) as one among other elements of the self-pattern it contributes to self-constitution; (b) self-narrative reflects all the other significant factors that make up the self-pattern. Accordingly, as Dennett himself suggested, self-narrative “is a much more complicated concept” than an abstract center of gravity.
We begin by characterizing Dennett's "homuncular functionalist" view of the mind, as described in his early work. We then contrast that view with the one outlined in From Bacteria to Bach and Back. We argue that recent changes in Dennett's view have produced tension in the way he conceives of functional decompositions. Functional decompositions based on the intentional stance are supposed to reach a bottom, "dumb" level which can be explained mechanically; however, since Dennett now believes that neurons may need to be described intentionally, it is not clear whether our explanations of cognitive functions can ever align with our explanations of neuronal and network behaviors. We explore the consequences of this tension for Dennett's view, and for cognitive neuroscience in general.
El presente artículo analiza la tesis sartreana sobre la muerte, desarrollada en el capítulo de El ser y la nada titulado “Mi muerte”. Esta tesis se resume en lo siguiente: la muerte es un absurdo que interrumpe todo proyecto humano; por lo tanto, no puede dar sentido a la vida ni formar parte de lo más propio de la condición humana. En otras palabras, la muerte no constituye ni fundamenta al ser humano. El propósito de este artículo es examinar la noción de muerte en Sartre y los problemas ontológicos que plantea. Para ello, se revisará primero su tesis sobre la muerte y, posteriormente, la crítica que formula al concepto heideggeriano de muerte.
Nuestro objetivo es mostrar que Ser y tiempo sostiene una posición idealista, en contraposición a lo defendido por Dreyfus y Spinosa. La naturaleza, que es reducida a lo intramundano, se presenta en esta obra como independiente o anterior al Dasein, más esto supone el despliegue temporal de la existencia. Aun así, Ser y tiempo no logra explicitar la excedencia de la naturaleza. Sostenemos que la figura de la tierra y la noción de “acontecimiento” permiten dar cuenta de esta excedencia.
Las teorías de Levinas y Sartre acerca del rostro y la mirada marcan un punto de inflexión en el abordaje de la alteridad en la fenomenología. En este artículo realizo un análisis comparativo de ambas doctrinas con el propósito de mostrar su originalidad, similitudes y disimilitudes. Para ello, abordo dos momentos clave. Primero, examino el punto de partida común de ambos fenomenólogos: el esfuerzo por dar cuenta del carácter absoluto y no relativo del Otro. Segundo, discurro acerca del papel de la generosidad en sus proyectos éticos, distinguiendo el enfoque deontológico de Levinas y el axiológico de Sartre.
