Metaethical value pluralism is the claim that there are many equally fundamental values that matter for normative choice, rather than one fundamental value. Deliberative democracy is an ideal from political theory stating that respectful, reasoned communicative contestations between free and equal citizens about the relative merits of policies is preferable to mere majoritarian voting. At first glance, both claims go together well. However, several theorists argue that they are incompatible: Value pluralists cannot be deliberative democrats, and deliberative democrats cannot be value pluralists. The argument rests on the supposition that plural fundamental values preclude a common standard of comparison that allows for weighing off different values, thereby rendering deliberation about value conflicts pointless. I argue that this supposition is implausible: Plural fundamental values can be rationally compared. The key is to conceive of the relevant standard as less fundamental than the values at stake. I conclude that value pluralists can remain neutral on the issue of deliberative democracy and that deliberative democrats can and should be value pluralists.
This paper examines the concept of rape through the lenses of epistemic injustice, social ontology, and conceptual engineering, arguing that entrenched rape myths and historically privileged meaningmaking render the operative concept of rape systematically distorted. The authors propose diagnosing these distortions via conceptual and ontological analysis and outline an ameliorative agenda that (a) revises both manifest (legal) and operative (everyday) concepts and (b) enriches the surrounding conceptual vocabulary to better capture the diversity of experiences of sexual harm. The paper positions this framework as a novel bridge between recent meta-ontological work and feminist philosophy on hermeneutical injustice, aiming to guide future theoretical and practical improvements.
Aging with a transformative illness such as dementia is – due to a progress of cognitive and sensory losses – often referenced and symbolized as “the social death”. Such a predominantly cognitive view posits a challenge to those affected and to those who care for people with dementia. In contrast to this disruptive view, an embodied and relational account of dementia stresses levels of the pre-reflective and relational self that allow for engaging with the world and attuning to the other through various bodily senses. By referring to case studies of multisensory engagement (e.g. Validation, Snoezelen) I show how states of well-being can emerge by turning to someone’s affective identity through body memory, interbodily resonance and therapeutic atmospheres, thereby constituting a synaesthetic responsivity. I argue that multisensory engagement contributes to participatory bodily sense-making and well-being within situations of existential crisis, providing possibilities for the “disoriented” self in dementia.
We acknowledge funding from Next Generation EU, in the context of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan, Investment PE8 – Project Age-It: “Ageing Well in an Ageing Society” [DM 1557 11.10.2022]. The views and opinions expressed are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Commission. Neither the European Union nor the European Commission can be held responsible for them. This resource was co-financed by the Next Generation EU.
This contribution examines the relevance of the concept “limit situation” in relation to aging and old age in a geriatric psychotherapy setting. The idea is to bring together concepts from phenomenology and the philosophy of age with methods from the field of qualitative social research. Experiences of groundlessness are viewed through the lens of Karl Jaspers’ terminology, leading to conceptualizing a dynamic of stabilizing beliefs yielding in the context of aging and old age. The results promise to contribute to psychotherapy research and explore new ways for employing phenomenological ideas in clinical practice and research.
The prevalence of wellbeing-related afflictions such as depression is, globally, on the rise in the elderly population. In this paper, subjective and intersubjective experiential dimensions of such afflictions are explicated through the theoretical framework of enactivism. Drawing on the cyclic agent-environment relation that is at the heart of enactivism, one can yield novel insights into the nature of age-based deteriorations, along with innovative therapeutic interventions and lifestyle changes that can help to preserve the ‘ripeness’ of old age.
Aging has hitherto been overlooked by social ontologists. The article argues for its reconsideration advocating for a phenomenological shift from “aging” to “being aged” to address the major shortcomings of current approaches. Two key insights are revealed: (i) age discrimination arises from a standardized view of life that neglects the personal dimension of aging; (ii) phenomenology proves helpful in addressing qualitative assessments of aging and its social dimension while maintaining existential sensitivity. Within the proposed framework, it becomes possible to outline a theory of shared aging and transgenerationality, hinging on three main claims: a) aging unfolds as generational time shared in a transgenerational sense; b) it unites people in social wholes according to different modes and degrees; c) it inspires primary and secondary transgenerationality. All this lays the groundwork to understand generational temporality, sociality, and normativity beyond constructivism.
This paper suggests that the concept of cognitive empathy, as currently presented in much of the literature, may rest on conceptually fragile assumptions. The argument is developed in three steps: a reconstruction of the historical misunderstandings behind the idea of empathy; a comparison between mindreading and metacognition; and a proposal for an alternative view of intersubjectivity based on what is defined here as a “relational void”. Rather than demonstrating definitive claims, this contribution aims to open a critical reflection on the theoretical status of cognitive empathy and its possible redundancy when viewed through the lens of metacognitive processes.
It seems to me that I am the bearer or owner of experience. However, this impression is misleading. If I am external to experience (that is, if what I am is not reducible to the way in which I appear in the present experience), then I can’t know with absolute certainty that I exist. But I do. Hence I am not external to experience, and a fortiori I am not the external bearer of experience. If I am internal to experience, then what I am is reducible to the way in which I appear in the present experience. However, if I am a part of experience, I can’t be its owner or bearer, for an owner or bearer of something can’t be a part of what it bears or owns. Therefore, I am not the internal bearer of experience.
This paper explores ageism and generationism in ageing societies through the lens of transgenerative social ontology and critical phenomenology. It argues that the everyday Lifeworld encompasses multiage groups coexisting in the same contemporaneousness, which sets up for the constitution of personal attitudes and social interactions, both conflictual and cooperative, between people of different ages and generations. Firstly, I draw on Schützian social phenomenology, focusing on the taxonomy of consociates, contemporaries, predecessors, and successors to analyze the shared experience of growing old together and the overlapping of different generations in shaping societal structures and social tensions. Introducing the concept of Future-Maker Generations (FMGs), I identify a transgenerational social unity aimed at challenging systemic injustices and discriminatory acts rooted in stereotypical beliefs about age and generation. Following some insights from Applewhite’s manifesto against ageism, the paper addresses collective intentionality and shared values of FMGs, providing a provisional phenomenological inquiry into the enactment of transgenerational social actions.
This paper aims to analyze well-being in the elderly. Taking into account the peculiar vulnerabilities and difficulties of old age, an attempt is made to identify the most appropriate normative specification for developing ethics and public policies to provide at least sufficient levels of quality of life for the entire elderly population. Highlighting some of the limitations of the subjective and objective theories of wellbeing found in the contemporary literature, the framework offered by Sen’s capabilities approach will be endorsed, considering it capable of correlating the role played by different capabilities under different health conditions and at different stages of the aging process.
This article takes up the idea of the “chain of generations” formulated by the British philosopher McCormick and has two basic objectives: (a) to offer an examination of the notion in ontology by showing how it is to be understood according to a predominantly metaphorical meaning; (b) to show how the notion of the people, which we propose to replace that of the chain of generations, better serves the purpose, i.e. is more useful for the formulation of an ontology of transgenerationality.
In this paper, we discuss the democratic inclusion of individuals with severe cognitive disabilities and in advanced age with a severe decline of cognitive capacities. Without entering in the question whether the latter condition can be conceptually subsumed in the former, we deem that they present analogous problems from the perspectives of justice. Thus, it is helpful to discuss them together. We specifically comment on the inclusion in democratic processes of individuals that lack a high degree of cognitive capacities. The fundamental problem is present in theories of justice that require such capacities for inclusion of persons as equals in political processes. Such is the demanding deliberative democratic proposal of social contract theories, such as John Rawls’s. Worries of exclusion regard two stages of reasoning about justice. The first is the theoretical stage where decisions are made about which individuals should be included in the scope of justice. Although this stage is shaped around the hypothetical reasoning of reasonable and rational persons, there is no decisive reason to exclude individuals with severe cognitive disabilities as beneficiaries of justice. On the contrary, if commonly shared judgments require such inclusion, then this demand shapes the social contract hypothetical reasoning. There are also no decisive reasons why a deliberative democratic theory based on such social contract theories should exclude individuals that do not have high cognitive capacities at the second stage – that of democratic decision-making. On the contrary, their presence and expressive resources are precious sources of knowledge at this deliberative stage, while fairness requires their participation at the stage of decision-making. At this stage, their presence can be complemented by guardians who express the will in their name.
This paper takes a phenomenological approach to understanding self and personhood in dementia. The paper challenges the view that subjects with dementia can simply be understood in terms of diminished cognitive capacities or that they have lost all vestiges of self and personhood or the capacity for meaningful interaction. Instead, drawing on phenomenology, an alternative view is offered that can more adequately account for self and personhood, as well as self-awareness and self-experience in dementia. The view offered here is of a body-orientated and relational view of personhood and selfhood. It not only assumes that cognition is always already embodied but significantly that embodiment and embodied memory are central to personhood. It also highlights the ways in which persons are constituted and affirmed through relation with others and considers the way in which surrounding worlds or care environments might be more or less enabling in contexts of dementia and aging by attending to personhood in care.
In this contribution, we discuss the phenomenon of aging as gender-based with the help of Beauvoir’s account of aging, temporality, and gender. We explore how the social centring of the reproductive capacities of women’s bodies impacts the ways in which they might tend to experience growing old. The first section frames our analysis within Beauvoir’s philosophical project and thus poses the issue of elderly women as people who cease being able to fulfil their reproductive ‘duties’ in patriarchal societies; in the second section we stress the relationship between temporality and gender as transcendental structures of the self. This methodological basis allows us to explore in the third section the core of the Beauvoirian thesis by addressing the existential dimension of aging for women, who still have – even in an advanced age – to navigate challenging experiences related to sexuality and reproduction.
In this article, I explore how older people can experience the tensions between ‘keeping an open mind’ at older age, intergenerational shifts in cultural norms, and social separation between generations— interpreting this phenomenologically as a rupture in the intergenerational habitus. Drawing on engaged phenomenological insights from qualitative interviews, as well as Beauvoir’s and Mannheim’s theories of intergenerationality, I explore structural factors which pose specific obstacles to intergenerational relationships and open-mindedness at older age. I phenomenologically review the conditions of possibility for being open to the perspectives of younger people. In particular, I attend to a moment of ‘hesitation’ (Al-Saji, 2014) experienced by participants during which they felt aware of intergenerational differences. I consider and analyse phenomenologically the different affective responses that are possible when moments of generational difference manifest in a tangible intergenerational encounter.
This paper presents a phenomenological analysis of shame in social networks. Initially, I examine Sartre’s (1956) account of the look and shame along with Dolezal’s (2017) reinterpretation. I then explore how shame is negotiated in online interactions arguing that, in social networking systems (SNSs), shame is banned. Since subjects are constantly visible when posting content, they tend to share material that minimizes the risk of shame’s thunderstruck. Yet, this shameless self-presentation raises complex phenomenological intricacies regarding personal identity and self-identification: in SNSs individuals strive for self-completion in posts, attempting to solve their otherwise irresolvable self-individuation process.
This contribution examines the relevance of the concept “limit situation” in relation to aging and old age in a geriatric psychotherapy setting. The idea is to bring together concepts from phenomenology and the philosophy of age with methods from the field of qualitative social research. Experiences of groundlessness are viewed through the lens of Karl Jaspers’ terminology, leading to conceptualizing a dynamic of stabilizing beliefs yielding in the context of aging and old age. The results promise to contribute to psychotherapy research and explore new ways for employing phenomenological ideas in clinical practice and research.
The essay discusses the relations between structural injustice and objective alienation (also called supra-individual alienation): that is, a type of social alienation where human-established norms and practices are perceived as unchangeable external forces, necessary and prescribing adaptation. These rigidified and “naturalized” norms and practices often conceal and reinforce relations of structural injustice, and, in turn, are sustained by them. I aim at inquiring, also by applying an intersectional perspective, the theoretical and practical relations between the two: I highlight their mutual differences, explore their interconnections, and outline potential normative strategies for addressing them comprehensively. I do this with the help of fictional, but realistic examples taken from literary and philosophical works, such as Richard Wright’s novel Native Son, Theodor Fontane’s Effi Briest, Doris Lessing’s short story “To Room Nineteen”, as well as examples provided by Iris Marion Young and Rahel Jaeggi.
The paper draws on Axel Honneth’s recognition theory to explore the notion of experiences of social injustice. It proposes revisions to this model, aiming to expand the recognition frame and its concept of social injustice experiences. While Honneth’s theory traces the origin of experiences of social injustice to socially engendered disrespect, the paper finds that it stops short of exploring the role of conferring due recognition for moral self-development and its relevance for social justice. The term self-confirmed moral recognizer is proposed to denote the positive self-relation enhanced by conferring due moral consideration. Co-determination is identified as a basic social precondition of it. The paper argues that absence of co-determination creates barriers to the (moral) self-development of recognizers, leading to specific experiences of social injustice, particularly within the realm of work.
