In research and clinical practice, the words chosen to describe others matter, particularly regarding race and ethnicity. Some terminologies are particularly problematic and should be avoided, given their tendency to distort cohorts of individuals based on presupposed common attributes and demographic characteristics. Racial taxonomy may unintentionally give rise to pejorative and potentially unsettling connotations. Hence, outdated racialised designations should be superseded by ethically and scientifically meaningful alternatives. The term Caucasian, as demonstrated in this manuscript, has persisted as a frequent terminology in Western biomedical parlance when referring to white individuals. The use of the term Caucasian represents a relic of an outdated and prejudiced racial classification system. In particular, the persistence of this terminology in the Australian healthcare setting is in disagreement with contemporary scientific and worldview values. Although the use of Caucasian as a descriptor has been challenged, given its inherent taxonomic and methodological flaws, several professional associations continue to include Caucasian as an acceptable category in racial classification systems, which suggests this time-worn term remains in wide use. It is likely, therefore, that the persisting use of Caucasian will continue to generate unreliable information and contribute to a misinterpretation of Australian populational composition. To the authors’ knowledge, the persistent use of Caucasian as a demographic descriptor has never been questioned in the Australian scientific literature. It is hoped that the argument presented herein will prompt further debate and development regarding this critical issue.
As more countries explore uterine transplant as a potential solution to absolute uterine factor infertility there is an urgent need to develop appropriate organ allocation methods that align with community expectations. The first live birth in Australia using a donated uterus occurred in December 2023 as part of a clinical trial at the Royal Hospital for Women in Sydney. For this research paper, an online survey was conducted in August 2024 on a sample of Australian adults (n = 395) regarding their attitudes toward uterine transplant within the context of the Australian healthcare system and Medicare. Survey questions asked participants to consider who they thought should be eligible to receive or donate a uterus for transplant, how potential recipients should be prioritised, who should pay, and what reasons, if any, they considered ethically acceptable for providing this novel transplant type. Organ transplantation programs rely on community awareness and support, so securing a social licence before expanding uterine transplant services is essential to ensure this new treatment does not negatively impact other forms of organ donation. The results of this study have policy implications for if and how uterine transplant should be integrated in standard fertility care in Australia, and globally.
Surrogacy and uterus transplantation (UTx) are current forms of assisted gestation. Support for UTx is often grounded on the basis that it would ethically and legally mitigate the moral issues associated with surrogacy. In this article, I problematize this narrative by highlighting the perspective of third parties to assisted gestation through the topics of incentivization and compensation. I demonstrate that the ethical, legal, and social idiosyncrasies associated with each technique make it the case that UTx does not easily resolve the shortcomings of surrogacy – and vice versa.
There is a shortage of organs for transplantation resulting in long waiting lists, and many die while waiting for a new organ. Different policies are discussed for solving this problem, but the most effective, namely the conscription of cadaveric organs, the routine taking of organs from dead bodies, is considered too controversial and is therefore not implemented anywhere.I discuss the reasons for and against conscription; the former are mainly based on utilitarian arguments, while the latter are mainly based on the interests and rights of the deceased and his family. (He, his, or him, is understood to mean he/him/his or she/her/hers throughout the article.) .This article investigates whether the deceased has any interests and rights. I argue that dead bodies are mere things and thus without interests or rights. I also discuss whether the interests of the family should override the needs of patients who are on waiting lists for organs.Using arguments based on Epicurean philosophy, and supported by contemporary scholars, I conclude that dead bodies do not have interests and rights and that the possible interests and rights of the dead’s family cannot be more important than saving the lives of the people on waiting lists for organs.Thus, I argue that conscription of cadaveric organs for transplantation can be defended and should be implemented as a normal hospital practice.
