Abstract: In the following paper, I argue that none of the recent criticisms of Kant’s transcendental idealism offered on behalf of Husserl scholars such as Dominique Pradelle give us reason to think that Husserlian phenomenology moves beyond Kant’s “revolutionary” Copernican turn in the subject-object relation. I begin by first providing an interpretation of Kant’s Copernican turn and then outline three issues with Kant’s transcendental idealism that scholars like Pradelle take as reason to reject Kant’s revolution in philosophy. Specifically, Kant’s transcendental idealism makes reference to the thing-it-itself, construes the subject of the turn along psychological lines, and results in skepticism. I then provide reasons why these supposed issues with Kant’s theory, especially when we take into account the Kantian defenses that can be assembled against them, ought not motivate us to think Husserl’s phenomenology does not adhere to the Copernician turn or move beyond it. Finally, I make the case that if we take into consideration the role played by the unity of apperception in Kant’s account of object constitution, then Kant and Husserl, far from differing on the turn, are in fact, and contra thinkers like Pradelle, closer on the topic of the objects of consciousness than is typically appreciated.
By establishing a transcendental theory of concrete subjectivity, the new-Kantian philosopher Richard Hönigswald radicalized Kant’s Copernican turn and described the human body as principle and factum in a manifold cultural philosophy. For this purpose, he had to overcome his close relationship to the realistic-metaphysical neo-Kantianism of Riehl and Liebmann, who fell behind Kant’s Copernican turn and his rejection of epistemological relevant things in themselves. Thus, Hönigswald went through his own Copernican turn, before he refined the Kantian concept. Localizing the Kantian ‘I think’ in the concrete human-being offers the possibility to combine several parts and aspects of the Kantian philosophy and its components like ethics, aesthetics, and anthropology. Here Hönigswald concentrates on the capacities of human-beings who explore and form their living world, while Kant’s Copernican turn shows their ambivalences of freedom and determination, understanding and alienness. To regard these ambivalences, we can look ahead in philosophical body theory and refer to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and today’s postphenomenological approaches that stress alienation and contingency by highlighting human-beings’ entanglement with the world. In this process postphenomenology partly tries to go beyond the Copernican turn by establishing a praxeology that rejects the constitutive relevance of intentionality. If we go back to Hönigswald’s radicalization of the Kantian turn we can highlight, that each way of problematizing practices and theories needs a problematizing subject and thus intentionality in its bodily representation.
It is an important concern for Kant to render the metaphysics to transition from the speculative to the practical domain. In the second edition preface of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant stated that we can securely guide the metaphysics along the path of a science through a revolution in the philosophy, in which the revolution is generally called Copernican Revolution. Since Kant divided metaphysics into metaphysics of nature and of morals, the revolution for the path of a science should aim not merely at metaphysics of nature but also at metaphysics of morals. However, the critique of the traditional metaphysics of nature does not directly lead to the systematic construction of the metaphysics of morals. It contains a transition. Yet, we cannot reach this transition based on the classical understanding of the Copernican Revolution, which disregards the historical context in astronomy. To contextualize the revolution within Kant's philosophy, we will reveal the essence of the Kantian Copernican Revolution. It shows that the essence of the revolution should not be a reversal of cognition and objects but a transformation in the cognitive faculties itself. Through the new interpretation of the Copernican Revolution we can illustrate how did Kant achieve the transition. It presents as a progressively practical transformation process and ultimately provides the groundwork for constructing the metaphysics of morals.
La complejidad lingüística se ha desarrollado como un tema cada vez más relevante en diferentes áreas teóricas y aplicadas de los estudios del lenguaje, incluso, en interface con la educación. Como son diversas las concepciones de complejidad, este artículo de revisión bibliográfica busca presentar un estado de la cuestión, construido con artículos producidos entre 2017 y 2022, sobre los estudios del campo específicamente dedicados al análisis de textos argumentativos, en los últimos cinco años. Para ello, se adoptó una metodología cualitativa descriptiva-interpretativa de tipo documental, principalmente centrada en el análisis de contenido. Se encontró que la mayoría de las investigaciones trabajan sobre lo que se conoce en la literatura como complejidad relativa y que los criterios empleados con mayor frecuencia son los sintácticos, aunque se presentan investigaciones dedicadas a la complejidad argumentativa en otros niveles lingüísticos (textuales y pragmáticos, por ejemplo). La mayoría de los trabajos se dedican a la escritura en nivel académico, con un énfasis en la competencia argumentativa en lenguas extranjeras o L2. Se encuentra poca investigación en niños, jóvenes y poblaciones no escolares y sobre la enseñanza de la argumentación en lengua materna, lo que nos abre caminos de investigación sobre la construcción del discurso argumentativo y de sus complejidades en diferentes contextos.
