ABSTRACT We study how salary variation coefficient growth rates are affected by two governance conditions (a decree law and a currency devaluation) and an extreme event (Covid‐19) in Argentina, using an event study approach. We find statistically significant novel evidence that, depending on the chosen model, (1) the Covid‐19 pandemic originated a negative daily average growth rate of the salary variation coefficient of approximately the same quantity as the positive effect of decree number 332/2022 in absolute value, when the salary variation coefficient was declared to be used to establish energy subsidies for clients with low and medium income; (2) we find that although a 50% currency devaluation has repercussions that increase nominal‐salary growth rates, decree number 332/2022 already accounts for at least half of the same dangerous effect—as if a 25% currency devaluation was applied—, or the same as a 50% currency devaluation, depending on the employed model. Our findings have relevant policy implications for regulators since they should know the consequences of changing governance conditions and extreme events.
ABSTRACT Argentina's political landscape experienced a major shift with the unexpected election of Javier Milei as President. Known for his radical right‐wing stance, Milei has pledged to drastically minimize the state's role, proposing a public spending cut of 14% of the gross domestic product. While his lack of a legislative majority poses a challenge to implementing his ambitious agenda, Milei has signaled his intent to use referenda to bypass Congress in a strategic maneuver. Do his supporters genuinely back his policy positions? In which areas and sectors of the state might Milei's voters endorse the application of his so‐called “chainsaw plan” and other proposed reforms? Using survey data ( n = 1181), this article will examine whether Milei's voters support his views and policies, signaling a shift to the right in public opinion after decades of strong support for left‐wing parties. Regression analysis on voting intentions reveals that, among various areas (health, environment, economy, immigration, international relations, and the role of the state), economic visions and preferences emerge as the strongest predictors of support for Milei, highlighting the economic dimension as central to the motivations of his voter base.
ABSTRACT Why does patronage (the discretionary appointment of public positions) in public education continue to exist in Latin America? What are the key factors that explain its persistence or decay? Using the cases of Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador, and leveraging a multi‐source qualitative approach, this study identifies three central features that set the path for diminished patronage in the education sector, (1) the degree of party system institutionalization in each country, (2) the level of politicization of teacher unions, and (3) the strength of civil society groups and policy networks. Overall, findings show that in countries with high party institutionalization, low union politicization, and a strong civil society, here exemplified by Chile, patronage in the education sector has remained low over time. Ecuador, on the other hand, has seen patronage become more deeply entrenched due to policies taken under the regime of Rafael Correa (2007–2017). Colombia is a “mixed bag” of sorts, curtailing national‐level patronage yet still encountering more nuanced and potentially more pernicious versions of patron–client relations at local levels. This article has important insights on state–society relations and particularly on the role education reform can have in lessening patronage practices.
