The paper addresses the collection of (broadly speaking) epistemic sophisms discussed in the Heytesburian treatise traditionally referred to as “Probationes conclusionum” and strives to fulfil four tasks based on analyses of its manuscripts: first, to suggest a new, or rather the original title for the text, namely “Conclusiones” (which, in this context, means “Sophisms”); second, to argue in favour of its authenticity by refuting the arguments for the opposite and showing that positive arguments applied to other texts (such as Sophismata asinina) apply to it as well; third, to outline the content of the chapter on epistemic sophisms and compare its topics with those addressed in Regulae solvendi sophismata; and fourth, to present a commented critical edition of two of the sophisms.
The aim of the paper is to critically evaluate, from the perspective of a Teresian scholar, Christia Mercer’s claim that Teresa of Ávila’s Interior Castle must have had a substantial influence upon Descartes’ Meditations on the First Philosophy. The paper considers three major topics: (a) the distinction between meditation and contemplation which is crucial in Teresa’s thought and is also crucial for correct evaluation of possible Teresian influence on Descartes; (b) the role of doubts and demon deceivers for both authors and (c) Descartes’ reading list and his relationship with the Jesuits. Mercer’s line of argument is shown to be wanting, her methodological approach flawed and her “arguments” disclosed as speculations at best. In the end I come to the conclusion that Mercer’s claim is unsubstantiated and should be dismissed as such.
The paper addresses the collecisms discussed in the Heytesburian treatise con clusionum" and strives to fulfil four tasks based on analyses of its manuscripts: first, to suggest a new, or rather the original title for the text, namely "Conclusiones" (which, in this context, means "Sophisms"); second, to argue in favour of its authenticity by refuting the arguments for the opposite and showing that positive arguments applied to other texts (such as Sophismata asinina) apply to it as well; third, to outline the content of the chapter on epistemic sophisms and compare its topics with those addressed in Regulae solvendi sophismata; and fourth, to present a commented critical edition of two of the sophisms.
The Swedish Lutheran theo logian and bishop Johannes Rudbeckius (1581-1646) formulated twelve arguments for the immortality of the soul in two dis tinct but interrelated dissertations, De ani mae immortalitate and Propositionesde animae humanae immortalitate, debated respectively in November1611 in Uppsalaandin Septem ber 1626 in V & auml;ster & aring;s. I presentthe arguments and discuss them critically. Further, I demon strate that Rudbeckius's source for his dis cussion is the commentary on Aristotle's De anima written by the Jesuit philosopher and theologian Franciscus Toletus (1532-1596), first published in Venice in 1574. Finally, I take up a dissertation authored by Rud beckius's student Olaus Gabrielis Felstadius (ca 1590-ca1620), De origine et immortalitate animae, debated in June 1611 in Uppsala. Felstadius's treatment is also shown to be dependent on Toletus's commentary.
The present essay considers the metaphysical thought of the late scholastic Jesuit Antonio P & eacute;rez (1599-1649). In partic ular, attention is given to his argument for God's existence which is presented along the lines of an ontological argument broadly construed. P & eacute;rez's formulation of the argu ment is unique in that it is framed in such a way that it denies that God is a chimera. If God is not a chimera, then God is not nothing, which is to sayGod is something. To speak of chimeras and impossible objects is to move beyond the realm of real being. In fact, P & eacute;rez thinks that real being itselfcan be defined by a larger genus of being, namely, intentional being. Indeed, as he says, intentional being is communion than even real being itself. I suggest, then, that what functions as the backdrop of P & eacute;rez's argument is the notion of supertranscendentality. Though he does not use the term as such, the notion of super transcendentality is now developed in such awaythat ityields a proofforGod's existence.
