Anthropic reasoning is impossible without the concept of the reference class. However, this basic concept is often unclear and even misunderstood. Here I bring attention to one particular error often committed in the area, namely reification of the reference class. While the reference class is a theoretically crucial concept, it corresponds to little in reality. On the contrary, a nominalist approach to reference classes promises the best - or at least most palatable - results. The analogy with the treatment of potentials in classical field theory could be instructive in both similarities and dissimilarities.
This paper examines Fahrbach’s criticism of the pessimistic induction, according to which the historical replacement of successful but false theories calls into question the approximate truth of contemporary theories. Fahrbach argues that the exponential growth of scientific activity, as well as the quantity and diversity of scientific work, allows contemporary theories to achieve a much higher degree of empirical success than abandoned theories. However, this paper argues that the growth in the number of researchers, publications, and data does not necessarily imply that theories are reliable. Fahrbach’s distinction between theories with low and high degrees of success is also challenged, since it is not based on a clearly defined and historically neutral criterion. The stability of contemporary theories need not result from their approximate truth, but may also arise from research conducted within accepted theoretical frameworks and from the declining productivity of scientific research. It is concluded that Fahrbach’s argument does not refute the pessimistic induction, because the exponential growth of scientific activity is not, by itself, a sufficient indicator of epistemic progress, nor does it justify treating contemporary theories as epistemically privileged.
In 1776, shortly before his death, David Hume added a new paragraph to the last part of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. In that paragraph the sceptic Philo claims that the dispute between a theist and an atheist is merely verbal because both of them accept that the cause of order in the universe bears some analogy to human intelligence. In this paper, I conduct a detailed textual analysis in order to show that the new paragraph, firstly, strongly suggests that the so-called Philo’s reversal does not represent a drastic change of his opinion, and secondly, serves as a key to interpreting Philo’s final speech in the Dialogues. This analysis also establishes that Hume's position, despite the conciliatory tone present in the new passage, is primarily skeptical.
Astropsychology represents a contemporary attempt to merge astrological concepts with psychological theories of personality and behavior. Although it is often promoted as an innovative approach to understanding psychological processes, status as a pseudoscience remains undisputed due to the absence of empirical support, the lack of theoretical coherence, and its inability to meet fundamental scientific criteria. This paper examines the reasons why astropsychology cannot attain scientific legitimacy through its association with psychology, given that it is grounded in astrological assumptions that are empirically and logically unsustainable. Special attention is devoted to the cognitive biases that contribute to its popularity. The paper also considers sociocultural factors and the influence of digital platforms on the spread of astrological practices, including popular applications and personalized horoscopes. It is concluded that astropsychology, despite its appeal and subjective persuasiveness, remains inconsistent with the scientific standards of psychology and represents a significant example of pseudoscientific discourse in contemporary society.
The main topic of this paper is the roles that models play in scientific practice. Although mechanistic models have been used since the emergence of Newtonian classical mechanics in the 17th century, philosophers of science have disagreed about their importance for scientific theories. Logical empiricists between the two wars strove for a rational reconstruction of science and the construction of a normative methodology of science in which models had no place. During the 50s of the last century, the Copernican turn in the philosophy of science took place, shifting the focus from rational reconstruction to actual scientific practice in which models are widely employed. The paper shows the ways of their construction, basic characteristics (mediation between abstract scientific theories and concrete physical phenomena, interpretative and representative function) and cognitive significance (descriptive adequacy, explanatory and predictive power, contribution to understanding and research). A number of examples have shown that scientific models are so diverse that it is almost impossible to form a unifying theory about them - they do not share any essential common properties, but are connected by a network of Wittgensteinian ”family resemblances”.
