Although Heideggerian research has extensively studied the influence of Aristotle, the figure of Descartes has not received equivalent attention, despite the near-complete publication of the Gesamtausgabe and the abundance of available documentation. From his earliest lectures in Freiburg and Marburg, Heidegger maintains an interpretative confrontation with the thought of Descartes, which extends even to the Zollikon Seminars of the 1950s and 1960s. Unlike Aristotle, whose presence is affirmative and formative, Descartes appears as a contrasting figure, which may explain the relative academic neglect of this connection. This paper examines the beginning of modern thought through Heidegger’s interpretation of the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, a text that permeates a significant portion of his reflections on Descartes. In doing so, it contributes to a more precise study of their relationship and offers new impulses for specialized research.
This paper explores some of the problems raised by the Husserlian explanatory model of affective acts in relation to the phenomenon of value. It is divided into two main parts. In the first, Husserl’s theory of value is analyzed from the perspective of its foundational acts, paying special attention to the problem of the relation between objectifying and non-objectifying acts. This section concludes that the intentional schema with which Husserl analyzes affective acts presents problems that derive from his “visual” interpretation. In the second part, the converging ideas of Carl Menger and Ludwig Feuerbach on value theory and action are presented, based on which it is proposed that the missing element in the Husserlian schema is the concept of need. With this concept, an extended intentional scheme of affective acts is developed, featuring a double intentionality of consciousness directed to both the subject and the object.
