This article aims to examine the presence of children and adolescents in the university environment and to analyse whether their human rights are effectively respected. The international legal framework and Spanish legislation establish clear obligations regarding children’s human rights, applicable to higher education institutions. Although it may seem obvious that universities should guarantee the rights of children, this approach is not always a reality in practice. This requirement extends to both university campuses and activities carried out beyond them. This paper reflects on the international obligations of public universities compared to private ones and examines some institutional initiatives that promote the rights of children. It concludes with a series of recommendations to ensure that children’s rights-based approach permeates all areas of the university, including teaching, research and knowledge transfer.
Rosalind Dixon’s Responsive Judicial Review Theory offers valuable insights into how courts navigate their complex relationship with democracy. This paper broadens the discussion to the international level, exploring some of the advantages that regional tribunals, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, can gain from the responsive approaches promoted by Dixon. The analysis centers on the case of Petro Urrego v. Colombia. Additionally, it examines the interaction between the Inter-American Court and Colombian political and judicial actors, highlighting aspects of the theory that could benefit from further refinement. Instead of expressing disagreement with the decision in this case, I will problematize the approach and highlight the dilemmas it entails in light of the RJR theory.
Perhaps one of the authors about whom writing will likely never cease is Hans Kelsen. His influence within the legal discipline is undeniable, and his thought remains relevant more than fifty years after his death. In this sense, the general objective of this paper is to reflect on Hans Kelsen’s theory of legal reasoning, more specifically, on two issues: his position regarding the judicial creation of law and his theory of legal interpretation. The aim is to determine whether this theory can be considered a realist theory or, conversely, a normative positivist theory. The idea to be demonstrated is simple: to defend the ambivalent nature of Kelsen’s theory of legal reasoning. The above is because, although it is true that his theory of legal interpretation is circumscribed within a realist theory, since it assumes interpretative skepticism, the rest of his theory does not abandon elements of a normative positivism, where these such as the completeness of legal systems or of legal science are assumed, from a dogmatic point of view.
Constitutional review in Colombia has a rich history spanning over a century that extends beyond the present-day Constitutional Court. At various points in its trajectory, the constitutional judge played a decisive role with respect to peace, mediating within a deeply divided society. In this context, the pursuit of peace paradoxically reveals the existence of profound democratic disagreement in Colombian society, whose possibilities for resolution have been channeled through constitutional change facilitated by the responsive action of the constitutional judge. This article draws on the theoretical framework proposed by Rosalind Dixon in her work Responsive Judicial Review and argues that the Colombian constitutional judge has acted responsively toward peace as both a democratic value and a constitutional principle. This responsiveness has helped overcome blind spots in the democratic system to materialize peace initiatives originating from the Executive. However, it has also generated inverse drag effects that translate into inertia regarding other decentralized peacebuilding efforts, as well as a democratic weakening of the Constitutional Court as an institution. Rather than opening debate for the sustained construction of peace, the court has also produced communicative closures that impact its legitimacy.
