The intensification of geopolitical tensions and great power rivalries have disrupted global climate actions. In the era of global conflicts, the effectiveness of current climate regime has been questioned. How to measure the stability of the climate regime under diverse shocks becomes the new issue to be analyzed. The article finds that global climate actions have formed an institutional network that involves the basic (state-dominated), central (UNFCCC centered) and extended (non-climate multilateral organization) layers of climate governance. We argue that the measurement towards the resilience of such structure shall be based on the evaluation of the ‘three-layer stability’. As proposed in the article, the three-layer structure in the global climate governance system is more resilient to shocks, presented with the two features of structural heterogeneity and institutional redundancy. Due to structural heterogeneity, shocks have performed differentiated effects across layers that allow certain autonomy to exist within layers. Based on structural redundancy, the extended layer is reinforced by the steady increase in climate reform and institutionalization in international organizations to sustain the system while the central layer is experiencing dysfunction in international affairs. The growth of climate finance from Multilateral Development Banks and global renewable energy investment indicates the function of three-layered institutional complex that mitigates shocks.

2021年美国拜登政府施政伊始就推动了一系列关于供应链的新政策,特别是以"国家安全"为叙事手段强化国内产业政策,扶持先进制造业和新兴技术研发,并联合安全盟友构建关键产业国际供应链联盟.与特朗普政府相比,拜登政府的新供应链政策进一步强调了经济安全和国家安全并重的原则.对于这种政策转变的本质,相关研究出现了战略性转变和功能性转变等两种观点.从理论逻辑看,经济政策的安全化分析路径,可以剖析全球供应链的安全效应,明晰经济和安全策略组合的类型,从而进一步揭示美国新供应链政策"混合式安全化操作"的生成机制.从政策实践看,拜登政府针对供应链问题的安全化操作主要呈现两个新的特点,一是新冠肺炎疫情冲击之下的兼顾供应链安全与大国战略竞争,二是以国内投资重塑产业链,并配合国际运作以形成关键产业供应链联盟,从而对战略对手实施经济权术.这些新政策面临着战略利益和市场力量之间的张力,存在诸多制约,其带来的政策冲击也为后疫情时代全球经济的稳定和复苏增加了不确定性.

全球新冠疫情冲击、大国战略竞争和地缘政治冲突导致价值链安全成为主要经济体关注的重要议题.全球不确定性的增强促使大国在价值链治理中更加关切抵抗风险的能力,进而增加了政策投入的力度,但是经济全球化内在的市场逻辑也带来了效率与安全的权衡难题.全球价值链本身具有的连接性与等级性特点,导致大变局时代诸多挑战不仅影响连接性层面的市场性联系和生产性联系,还会重塑等级性层面的制度性依托和嵌入性方式.结合这两个层面的风险,价值链安全治理的主要策略可以类型化为多元化、本地化、网络化和战略化,这些策略能够组合成引导型、调控型和塑造型治理路径.从现实政策变化角度看,2020年以来主要经济体依据价值链安全风险的变化实现了从引导型到塑造型治理路径的转变,美国具有强烈进攻性风格的价值链政策更是进一步促使全球价值链成为大国经济竞争的重要领域.面对大变局时代全球价值链的结构性变化带来的风险,新兴经济体需要加强政策协作,以强化全球价值链的公共产品属性,提高维护经济安全能力.

While global value chains (GVCs) necessitate effective global economic governance in providing a stable, rule-oriented international economic order for the cross-border flow of factors, it is witnessed that there’s an inevitable decline of multilateralism in the WTO in the contemporary era of deep globalization. This empirical puzzle has stimulated various theoretical explorations, including research on the multilateral trade negotiation model, North–South structural conflicts, and the absence of great power responsibility. The increasing friction between great powers around trade policy has illustrated that policy space conflicts constitute the central challenge of global trade governance. Policy space as a concept illustrates the scope and conditionality of domestic policy instruments when framed by supranational rules. By revisiting existing research, this article clarifies the nature of policy space and categorizes its conflict modes as regulatory diffusion, regulatory differentiation, regulatory competition, and regulatory conflict. The practice of global economic governance shows that deep globalization requires the convergence of diverse domestic regulations that reduce policy space; while maintaining competitive advantage of sovereign states in the global production system requires the preservation of certain flexibilities, especially in areas like interventionism, sequential reforms, or capacity building. This inherent tension causes policy space conflicts to evolve in kind with the escalation of competition among great powers in the global division of labour. Since 2017, the WTO reform agenda, US–EU–Japan trilateral coordination, and intense Trumpian trade wars have all proved that regulatory conflict has offered the dominant model. This shift has led to the decline of multilateralism and the weakening of the multilateral trading system. policy space, multilateralism, global value chains, regulatory competition, global trade politics, convergence and de-convergence, WTO reform

This article tracks the dynamic changes in institutional contestations between China and the United States and provides a new explanation based on the English School’s perception of primary and secondary international institutions. According to the power transition theory, the rise of China will inevitably bring about a divided international economic order. In fact, institutional contestations among great powers includes contested access, multilateralism, and legitimacy, which represent dynamic changes rather than linear evolutions. Taking two key factors—power and legitimacy—as variables, this article constructs the Institutional Contestations Framework (ICF) to describe the conditions underlying shifts between different types of institutional contestations. The article posits that the driving factor behind the increasingly intense China–US institutional contestations since 2016 has been a rising China prompting the US to alter its secondary institutions, in turn squeezing the policy space for China. The liberal international order at the level of primary institutions remains attractive. Contested legitimacy between China and the US is optional, rather than inevitable.

Climate Change related concerns affect multiple international and national policy forefronts. Globally, conflicts over renewables industry between the developed and emerging economies have affected the provision of green goods-thus slowing the overall welfare of global environmental governance. This article argues that the above phenomenon is a new form of green dilemma which arises from the long-lasting issue of balancing environmental protection and economic gains. It further tracks the historical evolutionary change of green dilemma, from version 1.0 to 2.0 to the current avatar of Green Dilemma 3.0. By developing the Green Dilemma Framework, the article aims to uncover the logic underlying the industrial policies and trade conflicts between the developed and emerging economies in their energy transitions. Utilizing the US vs China and US vs India conflicts in the solar PV industries as the two group of cases, the key feature of Green Dilemma 3.0 is illustrated as the conflict over status and control of the global division of labor in the new energy industry. This article offers a novel perspective on global inequality by deconstructing the unequal global production system that can act to restrict the optimization of energy use and production in tackling climate change and thus successively hindering global environmental governance in its realization of optimal results. Underneath global climate change governance, there is an unequal global production network and political system, and both these follow a core, semi-periphery, and periphery distribution of power structure. We argue that the inequality of global production system suppresses the effects of subsidy competition and erodes the economic foundation of global climate governance.

The post-2016 populist wave has induced reflection on the neoliberal globalization, and the return to embedded liberalism has become an attractive solution. However, the current international division of labor and its corresponding constraints on policy autonomy mark a major departure from the global conditions of the post-war period. This article argues that a revival of embedded liberalism would require the state to regulate the pace of economic liberalization and the distribution of income between labor and capital. Furthermore, there are two preconditions for implementing these functions: the capability of the state to control over cross-border capital flows, and to maintain neutrality in arbitrating between the competing claims of labor and capital. However, both of these conditions are unfeasible under neoliberal globalization for two reasons - (i) the deep engagement of national economies in global value chains (GVCs), and (ii) the structurally imbalanced bargaining power between capital and labor. The former has increased national economic stakes in facilitating non-interference in global capital flows, while the latter imbues the state with a policy bias favoring capital’s interest over labor’s. Therefore, attempt at levering the state to restore post-war embedded liberalism is constrained by this collusion of capital and power in hyper-globalization.

2016年以来,美国贸易政策愈加复杂,特朗普政府既迎合民粹主义运动转向保护主义,以缓解国内受经济全球化冲击的群体的不满,又推动与欧盟和日本的新国际经济规则谈判,服务跨国资本全球扩张的需要.对此,全球价值链的关联作用、要素流动的调节功能和国际地位变化等分析视角并不能充分解释这一看似矛盾的政策变化.作为一种资本积累模式,全球价值链使得资本的选择空间扩大,劳动力市场调整的滞后性增强,从而调节着美国内部资本—劳动要素的竞争优势.资本和劳动要素拥有者分别凭借结构性权力和社会运动,围绕贸易政策的取向展开竞争,使得美国贸易政策的调适逻辑集中表现为服务资本利益与应对社会反向运动之间的平衡.这一逻辑体现在1961-1986年美国有选择的贸易自由化、1986-2015年推动资本自由流动和国际投资保护的政策以及2016年的民粹主义和保护主义等阶段.与单纯的权力或经济利益分析相比,资本—劳动要素竞争框架不仅有助于系统认识美国贸易政策转向的政治过程,还有利于认识20世纪60年代以来它随经济全球化而出现的动态变化.

全球价值链的快速发展要求高质量的多边贸易规则,但是20世纪90年代以来多边贸易规则持续停滞,2016年以来民粹主义浪潮冲击了美欧等主要发达大国,更增加了国际经济政策协调的难度.既有的功能需求论、激励变化论与深度依存论都难以充分揭示全球价值链与多边贸易规则发展不匹配的根源.全球价值链是资本的生产组织和空间分布统一体,它提升了资本要素相对于劳动要素的议价权,打破了国际经济秩序所依赖的政治和社会基础,即国际经济谈判中利益互惠的政治契约和调节经济开放对国内不同群体利益冲击的社会契约.互惠主义的弱化导致多边贸易谈判路径之争加剧,社会契约的衰落冲击了自由贸易规范.美欧主导的高标准贸易协定谈判和不断高涨的贸易保护主义等新挑战表明,新兴大国引领经济全球化发展和维护多边贸易秩序需要适时地调整战略思路,在国际层面从“扩张市场”转变为“创造市场”以带动共同发展,在国内层面更加注重调节财富分配和培育消费能力,以增强在国际贸易秩序变革中的国际市场权力和国内适应能力.

从2008年以来国际货币基金组织的改革过程来看,可以发现美国对同类改革议题的容纳程度存在明显的差异,并直接影响着制度变革的效果.现有的国际制度的内部权力转移、外部竞争压力和国内政治的调节视角,解释了领导国家对制度改革的支持或抵制态度,但缺乏对领导国家应对改革的利益权衡及其策略选择的复杂性分析.作者以国际制度改革对领导权的冲击度、利益兼容度和领导权护持的成本因素所构建的分析框架发现,如果竞争者推动的国际制度改革是对领导权冲击度高的制度性变革且利益兼容度低,会导致既有领导国家的强烈反制;如果是冲击度低的程序性变革且利益兼容度高,既有领导国家会容忍或支持竞争者的改革;如果制度性变革且利益兼容度高,或者程序性变革且利益兼容度低,既有领导国家会依据护持成本选择反制或容忍.1994年至1998年国际货币基金组织框架内的资本账户自由化改革以及1998年至1999年欧盟倡议金融稳定论坛和日本倡议亚洲货币基金组织等案例所呈现的领导权较量表明,新兴大国在国际制度框架内争取制度性权力,需要增加改革方案的利益兼容度及提高既有领导权的护持成本,以推动所期望的制度变革.