The remarkably high level of political trust observed in Chinese surveys has ignited enduring debates regarding whether fear has inflated these numbers. The opposing sides share one assumption: fear and trust are inherently contradictory. Our study proposes an alternative view. Grounded in cognitive dissonance theory, which holds that induced compliance can lead to sincere attitude change, we argue that fear has in fact increased political trust in China. We take Xi's sweeping anti-corruption campaign as a quasi-natural experiment to test this theory. Using 2002-2021 survey data and employing a Difference-in-Differences model, we take the campaign as treatment and regime insiders as the treated group, finding that political trust among regime insiders increased faster than among outsiders during the campaign. This finding withstands various robustness checks. Our study not only addresses the fear-love conundrum in China studies but also uncovers a general mechanism of legitimacy production in deeply authoritarian states.

Economic development fails to greatly increase demand for liberal democracy in China. Is China an exception to modernization theory? If so, why? This paper studies these questions by analysing five waves of Asian Barometer Survey data from 2002 to 2019. We have three major findings. First, the shift of political values exhibits an inverted U-shaped curve with the mid-2010s as its turning point. Second, the better educated and more media exposed turned conservative much faster than the rest after the mid-2010s. Third, to trace the mechanism of this unusual reversal and divergence, we resort to a Difference-In-Differences model, taking political indoctrination, measured by media exposure and education, as treatment and the post-2013 era as treatment time, finding that political indoctrination significantly explains political cultural backsliding. Our findings enrich modernization theory by identifying the “interceptive” power of the state between economic development and cultural shifts.

亨廷顿所命名的第三波民主化浪潮展开至今已近半个世纪.近半个世纪后,这波浪潮走了多远?在卷入其中的国家中,有多少走向了民主稳固,有多少走向了民主困境?在多大程度上出现了民主衰退?又在何种意义上呈现了政体韧性?在Polity Ⅳ、Freedom House、World Value Survey等数据库的基础上,对上述问题进行实证分析后可以发现,大约一半左右的第三波案例走向了民主的阶段性稳固(在人口大国中,则为1/3),有近2/5经受了不同意义上的民主挫败(在人口大国中,则为一半左右).就“民主衰退”现象而言,在新兴民主中,它主要不是体现在政体数量的变化上,而是体现在民主的质量退化上,即政治自由度的显著下降和“中间政体陷阱”的出现.但是,从民主观念的深入程度和历史参照系下的“民主沉淀度”而言,新兴民主又展现出相当的政体韧性.研究显示,第三波民主化浪潮的结果多样而复杂,很难以完全的乐观或悲观判断去概括.

Many have studied whether China will democratize in the near future, but few have asked what would happen to China if China were to democratize. This paper sets out to explore this question in light of lessons from new democracies. Four lessons are drawn from new democracies. First is the importance of balancing state capacity and social power. Second is that the role of political elites can sometimes be more decisive than structural factors. Third is that culture might matter more than institutions. Fourth is the need to avoid the pitfall of economic populism. Reviewing China's conditions through the lens of these lessons, this paper argues that factors such as state capacity, socio-economic conditions and a culture of pragmatism favor democratic consolidation in China, but the lure of "strongman" populist-authoritarianism, the tradition of uncompromising political elites and fundamentalist nationalism could sabotage a transition to democracy.

ObjectiveIs there a tradeoff between democratization and stability? This article investigates this question through a typological analysis of the “third‐wave” countries. Specifically, it addresses two issues. First, are there more countries losing stability than gaining it after democratization? Second, between the “stability losers” and “stability gainers,” which camp has experienced a larger scale of change?MethodsThis article adopts both data set matching and case knowledge. By matching data sets on democratization (Polity IV) and violence episodes (Major Episodes of Political Violence), as well as by bringing in case knowledge, this study categorizes the third‐wavers into three groups (the stability losers, the gainers, and the no‐changers) and compares their proportion as well as scale of change.ResultsThis study discovers that, among the 108 “third‐wavers,” the ratio of “stability gainers,” “no‐changers,” and “stability losers” is 36:45:27. The scale of change is also bigger among the stability gainers than among the losers. Particularly, the chance of very bloody conflicts is much bigger under authoritarianism than after democratic transition.ConclusionWhile a level of caution for democratization is healthy, this topological analysis suggests a more balanced view. Democratization can be dangerous. The resistance to it can also be, if not more so.

民主和国家能力,作为政治发展两个最重要的维度,彼此之间的关系非常重要,也很富有争议.一种流行的看法认为,二者之间具有冲突性紧张关系:民主化会削弱国家能力,而缺乏国家能力不但反过来会影响民主本身稳固的可能性,而且会影响一个国家的社会经济发展,因此,如果必须取舍,应该“国家能力优先”.民主化之后国家能力会降低吗？这是一个理论问题,但同时也是一个实证问题.本文试图采用类型学的方法,对所有的“第三波民主化国家/地区”进行实证性分析.通过匹配第三波民主化以来关于政体和国家能力主要维度的数据库,本文对第三波民主化国家/地区进行分类,将其归入国家能力提升型、削弱型或无变化型,并得出三者的数量比率,从而为进一步的理论分析提供一个实证基础.尤其是,相比笼统地回答这个问题,本文增加了两个观察的维度:第一,国家能力的不同维度在民主化之后会朝着不同方向变化吗？第二,短期的国家能力改变会不同于长期的改变吗？本文最后的发现是复杂的.在国家汲取能力和行政能力方面,第三波民主化国家大多数有所提升,但在强制能力方面,更多的国家会下降.比较国家能力的短期改变和长期改变,并没有发现它们之间有显著的不同.

Fukuyama's emphasis on state-building as an underestimated component of political development is very insightful and timely; but to argue that the dynastic China had an impersonal modern state is questionable. This article argues that the dynastic state in China in general was ultra-personal despite its seemingly 'impersonal' means. Likewise, political decay in China mostly took a route different from the 'elite capture' pattern, which is the core of Fukuyama's understanding of political decay. Historically speaking, political decay in China happened more because of the overstretching of central power rather than the erosion of disintegrating elites. This article also examines contemporary China through this framework of political order and decay, suggesting that unique features of the contemporary society might help China escape from the historical cycle.

The original 2010 Input-Output Table doesn’t have “multi-product” sector. After some adjustments, the data tables are reclassified and re-balanced to provide the matrices required by GTAP. The format of GTAP tables that we submit is the original version, the second type of permitted format. Many Mark’s methods are used in updating database process, and here we give many thanks to Professor Mark Horridge.

Among all the challenges to electoral democracy,one type of criticism is common:“democ-ratization leads to economic populism”,“political democracy is incompatible with economic freedom”, or “democratization will reverse the path of marketization”.Intrigued by this argument,adopting data from the Polity IV and EFW,this research compares the level of economic freedom before and after the democratic transition among the third-wave democratizers.The result indicates that the third-wave de-mocratization took place simultaneously with an increase of economic freedom in almost all third-wave countries.The allegation that democratization harms economic freedom is not empirically supported among the third-wavers.The change of international system and the nature of modern representative democracy probably explain this phenomenon.

This paper systematically combed the research progress of national innovation system( NIS) and its internationalization and related theories. Based on the previous relevant structure- subject model,we constructed theElements- Institutions- Functions- Phasesfour dimensional analysis model of the internationalization of national innovation system from the systematic and dynamic point of view. Then according to some evaluation principles,such as scientific,systematic,authoritative,feasibility and so on,we designed the evolution system of the level of internationalization of national innovation system,making full use of the underlying indexes and data from the international authoritative innovation evaluation reports. Furthermore,we evaluated the internationalization level of 21 nations' innovation system including China. The results showed that the overall level of U. S. national innovation system scores the highest. While China's scores ranked after all the developed countries' and before all the developing countries'. Especially on the functional dimension,there is a notable gap between China and the developed countries. Finally,the learning object and improving content of China's national innovation system internationalization development were cleared.

of a dissertation at the University of Miami. Dissertation supervised by Professor Michel Dupagne. No. of pages in text. (120) The last decade has witnessed a global plethora of social media. One unique social media innovation, microblogging, which combines the features of blogging, texting, and social networking sites, enables its users to post personal thoughts and opinions as well as connect to online and offline networks. Particularly, microblogging has experienced a remarkable growth in China because it not only offers a popular platform for social interactions, but also plays an essential role as an alternative news medium. Within the framework of Diffusion of Innovations theory, this study aimed to examine the five stages of microblogging’s innovation-decision process and identify the predictors of the first three stage--knowledge, persuasion, and decision--in order to build up a model for social media innovation-decision process. In November 2011, a survey questionnaire was completed by 2,801 Chinese college students in Beijing, China. Results from mixture modeling analyses validated the theoretical framework of five stages of the innovation-decision process. Respondents went through knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation about microblogging. Also, as suggested by Diffusion of Innovations theory, socioeconomic status, technology ownership, communication behavior including social participation, online media use, cosmopoliteness, and opinion leadership, perceived innovation attributes including relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, and observability, and personality traits including dogmatism and attitude toward change all exerted direct influences on the innovation-decision process to some extent. Concerns for privacy, one variable that is highly relevant to social media use behavior, also predicted the decision stage of microblogging. Findings of the current study provided both theoretical and practical implications. By following the innovation-decision process and integrating psychological factors, such as personality traits and concerns for privacy, this study proposed a research model for the social media innovation-decision process. Furthermore, this study also suggested that future research needs to incorporate more psychological factors and that marketing strategists for social media should take social participation, online media use, and concerns for privacy into consideration to attract and target potential users.

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Columbia University Professor Andrew Nathan invented the phrase “authoritarian resilience” to describe post-Deng China, suggesting that the Party state is resilient enough to adapt to changing circumstances. Claremont McKenna Professor Pei Minxin used the phrase “illiberal adaption” to make a similar observation. University of California at Berkeley Professor Kevin O'Brien and University of Hong Kong Professor Li Lianjiang used “rightful resistance” to describe the popular protests in China in which protestors resort to official discourse to make their case. 2. For example, see Dwight Perkins and Thomas Rawski, “Forecasting China's Economic Growth to 2025,” in China's Great Economic Transformation, eds. Loren Brandt and Thomas Rawski (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 3. See Henry Rowen, “When Will the Chinese People Be Free?” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 3 (July 2007): p. 39. 4. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 63. On the other hand, the concrete demarcation of the “middle zone” might require more careful studies. 5. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The 1990 CIA World Factbook, 1990. 6. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011. 7. Official inflation data are widely disbelieved because of the formula used to calculate them. However, even the official numbers are telling: the rise of the monthly Consumer Price Index accelerated in 2010, reaching 4.4 percent in October, the highest level in two years. Experts estimate that it will reach five percent throughout 2011. See “Liu Yuhui: Weiyou cipo zichan paomo caineng gengzhi tongzhang” (Liu Yuhui: Only piercing the bubble of assets can cure the inflation), http://finance.ifeng.com/news/special/shuruxingtongzhang/20101130/2976687.shtml. 8. The survey was organized by a website called “field of finance,” and the question was: “The CPI reached 4.4 percent in October, the highest level in two years; do you feel the pressure of inflation?”, http://survey.jrj.com.cn/result/vote_result.jsp?questionnaireId=819. 9. Ministry of Finance, “Woguo meinian gongkuan xiaofei jin 9000 yi de shuofa bushi” (The statement that officials’ consumption reaches 900 million RMB is not true), http://news.qq.com/a/20060419/001054.htm. 10. Ministry of Finance, “Woguo meinian gongkuan xiaofei jin 9000 yi de shuofa bushi” (The statement that officials’ consumption reaches 900 million RMB is not true), http://news.qq.com/a/20060419/001054.htm. 11. Jack Anderson, “2009 Tax Misery & Reform Index,” Forbes, April 13, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/global/2009/0413/034-tax-misery-reform-index.html. 12. “Zhongguo shuifu shijie di'er shuofa bushi” (The statement that China's tax burden ranks second in the world is not true), People's Daily, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2011-09/19/c_122051304.htm. 13. Ministry of Finance, “Qian jiugeyue quanguo wancheng fangchanshui 798.59 yiyuan” (79.859 billion RMB property tax was raised nationally in the first nine months), http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20111020/103910656733.shtml. 14. Wang Changyong, “10.7 wanyi difang zhengfu zhaiwu shigao shidi” (10.7 trillion local government debt: is it high or low), http://www.caing.com/2011-06-27/100273555.html. 15. This is a quote from Justin Lin, the chief economist of the World Bank, in a talk he gave: http://en.ccer.edu.cn/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=6791. 16. Wang Xiaolu, “Zaisuan Huise Shouru” (Recalculating the gray income), http://magazine.caing.com/2010-07-18/100161844.html. His study shows that “gray income” in China reached 5.4 trillion RMB in 2008, and the top 10 percent of families earn 65 times of what the bottom 10 percent earn (official data suggest the figure is only 23 times). 17. Yang Yao, “A Chinese Way of Democratization?” http://ideas.repec.org/p/eab/develo/2039.html. 18. “Shan'xi jumin shida yuanwang zuori gongbu” (Ten top wishes of the Shan'xi residents was published yesterday), http://news.cnwest.com/content/2010-03/31/content_2915240.htm. 19. See Martin Whyte, Myth of the Social Volcano (Stanford University Press, 2010). 20. He Ruili, “Zhongguo pinfu chaju wenti shehui diaocha fenxi baogao” (An investigative report on the wealth gap in China), http://www.chinavalue.net/Finance/Article/2006-10-11/45553.html. 21. Joel Johnson, “1 Million Workers. 90 Million iPhones. 17 Suicides. Who's to Blame?” Wired, February 28, 2011, http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/02/ff_joelinchina/. 22. Yasheng Huang, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 23. “Jinnian chengxiang shouru chaju yuji kuoda” (The income gap between urban and rural residents is expected to grow this year), http://business.sohu.com/20100421/n271642438.shtml. 24. Bruce Dickson, Red Capitalists in China (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 25. See Eva Bellin, “Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries,” World Politics 52, no. 2 (January 2000). 26. Yun-Han Chu et al., eds., How East Asians View Democracy (Columbia University Press, 2008): p. 229. 27. As noted in the first endnote, Professor Kevin O'Brien and Li Lianjiang argued that the protesters in China often seek to ally with the central government to fight against local governments. See Kevin O'Brien and Li Lianjiang, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 28. Yun-Hal Chu et al., eds., How East Asians View Democracy, p. 219. 29. Tianjian Shi and Jie Lu, “Different Understandings of Democracy: Liberal Democracy and an Alternative,” unpublished manuscript. 30. Zhengxu Wang, “Generational Shift and Its Impacts on Regime Legitimacy in China,” The University of Nottingham—China Policy Institute, June 2010, http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/discussion-papers/discussion-paper-64-regime-legitimacy.pdf. 31. Tianjian Shi and Jie Lu, “Different Understandings of Democracy: Liberal Democracy and an Alternative.” 32. “China's Spending on Internal Policing Outstrips Defense Budget,” Bloomberg Businessweek, March 6, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-03-06/china-s-spending-on-internal-policing-outstrips-defense-budget.html. 33. Gao Bingzhong et al., eds., Zhongguo Gongmin Shehui Fazhan Lanpishu (The Bluebook on the Development of Civil Society in China) (Beijing University Press, 2008), p. 11. The huge discrepancy between the official number and the “real” number is due to the difficult registration system the government sets for NGOs. 34. The data come from a report produced by the Department of Sociology of Tsinghua University titled “Yi liyi biaoda zhidu shixian changzhijiu'an” (To achieve sustainable stability through institutions of interests expression), http://www.aisixiang.com/data/33573.html. 35. Yu Jianrong, “Yali Weiwen de zhengzhixue fenxi” (Political analysis of maintaining stability through pressure), Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Management), no. 7/8, 2010. 36. Junhan Lee, “Primary Causes of Asian Democratization: Dispelling Conventional Myths,” Asian Survey 42, no. 6 (November/December 2002). 37. See Han Han's blog at http://blog.sina.com.cn/twocold. 38. “Zhongguo wangmin shuliang da 4.85 yi” (The number of China's netizens has reached 485 million), http://news.youth.cn/rd/201107/t20110719_1668071.htm. 39. See Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton University Press, 1994). 40. Zheng Gongcheng, “Zhongguo shehui gongping zhuankuai fenxi” (An Analysis of Social Equity in China), Journal of Renmin University of China, no. 2 (2009): pp. 2–11. 41. See John L. Thornton, “Long Time Coming: The Prospects for Democracy in China,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (January/February 2008): p. 4. 42. See http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2010_10/05/2704767_0.shtml. 43. See http://politics.caijing.com.cn/2011-09-14/110859487.html. 44. Andrew Jacobs, “A Chinese Official Praises a Taboo: Democracy,” New York Times, July 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24beijing.html. Also, see http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=110108. 45. Professor Wang Changjiang of the Central Party School is one strong supporter of this view. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-06/24/content_8428025.htm. 46. The official explanation of “scientific development” is very inclusive, ranging from political development to economic development to cultural development. It also means harmonious social relations, sustainable development, social equality, and institutional reform. The interpretation is so broad that it does not have a practical meaning anymore. 47. See http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/95111/13161148.html. 48. Human rights lawyers and activists, such as Xu Zhiyong, Teng Biao, Ran Yunfei, Chen Guangcheng, Hu Jia, Ai Weiwei, and Tan Zuoren, have been under attack in recent years. 49. Different local governments use different methods to stop independent candidates from running. Some measures are relatively “polite,” such as removing the posters of the candidate or disqualifying candidates by adding tailored specifications. Some, however, use direct threats, including beatings. 50. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 51. Cheng Li, “China in the Year 2020: Three Political Scenarios,” Asia Policy, no. 4 (July 2007): pp. 17–29. 52. See Barry Naughton, “China's Left Tilt: Pendulum Swing or Midcourse Correction?” in China's Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy, ed. Cheng Li (Brookings Institution Press, 2008), pp. 142–160. 53. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 54. See Chapter 9 of Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 55. Leonardo Morlino and Wojciech Sadurski, Democratization and the European Union: Comparing Central and Eastern European Post-Communist Countries (Routledge, 2010). 56. Arch Puddington, “Freedom in the World 2010: Erosion of Freedom Intensifies,” Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw10/FIW_2010_Overview_Essay.pdf. The Polity IV project, which uses different measures, classified 92 countries as democracies in 2009. See Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, “Global Report 2009: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility,” Center for Systemic Peace, December 7, 2009, p. 11, http://www.systemicpeace.org/Global%20Report%202009.pdf. 57. Steven Lee Myers and Thomas Fuller, “Detecting a Thaw in Myanmar, U.S. Aims to Encourage Change,” New York Times, October 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/07/world/asia/united-states-aims-to-encourage-change-in-myanmar.html?_r=1. 58. Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, “Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization,” International Organization 60 (2006): pp. 911-933; Daniel Brinks and Michael Coppedge, “Diffusion is no illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy,” Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 4 (2006): pp. 463–489. 59. See Yang Yao, “The End of the Beijing Consensus,” Foreign Affairs, February 2, 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65947/the-end-of-the-beijing-consensus. 60. See Ruth Kricheli, “Rewarding Illiberal Elections? Electoral Autocracies and the International Community,” Working Paper, Department of Political Science, Stanford University (2009). 61. For more about the capital mobility mechanism of democratization, see Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 62. Jon C. Pevehouse, “Democracy from the Outside–In? International Organizations and Democratization,” International Organization 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): pp. 515–549. 63. See “Global Views of United States Improve While Other Countries Decline,” BBC World Service Poll, April 18, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/170610_bbcpoll.pdf. 64. Gleditsch and Ward, “Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization.” 65. Helen V. Milner and Bumba Mukherjee, “Democratization and Economic Globalization,” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): pp. 163–181. 66. “Transcript of President Ma's Associated Press interview,” October 19, 2010, http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=22582&rmid=2355. 67. See Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (December 1986): pp. 1151–1169; James Lee Ray, “Does Democracy Cause Peace?” Annual Review of Political Science 1(1998): pp. 27–46; and Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton University Press, 1993). Additional informationNotes on contributorsYu LiuYu Liu is an associate professor of political science at Qinghua University, China. She is also the author of Details of Democracy: An Observation of Contemporary American PoliticsDingding ChenDingding Chen is an assistant professor of government and public administration at the University of Macau, China

Behind the political stagnation on the surface, signs abound that a fundamental political transformation is taking place in China. In the fall of 2011, an unusually large group of independent citizens launched very vocal campaigns to compete for seats in various local congresses. Around the same time, groups of ‘‘netizens’’ went to a small village in Shandong province to try to visit Chen Guangcheng, a human right activist under house arrest, despite repeated reports about visitors being beaten. In July 2011, a train crash near the city of Wenzhou caused a storm of criticism against the government on ‘‘weibo,’’ micro-blog sites in China that claim nearly 200 million readers. Although these are just three pieces of evidence, they represent a rising independent civil society and illustrate that China’s political regime is increasingly being challenged. Over the last decade, terms typically used by Western academics to describe Chinese politics have included ‘‘authoritarian resilience,’’ ‘‘illiberal adaption,’’ and ‘‘rightful resistance,’’ indicating a pessimistic view of China’s democratic future. However, reality sometimes changes faster than scholars can reckon. China is moving closer to vindicating classical modernization theory, which states that economic development eventually leads to democratization. We argue that there is good reason to be optimistic that China will become a democracy, and forecast that China will embark on democratization around 2020 or so, although how it will happen, how long the process will take, and even whether it is desirable are issues beyond the scope of this article. Our relative optimism stems from four interlinked mega-trends: economic development, cultural change, political leadership trends, and the global environment.

Since the political scientist Lipset raised the argument that economic development promotes democratization in 1959,this thesis has been subject to numerous debates.The modernization theory,which centers on the Lipset thesis,went through three stages:rise,decline and revival.Through introducing the main research progresses and their methodologies,this article tries to examine and evaluate the increasingly sophisticated arguments in this field,and analyze the shifts of theories in light of the tides of real politics.

This article focuses on how Maoist discourse engineered revolutionary emotions as a method of political mobilization. Based on personal memoirs and eyewitness accounts, it argues that the Maoist discourse can be disaggregated into three themes, each aimed at provoking one type of emotion: the theme of victimization, which mobilized indignation in struggle campaigns; the theme of redemption, which generated guilt in thought reform campaigns; and the theme of emancipation, which raised euphoria in social transformation campaigns. It also argues that Maoist discourse propagation employed three techniques——personalization, magnification, and moralization—and emphasizes that these techniques of propagation are as important as the content of the three themes in the production of passions.

旅居英国好几年了,最近要搬家,我遇到一个难题:有很多"大型垃圾"需要扔掉,怎么扔、扔到哪里呢?所谓大型垃圾,就是指旧冰箱、拆掉的浴缸之类的大家伙.扔到楼下的垃圾桶里,小小垃圾桶装不下不说,妨碍了交通和景观,邻居也会抗议.找垃圾清理公司来收,花费肯定不菲.正一筹莫展之际,一个朋友建议:找剑桥市政府处理,他们会以低廉的收费给你处理大型垃圾.