This paper introduces international trade in intermediate inputs into Clarida et al.(2002) to examine the welfare gains from monetary policy cooperation when the world is hit by cost-push shocks. We find that Clarida et al.(2002)'s prediction is right. Specifically, the introduction of the international trade in intermediate inputs opens a new channel through which the terms of trade at the stage of intermediate-goods production produce the spillover effect. In Clarida et al. (2002), the risk sharing effect and the terms of trade effect cancel out and the welfare gains from monetary policy cooperation disappear when the utility function of consumption is logarithmic. By contrast, in our model, the new channel still works. By internalizing the spillover effect produced through the new channel, the cooperative monetary policymaker achieves the welfare gains which are substantially larger than those found in the literature. In addition, we find that the welfare gains increase with the degree of intermediate-goods trade openness.
This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a two-country Schumpeterian growth model incorporating the spirit of capitalism (SOC). We analyze how the strength of SOC in each country shapes the incentives for and outcomes of international monetary policy cooperation. In our framework, monetary policy affects domestic productivity growth via cash-in-advance constraints on both consumption and R&D investment. We show analytically that stronger SOC in either country lowers the optimal cooperative nominal interest rate by increasing R&D-driven growth and cross-border spillovers. Calibrating the model to the U.S. and the Euro Area, we find that the optimal cooperative interest rates satisfy the Friedman rule, while the Nash-equilibrium interest rates are positive in both economies. Moreover, while policy cooperation yields welfare gains for both parties when SOC levels are similar, it generates welfare losses for the country with the weaker SOC when asymmetries are large. Our results highlight a novel mechanism: the feasibility and desirability of international monetary policy cooperation depend critically on the relative strengths of the SOC across countries.
This study investigates the threshold effects of public debt on economic growth in developing countries using a dynamic panel threshold model over the years 1990–2020. To examine the heterogenous threshold effects of public debt, we classify the sample, on the World Bank’s income-based classification, as lower-middle-income economies and upper-middle-income economies. We find that public debt negatively affects the economic growth of developing countries above the threshold level of 50.988
近年来,中国的宏观杠杆率持续上升,对金融安全与稳定造成了一定的负面影响,引起了广泛关注.本文构建一个包含土地金融放大机制的多部门动态随机一般均衡模型,来研究房地产市场发展对杠杆率的放大作用,并评估房地产税在去杠杆过程中所发挥的作用.本文发现,地方政府采用土地金融方式进行融资放大了宏观经济波动,造成宏观杠杆上升.无论是对存量房地产还是流量房地产征税,房地产税均可以降低宏观经济波动和杠杆率.福利分析结果表明:在合理的取值范围内,房地产税税率与消费补偿呈U形关系,当房地产税税率较高时,需要补偿的消费比例较大.
In the literature on optimal monetary policy in open economies, the presence of local- cur-rency pricing provides a rationale for targeting CPI inflation rather than PPI inflation. In this paper, we reexamine this conclusion by incorporating international trade in intermediate inputs into Engel (2011). We find that the cooperative monetary policymaker should target the final-goods output gaps, the PPI inflation rates at both stages of production, the cur-rency misalignments at both stages of production, and the vertical relative price gaps. Welfare analysis shows that the monetary policymaker should target the weighted average intermediate-goods PPI (WPPI) inflation rather than CPI inflation for most combinations of price stickiness at both stages of production.(c) 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
本文在标准新凯恩斯货币模型中引入人工智能,研究人工智能对最优货币政策及货币政策设计的影响.基于推导出的二阶福利损失函数,本文首先分析了央行面临权衡的变化,然后以福利为标准分析了人工智能对央行货币政策规则选择的影响.研究发现:第一,在标准新凯恩斯货币模型中,央行在通胀和产出缺口之间权衡,而引入人工智能后,就业与人工智能投资波动也成为央行重要的权衡项.第二,引入人工智能后,相对于盯住通胀和产出缺口的泰勒规则,盯住通胀和就业缺口的货币政策规则带来更小的福利损失.这主要是因为,在人工智能可以高度替代劳动的情况下,过度重视产出缺口会导致人工智能投资和就业的巨大波动,并显著增加名义价格和工资粘性带来的福利损失.这一发现改变了央行应盯住通胀和产出缺口的结论,具有明确的政策含义.
本文在小国开放经济新凯恩斯货币模型中,引入了人民币国际流动性约束,研究其对货币政策选择的影响.货币国际流动性约束扭曲了跨国风险分担条件,使得央行需要在稳定价格水平和改进风险分担条件之间进行权衡.研究发现:(1)人民币国际流动性约束程度越高,央行越应增加实际汇率波动;(2)与盯住CPI通胀相比,执行盯住PPI通胀的政策规则能够在稳定价格水平的同时,增加实际汇率波动,改善国际风险分担条件,提高社会福利.
2008年国际金融危机后,我国M2供给增幅远高于CPI上涨幅度,这一现象被学界称为"货币失踪之谜".本文构建了一个两部门新凯恩斯货币模型来研究这一问题.当外部需求下降后,央行降低利率以提振经济,房地产部门和非房地产部门同时扩张.由于住房属于耐用消费品,具有一定的金融属性,其需求对利率变化更敏感.利率下降后,住房需求相对普通消费品需求上升更多.因为存在土地市场分割,商住用地供给弹性较小,住房需求上升导致商住用地价格上升较多,地价上涨提升了房地产企业的抵押融资能力,房地产部门进一步扩张.普通消费品需求对利率反应小,需求较弱导致工业用地价格上升幅度较小,非房地产部门抵押融资能力小幅提升.因此,非房地产部门产出和CPI只温和扩张.Ramsey最优货币政策模拟表明,只有实现了房地产部门与非房地产部门均衡发展,才能实现社会福利最大化.
In this paper, we aim to answer the question why the natural rate of interest displays a downward trend by introducing the spirit of capitalism in the spirit of Zou (1994,1995) in Diamond (1965). We find that the capital stock is higher and the interest rate is lower in our model than their respective counterparts in Diamond (1965). We also find that the stronger the spirit of capitalism, the higher the capital stock and the lower the interest rate. We conclude from the above findings that the decentralized equilibrium in an OLG model with the spirit of capitalism is more likely to be inefficient than that in Diamond (1965).
This paper studies how the monetary policymaker should conduct the monetary policy in a small open economy with labor market frictions.The welfare loss function shows that the monetary policymaker faces a stabilization tradeoff between the PPI inflation and the unemployment rate gap.We find that the welfare gains from implementing the optimal monetary policy are small relative to the optimized simple rule.In addition, when conducting the optimized simple rule, the monetary policymaker should attach a greater weight to the unemployment rate gap when the economy is more open.
Fostering Program for Excellent Research Papers at CUFE; Program for Innovation Research in Central University of Finance and Economics; National Social Science Fund of China [19ZDA069]
本文建立了一个包含重商主义的两国模型,从重商主义的角度解释了全球失衡的原因,分析其对消费、汇率、产出、贸易条件的短期和长期影响,并讨论了货币政策和关税政策对经济的影响.研究发现:(1)重商主义更强的国家(简称H国)在国际金融市场上积累资本,经常账户盈余;重商主义更弱的国家(简称F国)借贷资本,经常账户赤字.无论是短期还是长期,H国家庭户的消费都低于F国,H国货币贬值、相对产出更高、贸易条件恶化.(2)当H国发生正向货币供给冲击时,H国相对F国消费短期和长期都增加,货币短期贬值、长期变化方向不定,相对产出短期上升、长期降低,经常账户盈余增加,贸易条件短期恶化、长期改善.(3)H国关税提高对产出和经常账户盈余影响的方向不定.当H国经济规模相对较小时,H国相对消费短期和长期都下降,贸易条件长期恶化;当H国经济规模相对较大时,H国货币短期和长期都升值,贸易条件短期改善.
本文以2016年美国加息事件为背景,研究美国货币政策对中国资本流动、资产价格和宏观经济的影响.基于小国开放动态随机一般均衡模型,本文梳理了美国货币政策溢出效应的具体传导渠道,发现国外利率升高后,资本流动具有外部性,导致国内资产价格下跌,其通过金融加速器进一步使国内投资下降、资产价格进一步下跌,从而使得国内资产预期回报进一步下降,加 剧资本外流.基于政策和福利分析,本文发现资本账户管理可以有效缓解国外利率冲击对经济波动的影响,同时会提高货币政策的独立性,但也会影响国民财富的最优配置.因此,最优的资本账户管理应同时兼顾宏观审慎和效率两个方面.
Contrary to the consensus in the literature, we demonstrate that there exist the welfare gains from monetary policy cooperation when the world is hit by a global shock. We reach our conclusion in a two-country New Keynesian model with a global oil price shock and dollar standard. When exporters in both countries and oil producer which is modeled as a third party such as OPEC price goods in the home currency, the U.S. dollar, the status of home and foreign monetary policy is asymmetric. Speciffically, home monetary policy can influence the welfare levels of the households in the world while foreign monetary policy can only affect the welfare level of the domestic household. By internalizing the negative externality of home monetary policy to foreign country, world planner can achieve the welfare gains from monetary policy cooperation. In addition, unlike what is found in the literature, we show that not all countries are willing to take part in monetary policy cooperation, unless the world planner transfers part of the welfare gains from the country which benefits from the monetary policy cooperation to the one which loses.
Point orthogonal projection onto a spatial algebraic curve plays an important role in computer graphics, computer-aided geometric design, etc. We propose an algorithm for point orthogonal projection onto a spatial algebraic curve based on Newton’s steepest gradient descent method and geometric correction method. The purpose of Algorithm 1 in the first step of Algorithm 4 is to let the initial iteration point fall on the spatial algebraic curve completely and successfully. On the basis of ensuring that the iteration point fallen on the spatial algebraic curve, the purpose of the intermediate for loop body including Step 2 and Step 3 is to let the iteration point gradually approach the orthogonal projection point (the closest point) such that the distance between them is very small. Algorithm 3 in the fourth step plays an important double acceleration and orthogonalization role. Numerical example shows that our algorithm is very robust and efficient which it achieves the expected and ideal result.
This paper incorporates financial intermediaries within a small open DSGE model and studies the effects of bank runs on economic activities. Shocks to the world interest rate induce capital outflows and asset price reduction, and the decline in asset prices weakens intermediaries' balance sheets, making them vulnerable to bank runs and leading, in turn, to a more severe and persistent recession. Our model is successful in generating some key properties observed in emerging market business cycles. We also asses the stabilization effect of capital control policy, numerical experiment suggests that countercyclical tax on capital flows is effective in absorbing the disturbance from external financial shocks and reducing the probability of bank runs.
<span id="ChDivSummary" name="ChDivSummary" class="abstract-text">本文构建蕴含耐用品与非耐用品的两部门DSGE模型,研究投资专有冲击对货币政策及社会福利的影响。投资专有技术进步改进了投资转化为生产资本的效率,放大边际成本波动,增加了厂商调价动机和价格水平变动。即使耐用品价格完全灵活,最优货币政策也无法同时稳定价格和实际GDP。研究发现:(1)耐用品相对价格缺口波动率的上升虽然增加了实际GDP波动,但能够有效地降低投资专有技术对边际成本的冲击,减少价格变动的福利损失。所以两部门投资专有冲击时,央行倾向于稳定价格水平。与其相反,在单部门投资专有冲击和两部门生产技术冲击时,最优货币政策应降低耐用品相对价格缺口波动,稳定实际GDP。(2)对比三种泰勒规则:钉住非耐用品PPI、钉住加权平均PPI及钉住CPI,福利分析发现钉住非耐用品PPI最优,钉住CPI次之,钉住加权平均PPI的福利损失最大。就损失程度而言,投资专有冲击的福利损失是生产技术冲击的2倍,表明投资专有冲击加剧了最优货币政策在稳定价格与实际GDP间的权衡。</span>
In this paper, we examine the question of how to conduct fiscal and monetary policy in a two-sector Ramsey model with durable and non-durable goods. Due to the fact that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of durable goods is much higher than that of non-durable goods, the introduction of durable goods changes the policy prescriptions substantially. Specifically, in comparison with the findings in the literature, we find that the labor income tax rate and the interest rate exhibit greater volatility. In addition, the volatilities of the labor income tax rate and the interest rate increase with the decrease in the depreciation rate of durable goods.
What is the appropriate inflation target for the monetary policymaker in a currency union, core inflation or headline inflation? We answer the question in a two-country New Keynesian model with an energy sector. We derive the welfare loss function and find that optimal monetary policy should target output gaps, the terms of trade gap, the Producer Price Index inflation rates, and the real marginal cost gaps. We use the welfare loss function to evaluate two alternative Taylor-type monetary policy rules. We find that the choice of preferred policy rule depends on the shocks. Specifically, when productivity shocks hit the economy, the monetary policymaker should follow the headline inflation Taylor rule, while the core inflation Taylor rule should be followed when a negative energy endowment shock hits the economy. In our extended model in which a representative energy producer in the home country inputs domestic non-energy consumption goods to produce energy to meet the union-wide demands, we also find that the core inflation Taylor rule should be followed when a negative energy productivity shock occurs. In addition, whichever monetary policy rule the monetary policymaker chooses, the welfare level of home households is always lower than that of foreign households following a negative energy productivity shock.
This paper examines optimal monetary policy rules in a model of vertical production and trade with reference currency. As evidenced by empirical findings, we assume that final-goods prices are sticky, but intermediategoods prices are flexible. We find that even if intermediate-goods prices are flexible, monetary authorities need to respond to the shocks at the stage of intermediate-goods production. We also find that, when a shock occurs at the stage of final-goods production, monetary responses are independent of the expenditure share of finalgoods producers on intermediate goods. For the first time in the literature, our model gives a condition under which both countries are willing to participate in monetary cooperation. Thus the gains from cooperation are real. In addition, we compare the volatility of the nominal exchange rate in Nash case with that in cooperative case, and compare the volatility of the nominal exchange rate in our model with that in a model without vertical production and trade as well. We also extend the model to consider a case of dual price stickiness. We find that the change in solution methods completely alters the conclusions of the model.