Many public–private partnership (PPP) projects in China are facing increased fiscal expenditure responsibilities and weakened fiscal capacity, which may hinder investment in corporate innovation. Using data from Chinese prefecture-level cities and listed firms from 2014 to 2020, we find that PPP fiscal expenditure responsibilities negatively affect firms’ current and future innovation investment by reducing government subsidies and increasing corporate taxes. This negative effect is more pronounced when PPP fiscal expenditure responsibilities exceed a certain threshold. It is also stronger when local governments have higher levels of debt and lower central transfer payments. The effect is also stronger if the PPP project’s return mechanism increases the government’s future fiscal expenditure responsibilities, but weaker if the project’s operating model revitalizes government assets. The effect on private firms, small firms, high-debt firms, and firms facing strong financing constraints is more pronounced. From the perspective of fiscal capacity, this paper explains the underlying reasons why the effectiveness of government support policies for corporate innovation varies. Additionally, it examines the negative impacts of the financing-oriented PPP model on corporate innovation investment, providing empirical evidence to support options for optimal PPP strategies.

The literature traditionally treats the uncertainty firms encounter as a whole, neglecting the inherent heterogeneity of uncertainty that prevails in the real world. To address this critical issue, this study employs natural language processing methods to decompose uncertainty into three distinct levels: firm-level, industry-level, and macro-level uncertainty. We then examine the impact of heterogeneous uncertainty on corporate decision-making from a cost management perspective. Our findings indicate that while uncertainty as a whole increases cost stickiness, this effect mainly stems from firm-level uncertainty rather than industry-level and macro-level uncertainty. These findings suggest that firms only respond to uncertainty when they perceive uncertainty at the firm level. Cross-sectional tests indicate that the impact of uncertainty on cost stickiness is more pronounced when firms face higher adjustment costs, lower financing constraints, and lower competitive pressures than otherwise. Additionally, uncertainty diminishes firms' cost elasticity, curtailing their production flexibility. Collectively, our results provide insights into comprehending the internal mechanisms of firms' decision-making in the face of uncertainty.

We examine whether the immigration status of entrepreneurs is a concern for creditors when extending trade credit. Utilizing the disclosure of overseas residence rights of controlling shareholders in China, we show that overseas residence rights negatively affect firms' ability to obtain trade credit. This negative association is attenuated if the overseas jurisdiction has an extradition treaty with China. Our results are robust to the introduction of the Hong Kong national security law as a source of exogenous variation in the boundary of domestic law. The decrease in trade credit provision is more pronounced in firms that are perceived as less trustworthy (i.e., with less social trust or higher expropriation risk). Our results offer new insights into how the reach of law across borders can affect firms' financing activities.

We investigate the effect and economic consequences of bank digital transformation on corporate financial constraints using data from Chi-na.The results show that bank digital transformation alleviates corporate financial constraints by decreasing information search,processing,and verification costs.Furthermore,the effect of bank digital transformation on corporate financial constraints is more pronounced for firms with higher contract intensity,more intangible assets,and poorer external information environment.We also find that bank digital transformation alleviates corporate financial constraints by increasing debt financing.In addition,we show that digital transformation promotes lending by big banks,resulting in the crowding-out effect.Finally,we find that bank digital transformation promotes the flow of credit resources to non-zombie firms,which effectively improves credit allocation efficiency.This paper extends research on digital finance and new structural finance from the perspective of bank digital transformation.

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This study examines the impact of lending facilities on commercial banks’ lending and its underlying mechanism by employing the difference-in-difference method utilizing Chinese banking data. It is found that lending facilities significantly increase the scale of lending by commercial banks through the channel of the eligible collateral, and this effect has increased over time. The findings confirm for the first time that lending facilities in China play a credit promotion role through the channel of the eligible collateral, providing empirical evidence in the Chinese context of the effectiveness on lending facilities and important insights for improving lending facility operations.

货币政策如何更有效地改善企业融资一直是中国经济面临的难题.经济新常态以来,中国人民银行创设了货币政策担保品框架,通过将央行信用与企业信用相挂钩的方式支持企业融资.文章以公司信用类债券被纳入合格担保品范围作为准自然实验,运用双重差分模型研究了央行担保品政策创新的信贷融资效应及其作用机制.研究发现,将公司信用类债券纳入合格担保品范围这一央行担保品政策创新显著扩大了企业的信贷融资规模,尤其是长期借款融资规模,并降低了企业的信贷融资成本.在货币政策担保品框架下,央行可以通过调整借贷便利操作规模和利率的方式有效影响银行信贷投放,从而起到改善企业信贷融资的作用.文章从企业信贷融资视角为央行担保品政策创新的有效性提供了实证证据,对于更好地实施基于担保品的货币政策以促进经济高质量发展具有重要启示.

大量企业选择将资金投向金融市场而非实体产业的重要原因之一在于不完全市场下的投融资障碍.本文研究发现,高铁通车能抑制企业金融资产配置,且主要抑制企业的长期金融资产配置而非短期金融资产配置,从而降低企业风险,提高企业长短期绩效.机制分析发现,高铁通车通过增加实体投资机会和减少融资摩擦两条路径推动企业重返实体经济.进一步分析发现,高铁通车对企业金融资产配置的抑制作用主要存在于投资机会较少、融资约束较高、所处地区初始交通禀赋较差的企业中.本文研究既从完善交通基础设施方面为推动企业重返实体经济提供了一个可能的方案,也从金融投资与实业发展的视角丰富了高铁通车经济外部性的研究,为建设全国统一大市场、构建"以国内大循环为主体"的双循环发展格局提供了理论参考.

Manufacturing is fundamental to the real economy. Given the central role of cost management in the manufacturing industry, we study the role of people in firms’ cost management. We find that manufacturing background CEOs significantly decrease cost stickiness. The results can be explained by a manufacturing background CEO’s focus on corporate cost management and his superior ability to choose flexible production to accelerate inventory flow and mitigate the bullwhip effect. We also show that the impact of manufacturing background CEOs on cost stickiness is more prominent in firms with high demand uncertainty, high economic policy uncertainty, high asset intensity, or low customer concentration. Finally, we report evidence that CEOs with manufacturing and finance backgrounds are associated with less cost stickiness, thus confirming the critical role of business-finance integration in cost management. In sum, these findings highlight the importance of talents in building a powerful manufacturing country.

When negative media coverage causes reputational crises, companies must find suitable tools to repair their reputation and reverse their negative image. As a CSR activity with political- and livelihood-related implications, targeted poverty alleviation may be an effective tool. Using data on negative media coverage of Chinese A-share private listed companies, we examine whether companies engage in targeted poverty alleviation in response to reputational crises caused by negative media coverage. We find that negative media coverage leads private companies to engage more actively and intensively in targeted poverty alleviation because of the significant increase in public attention to the bad news. These companies must urgently rebuild their positive image using targeted poverty alleviation to resolve their public opinion crisis. Further analyses suggest that original and in-depth negative media coverage is more likely to cause companies’ active participation in targeted poverty alleviation. In addition, negative media coverage is more likely to lead companies to engage in targeted poverty alleviation when they are in heavily polluting industries or face greater pressure from external investors. Finally, we find that active involvement in targeted poverty alleviation helps companies improve their market reputation and thus effectively manage public relations crises caused by negative media coverage.

This paper constructs a database of anti-takeover provisions through text analysis. The two hypotheses of value creation and private-interest grabbing are tested based on anti-takeover provisions from the perspective of corporate investment. Our results supports the hypothesis of private-interest grabbing on the whole: the enterprises having anti-takeover provisions will reduce corporate investment efficiency. Specifically, the management of firms having anti-takeover provisions tends to seek over-investment in "empire building" rather than under-investment in enjoying “quiet life”. Mechanism test shows that anti-takeover provisions will intensify corporate insider control and affect corporate investment behavior. Furthermore, the private-interest grabbing is more significant when an enterprise has stronger effect anti-takeover provisions, pre-defensive effect provisions or strengthening management position provisions. Anti-takeover provisions in family enterprises has a value creation effect, but a private-interest grabbing effect in other private enterprises, share dispersing enterprises or enterprises without actual controller. This paper reveals the path of corporate terms on economic behavior, and provides ideas for deepening the reform of the capital market and promoting the improvement of corporate governance.

现有研究从调整成本、管理层乐观预期及代理成本视角解释了成本粘性现象的动因,但不同理论所蕴含的经济学意义却截然不同.鉴于此,本文研究成本粘性对公司价值的影响.研究发现,成本粘性在短期内会降低公司价值,在长期内则会提升公司价值,该跨期异质性影响主要表现在调整成本更高、管理者预期更乐观、代理成本更低及民营企业中.结果表明,企业保持成本粘性是管理层权衡了成本粘性的短期成本和长期收益后做出的理性选择.机制分析发现,成本粘性更高的公司,企业实际销售收入增长率和分析师预测的盈余增长率均更高.门槛回归结果还发现,企业在短期内对成本快速调整反而会降低公司价值,而保持适度的成本粘性则可以在长期内增加公司价值.

我国债券市场信用评级制度的有效性备受质疑,突出问题在于评级机构可能调高债券评级.然而,评级机构调高评级既可能是评级机构和发行人共谋的结果,也可能是评级机构基于对发行人私有信息的有效解读而做出的理性选择.鉴于此,本文研究信用评级机构的评级调整是否影响债券信用利差,以评估我国债券信用评级制度的有效性.研究发现,信用评级机构调高(调低)评级能显著降低(抬高)债券信用利差,该发现在考虑了各种稳健性检验后依然成立;本文还利用"大公国际被罚"事件进行安慰剂检验,并利用新冠疫情这一突发事件构建私有信息的外生冲击.结果表明,评级机构调高评级更多是基于对发行人私有信息的有效解读而做出的理性选择,即我国债券信用评级总体上是有效的.但进一步研究还发现,评级分析师的专业能力、债券市场的"刚性兑付"环境以及评级机构的付费模式竞争会影响我国债券信用评级制度的有效性.

R&D manipulation prevails in firms' application for high-tech enterprise certification. This paper provides evidence on how media coverage significantly inhibits firms' R&D manipulation behaviour by increasing citizens' concerns. Among all the media reports, original reports and in-depth reports serve the strongest purpose in alleviating R&D manipulation. Among all types of media, online media and authoritative media play a stronger role. We also find a more pronounced supervision role of media for enterprises that are owned by private entities, covered by more analysts, administrated by more capable governments or located in regions with a higher marketization level. We also provide evidence on the enhancement of firms’ R&D performance due to media coverage.

本文研究债券发行前企业是否机会主义地进行杠杆操纵以临时性地达到"降杠杆"的目标.研究发现,债券发行前企业的资产负债率分布在监管门槛附近出现显著的不连续现象,即企业在发债前有强烈的杠杆操纵动机.具体地,发债企业会通过改变租赁模式、发行永续债、注入土地资产,或通过政府"打欠条"以增加其他应收款等方式进行杠杆操纵.在长期内杠杆操纵会加剧企业未来的信用风险,但企业之所以仍进行杠杆操纵的主要目的是获得短期潜在收益,表现为提高债券发行信用评级,降低债券发行利差.本文从债券发行的视角探索了一个杠杆操纵的新场景,也为企业机会主义行为所引发的监管扭曲效应提供了新的微观证据.

债券"刚性兑付"打破后如何防范债务违约风险、保护债权人利益成为防范化解系统性金融风险的重中之重.在债券契约中引入交叉违约这一创新的金融制度安排旨在让同一企业不同债券投资者可以在企业发生债务违约时享有同等求偿权,意图保护债权人利益,但这也可能在事前释放了企业低质量的信号,在事后又可能导致企业因资金链断裂而产生更高的违约风险.为此,本文通过检验交叉违约制度对债券违约风险的影响,以分析其到底是债券投资者的"保护盾"还是债务违约的"多米诺".研究发现,交叉违约制度显著提高而非降低了债券违约风险,表现为债券信用利差显著更高.机制检验结果发现,债券发行人触发交叉违约条款后会产生一系列负面影响;当交叉违约条款更易被触发时,附有交叉违约条款的债券其信用利差更高.异质性检验发现,交叉违约制度导致债券信用利差抬升的现象在债务违约预期高、偿债压力大的企业中更显著,当债券未设置"事前"的限制性契约条款时也更显著.结果表明,与推出交叉违约制度的初衷不同,交叉违约会导致单只债券的违约对企业其他债券产生连锁违约效应,极大增加系统性金融风险.本文的研究发现为监管层重新认识交叉违约制度提供了实证依据.

本文手工收集中国投服中心行权数据,从挖掘公司负面信息的角度考察投服中心行权的信息治理效应.研究发现,小股东的参与可以缓解投资者信息劣势,促进公司负面信息披露,具体表现为股价崩盘风险显著降低;投服中心以参加股东大会、参加重大资产重组媒体说明会及网上问询方式行权时的信息治理作用更突出;投服中心行权问题越多和上市公司回复越详细时的信息治理效应越显著;投服中心行权通过内部和外部信息治理渠道促进公司负面信息披露.本文验证了小股东参与公司治理机制创新的政策效果,对理解小股东在公司治理中的作用有重要启示.

We study how government intervention in the bank loan granting process affects firms’ leverage dynamics. We exploit the setup of administrative approval centers (AACs) in China, a program aiming to reduce bureaucracy in business activities, as a quasi-natural experiment. On average, AACs help to shorten the leverage rebalancing period by as much as a quarter. This acceleration pattern persists in under-leveraged firms, which issue more debt to rebalance accordingly. Cross-sectional analyses show that the positive effect of AACs on leverage adjustment is more pronounced for firms that are in poorer legal environment, with more financial constraints, or less politically connected. ics.

本文研究以高速铁路建设为代表的基础设施建设在解决市场分割方面的积极作用.基于中国A股上市公司数据的研究发现,高铁通车降低了公司费用黏性,其作用渠道是降低企业调整成本、减少代理问题,最终提高企业的成本管理效率.异质性检验还发现,高铁通车对费用黏性的降低作用仅存在于地区初始交通条件较差、调整成本较高以及代理问题较严重的企业中.高铁通车对费用黏性的降低作用仅存在于距离高铁站50公里范围内的企业;高铁可以直达的城市数量越多,高铁的网络效应越明显,对费用黏性的降低作用也越大.本研究为交通基础设施建设在打破地理分割、促进要素流动方面的作用补充了微观证据,为高铁建设的经济外溢效应提供了理论依据.