Pharmaceutical industry is a typical innovation-driven industry. R＆D innovation is not only a basis of production and development of this industry, but also an important source of long-term stable profits and continuous competition for pharmaceutical enterprises. However, the high risk, high cost and high technical complexity of new drug creation have induced many pharmaceutical companies to small innovation and intensive marketing rather than blockbuster innovation. On the other hand, due to the strong spillover effect of pharmaceutical innovation, it is hard to achieve social optimal by market mechanism alone. In this regard, it is necessary for governments in various countries to put forward innovation incentive policies from the national strategic level to enhance pharmaceutical enterprises’ innovation incentives and solve the market failure in the research and development of new drugs. However, most previous literature took innovation incentive policy as a whole, and lacked the analysis of the differences within the policy. In particular, little attention has been paid to examine potential differences in incentive effects of various policy instruments. In view of the quasi-public nature of drugs, pharmaceutical market performance is constrained by various factors such as medical insurance policy and therapeutic competition. Thus, it is necessary to further clarify the choice of innovation incentive policy tools as well as their application conditions. To address the above problems, this paper subdivides innovation incentive policy into cost compensation mechanism（characterized by government innovation cost sharing） and innovation output incentive mechanism（characterized by government strategic innovation subsidy）. More specifically, we develop a stylized model comprising two representative pharmaceutical enterprises who produce and sell partially substitutable drugs such as different drugs for the same disease. The two enterprises have two options. One is to conduct R＆D innovation and produce innovative drugs, and the other is not to conduct R＆D innovation and produce general drugs. We investigate optimal decisions of pharmaceutical enterprises in a competitive market across three different incentive schemes, namely, pure market mechanism（i.e., without government intervention）, government innovation cost sharing, and government strategic innovation subsidy. We further compare equilibrium outcomes across the above three incentive policies and examine the influence mechanisms of different incentive policies on drug prices, pharmaceutical enterprises’ profits and pharmaceutical market allocation. The main results are as follows. First, three incentive mechanisms, i.e., pure market mechanism, government innovation cost sharing, and government strategic innovation subsidy can induce pharmaceutical enterprises to conduct R＆D innovation. Notably, only the government strategic innovation subsidy can allow pharmaceutical enterprises to achieve social optimality in innovation investment, while the pure market mechanism and the government innovation cost sharing will lead to distortion of pharmaceutical innovation investment in the majority of situations. Second, the government innovation cost sharing always enhances the pharmaceutical enterprises’ innovation rewards, while the government strategic innovation subsidy can either enhance or reduce their innovation rewards, which depends the medical copayment level. In particular, when the copayment level is sufficiently high, the government strategic innovation subsidy will lower pharmaceutical enterprises’ innovation profits. Finally, the government innovation cost sharing and the government strategic innovation subsidy can both enhance social welfare of the innovation pharmaceutical market, but have opposite different effects on prices of innovative drugs. The government innovation cost sharing will push up the innovative drugs’ prices while the government strategic innovation subsidy will lower their prices. Several managerial insights and policy implications are derived from our main research results. First of all, there is no absolute optimal policy to promote pharmaceutical innovation. Thus, the government should select desirable innovation incentive policies based on different policy objectives. Specifically, if the government aims to control drug prices and improve social welfare, it should select the strategic innovation subsidy policy. It is noteworthy that the government strategic innovation subsidy will lead to decreased innovation rewards for pharmaceutical enterprises when the copayment level is relatively high. In this regard, the government strategic innovation subsidy will lower R＆D innovation incentives for pharmaceutical enterprises and increase risk of supply shortages of innovative drugs in the long run. On the other hand, if the government aims to promote the development of the pharmaceutical industry, it should select the innovation cost sharing policy to raise pharmaceutical enterprises’ profitability, but such policy is not so effective to control prices of drugs. Moreover, given that the medical insurance plan has significant impact on market expansion effect of innovative drugs, which can either enhance or reduce pharmaceutical enterprises’ willingness for pharmaceutical innovation, the government should reasonably match innovation incentive policies and medical insurance reimbursement scheme according to social and economic development goals, so as to improve the sustainability of innovation drug supply and achieve a “multi-win” situation for pharmaceutical enterprises, patients, medical insurance organization and the government.

立足于制药产业研发——营销双密集的产业属性,探究广告竞争下,制药企业创新战略选择的影响机制和药品市场绩效.研究发现,制药企业的创新战略选择取决于创新投资和广告投资的内在关系和创新效率.当创新投资和广告投资之间存在挤入效应时,研发创新可能导致囚徒困境的结果;其次,适中的医保福利水平对制药企业的创新意愿有正向影响,过高或过低的医保福利水平,均会降低制药企业的创新意愿;最后,当创新效率足够高且创新投资强度中等时,更多的制药企业进行研发创新,可实现患者福利和社会福利的双重改进.否则,更多的制药企业进行研发创新将导致患者福利和社会福利的双重损失.研究结论可为制药企业协调创新战略和广告战略、政府部门优化医保支付政策和创新激励政策提供可操作性建议.

在药品市场竞争日益激烈的背景下,如何协调广告战略与研发战略之间的关系,提高创新药市场绩效成为制药企业面对的重要问题.本文构建双寡头制药企业的研发-价格竞争博弈模型,探究制药企业的广告战略、研发战略和政府价格管制政策对于不同类型企业研发激励、药品定价、市场份额、创新利润和创新药市场绩效的综合影响机制.研究发现,当且仅当广告投资和研发投入之间存在"挤入"效应时,实施广告战略才可能为企业带来竞争优势,但广告投资过大将导致企业利润的损失;其次,当且仅当广告投资效率较高时,实施广告战略才能增进创新药市场绩效;最后,价格管制政策和广告战略对企业利润产生综合影响,在一定条件下,价格管制能够强化广告战略对实施企业利润的增进效果,广告战略则有助于改善价格管制对实施企业市场份额的不利影响.

本文在综合考虑社会资本风险偏好和公平偏好的基础上,构建了政府与社会资本之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了社会资本风险偏好和公平偏好影响下PPP项目政府补偿机制的最优设计.研究表明:社会资本的最优投资水平随风险规避度的增高而降低,随公平偏好程度的增高而增高;政府补偿机制的最优设计应是在考虑单期风险及公平溢价成本的基础上,估计单期期望运营收益的高低,进而协调年建设成本补偿及运营期补偿系数两者的相对关系,设计最优的年建设成本补偿和运营期补偿系数.

基于“知识点”建立知识系统的“填鸭式”教学模式,已不能满足市场营销专业人才的培养要求,亟需进行教学模式改革.以服务营销课程为例,根据任务驱动和过程能力原则,将翻转课堂理念融入教学场景建构中,通过移动互联技术,实现场景之间的无缝切换,搭建师生和生生之间多维互动的桥梁.该教学模式可以激发学生多感官参与和学习主动性,改善教学效果,提升学生专业素养和解决实际问题的能力.

研究了在制造商选择返利促销的情况下,双寡头竞争企业的产品定位决策问题,基于Hotelling模型建立了企业的价格—定位竞争模型,并将返利促销模式的影响因素引入模型,通过对不同战略组合的博弈均衡解的分析,得到了企业选择返利促销模式对产品定位的影响,但是却并未改变与竞争对手的产品差异程度.此外,返利促销模式的返利值、兑现率、满足率的关系决定了竞争性企业的返利促销模式的选择.最后,通过将返利促销模式拓展到网络外部性的情形,分析了网络效应对企业促销模式选择和产品定位的影响.

Based on the typical characteristics of existing incentive and regulation in the pharmaceutical industry in China,the innovation incentive policy of the pharmaceutical industry can be divided into two types:incentive policy,and regulatory policy.This paper reviewed the research progress on the influence of price regulation policy,health insurance payment policy,centralized procurement regulation and incentive policy on the innovation of pharmaceutical industry.The present paper puts also forward the future research direction.Based on the literature review,it has been found that the futnre researches in this field should be based on the management practice situation in China,and make a breakthrough from the following three aspects-asymmetric information,comprehensive action mechanism from variable policy instruments,and introduction of new research paradigm.This research provides a theoretical reference for the research and decision-making of the innovation incentive policy in the pharmaceutical industry.

In this paper,we propose a multi-stage dynamic game model to investigate the comprehensive mechanism of government's strategic innovation incentives policy,price regulation policy,and medical insurance payment policy on pharmaceutical firms' innovation incentives and pharmaceutical market performance.We find that price regulation does not necessarily decrease the innovation incentives of pharmaceutical firms,and firms' innovation investment may achieve the social optimal level under a reasonable price regulation.In addition,matching price regulation to medical insurance payment policy may achieve multi-win among pharmaceutical firms,providers,patients,healthcare providers and the government.We also show that government's strategic innovation incentive policy may dual-regulate the innovation investment of pharmaceutical firms,and induce them to the first best allocation,as well as enhance firms' profits and social welfare.Last,improving medical insurance welfare or decreasing regulated price will reduce the welfare effects of the strategic innovation incentive policy.

This paper develops a multi-period dynamic game between duopoly pharmaceutical enterprises and a group procurement platform to analyze their decision-making behaviors and to investigate combining impacts of three factors group procurement regulation for medicines,procurement platform's charging mode,and pharmaceutical enterprises' differentiation strategy-on enterprises' innovation incentives and the market efficiency based on Chinese medicine market.We find that the group procurement regulation does not lower pharmaceutical enterprises' innovation incentives necessarily;the charging mode of procurement platform moderates impacts of group procurenent regulation on pharmaceutical enterprises' innovation incentives;group procurement does not always improve the allocation efficiency of the market unless the efficiency of group procurement is high enough;differentiation strategies will not only help to relieve negative effects of market competition on pharmaceutical enterprises but to increase their innovation incentives and reinforce the impact of group procurement regulation on social welfare.Results derived are of certain significance to improving the group procurement regulation,optimization of operation on the procurement platform as well as enterprises' decision-makings for pricing and innovation strategy.

Based on the present group procurement regulation for medicines,a bilateral bargaining game between two competing pharmaceutical enterprises and one government-oriented procurement platform is proposed to investigate pharmaceutical enterprises' pricing strategies,profit allocation mechanisms between two enterprises and one procurement platform,and key factors influencing pharmaceutical enterprises' willingness to participate in group procurement.The impacts of group procurement regulation on pharmaceutical enterprises' pricing strategies,profits,providers' procurement costs as well as the allocation efficiency of the medicine market are also discussed.The main results are as follows:First,group procurement regulation for medicines will lower prices and the whole procurement costs for medical providers but does not necessarily improve the social welfare.Second,firm's willingness of participation in group procurement increases with its own group procurement efficiency and its rival's bargaining power,and decreases with its rival's group procurement efficiency and its own bargaining power;Third,a firm higher bargaining power does not necessarily gain higher profit.The final profits of firms depend on the combined factors including enterprise's bargaining power,group procurement efficiency,and its rival's bargaining power and group procurement efficiency.Last,group procurement regulation for medicines does not necessarily lead to lower profits for both pharmaceutical enterprises.On some conditions,two enterprises can achieve "Win-Win" under group procurement regulation.In a word,our results provide practical significances for enhancing pharmaceutical firms' willingness to participate in group procurement,promoting the coordination between pharmaceutical firms and the group procure organization,giving full paly to the advantage of group procurement,and improving the allocation efficiency of the medicine market.

构建基于消费者策略行为的供应链收益共享契约模型,研究集中式和分散式决策下,风险中性供应商和损失规避零售商的决策行为,探讨消费者策略行为强度、零售商损失规避度对供应链协调决策的影响.研究表明:零售商最优订购量是损失规避度和批发价与收益共享系数比的减函数,消费者策略性越强,产品的批发价格越低,零售商获得的利润分成越高;面对策略型消费者,当供应商为风险中性,零售商为损失规避时,收益共享契约能够实现供应链的协调和上下游间损失共担;当上下游企业的议价能力相当时,收益共享契约更易于实施.

本文研究了同时考虑竞争者进入威胁和消费者行为的易逝品的动态定价机制.依据策略性和忠诚性两个维度,将市场中的消费者分为策略型忠诚者、策略型转换者、短视型忠诚者和短视型转换者四种类型.建立了在位企业、竞争企业与策略消费者间的两阶段动态博弈模型,通过均衡求解与分析,探讨了在位企业和竞争企业的最优价格机制以及消费者行为对企业定价行为和均衡收益的影响,深入分析了竞争者的进入行为对在位企业定价和收益的影响,以及消费者策略行为和转换行为与竞争者进入行为间的交互作用机制.研究表明:在位企业可以依据策略消费者的比例,采取智能的动态定价机制,实行或放弃对策略消费者的跨期价格歧视,最大化自身收益;消费者策略行为会降低在位企业的绩效却能够提高竞争者的绩效;竞争者的进入并非总是对在位企业不利,在一定条件下,竞争者的进入有利于提高在位企业的绩效;在位企业通过多种方式培养自己的忠实顾客,不仅能够应对竞争者的进入威胁而且能够缓解消费者策略行为的负面影响.

以我国医药行业产学研合作创新为现实背景,构建两家相互竞争的制药企业与学研机构的双边纳什议价模型,分析企业的创新价值和议价能力对联盟成员绩效的影响,探讨合作创新对药品价格、企业市场份额、经营绩效和社会福利的影响,研究制药企业创新战略的选择决策及创新对企业可能的危险.通过模型分析,得到如下结论:产学研合作创新能够提高社会总福利,但不一定提高制药企业的绩效和药品的价格;议价能力强的制药企业不一定总是获得高利润,企业最终的利润受到企业自身及竞争者的议价能力、创新价值的共同影响;虽然产品创新能够提高消费者的购买意愿,但盲目跟风创新可能会带来双输的结果.本研究对促进医药行业的产学研合作,提高产学研合作的有效性具有现实意义.

研究存在消费者策略行为和竞争者进入威胁时,在位企业的产品设计架构和定价的协同决策,探讨战略性产品设计架构应对消费者策略行为和竞争者市场进入的价值.结果表明:在位企业可通过战略性设计架构,增强成本优势或削弱竞争对手的成本优势,甚至阻止竞争者进入市场;消费者策略行为可提高进入者的利润,损害在位者的利润;战略性设计架构能够缓解消费者策略行为的负面效应,缓解效果与竞争者的品牌竞争力和消费者策略行为强度正相关,与产品的生产成本负相关.

This paper proposes two-period dynamic game model of monopoly seller and strategic consumers,and analyzes the remanufacturing production mode selection,product marketing and dynamic pricing strategies.Research results are as follows:First,seller should trade off the relationship between cost savings from remanufacturing and the strength of strategic behavior.When the recovery rate is lower,sellers need to further reduce the production costs of remanufacturing.Second,the pricing and products strategies are affected by recovery rate.With the decline of remanufacturing costs,the products strategy is from offering new products only,to both new products and remanufactured products,and remanufactured products only.Third,under both (manufacturing/remanufacturing) production modes,optimal pricing strategy is price reduction path.

依据条件风险值CVaR度量准则,建立了顾客策略行为下基于回购契约的供应链决策模型,分析了集中式供应链系统和分散式供应链系统中,风险规避供应商和风险规避零售商的决策行为.在此基础上,通过理论求解和数值分析,进一步探讨了顾客策略行为、成员风险规避性和供应链回购契约的交互影响.主要研究结论如下:第一,当供应链成员均为风险规避时,价格承诺可成为顾客策略行为的完美应对策略;第二,最优回购价格受到零售商和供应商的风险规避度的共同影响,零售商的最优订货量随产品回购价格的增加而增加;第三,当且仅当零售商与供应商的风险规避度相当时,回购契约能够实现分散式供应链系统的协调和利润在不同成员间的任意分配,否则回购契约不能实现供应链利润在不同成员间的任意分配.第四,当供应链成员风险规避不等时,零售商的利润分成随顾客对产品估价的增加而增加.同时,风险规避度较小方需要出让部分利润给风险规避度较大方才能够保证契约的实施.

顾客策略行为对企业的经营绩效带来了巨大的负面影响,本文基于供应链背景,探讨需求学习应对顾客策略行为的作用与价值.构建了由单一制造商、单一零售商和一组顾客群组成的两周期分散式供应链系统的博弈模型,将顾客划分为短视型和策略型两种类型.采用数理模型和数值分析,研究了需求学习对于供应链的定价决策、订货决策及整体绩效的影响,得到如下主要研究结论:第一,无论面对何种类型的顾客,零售商均偏好需求学习获取需求更新信息;第二,面对短视顾客时,制造商偏好于不获取更新信息,而当顾客为策略型时,制造商偏好于获取更新信息;第三,需求学习有助于提高零售商和供应链系统的利润,特别当面对策略型顾客时,需求学习带来的利润增值更大.以上研究结论表明,需求学习可以有效地缓解顾客策略行为的负面影响,提高企业的运营绩效.

The supply chain decision model considering strategic customer behavior is proposed based on revenue sharing contract. In a conditional value-at-risk framework, the optimal decision making behavior of centralized and decentralized supply chain are analyzed when supply chain members are both risk-averse. In addition, coordination mechanism as well as channel profit allocation between supply chain members are discussed based on group decision theory. The results are as follows. Firstly, the optimal retail price becomes endogenous and can be a good tool to balance the system’ s profit and risk to a certain extent when there are a large number of strategic customers. Secondly, the revenue sharing contract based on Pareto optimal criterion can coordinate the decentralized supply chain, but the channel profit cannot be alloca-ted arbitrarily between members in this contract when the risk-aversion of members is not equal. The final profits of the members depend not only on relative risk-aversion of members but also on their own influence powers in supply chain. Finally, the revenue sharing contract based on Pareto optimal criterion can balance the profits and the risks between supply chain members.

随着消费者学习能力的增强,策略性消费行为越来越普遍,忽视策略性消费会给企业造成巨大的利润损失.基于经典的营销4P理论,提出4PQI(价格、供给、渠道、促销及信息)的协同管理机制,即通过营销组合及运营的协同管理,达至供需匹配,以减少策略性消费行为的负面影响,促进企业、消费者和社会的共赢.

本文综合考虑价格管制和现行的医保支付政策,研究制药企业创新投入和药品定价的协同决策问题,探讨价格管制和医保支付政策对制药企业创新投入和创新药定价的交互作用机制.研究表明,制药企业定价机制的选择受到管制价格和医保支付政策的双重影响,特别地,当医保支付比例较高时,价格不能作为药品的创新水平的信号,适当降低医保支付有助于控制制药企业创新中的机会主义行为;价格管制对制药企业创新投入的作用受到医保支付政策和企业自身创新能力的共同影响;价格管制并非总是降低企业的创新激励,当医保支付比例较高时,价格管制可在一定程度上纠正创新投入配置的扭曲,提高创新能力中等的制药企业的创新激励.