Prior studies show corporate tax policy could impact corporate green innovation, however, the effectiveness of corporate tax policy depends on the intensity of tax enforcement and further fewer studies focus on the effect of tax enforcement of big data on corporate green innovation. Therefore, this study exploits a unique setting from China Golden Tax III enforcement reform with big data techniques to explore the relationship between tax enforcement of big data and corporate green innovation. And it shows that the tax enforcement of big data can positively increase corporate green innovation. Moreover, the above positive relationship is more pronounced in non-state-owned firms and firms with higher degrees of collusion with tax collectors. And further analysis shows that market competition and ESG performance can strengthen the positive relationship between tax enforcement of big data and corporate green innovation. As a result, it shows that tax enforcement of big data can be a driver of corporate green innovation by guaranteeing the execution effectiveness of corporate tax policy.

This study examines the efficacy of an innovative public enforcement mechanism: the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) random inspections. Since 2016, the CSRC has carried out random inspections in which both inspectors and inspection targets are randomly selected. The selected inspectors conduct on-site inspections focusing on information disclosure, corporate governance, and other normative operations of the selected listed companies. Unlike other public enforcement mechanisms, the inspection targets in this approach are completely random. Random inspections are thought to save regulatory costs and overcome problems such as selective enforcement, with the potential to create an effective deterrent for listed companies, resulting in a "governance effect". However, random inspections may also induce a "gambler's fallacy" among executives in the inspected companies, resulting in the "bomb-crater effect". We find that internal control quality decreases significantly in randomly inspected companies, supporting the bomb-crater effect hypothesis. Moreover, the deterioration in internal control quality caused by CSRC random inspections is more pronounced in firms with overconfident executives and in non-state-owned enterprises. In addition, the reduced quality of internal controls triggered by random inspections leads to lower-quality accounting information, an increased likelihood of financial restatements, and more frequent non-standard audit opinions. Overall, our results reveal the presence of bomb-crater effect in CSRC random inspections.

Based on province-level data on China’s local institutional environment from 2008 to 2014, we explore the relationship between the local institutional environment and stock price crash risk. We find that a stronger local institutional environment curbs stock price crash risk. Furthermore, we explore the relationship between local institutional environment and stock price crash risk for state-owned versus privately owned enterprises. We find that a stronger local institutional environment is more likely to curb stock price crash risk in state-owned enterprises than in privately owned enterprises. Our results are robust to additional tests. These findings suggest that it is necessary to accelerate the progress of local marketization in China to ensure the development of the stock market and a strong economy.

Prior studies of tax enforcement neglect the effect of tax enforcement officers' discretion on corporate internal control quality. This study exploits a unique quasi-natural experimental setting of the reform of Chinese province-level tax administrative penalty discretion standards since 2016 to examine the effect of tax authority governance on corporate internal control quality. We show that tax authority governance can improve corporate internal control quality. And this positive effect is more pronounced in firms with more tax avoidance and more collusion with tax supervisors. Furthermore, further analysis shows that legal enforcement and financial reporting environment can strengthen the positive relationship between tax authority governance and corporate internal control quality. Therefore, the above results show that tax authority governance not only increases the predictability of tax violation and its consequential penalties, but also restricts tax enforcement personnel's discretionary power, thereby reducing opportunities for tax avoidance and rent-seeking behaviour.

This study investigates the impact of the green finance pilot reform on corporate green innovation using the formation of the China Green Finance Pilot Reform in 2017 as a quasi-natural experiment. It shows that the green finance pilot reform increases corporate green innovation. Furthermore, by highlighting the differences between green enterprises and heavily polluting enterprises, it also shows that the positive relationship between the green finance pilot reform and corporate green innovation is more pronounced in green enterprises than in heavily polluting enterprises. The mechanism analysis shows that the green finance pilot reform mainly affects corporate green innovation by easing financing constraints and reducing financing costs. The heterogeneity analysis indicates that the positive relationship between the green finance pilot reform and corporate green innovation is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises and large-scale enterprises. As a result, the effect of the green finance pilot reform on corporate green innovation gives rise to certain green innovation incentives. It is thus necessary to optimise the external corporate governance environment by promoting the green finance pilot reform and further offers practical implications for corporate green innovation decision-making.

Previous studies of tax enforcement neglect the effect of tax-penalty discretionary benchmarks on corporate financial reporting quality. In China, province-level variations in implementing tax-penalty discretionary benchmarks provide a quasi-natural experiment to explore how tax enforcement standardisation affects corporate financial reporting quality. We show that when tax-penalty benchmarks are implemented in every province, there is a more pronounced positive relationship between tax enforcement standardisation and corporate financial reporting quality compared with the ex-ante period. Moreover, this positive relationship is primarily driven by firms with higher degrees of tax avoidance and collusion with tax collectors. Consequently, the implementation of tax-penalty benchmarks means that the standardisation of tax enforcement can improve corporate financial reporting quality. In turn, tax enforcement standardisation can optimise the external governance environment for listed firms and improve financial information disclosure in capital markets.

健全税务行政处罚裁量基准制度是法治政府建设过程中地方税务部门税收征管治理改革的重要举措.文章以2016年起各省级税务局陆续出台的《税务行政处罚裁量基准》为准自然实验场景,探究了税收征管规范化与公司审计定价的关系.研究发现,各地方税务行政处罚裁量基准实施后,税收征管规范化显著提高了公司审计定价,而且这种关系尤其体现在避税程度较高和征纳合谋程度较高的公司中.研究结果表明,伴随着税务行政处罚裁量基准的实施,税收征管规范化促使审计师通过加大审计投入降低公司涉税违法风险,进而优化了上市公司外部治理环境.

Identity theory in economics reveals that organisational identification motivates managers to take actions that are strongly aligned with firm interests. Nevertheless, organisational identification may also play a role in personal incentives. Leveraging the availability of CEO organisational identification data from the national internal control survey of listed firms in China, we document a positive impact of CEO organisational identification on corporate innovation. We also find that the positive impact is more pronounced for firms whose CEOs own shares, that are followed by more financial analysts, and that have higher institutional ownership. Additional analyses suggest that the interaction between CEO organisational identification and corporate innovation investment significantly enhances firm value. Overall, our study shows that CEO organisational identification is a non-trivial driver of firm innovation and growth.

We examine whether and how collusive and coercive forms of corporate corruption influence firm value. Our identification strategy exploits (i) the exogenous criminal prosecutions of regional government officials as part of China’s anti-corruption campaign as demand-side shocks and (ii) the unique reporting of entertainment and travel costs by Chinese firms as supply-side disclosure of corruption-related spending. Among firms for which corruption is likely to be perceived as collusive (coercive) by investors, we find that exposure to corruption-related political risk measured by abnormal entertainment and travel costs has a significantly negative (positive) relation with market reactions to the anti-corruption prosecutions. These findings are consistent with investors’ anticipation of a future decline in potential benefits (costs) arising from rent-sharing collusion (rent-extracting coercion). We also find that the collusion (coercion) effect is more pronounced for firms in regions with greater government economic intervention (in industries with stronger business competition). Furthermore, we provide evidence that the ex ante market reactions corroborate with the direction of changes in ex post operating performance of firms. Overall, our results suggest that investors can recognize differences in the economic consequences between collusive and coercive corruption and that the disclosure of corruption-related spending could help investors assess a firm’s exposure to corruption-related risk.

健全税务行政处罚裁量基准制度是法治政府建设过程中地方税务部门税收征管治理改革的重要举措.本文以2016年起各省级税务局陆续出台的《税务行政处罚裁量基准》为准自然实验场景,探究了税收征管规范化对公司股价同步性的影响.研究发现,相比实施前,各地方税务行政处罚裁量基准实施后,税收征管规范化显著降低了公司股价同步性,这种关系尤其体现在避税程度高、征纳合谋程度高和内部控制质量低的公司中.实证结果表明,随着税务行政处罚裁量基准制度的实施,税收征管规范化显著降低了公司股价同步性,增加了公司股价信息含量.因此,税收征管体制规范化能够优化上市公司外部治理环境,对改善资本市场信息披露环境具有重要实践意义.

Previous studies of corporate tax avoidance have focused exclusively on corporate income tax, an important tax for US firms in particular. Value added tax (VAT), which is a significant tax in other major economies in the world, is ignored in the literature. This paper examines corporate VAT avoidance behaviour in the context of China, where both corporate income tax and VAT are critical for firms. We develop a measure of corporate VAT avoidance and, using simultaneous equation regression, we find a complementary relationship between corporate income tax avoidance and VAT avoidance. This indicates that traditional studies that limit their focus to income tax may have underestimated the magnitude of firms' tax avoidance. The negative effect of VAT avoidance on firm value supports extant arguments in the literature that the opaqueness caused by tax avoidance increase the agency cost between shareholders and managers.

已有文献证实经理人组织认同能够激励经理人按照企业利益行事.那么,经理人组织认同能否改善薪酬契约有效性?文章基于CEO组织认同视角,以证监会中国上市公司内部控制问卷调查数据中的CEO组织认同数据为基础,考察CEO组织认同与高管薪酬业绩敏感性的关系.研究发现,CEO组织认同显著增强了高管薪酬业绩敏感性;进一步按财务报告质量和分析师跟踪分组检验发现,这一关系在财务报告质量较低、分析师跟踪较少的公司更明显.

An important action in the taxation area is to strengthen the normalization of tax enforcement in the processing of the construction of law-based government in China. Furthermore, the core of the normalization of tax enforcement is to establish and perfect the tax administrative penalty discretion standards. Based on the perspective of the tax administrative penalty discretion standards, on the one hand, the normalization of tax enforcement has fully absorbed the predisposing factors of tax enforcement, clarified the specific standards of taxation offences, strengthened the legal deterrence of tax enforcement, and reduced taxpayers’ subjective motivation of tax avoidance; on the other hand, the normalization of tax enforcement could improve the tax enforcement system to some extent, curb the rent-seeking possibility of the collusion between tax supervisors and firms, and further break the external environment of tax avoidance from the collusion through informal payments (e.g., business entertainment expenses) between taxpayers and tax supervisors. Therefore, an interesting and meaningful question is that, based on the perspective of tax administrative penalty discretion standards, how the normalization of tax enforcement restrains corporate tax avoidance behaviors.The province-level practice of tax administrative penalty discretion standards constructs a quasi-natural experiment to explore the relationship between the normalization of tax enforcement and corporate tax avoidance. Based on the province-level practice of tax administrative penalty discretion standards, this study examines the effect of the normalization of tax enforcement on corporate tax avoidance. It shows that compared with the ex-ante period of tax administrative penalty discretion standards implemented in every province, in the ex-post period of tax administrative penalty discretion standards implemented in every province, the negative relationship is more pronounced between the normalization of tax enforcement and corporate tax avoidance. Moreover, the former relationship is more pronounced in firms with less financial reporting quality, lower internal control quality and more collusion between tax supervisors and firms. Further, the former relationship is also more pronounced in private and smaller firms. As a result, as tax administrative penalty discretion standards are implemented, the normalization of tax enforcement can decrease corporate tax avoidance.This study makes several contributions as follows: First, based on the province-level practice of tax administrative penalty discretion standards, besides considering the traditional consequence of tax enforcement, this study also considers the effect of the normalization of tax enforcement from the predisposing perspective of tax administrative penalty discretion standards, broadens the horizon of tax enforcement research, and further enriches the relevant literature of tax enforcement. Second, this study broadens the horizon of the determinants of tax avoidance research, especially in the aspect of tax enforcement, and further enriches the relevant literature of the determinants of tax avoidance research. Third, this study reveals that the normalization of tax enforcement can optimize the external environment of listed firms’ governance and further offer beneficial implications for the fact that tax policies are implemented in the processing of the law-based government.

ABSTRACTBy integrating role theory and social identity theory, this study examines the differential effects of organizational identification of the chief executive officer (CEO) and the chief financial officer (CFO) on corporate philanthropy. We argue that CEO organizational identification can positively affect corporate philanthropy, whereas the opposite holds for CFO organizational identification. This is because the CEO and the CFO have varying attitudes about corporate philanthropy owing to their different role expectations; thus, those who identify strongly with their organizations would act for the best interests of the firm. Moreover, because the beliefs of top executives are probably influenced by those of other executives, we further explore the interaction between the CEO and the CFO. We propose that the positive influence of CEO organizational identification on corporate philanthropy will be weakened by CFO organizational identification, and the moderating effect of CFO organizational identification will become stronger when the CEO and the CFO have opposite genders or when the CFO has ownership. From a sample of 880 publicly traded firms in China, we found support for our hypotheses. Our study can contribute to the corporate philanthropy literature and research on executive organizational identification by highlighting the importance of executive roles and their interactions.

对2009 ～2012年1009家深交所中小板民营上市公司相关数据进行经验研究发现:单独进行社会责任信息披露的中小型民营企业比较倾向于税收规避;相对于制造业企业,非制造业中小型民营企业社会责任信息的披露并不显著地促进税收规避;相对于东部,中、西部中小型民营企业社会责任信息的披露更显著地促进了税收规避.这表明,我国的法律、制度环境缺乏对企业社会责任信息披露的有效监管,进而使许多中小型民营企业假借企业社会责任信息披露之名进行税收规避.因此,应进一步清理税收优惠政策,严惩各类违法违规行为,防止税收流失;同时,强制要求所有上市公司披露企业社会责任信息.