This paper examines behavior in contests where the prize value is ambiguous. We develop a theoretical model of bidding in a Tullock contest with an ambiguous prize where contestants account for the ambiguity attitude of their rival. Ambiguity affects optimal behavior via two countervailing channels - a direct effect arising from contestants’ ambiguity about the value of the prize and an indirect effect corresponding to the effect of ambiguity on the opponent’s behavior. Using a controlled laboratory experiment, we elicit individual risk and ambiguity attitudes and compare predicted and observed behavior in contests with an ambiguous prize, a risky prize and certain prizes. A comparison between contests with ambiguous and risky prizes, shows that participants invest significantly less under ambiguity. Additionally, we decompose the effect of changing from a certain prize to an ambiguous prize into two components - the first is the effect of introducing risk and the second is the effect of introducing ambiguity. Empirically, we find that both effects are significant, but work in opposite directions.

Problem definition: The asymmetric pull-to-center effect for newsvendors is a robust finding in operations, and understanding why newsvendors make suboptimal decisions is key for identifying ways to improve decision-making quality in this critical task. Although prior studies have indicated that experience does not substantially mitigate the pull-to-center effect, the experience levels achieved in those previous studies are limited in comparison with the experience level that a near-continuous time environment can provide. Methodology/results: We conduct a set of laboratory experiments using a nearcontinuous time environment to determine the effect that extensive experience has on newsvendor behavior and the extent to which resultant learning is transferable across conditions. Observed behavior clearly demonstrates that the pull-to-center effect is substantially reduced, if not eliminated, with sufficient experience and that this learning can have positive spillovers to more traditional settings. Further, the experiments suggest that it is the repeated feedback regarding a given inventory decision rather than the ability to explore many strategies that drives improved decision making. Managerial implications: Experience can mitigate the pull-to-center effect, and near-continuous time environments can be an effective training tool for gaining such experience.

We apply salience theory to choices over lotteries with multiple dimensions, such as insurance plans with deductibles and premiums, or monetary and non-monetary rewards. We show that salience theory can explain empirically observed dominated choices with large welfare costs to consumers (the selection of dominated insurance plans with low deductibles, dominated energy plans with a cancellation fee, and dominated consumption bundles with free features). The same framework also addresses a basic empirical puzzle in principal-agent problems: the effectiveness of non-monetary incentives over equivalent-in-value monetary incentives. Our results show that these systematically dominated choices documented in markets emerge from the same basic principles of salience perception that generate dominated choices in the laboratory.

We study an indefinitely repeated Tullock contest in which the stage-game winner gains an incumbency advantage in the next stage-game. The incumbent’s advantage allows the incumbent to carry over a proportion of their expenditure in the previous contest to the next contest. Theoretically, this advantage is not predicted to have a large impact on total expenditure. However, in a controlled laboratory experiment, we find the incumbency advantage increases total expenditure by a significant amount. Further, we find that carryover has a discouraging effect on challengers while encouraging incumbents react in a retaliatory manner.

The existence of lawsuits providing plaintiffs a negative expected value (NEV) at trial has important theoretical implications for signaling models of litigation. The signaling equilibrium possible when there are no NEV suits breaks down because plaintiffs with NEV suits do not have a credible threat to proceed to trial, which undermines the ability to signal type. Using a laboratory experiment, we analyze behavior with and without the possibility of NEV suits. Absent NEV suits, behavior largely follows predicted patterns. However, the possibility of NEV suits is not found to cause the signaling equilibrium to unravel or to cause the dispute rate to increase. Plaintiffs only drop NEV lawsuits three-fourths of the time, the rejection rate by defendants for revealing demands rises less than predicted and, contra theory, the rejection rate on demands in the semi-pooling range remains unchanged.

The efficient market hypothesis predicts that asset prices reflect all available information. Recent experimental work found the rational expectation model to outperform the prior information model in contingent claim markets when traders hold homogeneous values, despite the no trade equilibrium. However, recent experiments have also demonstrated the inability of contingent claim markets to successfully aggregate information when traders hold highly differentiated asset values. These prior findings beg the question of whether homogeneous values are a necessary condition for efficient market outcomes in contingent claim markets. The experiments reported in this paper show that homogeneous values are not a necessary condition for information aggregation.

This paper reports a series of experiments designed to evaluate how the advertised participation payment impacts participation rates in laboratory experiments. Our initial goal was to generate variation in the participation rate as a means to control for selection bias when evaluating treatment effects in common laboratory experiments. Initially, we varied the advertised participation payment to 1734 people from $5 to $15 using standard email recruitment procedures, but found no statistical evidence this impacted the participation rate. A second study increased the advertised payment up to $100 . Here, we find marginally significant statistical evidence that the advertised participation payment affects the participation rate when payments are large. To combat skepticism of our results, we also conducted a third study in which verbal offers were made. Here, we found no statistically significant increase in participation rates when the participation payment increased from $5 to $10 . Finally, we conducted an experiment similar to the first one at a separate university. We found no statistically significant increase in participation rates when the participation payment increased from $7 to $15 . The combined results from our four experiments suggest moderate variation in the advertised participation payment from standard levels has little impact on participation rates in typical laboratory experiments. Rather, generating useful variation in participation rates likely requires much larger participation payments and/or larger potential subject pools than are common in laboratory experiments.

Although the importance of the second-order Arrow-Pratt coefficients of risk aversion is well established, the importance of higher-order risk attitudes has only recently begun to be recognized. In this paper, we introduce a nonparametric approach to directly measure higher-order Arrow-Pratt coefficients of risk aversion in an expected utility framework using choices between compound lotteries and show how it can be easily implemented in behavioral studies. Specifically, we provide a theoretical basis for using risk apportionment to reveal the intensity of higher-order risk attitudes, and then draw upon our theoretical results to develop a simple, systematic, and generalizable procedure for eliciting higher-order Arrow-Pratt coefficients. We demonstrate our approach in a laboratory experiment and find that the modal second-order, third-order, and fourth-order Arrow-Pratt coefficients are positive and small. Further, we find that degrees of risk aversion are positively correlated across orders. Additionally, we discuss alternative implementations of our procedure.

We conduct unstructured bilateral and multilateral negotiations in a laboratory experiment, to assess whether bargainers’ impatience affects outcomes as predicted by structured models meant to represent less-structured naturally-occurring settings. For concreteness we consider a buyer who can make only one trade negotiating with one or two sellers, with impatience induced via time pressure: a bargainer receives their negotiated payoff only if agreement is reached before expiration of a randomly determined bargainer-specific time limit that is unknown to all bargainers. We find increasing the buyer’s impatience generally harms the buyer, supporting the predictions from standard bilateral models and from some multilateral models.

Gerrymandering, the drawing of electoral boundaries for political advantage, is a controversial political topic. Previous theoretical work has treated gerrymandering as a one-stage strategic game against nature, but this paper treats drawing districts as the first stage in a two stage game where parties subsequently compete for undecided voters within districts. In a laboratory experiment, subjects overwhelmingly engage in gerrymandering, which maximizes their probability of winning a majority of the districts and maximizes their expected payoff. However, the subjects self-report being opposed to the practice in politics regardless of their own political ideology. When forced to draw the electoral map behind a veil of ignorance, the subjects indicate a clear preference for symmetric maps although not the map with the highest theoretical expected payoff. Additionally, while subjects overspend in second stage competition, average spending is similar across electoral maps.

We attempt to replicate a seminal paper that offered support for the rational expectations hypothesis and reported evidence that markets with certain features aggregate dispersed information. The original results are based on only a few observations, and our attempt to replicate the key findings with an appropriately powered experiment largely fails. The resulting poststudy probability that market performance is better described by rational expectations than the prior information (Walrasian) model under the conditions specified in the original paper is very low. As a result of our failure to replicate, we investigate an alternate set of market features that combines aspects of the original experimental design. For these markets, which include both contingent claims and homogeneous dividend payments (as in many prediction markets), we do find robust evidence of information aggregation in support of the rational expectations model. In total, our results indicate that information aggregation in asset markets is fragile and should only be expected in limited circumstances. This paper was accepted by Bruno Biais, finance. Supplemental Material: The data and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4463 .

In many situations, two rivals find themselves facing a common threat necessitating cooperation. Such alliances are uneasy as the parties anticipate eventually competing against each other in the future. Recent theoretical work shows that both standalone and joint contribution strategies, as well as a hybrid of the two, can emerge in equilibrium where the former strategy is characterized by one of the rivals contributing enough to eliminate the common threat, while the latter is characterized by rivals providing half the necessary effort to eliminate the common threat. Using a controlled laboratory experiment, we show that player behavior is best described by the hybrid strategy. However, none of these predictions closely describes the observed behavior, which is better described as following a proportionate rule.

We study how a rationally inattentive decision maker chooses state-contingent actions under uncertainty in complex environments. We explore a series of decision problems by varying the number of states as well as incentive structures. We fully characterize the theoretical solutions and compare them to choices made by subjects facing those problems in a controlled laboratory experiment. Observed behavior is broadly consistent with the theoretical model, with subjects responding to changes in complexity and incentives by varying their level of attention. Nevertheless, some interesting differences emerge from the experimental data. In particular, we find only mixed support for the invariance under compression property, that perceptual factors may be required to explain some aspects of subject behavior, and that complexity can affect the ratio of expected utility to information gains.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

With the increased acceptance of marijuana, it is important to understand the impacts of its use. While much attention has been paid to concerns such as health, relatively little attention has been paid to the relationship between marijuana use and basic economic behavior. This experimental study uses incentivized tasks to measure prosocial behavior, risk-taking, memory, cognitive ability, and responsiveness to incentives for 374 subjects, and examines how these behaviors vary with frequency of marijuana use. The general results provide little evidence that increased marijuana is associated with any change in these basic behaviors. Despite the fact that we observe males to be more frequent users of marijuana, more willing to take risks, and more selfish, the general lack off a relationship between economic behavior and frequency of marijuana use holds for both males and females. Relationships between caffeine, tobacco, and alcohol use and basic economic behavior are also analyzed.

First price and Dutch auctions are theoretically isomorphic, but previous experiments report that the institutions are not behaviorally isomorphic. This article uses facial analysis of video recordings of laboratory experiments to investigate whether these auctions invoke different emotional responses from bidders. The results indicate that bidders are angrier during the Dutch auction and that winners exhibit more contempt after the first price auction. Overall, subjects in both auctions appear to be mostly bored and depressed, but there is evidence that bidders exhibit more positive emotions as prices fall in the Dutch auction.

The pull-to-center effect is a systematically observed suboptimal behavior in newsvendor experiments. Various explanations have been forward for this phenomenon, some of which are based on structural properties of the task while others are based upon the inventory context of the problem. To help distinguish between these two types of explanations, we compare behavior in a newsvendor game to behavior in a new, mathematically isomorphic, price gouging game. Our laboratory experiments replicate the standard results for newsvendors and yield the equivalent pattern in the price gouging game. This suggests previously observed newsvendor behavior is driven by structural aspects of the task consistent with models like prospect theory and impulse balance rather than context specific explanations pertaining to inventory management.

We experimentally study the impact of inequality on the effectiveness of contests for funding public goods in a development context. We observe that the typical result of a lottery funding mechanism leading to greater funding for the public good than predicted by theory extends to groups with inequality. However, while theory suggests that increased inequality should lower total contributions to a lottery funded public good, we observe the opposite pattern. This result differs from prior results for the standard voluntary contribution mechanism where increased inequality has been found to reduce public good provision. Moreover, we find that the poor do not contribute a greater share of their endowment to the public good than do the wealthy. Thus, overall our study demonstrates the potential for community development projects, when funded with a lottery mechanism, to be highly successful even in the presence of inequality and may facilitate a progressive redistribution of wealth.

There is an ongoing debate regarding the degree to which a forecaster’s ability to draw correct inferences from market signals is real or illusory. This paper attempts to shed light on the debate by examining how personal characteristics do or do not affect forecaster success. Specifically, we investigate the role of fluid intelligence, manipulativeness, and theory of mind on forecast accuracy in experimental asset markets. We find that intelligence improves forecaster performance when market mispricing is low, manipulativeness improves forecaster performance when mispricing is high, and the degree to which theory of mind skills matter depends on both the level of mispricing and how information is displayed. All three of these results are consistent with hypotheses derived from the previous literature. Additionally, we observe that male forecasters outperform female forecasters after controlling for intelligence, manipulativeness, and theory of mind skills as well as risk aversion. Interestingly, we do not find any evidence that forecaster performance improves with experience across markets or within markets. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, behavioral economics and decision analysis.

When a principal relies on an agent, a conflict of interest can encourage the agent to provide biased advice. Conventional wisdom suggests that such behavior can be reduced through disclosure requirements. However, disclosure has been shown to exacerbate self-serving bias and can actually lead to greater harm for the principal in one-shot interactions. But in many naturally occurring settings, agents form reputations, a mechanism that could diminish the incentive to provide biased advice. We test for bias in the advice agents provide when faced with reputation concerns, and examine the impact of disclosure in such an environment. In controlled laboratory experiments, we find little evidence of self-serving bias in the absence of disclosure when (1) agents form reputations and (2) principals use that information in selecting agents. However, we find the introduction of disclosure leads to self-serving biased advice that is difficult for principals to detect. When the conflict of interest is endogenous, we find that agents overwhelmingly put themselves in the position of having a conflict of interest, but principals neither avoid conflicted agents nor differentially discount the advice such agents provide.