We examine whether investors price firms’ selection for random inspections by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), even though inspection targets are randomly drawn rather than chosen because of suspected misconduct. Using a staggered difference-in-differences design, we find that the implied cost of equity increases after random inspection. The increase is larger for firms subsequently sanctioned and weaker among firms with stronger internal governance or external monitoring. Inspection is also followed by more negative investor-forum discussion, wider bid-ask spreads, and greater downward accrual-based earnings management, consistent with heightened perceived risk and reporting responses. The effect dissipates after events that reduce uncertainty or restore credibility, while inspected firms experience lower longer-horizon buy-and-hold abnormal returns. These findings show that investors price selection for regulatory scrutiny even under random assignment and identify an unintended financing cost of random supervision.

Despite the importance of integrity and the social cost of being dishonest, limited evidence exists regarding the economic consequences of dishonesty. Our study illuminates this issue by investigating how dishonesty affects audit fees. The results indicate that dishonest firms are charged with higher audit fees. We identify possible mechanisms through which dishonesty affects audit fees, i.e. increased operational risk and higher public pressure. Further, dishonesty would result in more modified audit opinions and frequent auditor switches. The negative consequences of dishonesty revealed in this paper indicate that auditors consider their clients’ dishonesty a source of risk and that they exert greater effort in response.

PurposeThis study examines the complementarity of two public enforcement mechanisms, the random audit inspection conducted by the CSRC and the initial public offering (IPO) review process for audit firms' clients by the stock exchanges.Design/methodology/approachOur initial sample includes all firms listed on the STAR market from its establishment in July 2019 through December 2022. We manually collect random audit inspection data from the CSRC ROs' official website and the issuance of comment letters during the IPO process from SSE's official website. We obtain other data (e.g. firms' post-IPO performance data) from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database (CSMAR).FindingsUtilizing a hand-collected dataset of random audit inspection and IPO review data, we find that IPO review intensity significantly increases for clients of inspected audit firms, especially when the audit firms are found to have issues during the random audit inspection. This effect is stronger when the reputations of the audit firms or underwriters are lower and external oversight is strengthened. Furthermore, clients of inspected auditors face more inquiries requiring auditors' independent opinions, longer reply intervals and IPO delays. Following random audit inspection, there is a marked tendency among IPO firms to update their prospectuses. Due to the deterrence effect, we find that random inspections influence IPO approval rates and post-IPO performance when audit firms are penalized.Practical implicationsFirstly, despite the improvement of audit quality after the random inspection, our findings show the causal effect of random audit inspection on IPO review intensity, which can serve as evidence of regulatory complementarity. Secondly, our paper demonstrates that regulators are concerned about auditor regulation and the consequent higher public pressure in the IPO review process, which further highlights the gatekeeper role audit firms should play in information disclosure quality and the importance of public opinion in the IPO review process.Originality/valueFirstly, our paper contributes to the extensive literature on the IPO review process by identifying the audit regulation as a significant regulatory antecedent. This study is one of the few that directly examines how regulatory activities within regulatory agencies affect exchange-led listing reviews. Secondly, we diverge from prior studies by introducing the random audit inspection to identify the causal effect and examining the real economic consequences of securities regulation.

We examine the capital market consequences of the exercise of rights by the regulatory minority shareholder. Using a manually collected sample from the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), a novel regulatory investor protection institution controlled by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, we employ a stacked difference-in-differences model in our main regression analysis to estimate the impact of the CSISC's actions. We find that the CSISC's exercise of rights has a risk signaling effect, increasing perceived risk among investors, which is reflected in reduced stock liquidity and an increased cost of equity. Event studies indicate negative market reactions to actions taken by the CSISC against targeted firms. Additional analyses show that a negative tone and increased investor attention toward the CSISC's actions further amplify the market responses. Cross-sectional analyses reveal a stronger effect for firms with regulatory alliances, while effective internal governance mitigates this effect. Collectively, our study highlights the market consequences of the regulator-led minority shareholder's interventions in an emerging market that lacks strong private enforcement.

The rapid pace of digitalization has given rise to concerns about its influence on job roles. Our findings reveal a substitution effect on accounting employees. This effect is more evident in private firms, firms with higher levels of digital transformation in their accounting departments, firms in the information technology industry, firms with overconfident managers and firms with a higher-level network infrastructure. Digitalization also has a positive effect on technically skilled and highly educated employees, leading to a decline in the proportion of entry-level employees. We also document that digitalization contributes to more efficient labor investment. Our study therefore offers insights into how digital transformation can change the labor market for accounting employees. (c) 2024 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecom

This paper examines whether financial market opening, as introduced by the staggered launches of the Stock Connect programs between China's mainland and Hong Kong, affects corporate tax avoidance. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the financial market opening significantly reduces tax avoidance behavior in Chinese A-share listed companies. In addition, we find that the observed effects are more prominent in firms that experience increased foreign institutional ownership following regulatory changes, and in firms with ex-ante weaker external monitoring and stronger external financing needs. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that financial market opening affects corporate tax avoidance through improved governance and reduced external financing costs. We further find that financial market opening decreases capital costs. Overall, our findings indicate that the opening of emerging financial markets to foreign investors is crucial for curtailing opportunistic tax avoidance by local firms.

党的二十大报告强调"加强和完善现代金融监管,强化金融稳定保障体系",而推动中小股东司法救济实践对于防范金融风险和促进资本市场高质量发展具有重要意义.为了解答资本市场如何看待中小股东司法救济实践这一重要问题,文章考察了中小股东发起股东诉讼是否以及如何引起投资者市场反应.研究发现,资本市场对中小股东诉讼的反应显著为负.区分案件类型显示,市场对证券虚假陈述和共同诉讼案件的反应为负.对于案件特征,当涉案金额和人数较多以及获得投服中心诉讼支持时,市场反应更加负面.对于公司特征,市场反应在违法违规风险较高、投资者保护意识较差、信息披露质量较低以及外部信息环境较好的公司中更加负面.进一步分析发现,新《证券法》审议通过后,中小股东诉讼各项特征的市场反应更加敏感,说明加强资本市场法律基础建设有利于增强中小股东诉讼的震慑效应.此外,市场反应越负面预示中小股东获得胜诉裁决的可能性越大.文章研究表明,中小股东诉讼具有事后司法追责的震慑效应,但其信息含量依赖于法律基础的夯实,这为贯彻党的二十大报告中关于金融监管和规范资本市场发展的要求提供了启示.

慈善捐赠是企业参与第三次分配和实现共同富裕的重要渠道,而现有研究仅关注单一特征与捐赠行为之间的联系,缺乏对不同捐赠动机的比较分析,企业捐赠的主导因素仍有待深入探究.文章基于机器学习中的集成学习方法,综合讨论了多维度捐赠动机特征对捐赠行为预测能力的差异,从而识别出影响企业参与捐赠的主要动机,并找出预测能力最强的特征.研究发现:(1)与战略性动机、政治动机和外部监督压力动机相比,企业慈善捐赠行为主要受内部治理动机驱使;(2)集成学习方法对慈善捐赠行为的预测能力优于传统线性研究方法,其中渐进梯度回归树具有最强的解释能力和最高的预测精度;(3)在多维度动机特征中,管理层薪酬激励、大股东资金占用行为、销售费用率、分析师关注程度、实际业绩表现和商业信用融资对慈善捐赠行为的预测效果最佳.文章不仅运用机器学习方法有效识别了企业慈善捐赠的关键因素,而且对完善三次分配制度、推进共同富裕具有重要启示.

全面实行股票发行注册制是全面深化资本市场改革的重大举措,对会计和财务领域的资本市场研究影响深远.本文系统梳理了我国股票发行审核的制度背景,分析全面注册制改革的详细动因及其典型特征,并从IPO审核问询机制的有效性及信息反应、全面注册制下新发行定价机制对定价效率和效果的影响、各类利益相关方受到的政策冲击及应对措施、注册制改革的实施效果以及后续监管有效性等角度提出未来研究方向.本文对中国特色现代资本市场相关研究具有一定的启示.

问询函作为证券交易所非处罚性监管的重要途径,主要针对高管法定责任内的信息披露问题且密切关注高管薪酬.考察问询函监管对高管薪酬契约的影响后发现,上市公司收到问询函会显著降低高管薪酬水平和超额薪酬,这种治理作用在财务报告问询函或年报问询函中更明显.进一步地,财务报告问询函特征、市场化水平、产权性质、盈余管理程度以及两职合一均会影响非处罚性监管对高管薪酬契约的治理效果.此外,问询函还减少了高管在职消费和超额在职消费.

The impacts and channels of regional integration policy on micro-enterprise behavior are important issues related to the high-quality development of China’s economy, but there has not been in-depth researches yet. The paper takes the comprehensive implementation of the national strategy of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei integration as a research scenario, and examines the substitutive effect of the formal system of regional integration policy on the role of informal system of regional social network from the perspective of corporate commercial credit. Based on the research of the “intra-region and non-local aggregated social networks”,the paper finds that: 1)the firms with weak regional social network obtain more trade credit after the integration policy; 2)this evidence is mainly showed in the firms with high information asymmetry, weak industry competition and low supply chain dependence, no executive-political connections, low network centrality, and work network relationships. The results may show that the regional integration policy helps to systematically reduce the transaction cost of the entire market, thereby improving the business environment, which provides a micro-mechanism of the regional integration strategy to support the high-quality development of the economy. The conclusion also provides policy implications for the implementation of a series of regional integration strategies such as Guangdong, Hong Kong, Macao and the Yangtze River Delta.

本文聚焦《财务管理学》课程,在对新时代大学生进行学情分析的基础上,立足于中国特色现代资本市场实践,融合专业教育和思政教育,兼融科研驱动型教学和实践驱动型教学,紧扣"培养职业道德、弘扬科学精神、陶冶财经素养"的微观目标和"树立底线思维、解读资本市场、增强制度自信"的宏观目标,全方位加强创新,探索出"教学过程、教学方法、教学内容、教学考核"全流程的"四位一体"财经类课程整合式课程思政体系,对高校财经类课程思政教学和教学改革具有借鉴意义.

本文基于税收规避视角研究中国制度背景下问询函性质非处罚性监管的经济后果.实证结果发现:财务报告问询函可以抑制公司税收规避行为,且财务报告问询函总数越多、针对同一财务报告问询次数越多、财务报告问询函问题数量越多,意味着问询函监管强度越高,公司税收规避降低幅度越大.同时,从细分特征来看,当财务报告问询函涉及税收或研发相关内容时,公司税收规避程度更低.进一步地,在融资约束程度较低和税收征管强度较高的公司中,税收规避程度较低,问询函的监管效果较好.

本文基于税收规避视角研究中国制度背景下问询函性质非处罚性监管的经济后果.实证结果发现:财务报告问询函可以抑制公司税收规避行为,且财务报告问询函总数越多、针对同一财务报告问询次数越多、财务报告问询函问题数M越多,意味着问询函监管强度越高,公司税收规避降低幅度越大.同时,从细分特征来看,当财务报告问询函涉及税收或研发相关内容时,公司税收规避程度更低.进一步地,在融资约束程度较低和税收征管强度较高的公司中,税收规避程度较低,问询函的监管效果较好.

In this study, we examine whether liberalization of the stock market improves stock price efficiency using China's market liberalization pilot program as a shock. We find that investible firms exhibit a significant increase in price efficiency, as proxied by stock price non-synchronicity, after stock market liberalization. The results are robust to a series of tests and remain unchanged after we address the issue of endogeneity. We identify two channels through which price efficiency can be improved: better disclosure by firms and the incorporation of more information into stock prices through the trading activities of foreign investors. We also find that investment becomes more sensitive to prices, further indicating that stock prices have become more efficient. Finally, we find that stock price informativeness also increases.

Using China's staggered Mainland-Hong Kong Stock Connect programs (hereafter, Connect programs) as quasi-natural experiments, we examine the impact of stock market liberalisation on corporate cash holdings. We find that the average cash holdings of the affected Chinese A-share listed firms decreased significantly after the launch of the Connect programs. Further tests show that the relaxed financial constraints and the improved information environment are two plausible channels that allow stock market liberalisation to reduce corporate cash holdings. Overall, we offer original evidence showing how stock market liberalisation in emerging economies affects firms' liquidity management decisions.

《关于建立国有企业违规经营投资责任追究制度的意见》首次提出了对国有企业高管实行重大决策终身责任追究.基于这一重要的政策冲击,本文检验了对高管经营投资行为的事后追责对国有企业风险承担的影响.结果发现,责任追究制度能够降低国有企业的风险承担水平、抑制国有企业的过度风险承担从而提高其风险承担效率.机制分析显示,责任追究制度通过影响管理层的风险偏好发挥风险承担抑制效应;通过改善资本投资和财务杠杆等决策,制度抑制了国有企业寻租式的高风险行为,降低了企业的破产风险;此外,经营投资责任的加强也增强了风险承担对企业价值的提升作用.本文为责任追究制度的正向实施效果提供了初步经验证据,结论对于完善国有资本监管体系和促进国有企业高质量发展具有重要启示.

In recent years, the securities market supervision system of China has gradually diversified, and the non-penalty regulations represented by inquiry letters have attracted more attention. With the increasing frequency of non-penalty regulations, inquiry letters gradually come into the public view, and the relevant media reports are also increasing. The current academic research on China’s securities supervision mainly focuses on penalty regulations, and less on non-penalty regulations. Although some studies have explored the economic consequences of inquiry letters, and found that non-penalty regulations improve the quality of auditing and the accuracy of performance forecast, and reduce the risk of stock price crash, whether the inquiry letters can truly play a regulatory role remains to be further explored.Under this condition, using the panel data of A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2017, this paper tests the effectiveness of inquiry letters from the perspective of corporate risk-taking. The results show that after receiving financial report inquiry letters, the level of corporate risk-taking is significantly increased; the more the total number (times) of financial report inquiry letters, the more inquiries contained in inquiry letters, and the more the total number of reply announcements, the stronger the promotion effect on corporate risk-taking. Meanwhile, the characteristics of inquiry letters will also affect the promotion of corporate risk-taking. Furthermore, we find that state-owned property rights and political connections are not conducive to the regulatory role of inquiry letters, inquiry letter regulation improves the level of corporate risk-taking by alleviating the agency problem between shareholders and the management, and inquiry letters significantly improve investment efficiency.This paper makes several contributions: Firstly, it makes complement to the relevant literature of non-penalty regulations by testing the economic consequences of inquiry letters in the new viewpoint of risk-taking. Secondly, it also enriches the studies of risk-taking behaviors, as the existing studies mainly focus on the internal and external environment. Thirdly, it has practical contributions by providing empirical evidence to affirm the effectiveness of non-penalty regulation methods, which helps to respond to the call of “innovating regulatory methods” proposed by the Report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

上市公司监管和投资者保护一直是困扰中国资本市场的难题,而成立具有监管性质的中证中小投资者服务中心(后简称"投服中心")则是具有创新性的监管尝试.通过持有上市公司100股股票,投服中心采用市场化手段为小股东发声,是独特的半公共—半私人实施机制.本文手工搜集投服中心参加股东大会的行权数据,对监管型小股东行权的影响因素、市场反应和监管效果进行了分析.结果发现:首先,投服中心选择行权标的时,倾向于选择曾受到监管机构处罚和问询、收到非标准审计意见、较少发放股利及大股东掏空动机较强的企业;其次,投服中心的行权事件具有信息含量,即被行权企业的市场反应更差,这一负向市场反应在中小股东行权积极的企业中更为明显,且会受到具体的行权提问特征及被行权公司特征的影响;投服中心行权还具有实际监管效果:上市公司在被行权后有更加负面的新闻报道,也更可能引发监管机构的处罚跟进;此外还发现投服中心行权的监管效果具有行业溢出效应.结论显示,作为中国特色的半公共—半私人实施机制创新,监管型小股东具有较好的监管效果,对近年来持续推进的"创新监管方式改革"及新《证券法》实施都具有重要启示.