Using China’s New Regulations on Asset Management (NRAM) as a quasi-natural experiment, this study examines how shadow-banking regulation affects the financial reporting decisions of Chinese A-share-listed non-financial and non-real-estate firms from 2015 to 2024. The results show that firms with greater pre-policy financial asset holdings significantly increase the magnitude of accrual-based earnings management following the NRAM. The baseline effect amounts to approximately 7.8% of the sample mean and becomes evident two years after policy implementation. Both income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals rise, whereas real earnings management through overproduction and reductions in discretionary expenditures declines, indicating a shift from real activities manipulation toward accrual-based accounting adjustments. The increase in accrual-based earnings management is concentrated among firms exposed to long-term financial assets, particularly available-for-sale financial assets. Mechanism tests show that the NRAM reduces affected firms’ financial asset holdings and related investment income and fair-value gains. Although these firms increase real investment, they experience no corresponding improvement in investment efficiency, total factor productivity, or operating profitability; their return on assets subsequently declines, and they become more likely to report earnings just above zero. The effect is stronger among non-state-owned enterprises, financially constrained and financially dependent firms, firms located in less financially developed regions, and firms subject to weaker external monitoring. These findings identify an unintended financial-reporting consequence of regulatory de-financialization: when the loss of financial income is not offset by improvements in core-business profitability, affected firms rely more heavily on accrual-based earnings management.

We find that boardroom centrality increases the market beta of firms. The higher stock returns of firms with high boardroom centrality diminish and turn statistically insignificant after controlling for market betas. The effect can be attributed to a comovement in accounting fundamentals and financial policies. Overall, these findings highlight the fact that the social networks of corporate leaders (i.e., directors of corporate boards) can have a substantial effect on firms' systematic risk exposure.

The real estate sector is a pillar industry of China's economic development. Although the "Three Red Lines" policy has intensified risks within the real estate industry, its risk spillover effects remain under explored. This paper constructs a quasi-natural experiment and employs data from China A-share listed non-real estate firms from 2017 to 2023 to investigate the spillover effects of the "Three Red Lines" policy on the stock price volatility of non-real estate companies. The findings indicate that, following the implementation of the "Three Red Lines" policy, upstream firms-suppliers to real estate companies-experienced an approximately 4.6 % greater increase in stock price volatility compared to downstream firms, which are their customers. Further analysis decomposes stock price volatility into systematic and idiosyncratic components and shows that both types of volatility contributed to the observed fluctuations in non-real estate firms' stock prices. Heterogeneity tests reveal that systematic volatility was driven by investors' ex ante biases and insufficient information, whereas idiosyncratic volatility stemmed from prepolicy competitive dynamics in the product market.

In response to the debate on restricting executive compensation, this study investigates the impact of executive pay caps on investments in research and development (R&D). Exploiting the 2014 pay restriction scheme for SOEs in China as a natural experiment, we find that R&D investment in SOEs grow slower than in non-SOEs following the scheme’s implementation, with the effect mainly observed in the expensed component of R&D. Consequently, SOEs experience a decrease in innovation quality and firm value after the executive pay restriction is imposed. Reflecting the role of political advancement as a substitutive incentive device in SOEs, we find the negative impacts of the pay restriction are lessened by political promotion incentives. Overall, our findings suggest policymakers should be cautious when implementing restrictive pay policies, as it may reduce executives’ incentive to pursue innovation efforts.

Drawing on the implementation of the compliance management guidelines issued by China’s SASACs, we construct a quasi-natural experiment to examine the impact of the implementation of these guidelines on the investment efficiency of SOEs. The investment efficiency of SOEs is significantly improved after the implementation of the guidelines. The impact is more pronounced on SOEs with significant financing constraints, high financing requirements and intense competition in the product market. We also find that the guidelines improve efficiency investment by reducing management’s risk appetite, mitigating the Type I agency problems and enhancing the level of internal control. The conclusions indicate that compliance management is an important strategy for enhancing the investment efficiency of SOEs.

脱贫攻坚是我国重大政治任务和第一民生工程,党的领导是脱贫攻坚的根本保障和根本优势.基于2016-2021年中国A股非国有企业样本,实证检验党组织嵌入对企业精准扶贫行为的影响及机理.研究发现,党组织嵌入显著促进了非国有企业的精准扶贫行为,且这一关系受到高管特征的影响.渠道分析表明,党组织嵌入主要通过提升企业的扶贫意识和扶贫能力来促进精准扶贫.进一步分析发现,相对于"输血"式扶贫,党组织对"造血"式扶贫的促进作用更明显,同时党组织嵌入还显著提升了扶贫成效.

本文研究了控股股东股权质押对分析师通过实地调研获取信息行为的影响.研究发现,分析师会减少对控股股东存在股权质押公司的实地调研,因为这类公司的管理层会采用更积极的语言语调与分析师交流,向其传递乐观情绪,阻碍分析师获取真实信息.对股权质押公司的实地调研越多,反而导致分析师的预测误差更大,降低了分析师进行实地调研的信息收益.当控股股东面临的内外部监督更少、控制权转移风险更大时,上述现象更加明显.进一步分析表明,对股权质押的公司进行实地调研不能起到改善公司治理的作用.本文的研究表明,在股权质押的情境下,实地调研不能帮助分析师获取私有信息应对质押风险,反而成为控股股东操控信息披露,向市场传递乐观情绪的工具.

本文聚焦《财务管理学》课程,在对新时代大学生进行学情分析的基础上,立足于中国特色现代资本市场实践,融合专业教育和思政教育,兼融科研驱动型教学和实践驱动型教学,紧扣"培养职业道德、弘扬科学精神、陶冶财经素养"的微观目标和"树立底线思维、解读资本市场、增强制度自信"的宏观目标,全方位加强创新,探索出"教学过程、教学方法、教学内容、教学考核"全流程的"四位一体"财经类课程整合式课程思政体系,对高校财经类课程思政教学和教学改革具有借鉴意义.

央企董事会建设是推进国有企业公司治理现代化的关键点.本文以国务院国资委在央企集团层面逐步开展的董事会试点改革为准自然实验,考察了董事会建设对企业投资的影响.研究发现:央企董事会建设能降低集团的投资水平、提高投资效率,且这一影响主要体现在一般竞争类企业和规模较小的企业中,内部人控制问题的缓解是董事会建设影响企业投资行为的重要渠道.进一步研究发现,董事会建设通过改善投资最终提升了经营业绩.本文的研究结论为董事会治理的有效性提供了直接证据,亦响应了十九届四中全会关于推动国有企业治理体系和治理能力现代化的要求,丰富了中国特色现代国有企业制度的相关研究.

Using an exogenous shock that drastically increased the liquidity of stocks listed in China, we find robust evidence that higher liquidity significantly increases the overall level of tax noncompliance. The increase is more substantial when controlling shareholders own more shares, and diversion for private benefits is less complementary to tax noncompliance. Liquidity has no significant impact on tax evasion-the most aggressive and risky tax noncompliance-and at the higher ends of the tax noncompliance distribution. The positive and significant effects are observed only at lower levels of tax noncompliance. We attribute the weaker impact of liquidity on aggressive tax noncompliance to diversion being more complementary to higher-risk tax noncompliance.

本文采用手工收集的业绩承诺协议数据,考察了业绩承诺协议对商誉确认以及未来商誉减值风险的影响.检验发现:(1)签订业绩承诺协议会导致超额商誉的确认,提高未来商誉减值风险;(2)业绩目标设置相对越高,虽然会导致超额商誉的确认,但未来商誉减值风险却更低.当高管过度自信程度较高时,其增强了业绩承诺协议与超额商誉以及未来商誉减值风险之间的正相关关系,同时也增强了业绩目标与超额商誉之间的正相关关系,减弱了业绩目标与未来商誉减值风险之间的负相关关系.在具体条款设置上,"补对价"的补偿内容、"股份支付"的补偿方式以及具有额外奖励机制,可以提高商誉的确认规模,且"补对价"和额外奖励机制可以显著降低商誉减值风险.本文揭示了业绩承诺协议导致公司在并购完成后出现商誉减值的作用机制,更严格的业绩目标设置、更合理的协议条款和理性的高管则有利于避免其成为"一纸空文".结论为有关部门制定业绩承诺协议的政策法规以及并购商誉的风险防范与披露提供了经验证据,有助于实现党中央提出的"防范重大风险"的要求.

2018年财务报表格式修订将研发费用的列报方式由附注披露改为利润表内单独列报.我们从市场对研发费用信息含量反应的视角对这一修订的意义进行了研究,发现当研发费用只在报表附注中披露时,未预期研发费用的市场反应显著为负,且通过买入研发费用最高的投资组合并卖出研发费用最低的投资组合,在未来一年可获得正超额回报;但研发费用在利润表内单独列报后,未预期研发费用的市场反应显著为正且前述超额回报不再存在.机制分析表明研发费用单独列报促进了投资者更多关注研发费用,并抑制了公司的研发费用操纵行为,提高了研发费用的信息含量,缓解了市场对研发费用的错误定价.本文为会计制度改革服务于国家创新战略提供了来自财务报表列报方面的经验证据.

This paper tests the superimposed negative market reaction of listed companies with high-level share pledging by controlling shareholders to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and finds that it is alleviated in the pharmaceutical industry and when the share pledge funds are obtained from a brokerage firm or flow back to the listed companies. Furthermore, a low-quality information environment exacerbates the negative reaction, while high-level research and development (R&D) investment and free cash flow alleviate it. A possible mechanism underlying the results is that the "gray rhino" erodes the company's operating efficiency. This paper provides timely and direct evidence regarding the capital market's response to COVID-19.

厘清加总会计盈余、市场总回报与货币政策之间的联动关系,有利于加深对货币政策影响股票市场机制传导的理解,这在危机事件期间尤为重要.基于我国上市公司季度数据,实证检验货币政策、加总盈余与市场总回报之间的关系.研究发现,加总盈余与市场总回报显著负相关,意味着上市公司加总盈余提升时股票市场总体反应为负,出现股票市场表现与实体经济的"背离".进一步分析发现,加总盈余中包含的货币政策信息能够较好地解释这种"背离",且加总盈余中包含的货币政策信息越多,二者之间的负相关性越强.结论 表明,加总会计盈余指标有助于理解股票市场的整体走向和更好地制定货币政策,进一步健全货币政策、防控金融风险.

已有文献证实了高管过度自信等非理性因素对企业投资决策的影响,但尚未有文献研究锚定心理在投资决策中的作用.税收政策连续性不足会使得企业实际税率充满不确定性,高管在预测未来实际税率时很可能会非理性地锚定当期的高税率,进而产生税率锚定行为.本文研究这种非理性的税率锚定行为对企业投资决策的影响,结果发现:企业投资决策中存在显著的税率锚定行为,对高税率的锚定显著降低了企业未来的投资支出,且内在锚效应(纵向对比)强于外在锚效应(横向对比).进一步地,我们发现经验更丰富的高管有助于缓解投资中的税率锚定效应,但更大的税率波动性加剧了这种效应,最终降低了公司业绩和价值.本文研究表明,控制投资中的税率锚定行为,有利于提高投资效率和企业价值,同时也表明保持宏观税收政策连续性有利于促进企业健康可持续发展.

对会计师事务所的会计信息质量监督工作已经开展数十年,这一做法对会计师事务所审计质量的影响有待检验.本文基于手工收集的会计师事务所被检查的公告,检验会计信息质量检查对会计师事务所审计质量的影响.结果发现对会计师事务所进行会计信息质量检查的当年,会计师事务所审计的客户层面的盈余管理程度明显下降,会计师事务所层面的审计质量也显著提高.进一步,相对于其他被查会计师事务所,被查会计师事务所为前"十大"会计师事务所、会计师事务所总所被稽查、被检查时涉及具体审计客户时,会计师事务所的审计质量提高得更加明显.结论在经过各种稳健性检验之后依然成立.探索会计信息质量检查工作对会计师事务所审计质量的影响积极响应了党的十九大报告关于提高经济发展质量、完善市场监管体制的要求,为切实激发会计服务市场活力,规范会计服务市场秩序提供了经验证据.

本文采用双重差分模型,研究"一带一路"对企业绩效的影响.结果发现,"一带一路"对于企业的短期会计绩效无显著影响,但对长期绩效具有显著的提升作用,且对于不同行业存在不同的影响.进一步研究发现,在高管具有市场背景、机构投资者持股比例高和公司治理水平高的公司,"一带一路"对公司长期绩效的提升更为显著;可能的机制是"一带一路"带动了公司的投资水平,有利于企业的长期发展.本文不仅丰富了宏观政策与公司绩效的相关研究,同时对于国家进一步推进"一带一路"的建设和促进我国资本市场的良好发展具有一定的参考价值.

已有文献主要考察税率变动和税率本身高低对企业投资决策活动的影响,鲜有文献研究税率不确定性对投资行为的影响.鉴于我国各地税收优惠政策及税收征管强度的差异和变化使得公司的税率存在较大的不确定性,探讨中国的税率不确定性对投资决策的影响显得尤为重要.本文研究发现:税率不确定性越大,公司投资支出降低得越明显,而且显著抑制过度投资行为.进一步地,当公司上一期的税率处于波峰、融资约束较高时,这种抑制作用更加显著;而政府补助、产业政策优惠则会弱化这种负相关关系.本文结论补充和拓展了以往关于投资理论的研究,不仅对企业的投资决策和政府部门的税收管理具有重要参考意义,也响应了中共十九大关于深化投资改革和税收制度改革的精神.

党的十九大提出了“防范系统性金融风险,坚决打好防范化解重大风险攻坚战”的要求,如何做到防患于未然是我们资本市场中的重点.本文引入自由现金储备的概念,并基于新冠疫情这一突发事件检验自由现金储备的风险防范作用.结果 显示,自由现金储备更有利于缓解资本市场对新冠疫情的负面反应,这验证了公司经营创造的自由现金储备的风险防范作用.进一步研究发现,上述风险防范效应在非国有企业中更为显著,且较低的信息质量环境、较高的代理成本会抑制自由现金储备的风险防范效应,而较高的研发投入水平则有利于提升该效应;其可能的影响机制是自由现金储备更能真正降低公司的财务风险.本文是新冠疫情如何影响资本市场的最早一批研究,既加深了对自由现金储备的理解,也说明了防范“黑天鹅”风险的重要性,为践行十九大的精神提供了重要证据支持.

近年来,党组织嵌入民营企业已经成为不可忽视的政治经济现象,但民营企业中的党组织是否发挥作用仍是一个被学术界忽略的问题。本文基于手工搜集的民营上市公司党组织的数据,从企业财务违规这一视角检验党组织嵌入的经济后果。结果发现,党组织嵌入显著抑制了民营企业的违规行为,其可能的机制是增强高管对组织的参与度和重视程度。进一步,这种抑制作用在高管是党员、高管存在政治关联和处于政治敏感期时更加显著;这种抑制作用也在代理成本更高、信息环境更差、融资约束更大的公司里更加显著。上述结果在控制了可能的内生性问题后依然成立。结论显示党组织嵌入民营企业有助于促进其改善公司治理,为中国特色的公司治理制度的完善和十九大提出的"加强基层党组织建设"的系列改革提供了重要启示。