An object one owns is typically more highly valued than an equivalent object owned by another person. This endowment effect has been attributed to the aversion of loss of one's possessions (through selling), or the added value of an item due to self-association (through owning). To date, investigation of these mechanisms has been hampered by the between-subjects methodology traditionally employed to measure endowment. Over two experiments, we report a novel within-subjects method for measuring an endowment bias. In these studies, Western participants showed enhanced valuation of owned items, whereas East-Asian participants did not. This endowment bias also correlated with the ownership effect in memory (a measure of self-referential processing) in Western, but not East-Asian participants. Our results suggest that the endowment effect is partly predicated on the same factors that influence the ownership effect and that this commonality is likely linked to conceptions of ownership specifically, and self-concept more generally.

It is well established that children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) show impaired understanding of others and deficits within social functioning. However, it is still unknown whether self-processing is related to these impairments and to what extent self impacts social functioning and communication. Using an ownership paradigm, we show that children with ASD and chronological- and verbal-age-matched typically developing (TD) children do show the self-referential effect in memory. In addition, the self-bias was dependent on symptom severity and socio-communicative ability. Children with milder ASD symptoms were more likely to have a high self-bias, consistent with a low attention to others relative to self. In contrast, severe ASD symptoms were associated with reduced self-bias, consistent with an ‘absent-self’ hypothesis. These findings indicate that deficits in self-processing may be related to impairments in social cognition for those on the lower end of the autism spectrum. What is already known on this subject? What does this study add?

Each cerebral hemisphere primarily controls and receives sensory input with regard to the contralateral hand. In the disconnected brain (split-brain), when the hands are uncrossed, direct visual access to each hand is available to the controlling (contralateral) hemisphere. However, when a hand crosses the midline, visual and tactile information regarding the hand are presented to different hemispheres. It is unknown how a contralateral hemi- sphere codes the position and orientation of a visually inaccessible hand in the discon- nected brain. The present work addresses this issue. We ask how each hemisphere represents “its” hand across hand positions that span the midline in the absence of cortical input from the contralateral hemisphere. In other words, when a hand is placed across the midline and is visually inaccessible, is it represented by the controlling hemisphere: (1) in accordance with its new position with respect to the body (e.g., a left hand “becomes” a right effector when it crosses the midline), (2) with left/right position information unal- tered (e.g., the left hand is represented as “left” regardless of its location), or (3) stripped of its location information altogether? The relationship between hand position and the spatial codes assigned to potential responses (an index of hand representation) was investigated in two split-brain patients using direct (Experiment 1) and orthogonal (Experiment 2) S-R compatibility paradigms. S-R compatibility effects in split-brain patients were consistent with those displayed by typical individuals. These findings suggest that position-based compatibility effects do not rely on cross-cortical connections. Rather, each hemisphere can accurately represent the full visuomotor space, a process that appears to be subserved by subcortical connections between the hemispheres.

It has long been established that when cues in the environment are perceived to have relevance to self (e.g., hearing your own name across a crowded room, seeing your own face in an array), these c...

It is well established that children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) show impaired understanding of others and deficits within social functioning. However, it is still unknown whether self-processing is related to these impairments and to what extent self impacts social functioning and communication. Using an ownership paradigm, we show that children with ASD and chronological- and verbal-age-matched typically developing (TD) children do show the self-referential effect in memory. In addition, the self-bias was dependent on symptom severity and socio-communicative ability. Children with milder ASD symptoms were more likely to have a high self-bias, consistent with a low attention to others relative to self. In contrast, severe ASD symptoms were associated with reduced self-bias, consistent with an 'absent-self' hypothesis. These findings indicate that deficits in self-processing may be related to impairments in social cognition for those on the lower end of the autism spectrum. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? Impaired self-processing in autism is linked to social and cognitive deficits. There are discrepancies across the literature, with reports of both intact and impaired self-processing in autism. Ownership tasks are developmentally appropriate and have shown to induce self-memory bias in young children. What does this study add? Using an ownership task, children with autism showed a significant self-memory bias, greater than typical peers. Severity was negatively correlated with level of self-bias, potentially explaining the previous discrepancies. Severe autism symptoms are associated with an 'absent self', and mild autism symptoms reduce attention to others.

Items that are produced (e.g., read aloud) during encoding typically are better remembered than items that are not produced (e.g., read silently). This "production effect" has been explained by distinctiveness: Produced items have more distinct features than nonproduced items, leading to enhanced retrieval. The goal of the current study was to use electroencephalography (EEG) to examine the neural basis of the production effect. During study, participants were presented with words that they were required to read silently, read aloud, or sing while EEG data were recorded. Subsequent memory performance was tested using a yes/no recognition test. Analysis focused on the event-related brain potentials (ERPs) evoked by the encoding instruction cue for each instruction condition. Our data revealed enhanced memory performance for produced items and a greater P300 ERP amplitude for instructions to sing or read aloud compared with instructions to read silently. Our results demonstrate that the amplitude of the P300 is modulated by at least 1 aspect of production, vocalization (singing/reading aloud relative to reading silently), and are consistent with the distinctiveness account of the production effect. The ERP methodology is a viable tool for investigating the production effect. (PsycINFO Database Record

We suggest that the Self Attention Network (SAN) maybe part of a larger self-regulatory system, which we term the Self-Relevance System (SRS) of which the “core” or default network is a major part. It is within the core network that memories are generated and the future imagined. Such memories and imaginings are the basis of preoccupations. Within the SRS then preoccupations drive the emergence of attentional biases (ABs). ABs in turn are modulated by the SAN activating and inhibiting circuits that shape behavior. We consider briefly how this might function in dysfunctional appetitive behaviors, e.g., substance abuse.

Perceived ownership has been shown to impact a variety of cognitive processes: attention, memory, and-more recently-reward processing. In the present experiment we examined whether or not perceived ownership would interact with the construct of value-the relative worth of an object. Participants completed a simple gambling game in which they gambled either for themselves or for another while electroencephalographic data were recorded. In a key manipulation, gambles for oneself or for another were for either small or large rewards. We tested the hypothesis that value affects the neural response to self-gamble outcomes, but not other-gamble outcomes. Our experimental data revealed that while participants learned the correct response option for both self and other gambles, the reward positivity evoked by wins was impacted by value only when gambling for oneself. Importantly, our findings provide additional evidence for a self-ownership bias in cognitive processing and further demonstrate the insensitivity of the medial-frontal reward system to gambles for another.

Self-referencing (i.e., thinking about oneself during encoding) can increase attention toward to-be-encoded material, and support memory for information in adults and children. The current inquiry tested an educational application of this 'self reference effect' (SRE) on memory. A self-referential modification of literacy tasks (vocabulary spelling) was tested in two experiments. In Experiment 1, seven-to nine-year-old children (N = 47) were asked to learn the spelling of four nonsense words by copying the vocabulary and generating sentences. Half of the children were asked to include themselves as a subject in each sentence. Results showed that children in this self-referent condition produced longer sentences and increased spelling accuracy by more than 20%, relative to those in an other-referent condition. Experiment 2 (N = 32) replicated this pattern in real-word learning. These findings demonstrate the significant potential advantages of utilizing self-referential encoding in the classroom. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Both the eye of origin and the images themselves have been found to rival during binocular rivalry. We presented traditional binocular rivalry stimuli (face to one eye, house to the other) and Diaz-Caneja stimuli (half of each image to each eye) centrally to both a split-brain participant and a control group. With traditional rivalry stimuli both the split-brain participant and age-matched controls perceived more coherent percepts (synchronised across the hemifields) than non-synchrony, but our split-brain participant perceived more non-synchrony than our controls. For rival stimuli in the Diaz-Caneja presentation condition, object rivalry gave way to eye rivalry with all participants reporting more non-synchrony than coherent percepts. We have shown that splitting the stimuli across the hemifields between the eyes leads to greater eye than object rivalry, but that when traditional rival stimuli are split as the result of the severed corpus callosum, traditional rivalry persists but to a lesser extent than in the intact brain. These results suggest that communication between the early visual areas is not essential for synchrony in traditional rivalry stimuli, and that other routes for interhemispheric interactions such as subcortical connections may mediate rivalry in a traditional binocular rivalry condition.

Ownership is a powerful construct. Indeed, in a series of recent studies, perceived ownership has been shown to increase attentional capacity, facilitate a memorial advantage, and elicit positive attitudes. Here, we sought to determine whether self-relevance would bias reward evaluation systems within the brain. To accomplish this, we had participants complete a simple gambling task during which they could “win” or “lose” prizes for themselves or for someone else, while electroencephalographic data were recorded. Our results indicated that the amplitude of the feedback error-related negativity, a component of the event-related brain potential sensitive to reward evaluation, was diminished when participants were not gambling for themselves. Furthermore, our data suggest that the ownership cues that indicated who would win or lose a given gamble either were processed as a potential for an increase in utility (i.e., gain: self-gambles) or were processed in a nonutilitarian manner (other-gambles). Importantly, our results suggest that the medial-frontal reward system is sensitive to perceived ownership, to the extent that it may not process changes in utility when they are not directly relevant to self.

Information that is relevant to oneself tends to be remembered more than information that relates to other people, but the role of attention in eliciting this "self-reference effect" is unclear. In the present study, we assessed the importance of attention in self-referential encoding using an ownership paradigm, which required participants to encode items under conditions of imagined ownership by themselves or by another person. Previous work has established that this paradigm elicits a robust self-reference effect, with more "self-owned" items being remembered than "other-owned" items. Access to attentional resources was manipulated using divided-attention tasks at encoding. A significant self-reference effect emerged under full-attention conditions and was related to an increase in episodic recollection for self-owned items, but dividing attention eliminated this memory advantage. These findings are discussed in relation to the nature of self-referential cognition and the importance of attentional resources at encoding in the manifestation of the self-reference effect in memory.

Processing information in the context of personal survival scenarios elicits a memory advantage, relative to other rich encoding conditions such as self-referencing. However, previous research is unable to distinguish between the influence of survival and self-reference because personal survival is a self-referent encoding context. To resolve this issue, participants in the current study processed items in the context of their own survival and a familiar other person's survival, as well as in a semantic context. Recognition memory for the items revealed that personal survival elicited a memory advantage relative to semantic encoding, whereas other-survival did not. These findings reinforce suggestions that the survival effect is closely tied with self-referential encoding, ensuring that fitness information of potential importance to self is successfully retained in memory.

Are we humans drawn to the forbidden? From jumbo-sized soft drinks to illicit substances, the influence of prohibited ownership on subsequent demand has made this question a pressing one. We know that objects that we ourselves own have a heightened psychological saliency, relative to comparable objects that are owned by others, but do these kinds of effects extend from self-owned to “forbidden” objects? To address this question, we developed a modified version of the Turk shopping paradigm in which “purchased” items were assigned to various recipients. Participants sorted everyday objects labeled as “self-owned”, “other-owned,” and either “forbidden to oneself” (Experiment 1) or “forbidden to everyone” (Experiment 2). Subsequent surprise recognition memory tests revealed that forbidden objects with high (Experiment 1) but not with low (Experiment 2) self-relevance were recognized as well as were self-owned objects, and better than other-owned objects. In a third and final experiment, we used event-related potentials (ERPs) to determine whether self-owned and self-forbidden objects, which showed a common memory advantage, are in fact treated the same at a neurocognitive–affective level. We found that both object types were associated with enhanced cognitive analysis, relative to other-owned objects, as measured by the P300 ERP component. However, we also found that self-forbidden objects uniquely triggered an enhanced response preceding the P300, in an ERP component (the N2) that is sensitive to more rapid, affect-related processing. Our findings thus suggest that, whereas self-forbidden objects share a common cognitive signature with self-owned objects, they are unique in being identified more quickly at a neurocognitive level.

The self-reference effect in memory is the advantage for information encoded about self, relative to other people. The early development of this effect was explored here using a concrete encoding paradigm. Trials comprised presentation of a self- or other-image paired with a concrete object. In Study 1, 4- to 6-year-old children (N = 53) were asked in each trial whether the child pictured would like the object. Recognition memory showed an advantage for self-paired objects. Study 2 (N = 55) replicated this finding in source memory. In Study 3 (N = 56), participants simply indicated object location. Again, recognition and source memory showed an advantage for self-paired items. These findings are discussed with reference to mechanisms that ensure information of potential self-relevance is reliably encoded.

The self-reference effect (SRE) is the reliable memory advantage for information encoded about self over material encoded about other people. The developmental pathway of the SRE has proved difficult to chart, because the standard SRE task is unsuitable for young children. The current inquiry was designed to address this issue using an ownership paradigm, as encoding objects in the context of self-ownership have been shown to elicit self-referential memory advantages in adults. Pairs of 4- to 6-year-old children ( n  = 64) sorted toy pictures into self- and other-owned sets. A surprise recognition memory test revealed a significant advantage for toys owned by self, which decreased with age. Neither verbal ability nor theory of mind attainment predicted the size of the memory advantage for self-owned items. This finding suggests that contrary to some previous reports, memory in early childhood can be shaped by the same self-referential biases that pervade adult cognition.