This essay deals with regime-boosting regionalism as an empirical phenomenon and as an academic concept. In the next two sections, I present the origins and logic of regime-boosting—a concept I coined in the early 2000s to make sense of how political actors in Africa employed a variety of discursive, symbolic, and ceremonial regionalist practices to strengthen the status, legitimacy and survival of their ruling political regimes domestically and internationally. Thereafter, I discuss the evolution and development of the regime-boosting approach and how it has diffused to several other debates within the broader field of Comparative Regionalism. I conclude with reflections about the future study of regime-boosting.

For more than 60 years, scholars of Comparative Regionalism have struggled over how to deal with European integration and, more recently, the European Union (EU). Two polarised perspectives have dominated the debate (Acharya, 2016; Söderbaum, 2016). On one side, European integration is taken as the foundation and model, even the gold standard for conceptual development and theory-building, giving rise to numerous hub-and-spoke comparisons centred around the EU. On the other side, scholars reject the EU as the key referent due to its alleged uniqueness and the problem of EU-centrism, turning instead to exclusively non -European cases.

This essay reflects on the Development Research School, a research school launched in 2022 by Lund University, Uppsala University, the University of Gothenburg, and the University of Ghana. Using this case, the essay explores two central themes: how research schools can add value to PhD education, and the particular challenges of running such a school in the field of development research. Based on the experience of designing and implementing the school, the essay discusses four central challenges: recruiting and retaining PhD students, coordinating international and cross-institutional collaboration, delivering relevant content to a diverse student body, and ensuring longevity beyond the initial funding period. The essay also discusses the pragmatic strategies we adopted in response, including open recruitment, decentralized course delivery, flexible program design, and deliberate legacy planning. While our experience of running the Development Research School illustrates the potential of research schools to add value to PhD education, it also underscores the structural and financial constraints that limit their long-term integration and institutionalization.

Dominant theories stipulate that high levels of authority are a prerequisite for effective problem-solving by international organizations (IOs). How, then, can we explain that African health organizations possess relatively low levels of authority, yet their response to COVID-19 has been touted as a remarkable success? In this article, we explain how low-authority IOs can engage in effective problem-solving. By rethinking the conventional zero-sum relation between national sovereignty and an IO's problem-solving potential, we develop a novel framework that allows us to analyze diverse cooperation logics pursued by various organizational actors within an IO. Applying this framework to the response of ECOWAS and its sub-agency, the West African Health Organization (WAHO), to the COVID-19 pandemic reveals that problem-solving cooperation dominated over symbolic and autonomy-oriented cooperation logics. This prevalence of problem-solving did not derive from ECOWAS' authority over states, but emerged because its member states saw it as expedient to address these issues through the organization. Our analysis shows that low-authority IOs can problem-solve if member states consider them to be transmitters instead of constraints of national sovereignty, that is, as suppliers of organizational services that enhance state capacities.

This article seeks to advance our understanding of the role of sovereignty for regional governance, with a focus on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). We argue that important insights into this issue can be gleaned by analyzing how ASEAN has responded to the Covid-19 pandemic. Most existing research on ASEAN considers sovereignty an obstacle to effective regional governance without further interrogating it conceptually. Such a monolithic understanding fails to account for ASEAN's variegated response to the pandemic. To develop a fuller account of the relation between sovereignty and regional governance, we engage with scholarship on sovereignty that emphasizes its performative and contextual character, and develop a framework that distinguishes four different sovereignty scripts. Drawing on expert interviews and document analysis, we show that ASEAN's multifaceted Covid-19 response is a result of member states' parallel enactment of diverging and overlapping sovereignty scripts, which engender competing modes of governance. Our study shows that typical governance problems - institutional proliferation and incoherence as well as implementation gaps - can be understood as emerging from diverging imperatives for practicing sovereignty and statehood. We suggest that our framework can be tested in other policy fields and regional organizations beyond ASEAN.

In emphasizing nationalism, popular sovereignty and identity politics, has populism fuelled a unilateralist backlash? This examination of four distinct types of institutional disengagement-criticism, obstruction, extortion and exit-reveals how right-wing populist governments in Hungary and the US balanced radicalism and pragmatism in foreign policy, shaping their disengagement through using these strategies flexibly. Abstract There is a widespread belief among scholars and policy-makers that populism has fuelled a unilateralist backlash because of its emphasis on nationalism, popular sovereignty and identity politics. Although a few populist governments have indeed withdrawn from some international institutions, this 'disengagement hypothesis' needs to be scrutinized and unpacked. In this article, we develop a framework that distinguishes between four types of institutional disengagement-criticism, obstruction, extortion and exit-and show that populist governments use them in a fluid and tactical way to navigate between the radical and pragmatic imperatives of populist politics. Our comparative case-study of the Hungarian executive under Viktor Orban (since 2010) and the Trump administration in the US (2017-2021) demonstrates that both governments have frequently used criticism, obstruction and extortion to disengage from international institutions but have only rarely exited from them. The article thus deepens our understanding of the impact of populism on both individual institutions and the multilateral order more broadly, and helps policy-makers develop strategies to counter the adverse effects of populism.

How do international organizations (IOs) and their proponents claim legitimacy, and how do their opponents undermine such legitimacy? This article develops a framework that accounts for the links between legitimation and delegitimation strategies and how they regularly produce 'legitimation struggles'. Drawing on the case of the African Union between 2015-2020, the study goes beyond existing research in three ways. First, legitimation struggles are not simply related to input and output legitimacy but are deeply related to the social purpose of the organization. Second, legitimation struggles do not only involve IO representatives and member-states but are strengthened by a range of other non-state agents. Third, while discursive strategies are essential, legitimation struggles are reinforced when they are combined with behavioural or institutional legitimation strategies. Future research would do well to go beyond the current Western-centric bias and draw on our findings to investigate legitimation struggles under different conditions around the world.

How do external actors promote regional international organisations (RIOs) through their regional foreign aid? Whereas most leading theories of regionalism stipulate that RIOs are designed and shaped by intra--r-egional actors from 'within', this study develops a novel framework for exploring donor involvement in RIOs during various stages of the foreign aid policy cycle. The research design is based on a comparison of the four largest European donors of regional foreign aid (EU, Germany, Sweden and the UK) towards the largest recipient in Africa (African Union). The comparative analysis reveals considerable variation and each donor employ their own distinct approach, which we conceptualise as Bully (EU), Overseer (UK), Micromanager (Germany) and Samaritan (Sweden). This comparative design enables us not only to escape the EU-centrism that currently distorts the research field but also to analyse the different ways by which European donors try to influence and even control RIOs in Africa through their foreign aid. The deep donor involvement in RIOs in Africa challenges us to rethink external intrusion, the meaning of ownership as well as conventional boundaries of 'inside'/'outside' in the study of regionalism.

The rise of populists to power in many states around the world has caused concern among defenders of multilateralism and the so-called liberal international order. Due to their frequent attacks on established international organizations (IOs), populists are often falsely portrayed as unilateralists. Our article addresses the apparent contradiction that populist leaders delegitimate certain IOs but actively legitimate others, and examines on what grounds they do so. We study speeches by three populist leaders from different continents: Viktor Orbán, Hugo Chávez and Rodrigo Duterte. The analysis shows that their (de)legitimation of IOs relies on representational claims, which critically interrogate on whose authority IOs speak, in whose interest they act, who they are made up of and what they stand for. Using the representational frames of popular sovereignty and popular identity, the three leaders have subverted conventional liberal arguments that legitimate IOs with regard to their performance or procedures. Based on these insights, we argue that instead of criticizing populists for being unilateralists (which they rarely are), stakeholders of established IOs should meet the populist challenge by engaging in more fundamental debates over the very purpose and mandate of IOs.

Summary Motivation Regionalism in Africa is to a large extent financed from the outside, which has given rise to a deep‐seated ownership problem. African actors and donors struggle with whether the ownership deficit derives from unequal donor–recipient relationships or recipient‐related weaknesses. This study goes beyond these debates and adds new insights by exploring the preconceived notions, ideas, and practices of ownership within the donor agencies themselves. Purpose The article explores the ownership of regional foreign aid to Africa through three generic questions: what is meant by “ownership” in a regional setting?; who are the “owners”?; and what strategies and activities are enacted to ensure ownership of regional foreign aid? Methods and approach The study is based on a paired comparison of Sweden and the United Kingdom. While both are large donors of regional aid to Africa, they have diverging approaches to ownership. The empirical material consists of official regional strategies, internal planning documents, aid evaluations and more than 20 semi‐structured interviews with Swedish and British officials based both in headquarters and in field offices. Findings The meanings and principles, considerations about “owners,” as well as strategies and activities to strengthen ownership frequently change over time and for different actors. In both Sweden and the UK, ownership means different things to different officials. Internal contestations between top‐level and field‐based officials reinforce the ambiguities and contradictions within each donor agency. Contrary to expectations, there is more diversity within the Swedish aid machinery than in the British. Policy implications In contrast to the widespread belief among both donors and African‐based actors that the ownership problem results from asymmetric donor–recipient relationships and/or weak African commitment to regional integration, the study shows that policy‐makers need to shift their attention towards the goals, strategies, and internal practices within donor agencies themselves.

How do international organizations (IOs) claim legitimacy, and why do they do so in different ways? Confronted with contestation and critique, IOs seek to enhance audiences' beliefs in their legitimacy by justifying their governance competence through public communication and the change of institutions and behaviour. This article serves as an introduction to a special section on ‘Legitimizing international organizations’. It theorizes the origins of IOs' legitimation strategies and outlines the analytical framework for the special section. We propose the agents-audiences-environment (AAE) framework, which synthesizes diverse literatures on organizational legitimation. While existing literature focuses on audiencesapos; normative demands as a key source of legitimation strategies, we supplement this perspective with ones that consider IO agents' normative beliefs and the norms institutionalized in peer organizations. In this introduction, we first clarify what is at stake in the debate over IO legitimation. We then explain the benefits of shifting perspective from audience beliefs to the origins of IO legitimation. Thereafter, we define the main concepts and develop our AAE-framework. We conclude by summarizing how our contributors use the AAE-framework to advance our understanding of IO legitimation.

In this short article, I will reflect on Ian Taylor’s legacy for comparative regionalism. Although Ian contributed a long list of impressive publications in this field, his research on comparative regionalism has not received as much recognition as it rightfully deserves. Some of Ian's most important contributions to this research field evolve around two themes, which are both elaborated at length in his article published in the Review of International Political Economy (RIPE) from 2003, entitled ‘Globalization and regionalization in Africa: reactions to attempts at neo-liberal regionalism’ (Taylor, 2003). The first theme is neoliberalism and the relationship between globalisation and regionalisation, and the second, regionalisation beyond the rhetoric of regional organisations (ROs). I will reflect on the article itself considering the two themes but also situate Ian’s contributions within a broader context. I will also refer to Sarah Whiteford’s excellent contribution on Ian’s impact on regionalism studies. Finally, in the last two sections, I will reflect on Ian’s legacy as a field worker, as well as some of his personal traits.

Foreign aid to regional international organizations (RIOs) has increased tremendously in recent decades. The vast differences between RIOs give rise to the question of why some RIOs attract considerable amounts of aid while others attract much less, or even nothing at all. To address that question, this article sets out and examines a set of hypotheses that focus on various characteristics of RIOs that allow donors to reduce transaction costs. Empirically, the analysis proceeds via two steps: the hypotheses are first subjected to an empirical plausibility probe based on quantitative methods and then illustrated based on case study of the Southern African Development Community. The findings reveal that RIOs are most attractive when they operate in a range of policy fields, involve many member-states and are engaged in long-lasting collaborations with donors. By contrast, there is little support for conventional explanations as to why RIOs attract funding – for instance, claims that being democratic, being most in need or providing donors with market access will lead to greater funding. The rather disturbing policy implication is that a small number of RIOs are likely to continue to attract the bulk of funding, whereas poorly funded RIOs are unlikely to attract significant amounts of aid.

AbstractThis chapter advances a theoretical framework for studying how, why, and with what impact on audiences, global governance institutions (GGIs) are legitimated and delegitimated. The first component of the framework concerns the distinction between agents and objects. An agent enacts practices of (de)legitimation, whereas an object of (de)legitimation is what is being (de)legitimated, namely the GGI or specific policies. The second component is an agent-structure approach enabling the study of (de)legitimation processes within broader institutional and structural contexts. In this regard, the chapter identifies institutional set-up, policy field, and social structure as particularly relevant factors to account for variation in (de)legitimation across GGIs. The third component of the framework consists of practices, justifications, and audiences of (de)legitimation. Legitimation practices are what different agents engage in when they legitimate or delegitimate GGIs. Justifications are the substantive normative content these agents draw on when engaging in such practices. Audiences are the actors on the receiving end of these processes. The chapter develops overall theoretical expectations related to variation in practices, justifications, and audiences of (de)legitimation across GGIs.

AbstractThis chapter explains variation in discursive, behavioral, and institutional legitimation and delegitimation practices with reference to the nature of the policy field and transnational actor access. Theoretical expectations are probed through a comparison of two intergovernmental global governance institutions during a legitimacy crisis: one operating in the policy field of sustainable development (the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC), the other being a multipurpose regional organization (the African Union). The chapter finds that the institutionally complex nature of the policy field of climate change explains the rich diversity of discursive, institutional, and behavioral legitimation and delegitimation practices in the case of the UNFCCC. In contrast, despite operating in several policy fields, legitimation practices in the African Union are predominantly discursive in nature and dominated by state actors. The high degree of access and openness within the UNFCCC explains variation in (de)legitimation practices. Although the African Union seeks to portray itself as a people-oriented union, the involvement of transnational actors is undermined by a range of exclusionary measures, which explains the limited variation in legitimation and delegitimation in this case.

AbstractCan political institutions be too legitimate for their own good? The standard view of legitimacy treats it purely as a resource—political institutions that enjoy legitimacy can draw on voluntary cooperation among their subjects to reach their aims, which is believed to make them more effective than institutions that lack legitimacy and must instead use coercion or bribery to reach aims. We challenge this conventional wisdom by advancing a more general theory that is sensitive also to the costs of legitimacy. High levels of legitimacy, we suggest, can make political actors complacent about the status quo and cause them to pay insufficient attention to problems related to implementation. In contrast, low levels of legitimacy—or legitimacy crises—can serve as a wake-up call and motivate actors to work harder to reach their original or wider goals. We illustrate this theory through a case study of the African Union, assessing when and how legitimacy serves as a cost or as a resource for political institutions, with implications for decision-making, implementation, and effectiveness.

Over the past few decades, regions and regional institutions have gained increased attention in both scholarly literature and policy debates. A fundamental weakness in both debates, however, is the simplified focus on state actors and the official goals and policies of regional international organizations and inter-state frameworks. This article addresses this extant weakness by opening up for a more diverse empirical reality. By drawing on the new regionalism approach and two illustrative, comparative case studies from West Africa and East Africa, we offer new insights about how state and non-state actors interact in both formal and informal domains in order to produce variegated logics of regionalism that are poorly described by other theoretical perspectives. The article concludes by assessing the implications for theory and future research on regionalism in Africa and in other regions.