How do our brains represent events in language? Recent work has shown that when we comprehend state-change events, multiple representations corresponding to different states of an object are simultaneously activated. As the sentence unfolds and the object is cued for retrieval, areas of the brain associated with representational conflict become more activated in proportion to how dissimilar the object-states are to each other. Before being retrieved, however, these object-states have to be actively maintained in the brain. What are the neural mechanisms by which we do so? Across two EEG experiments, we present evidence that, during sentence processing, the maintenance of multiple object-states in state-change events is supported by a neural signal that has been frequently linked to visual working memory: left temporal theta-gamma phase-amplitude coupling.

How do our brains represent events in language? Recent work has shown that when we comprehend state-change events, multiple representations corresponding to different states of an object are simultaneously activated. As the sentence unfolds and the object is cued for retrieval, areas of the brain associated with representational conflict become more activated in proportion to how dissimilar the object-states are to each other. Before being retrieved, however, these object-states have to be actively maintained in the brain. What are the neural mechanisms by which we do so? Across two EEG experiments, we present evidence that, during sentence processing, the maintenance of multiple object-states in state-change events is supported by a neural signal that has been frequently linked to visual working memory: left temporal theta-gamma phase-amplitude coupling.

The initial demonstration of anticipatory eye movements during sentence processing (Altmann & Kamide, 1999) found anticipatory looks towards the object that afforded the action referred to in the unfolding sentence. Here, we show that the object that affords the action is in fact dispreferred in the context of an object that instead affords the consequence of the action. We ran two studies to both confirm this bias and determine its malleability depending on the task. Our data suggest that looking behaviors (anticipatory or otherwise) are governed by the ubiquitous goal bias found in other cognitive domains. We offer a revised account of attentional biases in sentence processing that captures both action-based and goal-based biases in a unified approach to anticipatory event-based processes in language processing.

Objective: Although extensive insights about the neural mechanisms of reading have been gained via magnetic and electrographic imaging, the temporal evolution of the brain network during sight reading remains unclear. We tested whether the temporal dynamics of the brain functional connectivity involved in sight reading can be tracked using high-density scalp EEG recordings. Approach: Twenty-eight healthy subjects were asked to read words in a rapid serial visual presentation task while recording scalp EEG, and phase locking value was used to estimate the functional connectivity between EEG channels in the theta, alpha, beta, and gamma frequency bands. The resultant networks were then tracked through time. Main results: The network’s graph density gradually increases as the task unfolds, peaks 150–250-ms after the appearance of each word, and returns to resting-state values, while the shortest path length between non-adjacent functional areas decreases as the density increases, thus indicating that a progressive integration between regions can be detected at the scalp level. This pattern was independent of the word’s type or position in the sentence, occurred in the theta/alpha band but not in beta/gamma band, and peaked earlier in the alpha band compared to the theta band (alpha: 184 ± 61.48-ms; theta: 237 ± 65.32-ms, P-value P < 0.01). Nodes in occipital and frontal regions had the highest eigenvector centrality throughout the word’s presentation, and no significant lead-lag relationship between frontal/occipital regions and parietal/temporal regions was found, which indicates a consistent pattern in information flow. In the source space, this pattern was driven by a cluster of nodes linked to sensorimotor processing, memory, and semantic integration, with the most central regions being similar across subjects. Significance: These findings indicate that the brain network connectivity can be tracked via scalp EEG as reading unfolds, and EEG-retrieved networks follow highly repetitive patterns lateralized to frontal/occipital areas during reading.

In a series of sentence-picture verification studies we contrasted, for example, "… choose the balloon with "… inflate the balloon" and "… the inflated balloon" to examine the degree to which different representational components of event representation (specifically, the different object states entailed by the inflating event; minimally, the balloon in its uninflated and inflated states) are jointly activated after state-change verbs and past participles derived from them. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that the initial and end states are both activated after state-change verbs, but that the initial state is considerably less accessible after participles. Experiment 3 showed that intensifier adverbs (e.g., completely) before both state-change verbs and participles further modulate the accessibility of the initial state. And in Experiment 4, we ruled out the possibility that the initial state is accessible only because of the semantic overlap. We conclude that although state-change verbs activate representations of both the initial and end states of their event participants, their accessibility is graded, modulated by the morphosyntactic devices used to describe the event. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Online research methods have the potential to facilitate equitable accessibility to otherwise-expensive research resources, as well as to more diverse populations and language combinations than currently populate our studies. In psycholinguistics specifically, webcam-based eye tracking is emerging as a powerful online tool capable of capturing sentence processing effects in real time. The present paper asks whether webcam-based eye tracking provides the necessary granularity to replicate effects—crucially both large and small—that tracker-based eye tracking has shown. Using the Gorilla Experiment Builder platform, this study set out to replicate two psycholinguistic effects: a robust one, the verb semantic constraint effect, first reported in Altmann and Kamide, Cognition 73(3), 247–264 (1999), and a smaller one, the lexical interference effect, first examined by Kukona et al. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 40(2), 326 (2014). Webcam-based eye tracking was able to replicate both effects, thus showing that its functionality is not limited to large effects. Moreover, the paper also reports two approaches to computing statistical power and discusses the differences in their outputs. Beyond discussing several important methodological, theoretical, and practical implications, we offer some further technical details and advice on how to implement webcam-based eye-tracking studies. We believe that the advent of webcam-based eye tracking, at least in respect of the visual world paradigm, will kickstart a new wave of more diverse studies with more diverse populations.

Historically, the development of valid and reliable methods for assessing higher-order cognitive abilities (e.g., rule learning and transfer) has been difficult in rodent models. To date, limited evidence supports the existence of higher cognitive abilities such as rule generation and complex decision-making in mice, rats, and rabbits. To this end, we sought to develop a task that would require mice to learn and transfer a rule. We trained mice to visually discriminate a series of images (image set, six total) of increasing complexity following three stages: (1) learn a visual target, (2) learn a rule (ignore any new images around the target), and finally (3) apply this rule in abstract form to a comparable but new image set. To evaluate learning for each stage, we measured (1) days (and performance by day) to discriminate the original target at criterion, (2) days (and performance by day) to get back to criterion when images in the set were altered by the introduction of distractors (rule learning), and (3) overall days (and performance by day) to criterion when experienced versus naïve cohorts of mice were tested on the same image set (rule transfer). Twenty-seven wild-type male C57 mice were tested using Bussey-Saksida touchscreen operant conditioning boxes (Lafayette Instruments). Two comparable black-white image sets were delivered sequentially (counterbalanced for order) to two identical cohorts of mice. Results showed that all mice were able to effectively learn their initial target image and could recall it >80 d later. We also found that mice were able to quickly learn and apply a "rule" : Ignore new distractors and continue to identify their visual target embedded in more complex images. The presence of rule learning was supported because performance criterion thresholds were regained much faster than initial learning when distractors were introduced. On the other hand, mice appeared unable to transfer this rule to a new set of stimuli. This is supported because visual discrimination curves for a new image set were no better than an initial (naïve) learning by a matched cohort of mice. Overall results have important implications for phenotyping research and particularly for the modeling of complex disorders in mice.

Under a theory of event representations that defines events as dynamic changes in objects across both time and space, as in the proposal of Intersecting Object Histories (Altmann & Ekves, 2019), the encoding of changes in state is a fundamental first step in building richer representations of events. In other words, there is an inherent dynamic that is captured by our knowledge of events. In the present study, we evaluated the degree to which this dynamic was inferable from just the linguistic signal, without access to visual, sensory, and embodied experience, using recurrent neural networks (RNNs). Recent literature exploring RNNs has largely focused on syntactic and semantic knowledge. We extend this domain of investigation to representations of events within RNNs. In three studies, we find preliminary evidence that RNNs capture, in their internal representations, the extent to which objects change states; for example, that chopping an onion changes the onion by more than just peeling the onion. Moreover, the temporal relationship between state changes is encoded to some extent. We found RNNs are sensitive to how chopping an onion and then weighing it, or first weighing it, entails the onion that is being weighed being in a different state depending on the adverb. Our final study explored what factors influence the propagation of these rudimentary event representations forward into subsequent sentences. We conclude that while there is much still to be learned about the abilities of RNNs (especially in respect of the extent to which they encode objects as specific tokens), we still do not know what are the equivalent representational dynamics in humans. That is, we take the perspective that the exploration of computational models points us to important questions about the nature of the human mind.

Context is critical for conceptual processing, but the mechanism underpinning its encoding and reinstantiation during abstract concept processing is unclear. Context may be especially important for abstract concepts-we investigated whether episodic context is recruited differently when processing abstract compared with concrete concepts. Experiments 1 and 2 presented abstract and concrete words in arbitrary contexts at encoding (Experiment 1: red/green colored frames; Experiment 2: male/female voices). Recognition memory for these contexts was worse for abstract concepts. Again using frame color and voice as arbitrary contexts, respectively, Experiments 3 and 4 presented words from encoding in the same or different context at test to determine whether there was a greater recognition memory benefit for abstract versus concrete concepts when the context was unchanged between encoding and test. Instead, abstract concepts were less likely to be remembered when context was retained. This suggests that at least some types of episodic context-when arbitrary-are attended less, and may even be inhibited, when processing abstract concepts. In Experiment 5, we utilized a context-spatial location-which (as we show) tends to be relevant during real-world processing of abstract concepts. We presented words in different locations, preserving or changing location at test. Location retention conferred a recognition memory advantage for abstract concepts. Thus, episodic context may be encoded with abstract concepts when context is relevant to real-world processing. The systematic contexts necessary for understanding abstract concepts may lead to arbitrary context inhibition, but greater attention to contexts that tend to be more relevant during real-world processing.

We link cleansing effects to contemporary cognitive theories via an account of event representation (intersecting object histories) that provides an explicit, neurally plausible mechanism for encoding objects (e.g., the self) and their associations (with other entities) across time. It explains separation as resulting from weakening associations between the self in the present and the self in the past.

Understanding the time-course of event knowledge activation is crucial for theories of language comprehension. We report two experiments using the 'visual world paradigm' (VWP) that investigated the dynamic mapping between object-state representations and real-time language processing. In Experiment 1, participants heard sentences that described events resulting in either a substantial change of state (e.g. The chef will chop the onion) or a minimal change of state (e.g. The chef will weigh the onion). Concurrently, they viewed pictures depicting two versions of the target object (e.g., an onion) corresponding to the intact and changed states, and two unrelated distractors. A second sentence referred to the object with either a backward or a forward shift in event time (e.g. But first/And then, he will smell the onion). In Experiment 2, Degree of Change was manipulated by using different nouns in the first sentence (e.g. The girl will stomp on thepenny/egg). The second sentence was similar to the ones used in Experiment 1 (e.g., But first/And then, she will look atthe penny/egg). The results from both experiments showed that participants looked more at the 'appropriate' state of the object that matched the language context, but the shift of visual attention emerged only when the object name was heard. Our findings suggest that situationally appropriate object representations do trigger eye movements to the corresponding states of the target object, but inappropriate representations are not necessarily eliminated from consideration until the language forces it.

Gilead et al.'s approach to human cognition places abstraction and prediction at the heart of "mental travel" under a "representational diversity" perspective that embraces foundational concepts in cognitive science. But, it gives insufficient credit to the possibility that the process of abstraction produces a gradient, and underestimates the importance of a highly influential domain in predictive cognition: language, and related, the emergence of experientially based structure through time.

Abstract concepts differ from concrete concepts in a number of ways. Here, we focus on what we refer to as situational systematicity: The objects and relations that constitute an abstract concept (e.g., justice) are more dispersed through space and time than are the objects and relations that typically constitute a concrete concept (e.g., chair); a larger set of objects and relations might potentially constitute an abstract concept than a concrete one; and exactly which objects and relations constitute a concept is likely more context-dependent for abstract than for concrete concepts. We thus refer to abstract concepts as having low situational systematicity. We contend that situational systematicity, rather than abstractness per se, may be a critical determinant of the cognitive, behavioral, and neural phenomena typically associated with concepts. We also contend that investigating concepts through the lens of schema provides insight into the situation-based dynamics of concept learning and representation, and into the functional significance of the interactions between brain regions that make up the schema control network.

How are relationships between concepts affected by the interplay between short-term contextual constraints and long-term conceptual knowledge? Across two studies we investigate the consequence of changes in visual context for the dynamics of conceptual processing. Participants' eye movements were tracked as they viewed a visual depiction of e.g. a canary in a birdcage (Experiment 1), or a canary and three unrelated objects, each in its own quadrant (Experiment 2). In both studies participants heard either a semantically and contextually similar "robin" (a bird; similar size), an equally semantically similar but not contextually similar "stork" (a bird; bigger than a canary, incompatible with the birdcage), or unrelated "tent". The changing patterns of fixations across time indicated first, that the visual context strongly influenced the eye movements such that, in the context of a birdcage, early on (by word offset) hearing "robin" engendered more looks to the canary than hearing "stork" or "tent" (which engendered the same number of looks), unlike in the context of unrelated objects (in which case "robin" and "stork" engendered equivalent looks to the canary, and more than did "tent"). Second, within the 500 ms post-word-offset eye movements in both experiments converged onto a common pattern (more looks to the canary after "robin" than after "stork", and for both more than after "tent"). We interpret these findings as indicative of the dynamics of activation within semantic memory accessed via pictures and via words, and reflecting the complex interaction between systems representing context-independent and context-dependent conceptual knowledge driven by predictive processing.

Context is important for abstract concept processing, but a mechanism by which it is encoded and re-instantiated with concepts is unclear. We used a source-memory paradigm to determine whether episodic context is attended more when processing abstract concepts. Experiment 1 presented abstract and concrete words in colored boxes at encoding. At test, memory for the frame color was worse for abstract concepts, counter to our predictions. Experiment 2 showed the same pattern when colored boxes were replaced with male and female voices. Experiment 3 presented words from encoding in the same or different box color to determine whether a greater advantage is conferred by context retention in memory for abstract concepts. There was instead a disadvantage: abstract concepts were less likely to be identified when the encoding color was retained at test. Concrete concepts are more sensitive to simple episodic detail, and in abstract concepts, arbitrary context may be suppressed.

To understand language people form mental representations of described situations. Linguistic cues are known to influence these representations. In the present study, participants were asked to verify whether the object presented in a picture was mentioned in the preceding words. Crucially, the picture either showed an intact original state or a modified state of an object. Our results showed that the end state of the target object influenced verification responses. When no linguistic context was provided, participants responded faster to the original state of the object compared to the changed state (Experiment 1). However, when linguistic context was provided, participants responded faster to the modified state when it matched, rather than mismatched, the expected outcome of the described event (Experiment 2 and Experiment 3). Interestingly, as for the original state, the match/mismatch effects were only revealed after reading the past tense (Experiment 2) sentences but not the future-tense sentences (Experiment 3). Our findings highlight the need to take account of the dynamics of event representation in language comprehension that captures the interplay between general semantic knowledge about objects and the episodic knowledge introduced by the sentential context.

We offer a new account of event representation based on those aspects of object representation that encode an object's history, and which convey the distinct states that an object has experienced across time-minimally reflecting the before and after of whatever changes the object undergoes as an event unfolds. Our intention is to account for the content of event representations. For an event that can be described as "the chef chopped the onion," the event as a whole is defined by the changes in state and location, across time, of the onion, the chef, and any instruments that (might have) mediated the interaction between the chef and the onion. Thus, we maintain that events are encoded as "ensembles of intersecting object histories" in which one or more objects change state. Our approach requires not just the distinction between object types and object tokens, but also between tokens and token-states (e.g., between that specific onion and its different states before, during, and after the chopping). These distinctions require an account of how object tokens are represented within the context of episodic and semantic memory, and how distinct object states are bound into a single object identity. We shall argue that the theoretical pieces, and their neural instantiation, are in place to develop a unified account of event representation in which such representation is simply a consequence of the mechanism for generating object tokens, their histories, and the binding of one to the other. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Statistical approaches to emergent knowledge have tended to focus on the process by which experience of individual episodes accumulates into generalizable experience across episodes. However, there is a seemingly opposite, but equally critical, process that such experience affords: the process by which, from a space of types (e.g. onions-a semantic class that develops through exposure to individual episodes involving individual onions), we can perceive or create, on-the-fly, a specific token (a specific onion, perhaps one that is chopped) in the absence of any prior perceptual experience with that specific token. This article reviews a selection of statistical learning studies that lead to the speculation that this process-the generation, on the basis of semantic memory, of a novel episodic representation-is itself an instance of a statistical, in fact associative, process. The article concludes that the same processes that enable statistical abstraction across individual episodes to form semantic memories also enable the generation, from those semantic memories, of representations that correspond to individual tokens, and of novel episodic facts about those tokens. Statistical learning is a window onto these deeper processes that underpin cognition.This article is part of the themed issue 'Newfrontiers for statistical learning in the cognitive sciences'.