Individuals and governments often fail to take action to address climate change owing largely to widespread politicization of the issue and related discourse. In response to recent appeals for non-partisan approaches to pro-environmentalism, we propose that highlighting one's responsibility to future generations (RFG) could offer promise across the political spectrum. We argue that RFG may be effective because it is widely endorsed, uncorrelated with demographic indicators and less tied to political ideology compared to other forms of responsibility, such as personal responsibility for climate change mitigation. Across six main and seven supplementary studies (N = 161,633), we provide evidence for these claims. RFG is not only widely endorsed across countries and demographic groups but it also significantly predicts various measures of pro-environmental behaviour, both in correlational and pre-registered experimental contexts. These findings confirm established effects, reconcile inconsistencies and suggest prioritizing intergenerational responsibility may effectively reshape climate change narratives for the most resistant parties.

Across a series of eight high-powered studies ( N = 6,866), we develop a method for assessing impartial intergenerational beneficence, defined as intergenerational concern for all possible future generations. Across our studies, roughly 20% of participants displayed impartial intergenerational beneficence. Participants with impartial intergenerational beneficence expressed greater perceptions that future threats can be resolved, support for policies seeking to protect future generations of people, and a profound sense of responsibility for the long-term survival and prosperity of humanity. Similarly, associations with various future-oriented attitudes, patterns of prosociality, and longtermism-related behaviors and intentions were noted. This research thus introduces a method to capture impartiality in expressed intergenerational concern and finds that people who display impartial intergenerational concern endorse prosocial principles, such as altruism and utilitarianism, while also being more concerned about their own future, the future of others, and how they will be remembered by others.

Public acts of virtue can promote prosocial norms yet are often met with moral scepticism - a phenomenon known as virtue discounting. What psychological processes might underlie people's propensity to both discount others' public virtue and also engage in it themselves? We examine one possible explanation: whether people expect their own public virtuous behaviour to be judged more favourably than others' similar actions. Across four pre-registered studies (N = 2511), we tested for self-serving asymmetries in moral expectations. In three between-subjects experiments, participants either anticipated how others would evaluate their own actions (meta-perceptions) or judged the actions of another person (third-party judgements). Study 1 found no asymmetry in moral goodness. But in Studies 2 and 3, participants expected their own public virtue to be judged as more principled (and more morally good, in Study 2), less reputation-driven, and more trustworthy. Study 3 showed these asymmetries held across multiple perspectives. In contrast, Study 4 used a within-subjects design and found that self-serving asymmetries disappeared when judgements were made side by side. Together, these findings clarify how self-enhancement shapes moral expectations under naturalistic conditions and extend research on moral self-enhancement beyond trait judgements to public virtue and its perceived motivation.

How do descriptive norms shape injunctive norm beliefs, and what does this tell us about the cognitive processes underlying social norm cognition? Across six studies (N = 2,671), we examined whether people update their injunctive norm beliefs-as well as their moral judgments and behavioral intentions-after receiving descriptive norm information about how common (or uncommon) a behavior is. Specifically, we manipulated the descriptive normativity of behaviors, describing behaviors as uncommon (20% of people were doing the behavior) or common (80% of people were doing the behavior), and the type of behavior across studies (fairness, conventional, harm, preference). To measure belief updating, we assessed beliefs prior to and after receiving information about the descriptive norm. We had three main findings: First, participants positively updated their prior injunctive norm beliefs, moral judgments, and behavioral intentions (i.e., rated behaviors more injunctively normative and moral) after receiving a common descriptive norm and negatively updated their beliefs (i.e., rated behaviors less injunctive and moral) after receiving an uncommon descriptive norm, and updated to a larger extent for the common than uncommon descriptive norm. Second, participants were more likely to update their beliefs about what is moral for others compared to what is moral for the self. Third, participants updated their beliefs to a greater extent for fairness and conventional behaviors compared to harm behaviors and preferences. Together, our findings suggest that descriptive norms shape our injunctive norm beliefs and moral judgments and help to paint a fuller picture of the social cognition of social norms.

Sharing one’s pronouns when introducing oneself is an emerging practice intended to prevent assumptions of what pronouns to use when referring to others. This practice may make people comfortable sharing their pronouns so that they are not misgendered and may signal inclusiveness to transgender and nonbinary (TGNB) people. How do people in the United States perceive the motivations behind pronoun sharing? Three preregistered experiments (N=2,641), in addition to three pilot studies (N=8,219; results presented in SI), conducted in the US reveal that people perceive at least three underlying motivations for pronoun sharing when they learn that someone shared their pronouns in a workplace introduction: reputation signaling (trying to enhance one’s own reputation), identity signaling (straightforwardly indicating one’s identity and how one would like to be addressed), and norm support (sincerely endorsing pronoun sharing as a norm). We also show that the sharer’s TGNB identity influences the motivations that observers infer. In general, we find that perceptions of straightforward identity signaling and collective benefit-oriented norm support are higher, and perceptions of self-oriented reputation signaling are lower, when the sharer is transgender rather than cisgender. This research provides a novel characterization of social perceptions of trans-inclusive behavior.

Performing prosociality in public presents a paradox: only by doing so can people demonstrate their virtue and also influence others through their example, yet observers may derogate actors’ behavior as mere “virtue signaling.” Here we investigate the role of observability of actors’ behavior as one reason that people engage in such “virtue discounting.” Further, we investigate observers’ motivational inferences as a mechanism of this effect, using the comparison of generosity and fairness as a case study among virtues. Across 14 studies (7 preregistered, total N=9,360), we show that public actors are perceived as less virtuous than private actors, and that this effect is stronger for generosity compared to fairness (i.e., differential virtue discounting). Exploratory factor analysis suggests that three types of motives—principled, reputation-signaling, and norm-signaling—affect virtue discounting. Using structural equation modeling, we show that observability’s effect on actors’ trait virtue ratings is largely explained by inferences that actors have less principled motivations. Further, we leverage experimental evidence to provide stronger causal evidence of these effects. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of our findings, as well as future directions for research on the social perception of virtue.

Because of intergenerational discounting, individuals often fail to take meaningful action to address climate change. Such inaction is also increased by the widespread politicization of the issue, leading to polarization of discourse. Utilizing moral reframing theory, we hypothesized that one possible way to increase support for addressing climate change is to emphasize one’s responsibility to future generations. We argue that responsibility to future generations is effective because it is a widely endorsed belief/attitude, it is an attitude that is mostly uncorrelated with demographic indicators, and it is less correlated with political ideology than other types of responsibility (i.e., personal responsibility to reduce climate change). Across six main and seven supplementary studies (k=35 countries, N=161,633), we provide evidence for these claims. Responsibility to future generations meaningfully predicted a host of different measures of self-reports of proenvironmentalism correlationally and in a pre-registered experiment with significant direct and indirect effects on proenvironmental outcomes.

The empirical study of virtue is plagued by imprecise definitions and assessment. Here we propose a three-stage, data-driven (‘bottom-up’) method to differentiate lay perceptions of virtues. Employing two virtues—generosity (as cooperation) and fairness (as impartiality)—as a case study, we present findings utilizing data from 9 experiments (total N=2,667). First, natural language processing of free-response data indicated that participants used different ‘topics’ (i.e. clusters of words) to describe behaviours representing generosity (topics: ‘charity’ and ‘kindness’) and fairness (‘equality’). Second, participants in a survey experiment rated behaviours expressing generosity and fairness differently across 6 out of 9 underlying features measured. Third, participants perceive that actors in vignette-based experiments engaging in behaviours expressing generosity versus fairness were motivated differently on 5 out of 6 motivations measured. Our findings support the distinction of the virtues of generosity (as cooperation) and fairness (as impartiality) and indicate the utility of our bottom-up method for assessing and distinguishing virtues.

Anthropogenic carbon emissions have the potential to trigger changes in climate and ecosystems that would be catastrophic for the well-being of humans and other species. Widespread shifts in production and consumption patterns are urgently needed to address climate change. Although transnational agreements and national policy are necessary for a transition to a fully decarbonized global economy, fluctuating political priorities and lobbying by vested interests have slowed these efforts. Against this backdrop, bottom-up pressure from social movements and shifting social norms may offer a complementary path to a more sustainable economy. Furthermore, norm change may be an important component of decarbonization policies by accelerating or strengthening the impacts of other demand-side measures. Individual actions and policy support are social processes-they are intimately linked to expectations about the actions and beliefs of others. Although prevailing social norms often reinforce the status quo and unsustainable development pathways, social dynamics can also create widespread and rapid shifts in cultural values and practices, including increasing pressure on politicians to enact ambitious policy. We synthesize literature on social-norm influence, measurement, and change from the perspectives of psychology, anthropology, sociology, and economics. We discuss the opportunities and challenges for the use of social-norm and social-tipping interventions to promote climate action. Social-norm interventions aimed at addressing climate change or other social dilemmas are promising but no panacea. They require in-depth contextual knowledge, ethical consideration, and situation-specific tailoring and testing to understand whether they can be effectively implemented at scale. Our review aims to provide practitioners with insights and tools to reflect on the promises and pitfalls of such interventions in diverse contexts.

The COVID-19 pandemic has extensively changed the state of psychological science from what research questions psychologists can ask to which methodologies psychologists can use to investigate them. In this article, we offer a perspective on how to optimize new research in the pandemic’s wake. Because this pandemic is inherently a social phenomenon—an event that hinges on human-to-human contact—we focus on socially relevant subfields of psychology. We highlight specific psychological phenomena that have likely shifted as a result of the pandemic and discuss theoretical, methodological, and practical considerations of conducting research on these phenomena. After this discussion, we evaluate metascientific issues that have been amplified by the pandemic. We aim to demonstrate how theoretically grounded views on the COVID-19 pandemic can help make psychological science stronger—not weaker—in its wake.

We demonstrate a novel means by which the egoistic, affective motivations of charitable givers can be leveraged to increase donations: limit donors’ options to a binary choice between giving nothing or giving a specified amount (i.e., set a price). We first provide evidence of inelasticity of demand for charitable giving (N=287): increasing the amount requested 5-fold led to only a 13.3% decrease in the probability of donation. In a meta-analysis of 9 online experiments (total N=2,522), limiting donors’ choice set to giving a fixed amount or giving nothing raises more money for charity. We replicate this effect in a well-powered, preregistered study (N=2,850) and in a large field experiment (N=24,030) using physical mailers run by a national non-profit organization. Finally, we shed light on mechanism in an online lab experiment (N=2,027): the effect is moderated by individual differences in empathy, an affective capacity well-documented as a scope-insensitive motivator of giving.

AbstractFour experiments examine how lack of awareness of inequality affect behaviour towards the rich and poor. In Experiment 1, participants who became aware that wealthy individuals donated a smaller percentage of their income switched from rewarding the wealthy to rewarding the poor. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants who played a public goods game – and were assigned incomes reflective of the US income distribution either at random or on merit – punished the poor (for small absolute contributions) and rewarded the rich (for large absolute contributions) when incomes were unknown; when incomes were revealed, participants punished the rich (for their low percentage of income contributed) and rewarded the poor (for their high percentage of income contributed). In Experiment 4, participants provided with public education contributions for five New York school districts levied additional taxes on mostly poorer school districts when incomes were unknown, but targeted wealthier districts when incomes were revealed. These results shed light on how income transparency shapes preferences for equity and redistribution. We discuss implications for policy-makers.

Nonverbal behavior may be the most important clinical sign that is “hiding in plain sight.” The cost of missing nonverbal patient cues has significant implications for patient satisfaction, health outcomes, and malpractice claims. There is a gap in medical education in teaching nonverbal detection and expression of emotions. Although most human interaction and communication is nonverbal, nonverbal communication skills are not typically taught in courses where clinicians learn to obtain medical histories, explain medical interventions, or give bad news. The social psychology literature is making significant contributions on the roles that facial expression decoding, posture, tone of voice, and other nonverbal forms of communication play in human interactions. Additionally, in an increasingly culturally diverse world, language differences between clinician and patient can be an obstacle to providing optimal medical care. In these settings, accurate interpretation of nonverbal signals becomes ever more crucial to understanding patients’ communications of confusion, fears, or disagreement, both at the cultural and interpersonal level. Many patients, regardless of cultural differences, are reluctant to disagree verbally with their clinicians, and accurate detection of subtle nonverbal cues may be the critical entry point for discussions leading to shared medical decisions. To address this gap in medical education, the first author (H.R.) developed a new teaching tool grounded in the neurobiology of empathy that may be used as an easy-to-remember teaching tool: the acronym E.M.P.A.T.H.Y.—E: eye contact; M: muscles of facial expression; P: posture; A: affect; T: tone of voice; H: hearing the whole patient; Y: your response. This tool has the advantage of helping clinicians remember the key components of assessing nonverbal behaviors irrespective of culture.

Motivating the wealthy to engage in sustainable behaviors is both crucial and challenging; they consume vastly more resources per capita than less wealthy individuals, and they are relatively unresponsive to economic incentives (e.g., taxes). To test whether appeals advocating sustainable behavior may be more effective for the wealthy when framed in terms of the prosocial benefit, we conduct a field experiment to reduce residential water use among 10,500 high-income households in the state of Connecticut. In a 9-month campaign, we find that messages emphasizing the “Public Good” (e.g., to the environment) are more effective in motivating the wealthy to conserve water than messages emphasizing the “Private Benefit” (i.e., financial savings) as well as a control (no messaging). We conceptually replicate these results using two field experiments (one preregistered) that reached 59,882 Facebook users from high-income households in New England, showing significantly greater engagement with prosocial compared to self-interested framed posts.

We conducted a large-scale survey covering 58 countries and over 100,000 respondents between late March and early April 2020 to study beliefs and attitudes towards citizens' and governments' responses at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Most respondents reported holding normative beliefs in support of COVID-19 containment measures, as well as high rates of adherence to these measures. They also believed that their government and their country's citizens were not doing enough and underestimated the degree to which others in their country supported strong behavioral and policy responses to the pandemic. Normative beliefs were strongly associated with adherence, as well as beliefs about others' and the government's response. Lockdowns were associated with greater optimism about others' and the government's response, and improvements in measures of perceived mental well-being; these effects tended to be larger for those with stronger normative beliefs. Our findings highlight how social norms can arise quickly and effectively to support cooperation at a global scale.

How can individual scientists most effectively spread the adoption of open science practices? Engaging in open science practices presents a social dilemma because they are individually costly (given the current incentive schemes in academia) but collectively beneficial (due to production of higher quality and more accessible science). Mechanisms for promoting cooperation in social dilemmas typically rely on normativity—but open science practices are still comparatively rare. Further, individuals may be tempted to dishonestly “virtue signal” due to growing support for open science. We formulate a solution based on the theory of credibility-enhancing displays: advocates who are known to themselves practice the behavior they are advocating for (particularly if they are prestigious) are more effective at convincing others—specifically because their actions provide an honest signal of their belief in the behavior’s value. Thus, advocates for open science practices should find ways to engage in those practices visibly and often.

There is a paradox in our desire to be seen as virtuous. If we are modest in showing our virtue, others will not be able to see this quality in us; yet, if we show off our virtue, others may think that we do so only for social credit. Here, we investigate how virtue signaling works across two distinct virtues—generosity and impartiality—in 3 online studies (N=2,413). We demonstrate the novel phenomenon of differential virtue discounting, revealing that participants perceive actors who demonstrate virtue in public to be less virtuous than actors who demonstrate virtue in private, and, critically, that this effect is greater for generosity than impartiality. Further, we provide evidence that motivational attributions are a mechanism of differential virtue discounting using both correlational and experimental mediation paradigms. Specifically, we find that two factors of motivational attributions—reputational motivation and moral motivation—explain the effect of observability on perceptions of virtue. Our supplement includes all data collected (inclusive of main text, 12 studies, total N=6,126) and 7 analyses as robustness checks and demonstrations of boundary conditions. We discuss how these findings and our novel terminology can shed light on open questions in the social perception of reputation and motivation.

We conducted a large-scale survey covering 58 countries (N = 108,075) at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic—between March 20th and April 7th 2020—to explore how beliefs about citizens’ and government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the actions taken by governments, affected mental well-being. Our analyses reveal three findings. First, many respondents indicate that their country’s citizens and government’s response was insufficient. Second, respondents’ perception of an insufficient public and government response was associated with lower mental well-being. Third, we exploit time variation in country-level lockdown announcements, both around the world and through an event-study in the UK, and find that strong government actions—i.e., announcing a nationwide lockdown—were related to an improvement in respondents’ views of their fellow citizens and government, and to better mental well-being. These findings suggest that policy-makers may not only need to consider how their decisions affect the spread of COVID-19, but also how such choices influence the mental well-being of their population.

We conducted a large-scale survey covering 58 countries and over 100,000 respondents between late March and early April 2020 to study beliefs and attitudes towards citizens' and governments' responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Most respondents reacted strongly to the crisis: they report engaging in social distancing and hygiene behaviors, and believe that strong policy measures, such as shop closures and curfews, are necessary. They also believe that their government and their country's citizens are not doing enough and under- estimate the degree to which others in their country support strong behavioral and policy responses to the pandemic. The perception of a weak government and public response is associated with higher levels of worries and depression. Using both cross-country panel data and an event-study, we additionally show that strong government reactions correct misperceptions, and reduce worries and depression. Our findings highlight that policy-makers not only need to consider how their decisions affect the spread of COVID-19, but also how such choices influence the mental health of their population.