Advances in the protection of human rights have placed the notion of autonomous consent in the spotlight of ethical and legal thought. Nowadays, the moral demand for consent governs a range of everyday interactions, from medical care and third-party use of personal data to sexual relationships. Recently, however, scholars have called into question the suitability of consent as a moral ideal in the sexual domain. To contribute to this debate, we ask what a speaker's expression of consent ordinarily conveys. Probing participants' linguistic acceptability judgments and inferences in response to contextualized expressions of consent (total N = 1232) and leveraging the tools of natural language processing, we documented two attributes of people's conceptual representation of consent. First, expressions of consent were connected to the speaker's patient role in dyadic interactions. Second, consent was indicative of a person's instrumental desire toward the target action. These results help to construe prototypical acts of consent as conveying a speaker's instrumental acceptance of an agent's behavior (e.g., a medical intervention) for some ulterior end (e.g., to restore health). Finally, we confirmed that people selectively reject instrumental desire as an adequate standard in the sexual domain. Our findings may therefore help to explain recurring skepticism about the transformative power of sexual consent as stemming from a mismatch between what consent communicates and prevailing moral norms surrounding sex.

The injectable medication Ozempic (semaglutide) has demonstrated unprecedented effectiveness in promoting significant weight loss. However, its use has sparked moral debates, with critics dismissing it as a mere "shortcut" compared to traditional methods like diet and exercise. This study investigates how weight loss method—Ozempic, diet/exercise, or a combination of both—impacts moral judgments and perceptions of effort, praiseworthiness, and identity/value change. We used a contrastive vignette technique in two experiments (combined N = 1041, nationally representative for age, sex, and ethnicity) to study the attitudes of US participants toward a fictional character who lost 50 pounds through one of the three described methods. Weight loss through diet/exercise was deemed most effortful and most praiseworthy, whereas Ozempic use, even when combined with diet/exercise, was rated as both less effortful and less praiseworthy than diet/exercise alone. Ozempic use with no mention of diet/exercise was rated as least effortful and least praiseworthy. Compared to diet and exercise alone, Ozempic use also decreased perceptions that the individual had really changed as a person, or experienced a change in their underlying values. We discuss potential implications, address study limitations, and provide suggestions for further work.

How we should design and interact with social artificial intelligence depends on the socio-relational role the AI is meant to emulate or occupy. In human society, relationships such as teacher-student, parent-child, neighbors, siblings, or employer-employee are governed by specific norms that prescribe or proscribe cooperative functions including hierarchy, care, transaction, and mating. These norms shape our judgments of what is appropriate for each partner. For example, workplace norms may allow a boss to give orders to an employee, but not vice versa, reflecting hierarchical and transactional expectations. As AI agents and chatbots powered by large language models are increasingly designed to serve roles analogous to human positions - such as assistant, mental health provider, tutor, or romantic partner - it is imperative to examine whether and how human relational norms should extend to human-AI interactions. Our analysis explores how differences between AI systems and humans, such as the absence of conscious experience and immunity to fatigue, may affect an AI's capacity to fulfill relationship-specific functions and adhere to corresponding norms. This analysis, which is a collaborative effort by philosophers, psychologists, relationship scientists, ethicists, legal experts, and AI researchers, carries important implications for AI systems design, user behavior, and regulation. While we accept that AI systems can offer significant benefits such as increased availability and consistency in certain socio-relational roles, they also risk fostering unhealthy dependencies or unrealistic expectations that could spill over into human-human relationships. We propose that understanding and thoughtfully shaping (or implementing) suitable human-AI relational norms will be crucial for ensuring that human-AI interactions are ethical, trustworthy, and favorable to human well-being.

A recurring discrepancy in attitudes toward decisions made by human versus artificial agents, termed the Human-Robot moral judgment asymmetry, has been documented in moral psychology of AI. Across a wide range of contexts, AI agents are subject to greater moral scrutiny than humans for the same actions and decisions. In eight experiments (total N = 5837), we investigated whether the asymmetry effect arises in end-of-life care contexts and explored the mechanisms underlying this effect. Our studies documented reduced approval of an AI doctor's decision to withdraw life support relative to a human doctor (Studies 1a and 1b). This effect persisted regardless of whether the AI assumed a recommender role or made the final medical decision (Studies 2a and 2b and 3), but, importantly, disappeared under two conditions: when doctors kept on rather than withdraw life support (Studies 1a, 1b and 3), and when they carried out active euthanasia (e.g., providing a lethal injection or removing a respirator on the patient's demand) rather than passive euthanasia (Study 4). These findings highlight two contextual factors-the level of automation and the patient's autonomy-that influence the presence of the asymmetry effect, neither of which is not predicted by existing theories. Finally, we found that the asymmetry effect was partly explained by perceptions of AI incompetence (Study 5) and limited explainability (Study 6). As the role of AI in medicine continues to expand, our findings help to outline the conditions under which stakeholders disfavor AI over human doctors in clinical settings.

Experimental jurisprudence (or "X-Jur") addresses questions of jurisprudence or legal philosophy by complementing traditional philosophical analysis with empirical methods. Often those methods include survey experiments that examine laypeople's intuitions about legal-philosophical thought experiments and concepts of legal significance (e.g., causation, intent, reasonableness). Other times, experimental jurisprudence focuses on the cognitive processes underlying legal reasoning. This entry reviews representative work in experimental jurisprudence and discusses major objections and critiques.

Download This Paper Open PDF in Browser Add Paper to My Library Share: Permalink Using these links will ensure access to this page indefinitely Copy URL Copy DOI

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) raises ethical questions concerning moral and legal responsibility-specifically, the attributions of credit and blame for AI-generated content. For example, if a human invests minimal skill or effort to produce a beneficial output with an AI tool, can the human still take credit? How does the answer change if the AI has been personalized (i.e., fine-tuned) on previous outputs produced without AI assistance by the same human? We conducted a preregistered experiment with representative sampling (N = 1802) repeated in four countries (United States, United Kingdom, China, and Singapore). We investigated laypeople's attributions of credit and blame to human users for producing beneficial or harmful outputs with a standard large language model (LLM), a personalized LLM, or no AI assistance (control condition). Participants generally attributed more credit to human users of personalized versus standard LLMs for beneficial outputs, whereas LLM type did not significantly affect blame attributions for harmful outputs, with a partial exception among Chinese participants. In addition, UK participants attributed more blame for using any type of LLM versus no LLM. Practical, ethical, and policy implications of these findings are discussed.

We review some processing assumptions that underlie the currently used measures of moral judgement with moral dilemmas, contrasting them with the overlooked possibility that the primary mechanism consists in assessing a net balance of the costs versus benefits of the sacrificial action. Different dilemmas scenarios present different net balances of cost versus benefits, and participants usually change between them from disapproval to approval motivated by what appears to be a larger positive balance of moral benefits. The thresholds for such change are personal and vary. For the instrument to reliably estimate the individual differences in approval thresholds, there can be no disagreement on the facts affecting the balances and the ranking order of the items. We designed an instrument targeting three different balances with five indicators each and ran an exploratory factor analysis to prove that the different balances operate cleanly as separate factors. The expected three-factor solution and a stable ranking of the balance points were obtained across three samples from three different continents in three languages, suggesting the activation of cross-culturally stable cognitive processes. The strength ratio of utilitarian (U) to deontological (D) sensitivity was calculated for each participant and corrected using the scores of a balance-point with no net benefits. This instrument overcomes validation difficulties burdening the existing measures and offers good prospects for further development.

What should judges do when faced with immoral laws? Should they apply them without exception, since “the law is the law”? Or can exceptions be made for grossly immoral laws, such as historically, Nazi law? Surveying laypeople (N = 167) and people with some legal training (N = 141) on these matters, we find a surprisingly strong, monotonic relationship between people’s subjective moral evaluation of laws and their judgments that these laws should be applied in concrete cases.This tendency is most pronounced among individuals who endorse Natural Law (i.e., the legal-philosophical view that immoral laws are not valid laws at all), and is attenuated when disagreement about the moral status of a law is considered reasonable. The relationship is equally strong for laypeople and for those with legal training. We situate our findings within the broader context of morality’s influence on legal reasoning that experimental jurisprudence has uncovered in recent years, and consider normative implications.

Is legal interpretation fundamentally guided by a law’s text or its purpose? This chapter revisits this classic debate with new data from experimental jurisprudence. We present a “coordination theory of legal interpretation,” on which legal interpretation is partly an exercise in coordination: judges seek to interpret rules to match interpretations of their peers, other legal officials, and society. Past research indicates that a statute’s plain meaning often constitutes a focal point around which different interpreters successfully coordinate. One proposed explanation of this effect is that law’s text is more univocal than its purpose; that while moral and political disagreement leads to debate about what purpose laws should serve, people can more easily reach an accord on the meaning of a law’s plain text. We test this specific explanation through a coordination game with information exchange and the results do not support it, despite providing further evidence of the impact of coordination incentives on legal interpretation. Our discussion outlines a different possible explanation of coordination around law’s text based on considerations of publicity.

Mind upload, or the digital copying of an individual brain and mind, could theoretically allow one to “live forever.” If such a technology became available, who would be most likely to approve of it or condemn it? Research has shown that fear of death positively predicts the moral approval of hypothetical mind upload technology, while religiosity may have the opposite effect. We build on these findings, drawing also from work on religiosity and existential mattering as predictors of perceived meaning in one’s life. In a cross-sectional study (N = 1,007), we show that existential mattering and afterlife beliefs are negatively associated with moral approval of mind upload technology: people who believe there is a soul or some form of afterlife and who also report a high level of existential mattering, are least likely to morally approve of mind upload technology. Indeed, mind uploading—if it ever becomes feasible—is a form of technology that would fundamentally redraw the existential boundaries of what it means to be human.

Research in moral psychology has found that robots, more than humans, are expected to make utilitarian decisions. This expectation is found specifically when contrasting utilitarian action to deontological inaction. In a series of eight experiments (total N = 3752), we compared judgments about robots’ and humans’ decisions in a rescue dilemma with no possibility of deontological inaction. A robot’s decision to rescue an innocent victim of an accident was judged more positively than the decision to rescue two people culpable for the accident (Studies 1-2b). This pattern repeated in a large-scale web survey (Study 3, N = ~19000) and reversed when all victims were equally culpable/innocent (Study 5). Differences in judgments about humans’ and robots’ decisions were largest for norm-violating decisions. In sum, robots are not always expected to make utilitarian decisions, and their decisions are judged differently from those ofhumans based on other moral standards as well.

A cross-cultural survey experiment revealed a general tendency to rely on a rule’s text over its purpose when deciding which acts violate the rule. This tendency’s strength varied markedly across (k = 13) field sites, owing to cultural differences in the impact of moral appraisals on judgments of rule violation. Next, we observed that legal experts were more strongly inclined to disregard their moral evaluations of the acts altogether, and they consequently demonstrated stronger textualist tendencies than did laypeople. Finally, we examined a plausible mechanism for the emergence of textualism in a two-player coordination game: Incentives to coordinate without communicating reinforced participants’ reliance on rules’ literal meaning. Together, these studies (total N = 5109) help clarify the origins and allure of legal textualism. While diverse legal actors may have varied personal assessments of rules’ moral purposes, rules’ literal meanings serve as clear focal points—easily identifiable points of agreement that enable coordination among diverse agents and judges.

Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project (XRP) to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy (osf.io/dvkpr). Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward.

Os conflitos entre liberdade de expressão e direito à honra e à imagem no Brasil são regulados por meio de padrões vagos. Essa vagueza é muitas vezes defendida em nome de posições particularistas. No presente artigo, propomos uma escala que permite medir as atitudes que as pessoas têm a respeito desses conflitos. Ao longo de 4 estudos, desenvolvemos, validamos e aplicamos esse instrumento de pesquisa para testar hipóteses específicas. Nossos resultados mostram que a pontuação de cada respondente na escala exerce influência expressiva sobre as decisões tomadas por juristas e leigos em conflitos entre a liberdade de expressão e o direito à honra e à imagem (estudos 1 e 2). Ademais, as atitudes dos participantes nos estudos a respeito da liberdade de expressão e do direito à honra e à imagem se mantiveram relativamente estáveis ao longo do tempo (estudo 3). Finalmente, a influência exercida pelas posições prévias se mantém mesmo quando controlamos para as diferenças moralmente relevantes entre casos diferentes (estudo 4).

Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences-rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross-cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general.

NoûsVolume 53, Issue 1 p. 224-247 ARTICLE Nothing at Stake in Knowledge* David Rose, David Rose drose@philosophy.rutgers.edu Rutgers UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorEdouard Machery, Edouard Machery machery@pitt.edu University of PittsburghSearch for more papers by this authorStephen Stich, Stephen Stich stich.steve@gmail.com Rutgers UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorMario Alai, Mario Alai mario.alai@libero.it University of UrbinoSearch for more papers by this authorAdriano Angelucci, Adriano Angelucci adrian.angelucci@gmail.com University of UrbinoSearch for more papers by this authorRenatas Berniūnas, Renatas Berniūnas renatasberniunas@gmail.com Vilnius UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorEmma E. Buchtel, Emma E. Buchtel buchtel@eduhk.hk The Education University of Hong KongSearch for more papers by this authorAmita Chatterjee, Amita Chatterjee chatterjeeamita@gmail.com Jadavpur UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorHyundeuk Cheon, Hyundeuk Cheon hdcheon@gmail.com Ewha Womans UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorIn-Rae Cho, In-Rae Cho ircho@snu.ac.kr Seoul National UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorDaniel Cohnitz, Daniel Cohnitz d.cohnitz@uu.nl Utrecht UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorFlorian Cova, Florian Cova florian.cova@gmail.com University of GenevaSearch for more papers by this authorVilius Dranseika, Vilius Dranseika vilius.dranseika@fsf.vu.lt Vilnius University, LithuaniaSearch for more papers by this authorÁngeles Eraña Lagos, Ángeles Eraña Lagos mael@filosoficas.unam.mx Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAMSearch for more papers by this authorLaleh Ghadakpour, Laleh Ghadakpour laleh@ghadakpour.net Independent Scholar, IranSearch for more papers by this authorMaurice Grinberg, Maurice Grinberg mgrinberg@ngu.bg New Bulgarian UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorIvar Hannikainen, Ivar Hannikainen ivar.hannikainen@gmail.com Catholic University of Rio de JaneiroSearch for more papers by this authorTakaaki Hashimoto, Takaaki Hashimoto hshmt@l.u-tokyo.ac.jp University of TokyoSearch for more papers by this authorAmir Horowitz, Amir Horowitz amirho@openu.ac.il Open University of IsraelSearch for more papers by this authorEvgeniya Hristova, Evgeniya Hristova ehristova@cogs.nbu.bg New Bulgarian UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorYasmina Jraissati, Yasmina Jraissati yasmina.jraissati@gmail.com American University of BeirutSearch for more papers by this authorVeselina Kadreva, Veselina Kadreva vkadreva@nbu.bg New Bulgarian UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorKaori Karasawa, Kaori Karasawa karasawa@l.u-tokyo.ac.jp University of TokyoSearch for more papers by this authorHackjin Kim, Hackjin Kim hackjinkim@korea.ac.kr Korea UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorYeonjeong Kim, Yeonjeong Kim yeonjeongkim@cmu.edu Carnegie Mellon UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorMinwoo Lee, Minwoo Lee redooly86@gmail.com Korea University, SeoulSearch for more papers by this authorCarlos Mauro, Carlos Mauro cmauro72@gmail.com Católica Porto Business SchoolSearch for more papers by this authorMasaharu Mizumoto, Masaharu Mizumoto mizumoto@jaist.ac.jp Japan Advanced Institute of Science and TechnologySearch for more papers by this authorSebastiano Moruzzi, Sebastiano Moruzzi sebastiano.moruzzi@unibo.it University of BolognaSearch for more papers by this authorChristopher Y. Olivola, Christopher Y. Olivola olivola@cmu.edu Carnegie Mellon UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorJorge Ornelas, Jorge Ornelas jornelass@gmail.com Universidad Autónoma de San Luis PotosíSearch for more papers by this authorBarbara Osimani, Barbara Osimani B.Osimani@lmu.de Ludwig-Maximilians Univesität, München – MCMPSearch for more papers by this authorCarlos Romero, Carlos Romero ckronosz@hotmail.com UNAMSearch for more papers by this authorAlejandro Rosas Lopez, Alejandro Rosas Lopez arosasl@unal.edu.co National University of ColombiaSearch for more papers by this authorMassimo Sangoi, Massimo Sangoi massimosangoi@hotmail.com University of UrbinoSearch for more papers by this authorAndrea Sereni, Andrea Sereni andrea.sereni@iusspavia.it Scuola Universitaria Superiore IUSS PaviaSearch for more papers by this authorSarah Songhorian, Sarah Songhorian songhorian.sarah@unisr.it Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele MilanoSearch for more papers by this authorPaulo Sousa, Paulo Sousa paulo.sousa@qub.ac.uk Institute of Cognition and Culture, Queen's University BelfastSearch for more papers by this authorNoel Struchiner, Noel Struchiner struchiner@gmail.com Catholic University of Rio de JaneiroSearch for more papers by this authorVera Tripodi, Vera Tripodi vera.tripodi@unito.it University of TurinSearch for more papers by this authorNaoki Usui, Naoki Usui nusui@nna.so-net.ne.jp Mie UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorAlejandro Vázquez del Mercado, Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado vazquezdelmercado@gmail.com UNAMSearch for more papers by this authorGiorgio Volpe, Giorgio Volpe giorgio.volpe@unibo.it University of BolognaSearch for more papers by this authorHrag Abraham Vosgerichian, Hrag Abraham Vosgerichian hav00@aub.edu.lb American University of BeirutSearch for more papers by this authorXueyi Zhang, Xueyi Zhang zxynj0928@126.com Southeast University, P. R. ChinaSearch for more papers by this authorJing Zhu, Jing Zhu zhujing6@mail.sysu.edu.cn Sun Yat-Sen UniversitySearch for more papers by this author David Rose, David Rose drose@philosophy.rutgers.edu Rutgers UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorEdouard Machery, Edouard Machery machery@pitt.edu University of PittsburghSearch for more papers by this authorStephen Stich, Stephen Stich stich.steve@gmail.com Rutgers UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorMario Alai, Mario Alai mario.alai@libero.it University of UrbinoSearch for more papers by this authorAdriano Angelucci, Adriano Angelucci adrian.angelucci@gmail.com University of UrbinoSearch for more papers by this authorRenatas Berniūnas, Renatas Berniūnas renatasberniunas@gmail.com Vilnius UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorEmma E. Buchtel, Emma E. Buchtel buchtel@eduhk.hk The Education University of Hong KongSearch for more papers by this authorAmita Chatterjee, Amita Chatterjee chatterjeeamita@gmail.com Jadavpur UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorHyundeuk Cheon, Hyundeuk Cheon hdcheon@gmail.com Ewha Womans UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorIn-Rae Cho, In-Rae Cho ircho@snu.ac.kr Seoul National UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorDaniel Cohnitz, Daniel Cohnitz d.cohnitz@uu.nl Utrecht UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorFlorian Cova, Florian Cova florian.cova@gmail.com University of GenevaSearch for more papers by this authorVilius Dranseika, Vilius Dranseika vilius.dranseika@fsf.vu.lt Vilnius University, LithuaniaSearch for more papers by this authorÁngeles Eraña Lagos, Ángeles Eraña Lagos mael@filosoficas.unam.mx Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAMSearch for more papers by this authorLaleh Ghadakpour, Laleh Ghadakpour laleh@ghadakpour.net Independent Scholar, IranSearch for more papers by this authorMaurice Grinberg, Maurice Grinberg mgrinberg@ngu.bg New Bulgarian UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorIvar Hannikainen, Ivar Hannikainen ivar.hannikainen@gmail.com Catholic University of Rio de JaneiroSearch for more papers by this authorTakaaki Hashimoto, Takaaki Hashimoto hshmt@l.u-tokyo.ac.jp University of TokyoSearch for more papers by this authorAmir Horowitz, Amir Horowitz amirho@openu.ac.il Open University of IsraelSearch for more papers by this authorEvgeniya Hristova, Evgeniya Hristova ehristova@cogs.nbu.bg New Bulgarian UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorYasmina Jraissati, Yasmina Jraissati yasmina.jraissati@gmail.com American University of BeirutSearch for more papers by this authorVeselina Kadreva, Veselina Kadreva vkadreva@nbu.bg New Bulgarian UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorKaori Karasawa, Kaori Karasawa karasawa@l.u-tokyo.ac.jp University of TokyoSearch for more papers by this authorHackjin Kim, Hackjin Kim hackjinkim@korea.ac.kr Korea UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorYeonjeong Kim, Yeonjeong Kim yeonjeongkim@cmu.edu Carnegie Mellon UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorMinwoo Lee, Minwoo Lee redooly86@gmail.com Korea University, SeoulSearch for more papers by this authorCarlos Mauro, Carlos Mauro cmauro72@gmail.com Católica Porto Business SchoolSearch for more papers by this authorMasaharu Mizumoto, Masaharu Mizumoto mizumoto@jaist.ac.jp Japan Advanced Institute of Science and TechnologySearch for more papers by this authorSebastiano Moruzzi, Sebastiano Moruzzi sebastiano.moruzzi@unibo.it University of BolognaSearch for more papers by this authorChristopher Y. Olivola, Christopher Y. Olivola olivola@cmu.edu Carnegie Mellon UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorJorge Ornelas, Jorge Ornelas jornelass@gmail.com Universidad Autónoma de San Luis PotosíSearch for more papers by this authorBarbara Osimani, Barbara Osimani B.Osimani@lmu.de Ludwig-Maximilians Univesität, München – MCMPSearch for more papers by this authorCarlos Romero, Carlos Romero ckronosz@hotmail.com UNAMSearch for more papers by this authorAlejandro Rosas Lopez, Alejandro Rosas Lopez arosasl@unal.edu.co National University of ColombiaSearch for more papers by this authorMassimo Sangoi, Massimo Sangoi massimosangoi@hotmail.com University of UrbinoSearch for more papers by this authorAndrea Sereni, Andrea Sereni andrea.sereni@iusspavia.it Scuola Universitaria Superiore IUSS PaviaSearch for more papers by this authorSarah Songhorian, Sarah Songhorian songhorian.sarah@unisr.it Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele MilanoSearch for more papers by this authorPaulo Sousa, Paulo Sousa paulo.sousa@qub.ac.uk Institute of Cognition and Culture, Queen's University BelfastSearch for more papers by this authorNoel Struchiner, Noel Struchiner struchiner@gmail.com Catholic University of Rio de JaneiroSearch for more papers by this authorVera Tripodi, Vera Tripodi vera.tripodi@unito.it University of TurinSearch for more papers by this authorNaoki Usui, Naoki Usui nusui@nna.so-net.ne.jp Mie UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorAlejandro Vázquez del Mercado, Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado vazquezdelmercado@gmail.com UNAMSearch for more papers by this authorGiorgio Volpe, Giorgio Volpe giorgio.volpe@unibo.it University of BolognaSearch for more papers by this authorHrag Abraham Vosgerichian, Hrag Abraham Vosgerichian hav00@aub.edu.lb American University of BeirutSearch for more papers by this authorXueyi Zhang, Xueyi Zhang zxynj0928@126.com Southeast University, P. R. ChinaSearch for more papers by this authorJing Zhu, Jing Zhu zhujing6@mail.sysu.edu.cn Sun Yat-Sen UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 24 August 2017 https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12211Citations: 25 † *This paper is dedicated to Richard Nisbett, who helped create the field of experimental philosophy, on the occasion of his retirement. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume53, Issue1March 2019Pages 224-247 RelatedInformation

Using hypothetical divorce cases we examine the role of gender stereotypes in decisions about child custody. Good mothers received greater custody allocations than did good fathers across a tightly-matched pair of vignettes in three culturally-distinct samples: Argentina, Brazil and the United States (Study 1). Two follow-up studies indicated that the warmth dimension of stereotype content partly accounted for the asymmetry in custody awards: The proportion of maternal-primary custody was predicted by the tendency to ascribe warmth-related traits—such as friendliness, generosity or trustworthiness—to mothers (Study 2) and associate them to female over male nouns (Study 3). We also found that endorsing shared custody mitigated the asymmetry in custody awards documented in our studies. Together, these results highlight the interplay of stereotyped attitudes and egalitarian commitments in the context of judicial decisions about child custody.