Why do firms re-establish previously dissolved relations with other firms? In this paper we explore this phenomenon in a customer-supplier context. Organization and strategy theorists have focused primarily on the formation, evolution, and dissolution of interfirm ties, but few have examined their reconstitution, despite evidence that tie reconstitution can have benefits for firms. We address this gap through an examination of strategic customer-supplier relations among 26 Scandinavian firms. Based on 95 open-ended interviews with executives of these firms, we show that four factors promote the reconstitution of previously dissolved ties: the existence of relation-specific investments in the earlier tie, accompanied by a history of reliability and coordination; concerns regarding the uncertainty and risk associated with the initiation of a new relation from scratch; the maintenance of social ties between firm officers during the period of dormancy; and a major structural change such as a reorganization, merger, or acquisition in one or both firms. The results suggest that reconstituted interfirm relations represent a type distinctly different from newly-formed, currently active, or repeated ties. Successful reconstitution requires that the firms overcome whatever difficulties led to the cessation of their relation in the first place. How the ties were dissolved has an impact on their reconstitution at a later stage. A dormancy stage may provide new and unexpected knowledge, novel information, and other new resources that can lead to substantial benefits after the firms achieve a successful reconstitution.

Our study investigates the interaction effects of faultline strength, subgroup size and faultline trigger timing on perceived group performance and group viability. Further to extant faultline literature, we argue that strong faultlines would be associated with intense group conflict and power struggle, particularly when the subgroup size is imbalanced in a resource-based subgroup and when a faultline trigger happens early in group development. We also argue that such conflict and power struggle would serve as negative process cues leading to lower perceived group performance by members, subsequently reducing group viability. We tested our hypotheses on 55 groups in a time-lagged laboratory study. Our results support our hypotheses, after controlling for group size and third-party measures of group performance.

The trade-off between mercy and justice is a classic moral dilemma, particularly for organizational leaders and managers. In 3 complementary studies, we investigated how resolving the "punishment dilemma" influences interpersonal trust. Study 1 used controlled scenarios to show that uninvolved observers trusted leaders who administered large or medium punishment more than leaders who administered no punishment when transgressors deserved punishment. At the same time, large punishment decreased trust more than medium or no punishment for less deserving targets. Study 2's similar scenarios showed that leaders who administered punishment lost trust when they subsequently received benefits even though it was not clear whether their benefits resulted from their act of punishment. Study 3 provided a behavioral replication of these results. These findings suggest that people trusted punishers more than nonpunishers, but only when punishers' motives were not personal revenge. In the discussion, we explore the practical and theoretical implications of these results for organizations.

Contracts are commonly used to regulate a wide range of interactions and relationships. Yet relying on contracts as a mechanism of control often comes at a cost to motivation. Integrating theoretical perspectives from psychology, economics, and organizational theory, we explore this control-motivation dilemma inherent in contracts and present the Contract-Autonomy-Motivation-Performance-Structure (CAMPS) model, which highlights the synergistic benefits of combining structure and autonomy. The model proposes that subtle reductions in the specificity of a contract's language can boost autonomy, which increases intrinsic motivation and improves a range of desirable behaviors. Nine field and laboratory experiments found that less specific contracts increased task persistence, creativity, and cooperation, both immediately and longitudinally, because they boosted autonomy and intrinsic motivation. These positive effects, however, only occurred when contracts provided sufficient structure. Furthermore, the effects were limited to control-oriented clauses (i.e., legal clauses), and did not extend to coordination-oriented clauses (i.e., technical clauses). That is, there were synergistic benefits when a contract served as a scaffold that combined structure with general clauses. Overall, the current model and experiments identify a low-cost solution to the common problem of regulating social relationships: finding the right amount of contract specificity promotes desirable outcomes, including behaviors that are notoriously difficult to contract. The CAMPS model and the current set of empirical findings explain why, when, and how contracts can be used as an effective motivational tool.

The observation that in China people generally do not trust strangers motivated us to study this phenomenon. We used the literature of guanxi to define strangers, and we drew on intergroup contact theory to hypothesize that positive experiences with outgroup, but not with ingroup members will increase trust in strangers. In three experiments we found that perceiving support from (Study 1), receiving help from (Study 2), and being trusted by (Study 3) outgroup members led to higher trust in strangers. Indirect reciprocity mediated this relationship, suggesting that people generalize experiences with one outgroup member to other social actors, and in turn, increase their trust in strangers. Study 4 showed that intrapersonal trust increased after a positive outgroup experience. Study 5 replicated this finding using secondary field data. This research contributes to the trust literature by showing how specific and eventful experiences increase trust in strangers. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

This paper presents a selective review of decades of empirical research on behavioral games, with a particular focus on experimental games. We suggest that games effectively (but imperfectly) model many human social interactions, and we present important findings from six popular experimental games – Prisoner’s and Social Dilemmas, and the Trust, Ultimatum, Dictator, and Deception games – to discuss their theoretical and empirical implications as well as their various insights into human nature. We close by asking several fundamental questions about games and suggesting several directions and ideas for future research.

Although people generally try to avoid lying, the lure of potential monetary payoffs often leads to unethical behavior. The current research investigates whether small monetary rewards for honesty help people resist the temptations of larger incentives or whether they backfire and lead to even more dishonesty. Four experiments address these issues. Experiment 1 shows that a $1 bonus led people to act more honestly when they could have lied to obtain $4; an identical bonus, however, did not increase dishonesty. Experiment 2 uses a different context and again shows that a $1 bonus led people to act more honestly; it also finds no evidence that this small payoff crowded out subsequent altruistic behavior. Experiment 3 shows that a $1 bonus increased people’s honesty even when the payoffs for lying increased to $8, $12, and $16, but not when the payoff for lying increased to $20. Experiment 4 finds that smaller bonuses for honesty still had an impact, although it tended to be somewhat weaker. In addition, compared with no bonus, the combined effect of several small monetary bonuses (1 dollar, 75 cents, 50 cents, and 25 cents) marginally reduced lying. Data are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2480 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.

This paper reports the distribution of agreements over time in four bargaining experiments. There is a striking concentration of agreements reached in the very last seconds before the deadline. This "deadline effect" appears to be quite robust, in that the distribution of agreements over time appears to be much less sensitive to the experimental manipulations than is the distribution of the terms of agreement. Each of these experiments also exhibited a substantial frequency of disagreement. Since last-minute agreements are widely believed to occur frequently in naturally occurring negotiations,' it may be helpful to

The vast majority of research on the value of social or professional relationships has focused on ties that already exist. We ask if it is possible to predict in advance-before people ever meet-which brand-new ties will yield more value in the form of useful work-related knowledge. We examine this question using three perspectives: the resource (actor) perspective, the relational (tie) perspective, and the network (structure) perspective. To test our predictions, we asked 150 executives to reach out for work-related advice from someone they had never met, and to complete a survey of their thoughts and judgments of the other person both before and after making a connection. Controlling for the effects of homophily, we find support for all three perspectives after a connection has been made, i.e., once there is already an existing tie. However, before tie formation-our focus in this paper-we find evidence only for the network perspective, in the form of either bonding or bridging. Our results suggest that the lack of reliable information about strangers-especially their likely relational or resource qualities-makes it difficult to predict which ties will turn out to be more valuable, but that the existing network structure remains a reliable predictor of value, even for brand-new ties.

Perspective-taking often increases generosity in behavior and attributions. We present an intentions-based account to explain how perspective-taking can both decrease and increase moral condemnation. Consistent with past research, we predicted perspective-taking would reduce condemnation when the perspective-taker initially attributed benevolent intent to a transgressor. However, we predicted perspective-taking would increase condemnation when malevolent intentions were initially attributed to the wrongdoer. We propose that perspective-taking amplifies the intentions initially attributed to a transgressor. Three studies measured and manipulated intention attributions and found that perspective-taking increased condemnation when malevolent intentions were initially attributed to a transgressor. Perspective-taking also increased costly punishment of a transgressor, an effect mediated by malevolent intentions. In contrast, empathy did not increase punitive responses, supporting its conceptual distinction from perspective-taking. Whether perspective-taking leads to forgiveness or condemnation depends on the intentions the perspective-taker initially attributes to a transgressor.

Reconnecting with long-lost or dormant contacts can be very valuable both professionally and personally. But choosing from among hundreds of former contacts can be challenging. We find that executives, when left to their own devices, don't take full advantage of their opportunities to reconnect. And when they do reconnect, they tend to focus on comfort and not on re-connections that might offer the best advice. Unmaintained relationships are not dead at all: they can be revitalized fairly easily. Research revealed the most valuable reconnections were people who provided novelty and engaged fully. Generally, it was better to reconnect with higher-status contacts and people the executives had not spent a lot of time with in the past; this allowed for more novel insights. In addition, participants expectations of who would care about them and be willing to help turned out to be predictive of the value they received, as this engagement allowed for authentic and productive conversations rather than just a shallow catching up.

Models of diffusion of responsibility suggest that principals will avoid direct moral responsibility by hiring agents to act unethically on their behalf. The current research goes beyond the research on the diffusion of responsibility by investigating the influence of agents’ character on principals’ moral choices. Study 1 allowed principals to choose an honest or dishonest agent. The results indicated that having the opportunity to choose dishonest agents, regardless of the agents’ ultimate intentions for their previous lies, increased the likelihood that principals would subsequently hire the agents to lie on their behalf to harm others. Study 2 was designed to avoid potential self-selection effects by randomly pairing principals and agents; it found that observing agents telling harmful black lies or seemingly harmless white lies led to increased immoral actions by their principals. Our results contribute to the literatures on moral diffusion and principal-agent relationships by revealing some of the inherent dynamics in the principal-agent moral interactions.

Negotiation JournalVolume 31, Issue 4 p. 361-362 “Attitudinal Structuring,” also Known as Influence and Relationship Building Attitudinal Structuring and Game Theory J. Keith Murnighan, J. Keith MurnighanJ. Keith Murnighan is the Harold H. Hines Jr. Distinguished Professor of Risk Management at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois. His e-mail address is [email protected].Search for more papers by this author J. Keith Murnighan, J. Keith MurnighanJ. Keith Murnighan is the Harold H. Hines Jr. Distinguished Professor of Risk Management at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois. His e-mail address is [email protected].Search for more papers by this author First published: 23 October 2015 https://doi.org/10.1111/nejo.12108Citations: 6 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. References Gilbert, D. T., E. C. Pinel, T. D. Wilson, S. J. Blumberg, and T. Wheatley. 1998. Immune neglect: A source of durability bias in affective forecasting. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75(3): 617–638. Luce, R. D., and H. Raiffa. 1957. Games and decisions: Introduction and critical survey. New York: John Wiley. Thibaut, J. W., and H. H. Kelley. 1959. The social psychology of groups. New York: John Wiley. Von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern. 1947. Theory of games and economic behavior, 2nd rev. edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Citing Literature Volume31, Issue4October 2015Pages 361-362 ReferencesRelatedInformation

Even the simplest choices can prompt decision-makers to balance their preferences against other, more pragmatic considerations like price. Thus, discerning people's preferences from their decisions creates theoretical, empirical, and practical challenges. The current paper addresses these challenges by highlighting some specific circumstances in which the amount of time that people spend examining potential purchase items (i.e., viewing time) can in fact reveal their preferences. Our model builds from the gazing literature, in a purchasing context, to propose that the informational value of viewing time depends on prices. Consistent with the model's predictions, four studies show that when prices are absent or moderate, viewing time provides a signal that is consistent with a person's preferences and purchase intentions. When prices are extreme or consistent with a person's preferences, however, viewing time is a less reliable predictor of either. Thus, our model highlights a price-contingent "viewing bias," shedding theoretical, empirical, and practical light on the psychology of preferences and visual attention, and identifying a readily observable signal of preference.

Abstract Altruism involves action that benefits others, without respect to the actor's outcomes; it is strictly focused on others. People engage in all sorts of reciprocal altruism; at the same time, they are tempted to cheat by reciprocating less.

This article explores the tumultuous path to publication that begins for many of us with trying to publish our dissertation. We invited Roy J. Lewicki and J. Keith Murnighanthe 2013 and 2015 recipients of the International Association for Conflict Management (IACM) Lifetime Achievement Awardto reflect on this process, as neither of them were successful in getting their dissertation articles published. We also asked them to reflect on the twists and turns of academic publishing, and we asked Max Bazerman to integrate these reflections. Together, we hope to spark generative conversations that will enable scholars to successfully navigate their academic careers.