Zur Ökonomie von Entlohnungssystemen

Abstract The coexistence of fiat money (cash) and digital monies constitutes a system of parallel currencies as media of exchange. This paper asks whether a new (digital) currency is essential: Does a new currency allow for a better resource allocation even if a fully accepted currency is in circulation and remains in circulation? Using the dual currency search model of Kiyotaki and Wright (1993. A search-theoretic approach to monetary economics. Am. Econ. Rev. 83: 63–77), we show how the introduction of a secondary currency affects average utility. There is some scope for a welfare improvement as the welfare effect depends on differences in returns and costs, and, in particular, on the proportion of cash traders who will be replaced by digital money traders.

ZusammenfassungMit der Implementierung des Bestellerprinzips – wer den Makler beauftragt, muss ihn auch bezahlen – hat der Gesetzgeber einen Wechsel der Zahllast für die Courtage vom Mieter zum Vermieter vorgenommen. Mit Hilfe eines sequentiellen Verhandlungsspiels wird hier diskutiert, inwieweit der Wechsel der Zahllast mit einer Veränderung der ökonomischen Traglast einhergeht. Es wird gezeigt, dass für plausible Parameterkonstellationen (i) die Makler verlieren in Form einer sinkenden Courtage, (ii) die Mieter gewinnen trotz Überwälzung der Courtage auf die Miete, und (iii) auch die Vermieter gewinnen trotz Übernahme der Zahllast der Courtage.

Im Prozess der Digitalisierung wird zunehmend die Nachfrage nach Bargeld verdrängt und der Zahlungsverkehr privatisiert. Spiegelbild dieser Entwicklung ist ein Machtverlust der Zentralbanken, ihr Instrumentenset droht an Effizienz zu verlieren. Eine in jüngerer Zeit viel diskutierte Reaktion der Zentralbanken auf diese Problematik ist das digitale Zentralbankgeld mit einem Zentralbank-Konto für Jedermann. Dieser Beitrag erläutert die Konzeption, die Ausgestaltungsoptionen, die Einbettung in den operativen Rahmen der Geldpolitik sowie die makroökonomischen Implikationen des digitalen Zentralbankgelds.

Empirical evidence suggests that the bargaining power of trade unions differs across firms and sectors. Standard models of unionization ignore this pattern by assuming a uniform bargaining strength. In this paper, we incorporate union heterogeneity into a Melitz (2003) type model. Union bargaining power is assumed to be firm specific and varies with firm productivity. This framework allows us to re-analyze the labor market effects of (i) a symmetric increase in the bargaining power of all unions and (ii) trade liberalization. We show that union heterogeneity unambiguously reduces the negative employment effects of stronger unions. Firm-specific bargaining power creates a link between unionization and the entry and exit of firms, implying a reduction of the unions' expected bargaining power. Moreover, union heterogeneity constitutes an (un)employment effect of trade liberalization. If unions are most powerful in the high-productivity (low-productivity) firms, trade liberalization will increase (decrease) unemployment.

The development of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin after the global financial crises from 2007 onwards has put the financial sector into trouble. Some voices even speak of the possibility of abolishing cash. This article shows, first, whether and to what extent cryptocurrencies can replace cash, second, to what extent they change non-cash payment systems, and third, which obstacles have to be overcome on the way to large acceptance. We shall first scrutinize the financial sector's response to the multifaceted phenomenon of the Distributed Ledger Technology (“blockchain”).

Empirical evidence suggests that high-productivity firms face stronger trade unions than low-productivity firms. Then a policy that puts all unions into a better bargaining position is no longer neutral for firm selection as in models with a uniform bargaining strength across firms. Using a Melitztype model, we show that firm selection becomes less severe. Since more low-productivity firms enter the market, the negative employment effect of unionization is mitigated. Neglecting inter-union differences in bargaining power leads to an overestimation of the negative labor market effects. However, trade liberalization increases unemployment because firms with the least powerful labor unions have to leave the market.

Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoins may revolutionize the financial system by at least partially replacing intermediaries such as central banks and commercial banks. The blockchain technology enables users to transact on a peer-to-peer basis. This imposes a serious threat on the financial intermediaries as well as on monetary policy authorities. In this paper, we examine how well cryptocurrencies fulfill the functions of a fiat money and discuss the comparative advantages of cryptocurrencies. We proceed by exploring the implications of digital currencies for the concept and conduct of monetary policy.

Optimale Geldpolitik in einer Währungsunion: Implikationen länderspezifischer Finanzmarktfriktionen Wachsende empirische Evidenz deutet auf eine von Land zu Land divergierende Ausprägung von Finanzmarktfriktionen hin. Wir integrieren länderspezifische Finanzmarktfriktionen in ein Neukeynesianisches Zwei-Länder-Modell einer Währungsunion und untersuchen in diesem Rahmen die Frage, wie die optimale Geldpolitik auszugestalten ist angesichts von unionsweiten und nationalen nicht- finanziellen Schocks. Aufgrund der direkten Wirkung auf die Grenzkosten der Unternehmen mindern Finanzmarktfriktionen die Effizienz der Geldpolitik in der Steuerung der Inflation. Wir zeigen, dass es optimal ist auf die verringerte Effizienz mit einer stärkeren Nutzung des Zinsinstruments zu reagieren. Andererseits gilt: Je größer die Differenz in den länderspezifischen Finanzmarktfriktionen, desto weniger aggressiv ist die unionsweite Geldpolitik. Die Wohlfahrtsanalyse offenbart für fast alle möglichen Parameterkonstellationen ein eindeutiges Ranking hinsichtlich der Politikregime: Commitment übertrifft die Taylor Regel, die Taylor Regel übertrifft Strict Inflation Targeting, und Strict Inflation Targeting übertrifft Discretion.

Real estate agents (REAs) brokering rent contracts in Germany charged fees only to tenants but not to landlords until 2015. In order to relieve tenants from this burden, German law now requires REAs to only charge landlords. We suggest three reasons for why landlords’ brokerage fees are not simply passed on to tenants but declined substantially after the legal change as did the amount of brokering of rent contracts. First, REAs’ bargaining power declined when landlords replaced tenants as bargaining partner. Second, brokerage fees to be paid by tenants serve as a self-selection mechanism of long term tenants. Third, REAs’ incentives to provide high quality decline when the price is fixed before they produce their service. As a consequence, REAs loose from the legal change while short term tenants will win. Other tenants and landlords may win or lose.

Mit der Implementierung des Bestellerprinzips — wer den Makler beauftragt, mußs ihn auch bezahlen — hat der Gesetzgeber einen Wechsel der Zahllast für die Courtage vom Mieter zum Vermieter vorgenommen. Ob die intendierte Entlastung der Mieter gelingt, hängt maßgeblich vom Grad der Überwälzung auf die Miete ab. Auf der Verliererseite werden die Makler sein, da sie mit einer geringeren Nachfrage sowie einer Erosion der Courtage rechnen müssen.

This paper contributes to the economics of examination rules. We show how rational students reallocate their learning effort as a response to a charge for the second attempt (resit), a resit mark cap, a variation of the time span between two attempts, and a malus points account. The effort maximizing rule is the malus account, a resit charge delivers the highest overall passing probability.

Trade unions are typically able to convert their industrial power into political power. We show that, depending on the constellation of parameters, stronger trade unions may improve welfare in terms of an increase in aggregate employment and output if they successfully lobby for lower trade barriers set by the government.

There is growing empirical evidence that the strength of the cost channel of monetary policy differs across countries. Using a New Keynesian model of a two-country monetary union, we show how the introduction of a cost channel (differential) alters the optimal monetary responses to union-wide and national shocks. The cost channel makes monetary policy less effective in combating inflation, but it is shown that the optimal response to the decline in effectiveness is a stronger use of the instrument. On the other hand, the larger the cost channel differential, the less aggressive will the optimal monetary policy be. For almost all parameter constellations, our welfare analysis suggests a clear-cut ranking of policy regimes: commitment outperforms the Taylor rule, the Taylor rule outperforms strict inflation targeting, and strict inflation targeting outperforms discretion.

Für den Erfolg in Studium und Beruf ist aktuelles und methodisches Wirtschaftswissen das A und O. Die Zeitschrift WiSt liefert dieses Wissen Monat für Monat. Hochaktuelle Wirtschaftsthemen werden vor dem Hintergrund der volks- und betriebswirtschaftlichen Modelle erörtert und diskutiert. So bleiben Sie up-to-date, kennen die brisanten Details und durchschauen schnell komplexe Wirtschaftsstrukturen.

Zur Erinnerung: Anfang 2002 wurde bekannt, dass bis zu 70% der angegebenen 3,9 Millionen Stellenvermittlungen der Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit falsch waren. Als Reak-tion ist seitens der Bundesregierung die Hartz-Kommission eingesetzt worden, um Vorschlage zur Neuorganisation der Arbeitsvermittlung vorzulegen. Unterstutzend galt es Masnahmen zur Verstarkung der Suchbereitschaft der Arbeitslosen zu entwickeln. Das Resultat sind die Hartz-Gesetze, die in drei Schritten - 2003 (Hartz I und II), 2004 (Hartz III) und 2005 (Hartz IV) - verabschiedet und implementiert worden sind. Die Reorganisation der Arbeitsvermittlung stand zwar zunachst im Mittelpunkt, jedoch haben die Hartz-Vorschlage eine immer grosere Spannbreite entfaltet, sodass sie aus heutiger Sicht als bis dato umfassendste Reform des bundesdeutschen Arbeitsmarktes anzusehen sind. Es bietet sich an, eine Gruppierung der einzelnen Reformmasnahmen nach ihrer primaren Stosrichtung - Arbeitsangebot, Arbeitsnachfrage, Matching - vorzunehmen. Bis zu Beginn der 2000er Jahre war es zumindest in der Politik herrschende Meinung, dass die Arbeitslosigkeit ein Angebotsuberschuss sei und daher die Therapie bei einer Steigerung der Nachfrage nach Arbeit (z.B. via expansiver Fiskalpolitik) oder bei einer Reduktion des Angebots (z.B. via Fruhverrentung) anzusetzen habe. Mit den Hartz-Reformen hat diesbezuglich ein gewisser Paradigmenwechsel stattgefunden, der Glaube an die Funktionsfahigkeit der Marktkrafte auch auf dem Arbeitsmarkt ist zuruckgekehrt. Durch Schaffung von Anreizen zur Arbeitsaufnahme, sei es durch Verminderungen des Reservationslohns oder durch eine bessere Vermittlung, wurde es gelingen, die Arbeitslosigkeit abzubauen. Dies setzt das Vertrauen voraus, dass das zusatzliche Arbeitsangebot lohnsenkend wirken werde und die zum Zeitpunkt der Reform noch nicht vorhandenen Arbeitsplatze in Zukunft schon noch geschaffen werden. Es war politisch mutig, eine solche Hoffnung zu hegen, aber - die Zahlen legen das nahe -, es war richtig.

‘‘Getting it Wrong’’ by William A. Barnett is a well-written, captivating and thought-provoking narrative of the history of Divisia monetary aggregates and U.S. monetary policy adorned with a comprehensive and insightful mathematical appendix on the theories of aggregation and index numbers reproducing the core of Barnett’s path-breaking publications from 1978 onward. Barnett eloquently argues two main points: Firstly, the simple-sum monetary aggregates produced by the Federal Reserve are inconsistent with neoclassical theory and inadequate in view of modern aggregation and index-number theories and should be abandoned in favor of Divisia indexes that apply different weights for the individual component series of monetary aggregates. Secondly, faulty statistics provided by the Federal Reserve are the root cause of the international financial crisis and the Great Recession as they caused economic agents to form their rational expectations on the wrong assumption of an ever-lasting Great Moderation. Divisia aggregates differ from the simple-sum monetary aggregates officially published by most central banks, including the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, in that they attach different weights to the individual components such as checking accounts, savings accounts and money market funds depending on their usefulness as a medium of exchange. The latter, called the user cost price, is measured by the interest forsaken by investing in a more liquid rather than longer-term asset. Barnett traces the evolution of Divisa indexes from their origins in the writings of Irving Fisher and François Divisia to the present day, in which Barnett – prompted by Rotemberg – has even incorporated the risk attached to the interest earned at the end of the period. Barnett draws the analogy between monetary aggregate indexes and consumer price indexes, which sensibly do not attach equal weight to a pair of rollerskates and a subway car, even though both provide transportation services. Along the way we encounter tantalizing views on some of the great economists of our time, the Federal Reserve and the author himself. Irving Fisher, for example, believed mental illness to be caused by infection and curable by surgical removal of infected body parts. The ‘‘maestro’’ Greenspan, who ‘‘had never published well-regarded research in major peer-reviewed journals’’, had an ‘‘exceptionally commanding sales personality’’. Karl Brunner, critical of the Fed’s policy, was banned from the Federal Reserve Board building. The central bank of North Korea, like the Federal Reserve, withholds data on interest paid on deposits and checking accounts necessary to construct Divisia aggregates. The monetary aggregate MQ, published as an experimental aggregate and based on turnover rates, ‘‘made no sense’’ and was the unfortunate result of a misunderstood joke Barnett himself played. Furthermore, unbeknown to the Board, Divisia M2 was temporarily used in the Fed’s macroeconomic model, and Governor Burns called in the FBI to identify a Fed staffer who had supplied the media with harmless (but, as a footnote clarifies, nonetheless confidential) commercial bank statistics. Barnett himself was a rocket science system engineer before embarking on his impressive career as an economist. The current professor and editor of many renowned economic journals spent eight years on the staff of the Federal Reserve, at the end of which he received an ‘‘exit threat’’ rather than an exit interview. The main objective of the book can hardly be disputed: Divisia monetary indexes are the state of the art and, from a theoretical perspective, superior to the simple-sum aggregates published by most central banks including the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB). As Barnett writes: ‘‘In continuous time the Divisia index tracks the value exactly correctly without any error at all.’’ Completely lacking, however, is a discussion of the judgment calls required