This fourth edition of an enduring and popular book has been fully updated and revised, exploring the two opposing paradigms of sustainability in an insightful and accessible way. Eric Neumayer contends that central to the debate on sustainable development is the question of whether natural capital can be substituted by other forms of capital. Proponents of weak sustainability maintain that such substitutability is possible, whilst followers of strong sustainability regard natural capital as non-substitutable.

Protests against coronavirus policies have occurred in all European countries. The intensity of protest varies strongly, however. We explain this variation by strategic choices that protest organizers make to maintain the protest movement. Specifically, we argue that protest organizers pay heed to the dynamics of the pandemic in their country: the number of protest events is higher when and where mortality rates are lower and containment policies are more stringent. At the same time, the number of protest events is influenced by political factors. Despite the fact that civil liberties facilitate trust in government, these two variables exert opposite effects: while higher trust in government and public administration reduces the number of protest events, stronger civil liberties increase the number of protest events. We find evidence for these hypotheses in an analysis of the number of monthly protest events based on information from ACLED, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, in 28 European countries between March 2020 and August 2021.

Aims: Epidemic wavefront models predict the spread of medieval pandemics such as the plague well. Our aim was to explore whether they contribute to understanding the spread of COVID-19, the first truly global pandemic of the 21st century with its fast and frequent international travel links. Methods: We analysed the spatial spread of reaching a threshold of very high incidence of new daily infections of the virus across European countries in the autumn of 2021 in which the Delta variant was dominant, as well as an even higher threshold of incidence in the subsequent spread of infections across the same set of countries during the winter of 2021/2022 when the Omicron variant of the virus became dominant. Results: We found patterns that are consistent with wavefront models for both periods of the pandemic in Europe. Conclusions: Modern means of transportation strongly accelerated the spread of the virus and typically generated diffusion patterns along bidirectional constrained mobility networks in addition to stochastic diffusion processes. However, since the majority of mobility, including mobility across international borders, is over short distances, wavefront patterns in the spread of a pandemic are still to be expected.

Protest against containment policies in U.S. states is fueled by two drivers: the stringency of containment policies and the partisan control over the governorship and legislatures in each state. In our analysis of the period from March 2020 to March 2022, we find more protest events in states fully controlled by Democrats than in Republican controlled states both in a sample consisting of all states and a balanced sample in which we constrain observations to those red and blue states with on average similarly stringent containment policies. Protest was therefore politicized, and we find that partisanship exerts a roughly equal substantive effect on the number of protest events as the stringency of containment policies. If we assume no direct effect of partisanship on protest but allow for causal heterogeneity along partisan lines in the effect of containment policies, we find that the same increase in the stringency of policies evokes a stronger protest response in blue states than in red states.

The province of Aceh in Indonesia provides a promising case for studying the economic legacy effects of conflict given subnational district-level data on violence and gross domestic product. We demonstrate specific negative economic legacy effects of armed conflict despite a general peace dividend: whilst all districts in Aceh grow faster after conflict ends in 2005 than during the conflict, the districts that suffered relatively more from violence during the war grow relatively more slowly during peacetime than districts that experienced relatively little violence. These negative legacy effects are relatively short-lived, however, and are no longer statistically significant from 2009 onwards. JEL classification: O40, O47, Q54

Governments can underreport Covid-19 mortality to make their performance appear more successful than it is. Autocracies are more likely to 'fudge' these data since many autocratic regimes restrict media freedom and thus can prevent domestic media from reporting evidence of undercounting deaths. Autocracies also enjoy greater leverage over reporting health authorities to either fudge data or adopt restrictive definitions of what constitutes Covid-19 mortality. Controlling for other factors that explain official Covid-19 mortality, excess mortality and the difference between the two, our results suggest that any apparent 'autocratic advantage' in fighting the pandemic is likely to only exist in official Covid-19 mortality. Analyzing the gap between excess mortality and official Covid-19 mortality we find that autocracies on average have a larger gap between official Covid-19 mortality data and excess mortality data, which points towards 'autocratic data fudging' of their official Covid-19 mortality statistics.

Do partisan preferences, the electoral system, checks on government, political fragmentation, civil liberties and trust contribute to explaining the stringency of containment policies in European countries? Empirical studies suggest that political science theories have helped very little in understanding European democracies' political response to the pandemic's first wave. We argue in this article that the negligible effect of politics, broadly defined, is confined to the first wave and that during subsequent waves over the autumn 2020 to spring 2021 season some of the above political factors contribute to our understanding of variation in countries' response. Employing a sample of 26 European democracies analyzing daily data on the stringency of adopted containment policies we provide evidence that politics does not matter during the first wave but is substantively important during later waves.

During the recent European refugee crisis, more than two million people applied for asylum in Germany. Female applicants stand a higher chance to gain protection than male applicants. Whilst small on average, this gender gap in asylum recognition rates varies strongly across countries of origin which has remained little noticed. We analyse the gender gap in asylum recognition rates for the 56 major countries of origin of refugees whose asylum claims are decided on over the period 2012-2018. We show that both general or gender-unspecific human rights abuses and gender-specific human rights violations are associated with cross-country variation in the gender gap in recognition rates - but in opposite ways. Specifically, we find that the gender gap is lower for refugees coming from countries with worse general human rights abuses in the form of political terror perpetrated by state agents but is higher for refugees from countries with a higher prevalence of female genital mutilation and a higher prevalence of child marriage.

AbstractObjectivesThe article analyzes the existence of bilateral travel restrictions between European countries during the second wave of the Sars‐CoV‐2 pandemic. The paper tests three sets of theoretically derived predictions, which follow epidemiological, economic, and political logics.MethodWe analyze a sample of directed bilateral travel restrictions between 27 European countries: 27.26 = 702 country dyads over a period of 6 months during the second wave of the pandemic.ResultsWe find robust and relevant results for the difference in incidence rates, for income from tourism, for trust in government and public administration and for political inclusiveness.ConclusionOur analyses demonstrates that economic and political logics exert a strong influence on containment measures and thus stress the relevance of forming a large societal and political coalition against the pandemic.

Background The Robert-Koch-Institute reports that during the summer holiday period a foreign country is stated as the most likely place of infection for an average of 27 and a maximum of 49% of new SARS-CoV-2 infections in Germany. Methods Cross-sectional study on observational data. In Germany, summer school holidays are coordinated between states and spread out over 13 weeks. Employing a dynamic model with district fixed effects, we analyze the association between these holidays and weekly incidence rates across 401 German districts. Results We find effects of the holiday period of around 45% of the average district incidence rates in Germany during their respective final week of holidays and the 2 weeks after holidays end. Western states tend to experience stronger effects than Eastern states. We also find statistically significant interaction effects of school holidays with per capita taxable income and the share of foreign residents in a district's population. Conclusions Our results suggest that changed behavior during the holiday season accelerated the pandemic and made it considerably more difficult for public health authorities to contain the spread of the virus by means of contact tracing. Germany's public health authorities did not prepare adequately for this acceleration.

There is a large variation across countries of origin in the gender composition of migrants coming to Germany. We argue that women’s economic rights in developing countries of origin have three effects on their migration prospects to a place like Germany that is far away and difficult to reach. First, the lower are women’s economic rights the fewer women have access to and control over the resources needed to migrate to Germany. Second, the lower are the rights the lower is women’s agency to make or otherwise influence migration decisions. These two constraining effects on the female share in migrant populations dominate the opposing third effect that stems from low levels of women’s economic rights generating a potentially powerful push factor. We find corroborating evidence in our analysis of the gender composition of migration to Germany over the period 2009–2017.

Eric Neumayer and Charles Joly argue that the key challenges posed by making a transition to a sustainable net-zero carbon economy are social, rather than technological. As such, instead of waiting for technological change to simply emerge, in the post-covid world, a new emphasis should be placed on SHAPE subjects (social sciences, humanities, arts) and the insights they provide into enabling and delivering change across every aspect of society and the economy.

AbstractObjectivesThe article analyzes the epidemiological and political logics of protest against containment policies in Germany. To maximize the mobilization potential, protest organizers organize more protest events when Covid‐19 mortality rates are low, the stringency of containment policies is high, and in districts in which the vote share of mainstream parties is traditionally low.MethodUsing a negative binomial model, we analyze the number of protest events in a sample of 401 German districts over the period from March to May 2020.ResultsWe find robust positive predicted effects of the stringency of containment policies and negative predicted effects for the mortality rate and the strengths of mainstream parties.ConclusionWe interpret these findings as evidence of the strategic behavior of protest organizers that target protest participation and mobilization to keep the movement alive and potentially grow it.

This research note reports novel results on the negative effect of time zone differences on international tourism in a global sample of countries over the period 1995-2013. A gravity-type model, which has become standard in international tourism demand, is estimated with Pseudo-Poisson maximum likelihood, controlling for geographical distance and other potential confounders at the dyadic level in addition to origin-year and destination-year fixed effects. The effect of time zone differences is found to be substantively strong and approximately (log-)linear across the various hours of time zone difference, with an average negative effect of about 11.6% per hour of time difference.

ABSTRACT Objectives To estimate the effect that summer school holidays had on the growth rate in Sars-CoV-2 infections across German districts. The Robert-Koch-Institute reports that during the summer holiday period a foreign country is stated as the most likely place of infection for an average of 27 and a maximum of 49 percent of new Sars-CoV-2 infections in Germany. Yet, infection may have taken place elsewhere, not all international travel is holiday-related and any impact of holiday-related travel will not be restricted to holidays abroad. Design Cross-sectional study on observational data. In Germany, summer school holidays are coordinated between states and spread out over 13 weeks. We analyse the association between these holidays and the weekly infection growth rate in SARS-CoV-2 infections across 401 German districts. Employing a dynamic model with district fixed effects, we test whether the holiday season results in a statistically significantly higher infection growth rate than the period of two weeks before holidays start, our presumed counterfactual. Results We find effects of the holiday period equal in size to almost 50 percent of the average district growth rate in new infections in Germany during their respective final week of holidays and the two weeks after holidays end. States in the West of Germany tend to experience stronger effects than those in the East. This is consistent with another result, namely that we find statistically significant interaction effects of school holidays with per capita taxable income and the share of foreign residents in a district’s population, with both factors hypothesised to increase holiday-related travels. Conclusions Our results suggest that changed behaviour during the holiday season accelerated the pandemic and made it considerably more difficult for public health authorities to contain the spread of the virus by means of contact tracing. Governments did not prepare adequately or timely for this acceleration.

Background Reports from the UK and the USA suggest that coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) predominantly affects poorer neighbourhoods. This article paints a more complex picture by distinguishing between a first and second phase of the pandemic. The initial spread of infections and its correlation with socio-economic factors depends on how the virus first entered a country. The second phase of the pandemic begins when individuals start taking precautionary measures and governments implement lockdowns. In this phase, the spread of the virus depends on the ability of individuals to socially distance themselves, which is to some extent socially stratified. Methods We analyze the geographical distribution of known cumulative cases and fatalities per capita in an ecological analysis across local districts in Germany distinguishing between the first and the second phase of the pandemic. Results In Germany, the virus first entered via individuals returning from skiing in the Alps and other international travel. In this first phase, we find a positive association between the wealth of a district and infection rates and a negative association with indicators of social deprivation. During the second phase and controlling for path dependency, districts with a higher share of university-educated employees record fewer new infections and deaths and richer districts record fewer deaths, districts with a higher unemployment rate record more deaths. Conclusions The social stratification of COVID-19 changes substantively across the two phases of the pandemic in Germany. Only in the second phase and controlling for temporal dependence does COVID-19 predominantly hit poorer districts.

Background Reports from the UK and the USA suggest that COVID-19 predominantly affects poorer individuals and neighbourhoods. This article paints a more complex picture by distinguishing between a first and second phase of the pandemic. The initial spread of infections and its correlation with socio-economic factors largely depends on how the virus first entered a country. The second phase of the pandemic begins when individuals start taking precautionary measures and governments implement lockdowns. In this phase the further spread of the virus depends on the ability of individuals to socially distance themselves, which is to some extent socially stratified. Methods We analyze the geographical distribution of known cases per capita across 401 local districts in Germany, once for infections in the initial phase and for new infections during the second phase. Results In Germany, the virus first entered via individuals returning from skiing in the Alps and other international travel. In this first phase we find a positive association between the wealth of a district and infection rates and a negative association with indicators of social deprivation. During the second phase, richer districts and districts with a higher share of university-educated employees record fewer new infections, whilst the initial safety advantage of more socially deprived districts disappears. Conclusion The social stratification of Covid-19 changes substantively across the two phases of the pandemic in Germany. Only in the second phase does socio-economic advantage turn into a safety advantage. Thus, suggestions that the pandemic predominantly hits the poor needs to be qualified.

This paper follows European countries as they struggled through the first wave of the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic. We analyze when countries were confronted with the virus, how long it took until the number of new infections peaked and at what level of infections that peak was achieved via social distancing and lockdown policies. Most European countries were able to successfully end the first wave of the pandemic – defined as a two-week incidence rate smaller than 10 cases per 100,000 people. We find that countries in which the virus made significant landfall later in time enjoyed a latecomer advantage that some of these countries squandered, however, by not responding quickly enough and that an early lockdown was more effective than a hard lockdown.

Infectious diseases generate spatial dependence or contagion not only between individuals but also between geographical units. New infections in one local district do not just depend on properties of the district, but also on the strength of social ties of its population with populations in other districts and their own degree of infectiousness. We show that SARS-CoV-2 infections during the first wave of the pandemic spread across district borders in England as a function of pre-crisis commute to work streams between districts. Crucially, the strength of this spatial contagion depends on the phase of the epidemic. In the first pre-lockdown phase, the spread of the virus across district borders is high. During the lockdown period, the cross-border spread of new infections slows down significantly. Spatial contagion increases again after the lockdown is eased but not statistically significantly so.