This chapter attempts to follow some of Alexander George's exacting standards in analyzing two crises: the 1958-1959 Berlin Deadline crisis and the 1961 Berlin Wall crisis. It shows how one can use three variables from different levels of analyses to predict actors' constrained preferences in a given situation. The chapter also shows the fundamental similarities between the two crises, both with respect to actors' evaluations of options as well as to the outcomes. It presents an examination of the Berlin Deadline crisis. The chapter discusses the Berlin Wall crisis and compares it to the earlier one. It defines the issue domain as politico-military bargaining over Berlin within a larger US-Soviet strategic context. The principal actors were Nikita S. Khrushchev, leading the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower leading the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Berlin lay over a hundred miles within communist territory.

This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on the concepts covered in the preceding chapters of the book. The book explains how foreign intervention influences the course of civil wars. It focuses on how foreign resources affect the military power of the recipient belligerent. The book analyses how changes in the balance of capabilities influence the form of warfare that characterises a civil war. It introduces the idea that foreign resources possess both a gross and interactive value. The book explores how changes in one, or more, belligerent's military power will affect the character of the warfare in civil war. It presents evidence that foreign intervention in the Angolan and Afghan civil wars had a significant impact on the contending strategies of the belligerents in those conflicts. Foreign intervention in the Angolan and Afghan civil wars reinforces the notion that foreign resources will have an inconsistent impact on …

At the cutting edge of current modelling in international relations using non-cooperative game theory, this collection of original contributions from political scientists and economists explores some of the fundamental assumptions of game theory modelling. It includes a theory of game payoff formation, a theory of preference aggregation, thorough discussions of the effects of interdependence between preferences upon various game structures, in-depth analyses of the impact of incomplete information upon dynamic games of negotiation, and a study using differential games. Numerous illustrations, case studies and comparative case studies show the relevance of the theoretical debate. The chapters are organised to allow readers with a limited knowledge of game theory to develop their understanding of the fundamental issues.