Up to the present, the dominance of offense over defense has been based on technical considerations. Great strides have been made in the ability to produce, focus, and aim laser and particle beams of increasingly high power. Major technical advances have led to great improvements in the offense. The crucial question that must be addressed is whether technology now offers a new promise of changing the conditions of offense dominance. The concept of a "defense-in-depth" has evolved since no single technology alone is adequate to provide an impenetrable defensive shield, or anti-ballistic Maginot Line. The concept of a defense-in-depth envisages one or two layers operating during the mid-course phase, which for ICBMs lasts twenty to twenty-five minutes following the completion of the booster burn and prior to reentry of the warheads into the atmosphere.

In this paper, I will emphasize two points on Theoretical Aspects of Lepton-Hadron Scattering: (1) The crucial importance of testing the ``exact`` sum rules as tests of the local current algebra. Discrepancies, if found, between experiment and theory cannot be ``interpreted away`` in terms of more complex parton wave functions for the hadronic ground state. The three sum rules of interest are those of Adler, Bjorken, and Gross and Llewellyn-Smith. (2) An understanding of the corrections to scaling in QCD and what they teach us.

Settling the fight over a telescope on a Hawaiian holy site

This is a review of the program we started in 1968 to understand and generalize Bjorken scaling and Feynman's parton model in a canonical quantum field theory. It is shown that the parton model proposed for deep inelastic electron scatterings can be derived if a transverse momentum cutoff is imposed on all particles in the theory so that the impulse approximation holds. The deep inelastic electron-positron annihilation into a nucleon plus anything else is related by the crossing symmetry of quantum field theory to the deep inelastic electron-nucleon scattering. We have investigated the implication of crossing symmetry and found that the structure functions satisfy a scaling behavior analogous to the Bjorken limit for deep inelastic electron scattering. We then find that massive lepton pair production in collisions of two high energy hadrons can be treated by the parton model with an interesting scaling behavior for the differential cross-sections. This turns out to be the first example of a class of hard processes involving two initial hadrons.

We explore in this article some of the emerging opportunities, and associated challenges, that the digital age offers for public-domain verification of compliance with international treaties. The increase in data volume, in ever-improving connectivity, and the relentless evolution towards ubiquitous sensors all provide a rapidly changing landscape for technical compliance verification of international treaties. From satellites to cell phones, advances in technology afford new opportunities for verifying compliance with international agreements, on topics ranging from arms control to environmental and public health issues. We will identify some of the engineering challenges that must be overcome in order to realize these new verification opportunities.

THE TIMES WE live in are dangerous for many reasons. Prominent among them is the existence of a global nuclear enterprise made up of weapons that can cause damage of unimaginable proportions and power plants at which accidents can have severe, essentially unpredictable consequences for human life. For all of its utility and promise, the nuclear enterprise is unique in the enormity of the vast quantities of destructive energy that can be released through blast, heat, and radioactivity. To get a better grip on the state of the nuclear enterprise, we convened a group of prominent experts at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. The group included experts on nuclear weapons, power plants, regulatory experience, public perceptions, and policy. This essay summarizes their views and conclusions. We begin with the most reassuring outcome of our deliberations: It's the sense generally held that the U.S. nuclear enterprise currently meets very high standards in its commitment to safety and security. That has not always been the case in all aspects of the U.S. nuclear enterprise. But safety begins at home, and while the U.S. will need to remain focused to guard against nuclear risks, the picture here looks relatively good. Our greatest concern is that the same cannot be said of the nuclear enterprise globally. Governments, international organizations, industry, and media must recognize and address the nuclear challenges and mounting risks posed by a rapidly changing world. The biggest concerns with nuclear safety and security are in countries relatively new to the nuclear enterprise, and the potential loss of control to terrorist or criminal gangs of the fissile material that exists in such abundance around the world. In a number of countries, confidence in civil nuclear energy production was severely shaken in the spring of 2011 by the Fukushima nuclear reactor plant disaster. And in the military sphere, the doctrine of deterrence that remains primarily dependent on nuclear weapons is seen in decline due to the importance of nonstate actors such as al-Qaeda and terrorist affiliates that seek destruction for destruction's sake. We have two nuclear tigers by the tail. When risks and consequences are unknown, undervalued, or ignored, our nation and the world are dangerously vulnerable. Nowhere is this risk/consequence calculation more relevant than with respect to the nucleus of the atom. From Hiroshima to Fukushima THE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE was introduced to the world by the shock of the devastation produced by two atomic bombs hitting Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Modern nuclear weapons are far more powerful than those early bombs, which presented their own hazards. Early research depended on a program of atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. In the early years following World War II, the impact and the amount of radioactive fallout in the atmosphere generated by above-ground nuclear explosions was not fully appreciated. During those years, the United States and the Soviet Union conducted several hundred tests in the atmosphere that created fallout. A serious regulatory weak point from that time still exists in many places today, as the Fukushima disaster clearly indicates. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was initially assigned conflicting responsibilities: to create an arsenal of nuclear weapons for the United States to confront a growing nuclear-armed Soviet threat; and, at the same time, to ensure public safety from the effects of radioactive fallout. The AEC was faced with the same conundrum with regard to civilian nuclear power generation. It was charged with promoting civilian nuclear power and simultaneously protecting the public. Progress came in 1963 with the negotiation and signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) banning all nuclear explosive testing in the atmosphere (initially by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom). …

Strong regulation and peer review are needed, particularly in nations new to nuclear power and weapons.

The treaty provides for reciprocal verification overflights, on 24 hours' notice, over any and all portions of the 34 states currently participating in the treaty.\n The results from studies focusing on the releases from covert fuel-cycle facilities imply that a monthly Open Skies aerosol collection flight over a region the size of the Middle East, in conjunction with high-sensitivity laboratory analysis techniques, should provide good monitoring of clandestine fissile material production activity over such a region. 12 The studies consider only fixed ground stations, but an Open Skies flight can collect aerosols along the entire flight path and from an optimized altitude. The highest resolution images of urban areas in Google Earth are from aerial photography, not from commercial satellite images. 15 The high-resolution camera system currently used on the US Open Skies collection platform, the KA-91C camera, is operated from an …

Alfa-Bank, CDS International and Oxford University are pleased to announce a call for applications for the Alfa Fellowship Program’s 2012-13 Fellows. Now entering its eighth year, the Alfa Fellowship Program is a professional-level exchange designed to foster a new generation of American and British leaders with meaningful professional experience in Russia.The Alfa Fellowship begins with language training in the US or the UK, followed by a language course in Moscow. Throughout the summer, Alfa Fellows attend a seminar program with key Russian government, public, and private sector officials to discuss current issues facing Russia. Fellows then work at leading organizations in Russia including private companies, media outlets, think tanks, NGOs, and government institutions.

Drawn from the third in a series of conferences the Hoover Institution at Stanford University on the nuclear legacy of the cold war, this report examines the importance of deterrence, from its critical function in the cold war to its current role. Recognizing that today's international environment is radically different from that which it was during the cold war, the need is pressing to reassess the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence in the world of today and to look ahead to the future.

President Obama has said that he intends to "make the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons a central element in [US] nuclear policy". He faces enormous challenges in converting this aspiration into a practical reality, both at home and abroad. One reason is that the world has become accustomed to thinking of nuclear weapons the way Winston Churchill described them in 1955: "It may be that we shall by a process of sublime irony have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation." Over half a century later, the world has changed and the "sublime irony" is that terror and annihilation still loom over humanity, while safety and survival are still in doubt.

Deterrence is becoming less effective and increasingly hazardous. A series of practical steps can be initiated leading to a world without nuclear weapons. As the world proceeds down that path, political conditions will be created that will improve its prospects.

Hans Bethe and His Physics, pp. 251-262 (2006) No AccessShaping Public PolicySidney DrellSidney Drellhttps://doi.org/10.1142/9789812774507_0016Cited by:0 PreviousNext AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsRecommend to Library ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail Abstract: Please refer to full text. Presented at the Hans Bethe Symposium, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 19 August 2005. FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails Hans Bethe and His PhysicsMetrics History PDF download

Fundamental decisions affecting US national policy—be they about health, economics, or national security—are made by duly elected national leaders and are based predominantly, but not exclusively, on their political judgment. These leaders must also have access to solid scientific and technical information to help infrom their decisions. Gaining an understanding of physical and technical realities is crucial to distinguish goals that may be achieved from goals that are wishful thinking.