This study presents a dual-method approach to systematically analyze public health advisory networks during the COVID-19 pandemic across four jurisdictions: Belgium, Quebec, Sweden, and Switzerland. Using network analysis inspired by egocentric analysis and a subsystems approach adapted to public health, the research investigates network structures and their openness to new actors and ideas. The findings reveal significant variations in network configurations, with differences in density, centralization, and the role of central actors. The study also uncovers a relation between network openness and its structural attributes, highlighting the impact of network composition on the flow and control of expert advice. These insights into public health advisory networks contribute to understanding the interface between scientific advice and policymaking, emphasizing the importance of network characteristics in shaping the influence of expert advisors. The article underscores the relevance of systematic network descriptions in public policy, offering reflections on expert accountability, information diversity, and the broader implications for democratic governance.

Under which conditions do politicians listen to scientific experts in a crisis? This study addresses this question by assessing how the Swiss government implemented 186 policy recommendations formulated by the National COVID-19 Science Task Force (STF) to combat the spread of the virus and alleviate its impact on the health system, society and economy during the first year of the pandemic. Results of multiple regression analyses show that the impact of problem pressure on the propensity of the government to implement experts' recommendations varies over time: it was considerably larger during spring 2020 than afterwards. We argue that this reflects a change in status of the STF during the second phase of the pandemic: it was distanced from the political-strategic level of the crisis management organization and its epistemic authority was increasingly questioned by political parties and interest groups. Policy scholars should thus give more attention to how rapidly the government's propensity to rely on expert advice can change.

This chapter recounts the historical development of the Swiss system of interest intermediation. It discusses the central role of interest groups in the Swiss political system. After their creation at the end of the nineteenth century, the major economic interest groups (business interest associations and trade unions) could rely on the financial support of the federal state to fund their secretariat. They helped an incipient federal state extend its reach and thus forged themselves a key role in the Swiss political system, which was strengthened throughout the twentieth century. Even nowadays, they dispose of considerable resources in comparison to political parties, in terms of finance, membership, and expertise, and actively intervene in the different phases of the Swiss decision-making process. The chapter is structured as follows: after a first section on the creation of the major Swiss interest groups, it analyses the institutionalization of their relations with the political authorities at the federal level and the intertwining of the public and private spheres. It then examines their influence in the major political arenas (administration, parliament, and direct democracy). The next section presents and discusses the relevance of the neo-corporatist model applied to Switzerland. Finally, the last section delves into recent changes since the 1990s, marked by important changes in the organization and political strategies of interest groups in a context of growing globalization and mediatization of Swiss politics.

Abstract This chapter recounts the historical development of the Swiss system of interest intermediation. It discusses the central role of interest groups in the Swiss political system. After their creation at the end of the nineteenth century, the major economic interest groups (business interest associations and trade unions) could rely on the financial support of the federal state to fund their secretariat. They helped an incipient federal state extend its reach and thus forged themselves a key role in the Swiss political system, which was strengthened throughout the twentieth century. Even nowadays, they dispose of considerable resources in comparison to political parties, in terms of finance, membership, and expertise, and actively intervene in the different phases of the Swiss decision-making process. The chapter is structured as follows: after a first section on the creation of the major Swiss interest groups, it analyses the institutionalization of their relations with the political authorities at the federal level and the intertwining of the public and private spheres. It then examines their influence in the major political arenas (administration, parliament, and direct democracy). The next section presents and discusses the relevance of the neo-corporatist model applied to Switzerland. Finally, the last section delves into recent changes since the 1990s, marked by important changes in the organization and political strategies of interest groups in a context of growing globalization and mediatization of Swiss politics.

A variety of direct democratic instruments allow “policy-making at the ballot box” (Gerber, 1999, p. 3), with the citizens having the last word on policy adoption and change. Criteria for the classification of direct democracy devices include who initiates a popular vote, who has control over the content of the proposal, whether it addresses statutory or constitutional law, or whether the result is binding or not. Interest groups use two main direct democracy instruments to influence policy-making: the initiative to put a new policy issue on the political agenda and the referendum to veto a policy adopted by the legislature. This chapter scrutinizes the effects of these tools on the policy process, on policy outputs, and on interest group populations. It shows that citizen groups benefit more than business groups from the initiative and referendum.

Swiss Political Science ReviewVolume 28, Issue 4 p. 754-756 BOOK REVIEW Business Lobbying in the European Union , David Coen, Alexander Katsaitis, and Matia Vannoni, Oxford, Oxford University Press (2021), 221 p., ISBN 978–0–19-958975-3 Steven Eichenberger, Corresponding Author Steven Eichenberger [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0002-8231-8412 Université de Genève Correspondence e-mail address: Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Steven Eichenberger, Corresponding Author Steven Eichenberger [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0002-8231-8412 Université de Genève Correspondence e-mail address: Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 25 September 2022 https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12544Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL No abstract is available for this article. REFERENCES Boehmke, F. J., Gailmard, S., & Patty, J. W. (2013). Business as Usual: Interest Group Access and Representation across Policy-Making Venues. Journal of Public Policy 33(1): 3– 33. Dür, A., Bernhagen, P., & Marshall, D. (2015). Interest Group Success in the European Union: When (and Why) Does Business Lose? Comparative Political Studies 48(8): 951– 983. Dür, A., Marshall, D., & Bernhagen, P. (2019). The Political Influence of Business in the European Union. New Comparative Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Gray, V., & Lowery, D. (1996). The Population Ecology of Interest Representation: Lobbying Communities in the American States. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Klüver, H. (2013). Lobbying as a Collective Enterprise: Winners and Losers of Policy Formulation in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy 20(1): 59– 76. Lowery, D., & Gray, V. (2004). Bias in the Heavenly Chorus Interests in Society and before Government. Journal of Theoretical Politics 16(1): 5– 29. Messer, A., Berkhout, J., & Lowery, D. (2011). The Density of the EU Interest System: A Test of the ESA Model. British Journal of Political Science 41(1): 161– 190. Varone, F., Eichenberger, S., Gava, R., Jourdain, C., & Mach, A. (2020). Business Groups and Advocacy Success: Insights from a Multi-Venue Approach. Acta Politica 56, 477– 499. Volume28, Issue4December 2022Pages 754-756 ReferencesRelatedInformation

This study analyses how information provided by different types of interest groups influences the ability of members of parliament (MPs) to accurately perceive the preferences of those citizens who voted them into office. To study how information provision by interest groups affects MPs' perceptions, we combine unique data from a citizen survey and face-to-face meetings with 151 federal MPs in Switzerland, thus enabling a comparison of actual voter preferences with MPs' estimations of these preferences. Ties to citizen groups, as self-reported by MPs in our survey, relate to more accurate perceptions by MPs, even when controlling for MPs' partisan affiliation. Ties to business groups, as declared in the official registry, relate to less accurate perceptions. These findings suggest that interest groups can both tighten and weaken MPs' link to their party voters, which might have repercussions on substantive representation and democratic accountability.

Ce chapitre vise a repondre aux questions suivantes : Qu’est-ce qu’un groupe d’interet ? Quels types de groupes d’interet sont mobilises dans les systemes politiques ? Quelle strategie d’influence politique developpent-ils et avec quel succes ? En plus de resumer la litterature existante sur ces trois questions centrales, ce chapitre discute aussi quelques developpements sur les liens entre groupes d’interet et partis politiques, ainsi que sur les defis que pose l’internationalisation des politiques publiques aux groupes d’interet.

This study applies a multi-venue approach to assess whether business groups are more likely to realize their policy preferences than citizen groups. Conceptually, it measures the advocacy success of interest groups that are involved in the various institutional venues visited during entire policy-making processes (i.e., executive, legislative, judicial and direct democracy). Empirically, it compares interest group advocacy across three different policy issues (i.e., railway infrastructure, stem cell research and promotion of renewable energy) in both pluralist California and neo-corporatist Switzerland. The findings show that, when controlling for the political system, policy issues and advocacy strategies (i.e., single- or multi-venue), business groups display higher levels of advocacy success than citizen groups.

This research note presents three newly interconnected and expanded datasets on interest groups' (IGs) access to the Swiss political decision-making process: (1) extra-parliamentary committee seats occupied by IGs (1980, 2000, 2010), (2) parliamentary (committee) seats occupied by IG representatives (1992-2015), and (3) consultation replies submitted by IGs (2008-11). We show that the Swiss system of interest intermediation adapted to the multiplication and organizational consolidation of citizen groups, which defend non-producer interests and do not provide selective benefits to their members (e.g. environmental groups). The share of access granted to citizen groups has increased in both the administration and parliament, across all federal departments and most legislative committees. Moreover, citizen groups benefit from a larger share of access in the recently revitalized parliament, compared to the administration. This suggests that economic groups' decline in power is also related to the rise of citizen groups.

This study assesses whether economic interest groups (business associations and trade unions) enjoy better access to the policymaking process than citizen groups. It compares the interest group population in Switzerland with those sets of groups present in the administrative and legislative venues. The study devises an aggregate measure of access to policymaking as a whole, which weights access according to different venues' importance. It theorizes the granting of access as a sequential process. Policymakers first decide whether to grant any access at all (selection stage) and then decide on the amount of access (allocation stage). Empirical evidence shows that policymakers do not discriminate between economic and citizen groups at the selection stage, but that they subsequently grant more access to economic groups. These findings qualify existing research, which interprets economic groups' superior access as the resilience of neo-corporatism, while also questioning the pluralizing effect of multiple policymaking venues.

Whereas some recent studies underline interest groups' strategy to specialize in certain venues when lobbying, we investigate under which conditions groups develop a multi-venue strategy. This study examines and compares groups' advocacy activities during three issues that were each debated in California and Switzerland. Empirical evidence shows that the policy issue at stake influences the diversity of groups that mobilize to influence an issue, while institutional factors and group types are key to explain the level of multi-venue advocacy. Multi-venue groups are proportionally more numerous in the Swiss neo-corporatist system than in the Californian pluralist system. And citizen groups are more frequently multi-venue players than business groups, regardless of the policy sector or the political system. These findings demonstrate the added value of a research design encompassing advocacy activities in all venues visited during a policy process and, furthermore, comparing these advocacy activities across political systems and policy domains.

While previous research on interest groups’ (IGs) relations to MPs has mainly focused on informal lobbying strategies or interorganizational linkages, the analysis of formal ties between MPs and IGs has remained neglected. Such formal ties can be conceptualized as an exchange relationship between individual MPs and IGs. The latter benefit from access to parliament while the former benefit from the expertise and support provided by IGs. We investigate whether committee members’ formal ties to IGs reflect committees’ responsibilities. Our results show that there is a strong topical match between committee members’ ties to IGs and committees’ area of competence. However, this congruence is less due to the background of MPs than to the ties developed after committee assignment. Formal ties are, to a large extent, the consequence of IGs recruiting MPs who can give them access to relevant committees. Empirical evidence comes from Swiss MPs’ ties to IGs between 2000 and 2015.

En Suisse les associations economiques (patronales, professionnelles et syndicales) ont longtemps represente les interlocuteurs privilegies des autorites etatiques. Cette these de doctorat vise a comprendre si le systeme de representation des interets s'est adapte a l'essor et a la consolidation des groupes d'interets publics (GI publics). Nous cherchons a comprendre si l'acces des GI publics a l'administration, au Parlement et a l'arene de la democratie directe a augmente. Nous comparons l'acces obtenu et les strategies appliquees des GI publics ainsi que des associations economiques. Ces questions sont traitees sur trois niveaux d'analyse (macro, meso, micro). Premierement, nous nous appuyons sur des donnees provenant d'une serie de points d'acces officiels permettant une analyse diachronique (1980-2015) (macro). Cette premiere analyse montre que l'acces des GI publics a l'administration est reste stable tandis que celui des associations economiques a diminue. Neanmoins, les associations economiques beneficient toujours de plus d'acces a l'administration que les GI publics. De plus, les associations economiques ainsi que les GI publics ont tous augmente leur acces a l'arene parlementaire. Celle-ci represente egalement l'arene fournissant un acces plutot egal aux differents types de groupes. Deuxiemement, une analyse de quatre processus de decisions confirme que les taux d'acces des differents types de groupes sont les plus similaires au Parlement (meso). Les analyses macro et meso montrent que les institutions de la democratie directe ne garantissent pas un acces egal aux differents types de groupes. Cela nuance les etudes existantes qui insistent sur le caractere pluralisant de la democratie directe. En effet, seuls les enjeux qui mobilisent des GI publics avec des ressources organisationnelles considerables affichent des taux d'acces similaires pour des GI publics et les associations patronales. Troisiemement, une analyse des strategies utilisees montre que la consolidation organisationnelle permet aux GI publics de concentrer leurs activites de lobbying sur l'administration et le Parlement. En somme, nous pouvons dire que le systeme de representation des interets s'est effectivement pluralise grâce a un acces accru des GI publics a l'administration ainsi qu'a la revitalisation du Parlement qui assure aux GI publics un plus grand acces et en raison du recours accru de ces derniers a la democratie directe. L'affaiblissement du pouvoir des associations economiques peut etre lie a ces evolutions. Dans le domaine de la politique environnementale, les GI publics et les associations economiques se trouvent meme sur un pied d'egalite en termes d'acces, mais de futures recherches devront montrer si la force organisationnelle des associations environnementales empeche la consolidation organisationnelle des GI publics actifs dans d'autres domaines de politiques publiques. -- This thesis questions whether the Swiss interest group (IG) system, which was built around economic IGs (business interest associations and trade unions), has evolved into a more pluralist system, adapting to the rise and consolidation of citizen groups. We seek to understand whether citizen groups have been able to increase their access to the administration, parliament and direct democratie venue. We also compare the access gained and strategies deployed by citizen groups and economic IGs. We focus on three levels of analysis (macro, meso, micro). First, we have conducted a diachronic analysis (1980-2015) on data gathered from various officiai access points (macro). It shows that citizen groups' access to the administrative venue has remained stable in a time in which both business groups' and trade unions' access has declined. But, the latter still enjoy more access to the administrative venue than citizen groups. On the other hand, economic IGs and citizen groups have ail increased their access to parliament, which represents the venue providing equal access to different group types. Secondly, a focus on ail IGs mobilized during four decision-making processes confirms that economic and citizen groups indeed display equal access rates to the legislative venue (meso). Both the macro- and meso-level analyses show that direct democratie institutions do not guarantee equal access rates for economic and citizen groups. This nuances existing research which underlines direct democracy's pluralizing character. In fact, only policy issues which mobilize resourceful citizen groups display equal access rates for both economic and citizen groups throughout the entire decision-making process. Thirdly, a focus on specifie interest groups shows that organizational consolidation enables citizen groups to focus on inside lobbying, in spite of their need for publicity (micro). In sum, it can be said that the Swiss IG system has been pluralized due to citizen groups' stronger presence within the administrative venue, due to the revitalization of the legislative venue, which is particularly hospitable to citizen groups, and due to citizen groups' increased reliance on direct democratie instruments. This is likely to have contributed to the decline in power of economic IGs. Within the environmental policy domain, citizen groups and economic IGs stand on an equal footing in terms of access, but further research must show whether the strength of environmental groups hinders the organizational growth of citizen groups in other policy domains.

This research note presents an innovative dataset of Swiss MPs’ interest ties between 2000-2011. The longitudinal analysis shows that the average number of interest ties per MP has more than doubled: from 3.5 in 2000 to 7.6 in 2011. Since the mid-2000s, public interest groups have accounted for approximately one out of two ties between MPs and interest groups, showing the strongest increase during the period. However, when looking at the most present individual groups, important business groups dominate and appear well connected with the governmental parties of the political right. Finally, interest groups are also able to forge themselves a strategic presence within the parliamentary committees that are the most relevant for their policy issues. Next research steps include the assessment of the (un)biased access of interest groups to the parliamentary venue and their policy influence.