John Rawls’s political liberalism demands that reasonable citizens comply with the duty of civility, which limits the justification of state action to public reasons. However, many religious citizens in liberal democratic societies reject the exclusion of religious reasons from public debate. What can be done to encourage these citizens to endorse public reason? Rawls proposes the idea of reasoning from conjecture (RC), i.e. directly engaging with someone’s comprehensive doctrine and showing them that such a doctrine actually supports public reason. In this article, we argue that reasoning from conjecture faces serious objections and that interfaith dialogue (ID) provides a better and more effective tool to encourage religious citizens to endorse public reason. More specifically, ID provides support to public reason by (i) relying on the principles of equality, sincerity and self-criticism, which are also central to public reason; (ii) leading participants to de-parochialize religion; and (iii) promoting tolerance. Moreover, ID avoids the main objections faced by RC, which undermine the latter’s morality and effectiveness.

Incivility in parliaments is always prominently displayed in media reports, often with the implicit or explicit commentary that the situation is getting worse. This paper processes and analyses the records of verbal interactions in the Australian Parliament for over 100 years to provide a first approximation on the evolution of civility. It provides a framework for understanding the multidimensional nature of civility that examines both ‘politeness’ and ‘argumentation’, with the latter grounded in notions of public-mindedness. The analysis focuses on the interactions between parties of the orators and the party in power, the chamber of utterance, and the year. The results indicate that instances of impoliteness have increased since the 1970s but only modestly and remain highly infrequent. Minor parties, particularly those representing right-wing and Green politics are more likely to use dismissive or offensive language than the dominant centre-left and centre-right parties, although direct insults and swearwords are the particular remits of right-wing ‘system-wrecker’ parties. All these minor parties, nonetheless, also display higher levels of argumentation in their interventions. This combination of aggressive language and increased argumentation highlights the pressures on minor parties to convey their points in a forceful way, a challenge that is particularly pressing in two-party systems like the Australian one.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, many governments implemented social distancing requirements, lockdowns and stay-at-home orders. These caused unprecedented disruptions, especially in industries that often rely heavily on the labour of temporary migrants. As a result, temporary migrants were particularly disadvantaged by measures to safeguard population health. We critically scrutinise government policies related to temporary migrants in Australia during the pandemic. The Australian Government provided financial safety nets to individuals and families who were citizens and permanent residents, while deliberately excluding temporary migrants from such support. In contrast, efforts were made at the state level to compensate for this hardship. We trace how the Victorian Government ultimately came to provide financial support for temporary migrants. The case highlights how the interests of precarious members of society can go from being ignored to receiving the attention necessary to produce a policy change to meet their needs. With its emphasis on the role policy narratives play in shaping outcomes for temporary migrants, the analytical approach utilised here could inform future studies of migrant treatment in other contexts as well as studies focusing on other vulnerable and politically marginalised members of society.

This chapter examines controversial public monuments through the concept of civility. First, we explain what we mean by (in)civility, distinguish between its different dimensions, and examine different ways in which they may intersect. We are particularly interested in a form of civility that is not necessarily a good thing (surface-level civility) as well as a form of incivility that is not necessarily a bad thing (critical incivility). Second, we focus on surface-level civility, which is illustrated by the statue of Joan of Arc in the Place des Pyramides in Paris and by Fearless Girl in New York. We then examine how monuments can also be critically uncivil, through the cases of a statue honoring Desmond Tutu in South Africa and Australia's settler monuments. We reveal the complexities and nuances of monuments through the use of the disaggregated concept of (in)civility, showing that the question of how to interpret the messages that these monuments send requires more research than has commonly been assumed.

Scholars recognize the important role that diasporas play in conflict dynamics, including efforts to build peace in conflict-affected communities. Broader academic research emphasizes a focus on local conditions and actors, as well as site-specific understandings of peace and peacebuilding practices. This focus on specific communities and contexts often draws on qualitative, narrative-driven data, predominantly collected through interviewing. This article identifies some of the core challenges related to data collection encountered during semi-structured interviews in a study of Somali diaspora members in Melbourne, Australia. We emphasize how issues associated with cross-cultural and gendered understandings of concepts related to peacebuilding can affect each stage of a research project, from the preliminary collection of data to the analysis and discussion of research implications. Specifically, we address challenges related to instances of conceptual dissonance that occur when researchers employ cross-cultural and gendered concepts-in this case, peace, peacebuilding, and leadership. The findings will benefit conflict researchers who work with socially distant groups and ethnically divided populations more broadly, along with those who employ interpretivist methodologies that focus on how meaning making might ultimately influence peacebuilding practices and outcomes.

In this article, we offer a normative analysis of environmental politics through the lens of civility. First, we explain what civility is by identifying its three key dimensions: civility as politeness, moral civility and justificatory civility. We then examine various instances of environmental politics and activism through the lens of civility, by focusing on the complex intersections between its three dimensions as well as the hierarchical relationship that exists between them, with moral civility taking precedence over justificatory civility and the latter over civility as politeness. This analysis, we argue, can help us to formulate more nuanced judgements about the desirability of different instances of civil and uncivil environmental politics and activism, and to develop educational strategies for preparing policymakers, environmental activists and citizens more generally to be civil participants in environmental politics.

Conspiracism has become a topical issue in democracies around the world, eliciting debate in political theory and philosophy regarding its normative and practical implications, especially its potential negative effects on democratic systems. In this article, we analyse conspiracism through the lens of civility. The public virtue of civility plays a key role in democratic politics and in public life more generally, by helping to sustain democratic institutions and facilitating social interaction despite disagreement. If conspiracism undermines civility and contributes to incivility, as we argue in this article, that might have distinctively deleterious effects on democratic life. We begin by unpacking the concept of civility into three key dimensions: (a) civility as politeness, (b) moral civility and (c) justificatory civility. We then illustrate how conspiracism can contribute to incivility and harm democracy in each of the three dimensions but also how it can sometimes be harmless or even helpful for democracy.

Examining militia relationships with the government and civilian populations can help scholars and policymakers better assess differences in militia form, function, and behavior. In this article, we examine the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU), a pro-government militia in the Philippines, to better understand how militia participants view insurgents, politicians, state security forces, and civilians based on their experiences serving in the group. We argue that analyzing these beliefs is critical to understanding how militias influence civilian security and the risk of political violence in conflict-contested areas, as well as the trajectory of civil conflict in states like the Philippines that rely on militias to perform core security functions. We base the analysis on surveys and interviews with CAFGU members and civilians living in the Eastern Visayas, a region of active and ongoing conflict, where insurgents and other armed militants advance their aims through acts of violence and terrorism. In doing so, we contribute to a growing literature on the role that militias play in civil war, as well as the implications that follow when states choose to arm “civilians” to aid in counterinsurgency and conflict suppression.

This study analyzes whether climate disasters and climate-induced food scarcities influence individuals' willingness to fight for the state in a pro-government militia in the Philippines. We find that experiencing a disaster or subsistence loss corresponds to an increased willingness to join, even when accounting for other prominent explanations in the literature. This outcome, we argue, reflects the impact of climate change on the opportunity costs of conflict participation, especially in regions dependent on agriculture for income and food production, as diminished livelihood opportunities and subsistence resource access increase the viability of conflict participation as a strategy for livelihood diversification.

AbstractLike many countries, the Philippines faced severe economic, social, and political challenges during the COVID‐19 pandemic. In March 2020 President Duterte issued an executive order announcing a national state of emergency that introduced a highly restrictive system for community quarantine and lockdown. While these measures led international observers to rank the Philippinesʼ pandemic response among the worldʼs most stringent, it is unclear whether subsequent health outcomes were sufficient to justify the severity. In this article, we evaluate discrepancies between COVID‐19 policy goals and outcomes in the Philippines via a compelling but under‐utilized method of democratic deliberation, the ‘mini‐public’. The mini‐public that we held brought together a random sample of citizens who heard testimony from local public health experts and political leaders, and then used this information in conjunction with their own experiences to identify policy shortcomings and develop recommendations for policymakers. The most substantial challenges to the governmentʼs pandemic response were reported to be inadequate enforcement and under‐resourcing of government officials tasked with policy implementation. These challenges created a disconnect between policy objectives and their performance in practice. We conclude by summarizing the mini‐public participantsʼ recommendations.

The alternative splicing landscape of pancreatic islets is dominated by an evolutionarily conserved program of microexons. These short exons encode only a few extra amino acids in genes related to hormone secretion. Microexons are important to islet function, affecting glycaemic control and the risk of type 2 diabetes.

Education is central to creating well-informed citizens capable of participating in social and political life. However, civic education in some liberal democratic societies has often focused on teaching students the mechanics and structure of party politics, overlooking many of the public virtues that help to sustain democratic life. In this article we examine one such virtue, i.e., civility, and its role in party politics. We focus especially on partisan 'civility as politeness,' which entails the norms of politeness and etiquette that regulate partisans' speech and behaviour during electoral campaigns and within legislatures. We analyse partisan civility as politeness and explore its connection with two other dimensions of partisan civility, i.e., 'moral civility' and 'justificatory civility.' We conclude by developing recommendations on how to advance civility in party politics by creating well-informed citizens and politicians who recognize the importance of civility in democratic life.

By examining the UK Prime Minister's justifications for his government's pandemic responses given during press conferences and during Prime Minister's Questions from March 2020 to July 2021, this article illustrates the narrative 'fusion' (using the pandemic narrative to advance other elements of policy) and 'layering' (using the pandemic narrative to justify past policy decision) evident in the construction of Boris Johnson's pandemic narrative. The article makes the case for viewing Johnson's COVID-19 narrative in light of broader political dynamics within UK politics, particularly adaptations of Conservative statecraft in the Brexit era that preceded the pandemic. The article argues that the narrative itself can be a product of multiple political crises and projects. Specifically, Johnson's pandemic narrative 'fused' and 'layered' elements of two other narratives advanced during his time in office: countering challenges to the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom and justifying the withdrawal from the European Union.

This article uses new survey data to examine student preferences and experiences with active learning among a graduate student cohort across two key identity markers: international student status and gender. Our survey of students enrolled in a Master of International Relations program suggests that most view active learning favorably and believe it improves learning outcomes. We find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, international students prefer active learning to traditional lectures at the same levels as domestic students. Our findings also indicate that women prefer active learning as much as, and in some cases more than, men. We discuss potential reasons for these preferences and experiences and conclude with suggested avenues for future research.

Existing research on Peru's internal armed conflict focuses predominantly on violence perpetrated by Shining Path militants and state security forces despite the important role different types of armed civilian groups played during the conflict. This chapter begins with a brief history of two prominent paramilitary groups from the conflict period: the Rodrigo Franco Group and the Colina Group. It examines the origins and evolution of each group, as well as their relationships to political parties, state security forces, and elite interests. The chapter then presents an assessment of how the state military helped organize paramilitary forces during its heavy-handed counterinsurgency campaign in the countryside by providing examples of state-led efforts to arm civilians to combat Shining Path militants and to reestablish the state's authority in remote regions of Peru. It challenges the idea that all anti-guerrilla civilian armed groups were mobilized by the state and reveals that initial efforts to organize resistance to the Shining Path usually came through a community's own initiative. The state only provided assistance and co-opted the organizations later. The chapter is based on 22 months of fieldwork between 2011 and 2017, including over 200 personal interviews with self-defense force members, community leaders, military officials, and civilians.

Calls for civility feature prominently in public discourse, and the concept has received growing attention by political philosophers recently. But what does it mean to be civil? The existing literature distinguishes between two main understandings of civility: civility as politeness and civility as public-mindedness. The objective of this article is to show that these conceptions and the different normative claims associated with them can all fit together. We argue that civility and incivility should be disaggregated in order to uncover fruitful connections between different aspects of the concept. We introduce a distinction between two dimensions of civility as public-mindedness (moral and justificatory), as well as a new distinction between the means and ends of civility. We examine the complex connections between the different dimensions of (in)civility and show that the disaggregation of civility and incivility tells us what kind of (in)civility matters, as well as when and why.

AbstractThis chapter examines the implications of COVID-19 for civility as public-mindedness. First, the pandemic has exacerbated various types of morally uncivil behaviour, such as discrimination and hate. Moreover, COVID-19 has created opportunities for some political actors to put forward sectarian agendas, grounded in partial interests and controversial beliefs, that breach the demands of justificatory civility. Furthermore, some policies to contain the pandemic have resulted in unreasonable ‘strains of commitment’ for members of marginalized sectors of the population, such as racial minorities, women, the LGBTIQ+ community, and older people; governments should acknowledge this aspect when publicly justifying these policies. Finally, justificatory civility during the pandemic has been undermined by scientific uncertainty around particular aspects of the virus itself; limited research on its social and cultural dimensions; and the politicization of science for personal or partisan advantage. The chapter advances numerous suggestions to counteract these challenges to moral and justificatory civility.

This study examines the recent massive expansion of electricity supply in India. With data from over 120,000 observations relating to households across the country in 2014 and 2019, we describe the rapid but uneven increases in hours of supply. We compare three distinct logics of public service delivery that may account for different rates of improvement in electricity supply - the logics of clientelism, incrementalism and maximin. The clientelist logic posits that state-level elected representatives target investments toward local areas where they hold small margins of support to improve their chances of re-election. According to the logic of incrementalism, policymakers focus on policies that are closely aligned with existing policies, which implies that supply increases most in locations where surrounding areas have relatively good electricity supply. The maximin logic, by contrast, posits that the greatest improvements take place in locations that previously had the poorest supply. The evidence supports each of the three logics to some extent, but by far the strongest evidence supports the maximin logic.

Globally, infection and death rates from COVID-19 vary dramatically. While states had broadly the same information about the virus at the start of the crisis, responses were very different. What caused such disparity in policy actions and outcomes? While various factors may account for divergent responses, we highlight the importance of narratives employed by key policy actors. First, we review the literature on policy narratives. We suggest it can be usefully augmented with consideration of localisation and public justification. We apply this augmented framework using case studies of Germany and the United Kingdom. Chancellor Angela Merkel's narrative was more successful at persuading German citizens to embrace government policies to counter COVID-19 than was Prime Minister Boris Johnson's in the United Kingdom. This difference held important implications for policy outcomes in each country. We conclude by discussing the benefits of this augmented approach to analysis of policy narratives.