In this first main part of the book, I argue conceptually that we must radically change our usual view of what a person is.
This first introduction is a run-through of basic discoveries to be made in the book.
In the fifth main part of this book I take a different angle in arriving at the radical view. The conditions for an experience being this one are discovered by way of analysing and solving the Sleeping Beauty problem.
In the fourth main part of this book I enter into further considerations. Topics include Nick Bostrom’s objections to unification and how the radical view is related to Buddhism, dualism, Hume and Parfit.
In the sixth and final main part of this book I take yet another angle in arriving at the radical view. A science fiction thought experiment tests whether the reader’s experience is a token or a type.
This second introduction to this book starts with an ancient joke that highlights and mocks what is wrong in the idea of personal identity that we all initially mistakenly believe. Then we drill down deep into how we must radically reverse that mistaken thinking. It is demonstrated that the one piece of evidence powerfully persuading us that the mistaken usual view is true cannot be evidence for it at all. What we always assumed was true must be sliced away by Ockham’s razor because there is no reason to believe it.
In the third main part of this book I lay out the logic of empirical discovery.I show that the logic of empirical discovery requires us to accept the radical view of what a person is. I then show how this change of view is essential for a thorough understanding of physics.
Deprivationism is the label given to the rather intuitive view that death is bad for the deceased because it deprives them of future goods. This paper considers two versions of this view, the one typically found in the literature and the one originally offered by Thomas Nagel. After laying out the key differences between them, it is argued that we have good reasons to prefer Nagel’s deprivationism to the typical version. Along the way, consideration is given to how all of this relates to the debate between deprivationists and Epicureans.
Quarrels and wisecracks are essential features of interpersonal life. Quarrels are conflicts that typically take place only between friends, family, and those with whom we are personally engaged and whose attitudes toward us matter. Wisecracks are bits of improvised wit—banter, teasing, mockery, and ball busting—that also typically take place only in interpersonal life (note the following odd but revealing comment: “I can’t tease her like that; I barely even know her!”). Quarrels and cracks are, though, mutually exclusive. People know their quarrel is basically over once they start being amused by each others’ wisecracks again, and if you’re enjoying wisecracks with each other, it’s very hard, if not impossible, to quarrel at the same time. Why is this and what does it mean for interpersonal conflict? In this paper, I attempt to answer this question via a deep dive into the nature of wisecracking humor to explore the unrecognized—and valuable—role it plays in our interpersonal lives. In particular, there is a type of wisecracking humor that has a distinctive sort of interpersonal power, the power to dissolve the anger in quarrels in a surprising and productive way.
This paper examines moral responsibility for instances of negligence. It assumes throughout the common-sense claim that we can be morally responsible for cases of negligence, and then looks at the ramifications of this commitment for theories of moral responsibility. Specifically, I argue that instances of negligence pose a problem for two of the most influential theses regarding the nature of moral responsibility. First, negligence poses a problem for the Control Principle, the claim that control is necessary for moral responsibility. Second, negligence makes trouble for the Actual Sequence Thesis, the claim that facts about an agent's moral responsibility are grounded solely in facts about the sequence of events leading up to the outcome. I end by suggesting that, contrary to the now more orthodox position, cases of negligence indicate that abilities to do otherwise are, at least sometimes, the basis of moral responsibility.
Ockhamism promises to reconcile our powers to do other than we actually do with various metaphysical assumptions, including the determinate, "pre-ordained" future and earlier states of knowledge, both human and divine, concerning what we will do. I defend a Ockhamist response to Nelson Pike and John Fischer's skeptical arguments from divine foreknowledge, arguing that God's earlier cognitions concerning what we will do in the future are part of the "soft" past that does not constrain our later powers, as those cognitions are dependent upon how we will exercise those powers in the future.
Quarrels and wisecracks are essential features of interpersonal life. Quarrels are conflicts that typically take place only between friends, family, and those with whom we are personally engaged and whose attitudes toward us matter. Wisecracks are bits of improvised wit-banter, teasing, mockery, and ball busting-that also typically take place only in interpersonal life (note the following odd but revealing comment: "I can't tease her like that; I barely even know her!"). Quarrels and cracks are, though, mutually exclusive. People know their quarrel is basically over once they start being amused by each others' wisecracks again, and if you're enjoying wisecracks with each other, it's very hard, if not impossible, to quarrel at the same time. Why is this and what does it mean for interpersonal conflict? In this paper, I attempt to answer this question via a deep dive into the nature of wisecracking humor to explore the unrecognized-and valuable-role it plays in our interpersonal lives. In particular, there is a type of wisecracking humor that has a distinctive sort of interpersonal power, the power to dissolve the anger in quarrels in a surprising and productive way.
