This paper explores the role anxiety plays in Hume's philosophy. It begins by discussing anxiety as an emotion and connecting it to its object, namely problematic uncertainty. I then explore Hume's own view of anxiety, beginning with a discussion of T 2.39, "Of the direct passions," where he draws the connection between anxiety, a species of fear, and uncertainty. I then connect this with his remarks on doubt, before turning to Hume's treatment of the false religions of superstition and enthusiasm, and their connection with anxiety as a mood rather than an emotion.
For Hume, desire and pleasure (and aversion and pain) are closely linked. It might seem then that seeking out pain (non-instrumentally) is not possible for the Humean agent, and thus several prominent interpretations of his theory of motivation rule out masochistic desires. But by connecting these discussions of motivation with the debate over the status of perceptions in Hume's philosophy-are they mental objects or mental episodes of some kind?-I show that Humean masochism is possible. The key is recognizing that perceptions are best understood as perceivings, some of which "delineate out objects" and others of which are non-representational feelings-colourings of objects we are aware of through different perceptions. Masochism involves feeling non-representational pain but making it into the object of introspection, at which point it is possible to be pleased at and desire this mental state.
This article examines Hume's infamous racist footnote by placing it in the context of his reflections on contempt and classificatory issues surrounding questions of dehumanisation and monstrosity. The aim of this is to show that it is precisely because contempt motivated Hume's deprecating views about non-White people that he remained oblivious to the fact that the footnote was inconsistent with his broader philosophical commitments and explanatory strategies concerning the context-dependence of human life. More generally, this analysis reveals that contempt is a passion that tends to confirm itself by rendering the mind blind to the deficiencies of its own thinking. Diagnosing this problem in Hume does not serve as an excuse for his racism but aims to provide resources for identifying strategies to address contempt-driven prejudices in one's own thinking.
Hume is widely understood to believe that all virtues and vices are "durable principles of the mind," and that durable principles of the mind are character traits. Several scholars therefore read him as a virtue ethicist. I argue that we should reject all such interpretations. I argue that Hume allows that some virtues and vices are simply single perceptions, such as a motivationally strong desire to help a stranger or to murder someone. Therefore, I argue, we should not read him as a virtue ethicist. Hume is, however, a reductionist about character, who understands a character trait as simply a long-lasting but interrupted succession of perceptions. On my interpretation, a durable principle of the mind is an uninterrupted, relatively short-lived succession of different perceptions within an actor's mind, of a kind that mainly interests Hume because he thinks it enables observers to associate a person's action with her mind.
This paper investigates the role of the passions in Hume's moral philosophy by focusing on resentment, its nature, and its contribution to justice. Drawing on the Treatise of Human Nature and the second Enquiry, I first argue that Hume offers a nuanced and plausible account of this passion, illuminating key aspects of our moral psychology and everyday evaluative practices. Building on this account, I then show how resentment shapes Hume's theory of justice in two ways: first, by playing a central role in the moralization of justice, and second, by acting as a stabilizing force that sustains moral sentiments once justice is moralized. This second task requires explaining why violations of property are experienced as injuries, which I address through the connection between property and a particular class of virtues-helping to clarify why disruptions of property relations are morally significant.
Hume's theory of the emotions and moral evaluation have consequences for the feasibility of forgiveness, even though he never addresses the topic. Intriguingly, it follows from Adam Smith's theory of the moral sentiments (which also fails to mention it) that forgiveness is conceptually impossible. After exhibiting this consequence of Smith's position, I consider whether Hume's accounts of hatred, ill will, and moral disapprobation also render forgiveness impossible. The answer depends on what interpretation we adopt of Hume's conception of moral evaluation. If we adopt a well-known view of what the moral sentiment is (the "hatred interpretation"), then yes, Hume does rule out forgiveness, though he makes it psychologically rather than conceptually impossible. If we reject the hatred interpretation but assume a noncognitivist reading of Hume's moral judgments, Hume allows minimal space for forgiveness under highly constrained circumstances. However, a cognitivist interpretation opens substantial additional opportunities for forgiveness.
This essay explores David Hume's account of malice, as well as the principle of comparison that underwrites the sentiment. Considered an indirect passion by Hume, malice "gives us a joy in the sufferings of others" in that these pains can make our own more fortunate circumstances appear more prominent by comparison. We will investigate the possibility that there may be two distinct types of malice when we canvas the intentional objects of the sentiment. Finally, malice will be held to serve a key explanatory function in a novel resolution of the paradox of tragedy.
Lorne Falkenstein's terrific book is a study of central themes of Hume's theoretical philosophy, with due focus on the Treatise and first Enquiry.1 The book displays an impressive combination of breadth and depth. While the discussion includes a wide range of topics, such as belief, identity, space and time, the metaphysics of mind, and skepticism, Lorne's consideration of each is exacting and detailed. Another virtue of the book is its rigorous and illuminating interrogations of Hume's positions and arguments. It is a major contribution to the study of Hume's philosophy, and every scholar of eighteenth-century metaphysics and epistemology would benefit from engaging with it. I begin by considering a cluster of claims that Lorne advances concerning the nature of sensory impressions. I then consider his interpretation of Hume's skepticism as remedial in intention.
This paper develops an interpretation of Hume's accounts of the obligation and value of justice. According to my interpretation, Hume takes the obligation of justice to depend (in part) on the conventions that define the rules of justice realizing a distinctive form of value, which I call functional value. Properly understanding Hume's accounts, I argue, requires revisionary understandings of his accounts of both the set of things susceptible to fundamental moral evaluation and his view of the nature of utility.
Abstract: This article provides an English translation of Voltaire’s review of David Hume’s History of England . The original French text of the review, which appeared in the May 2, 1764 supplement to La Gazette Littéraire de l’Europe , is also transcribed in full. When Voltaire’s review is mentioned in English-language scholarship, it is usually presented straightforwardly as a glowing appraisal of the History and of Hume as historian. However, a closer examination of the review reveals a more complicated text than has hitherto been generally acknowledged. In fact, there are good reasons to believe that Voltaire had never read the pre-Tudor volumes of Hume’s History when he wrote this review. It is hoped that, by rendering Voltaire’s review accessible to a wider readership, this translation will draw more attention to the text and to its significance in historiographical debates involving two of the eighteenth century’s leading European historians.
