The research on the choices of foreign strategies of key small states has great significance in international politics,but for a long time the mainstream international political research paradigm has not paid enough attention to the foreign strategies of key small states. Through reviewing the history and reality,it can be found that key small states with important geographical position and superior resource have increasingly prominent influence in the international system,and the research on the survival and development of key small states and diplomatic relations has gradually become a new trend in the research of international political theory. Due to the differences in state power and international status,there are certain differences between small states and big countries in their foreign strategic choices. The sensitivity and vulnerability,dependence and flexibility of small states’ politics also make small states play a dual role in international environment. On the one hand,key small states can play a unique role in maintaining world peace and participating in the mediation of international disputes through institutional power; On the other hand,the key small states themselves may also become the “troublemakers”that cause conflicts between major states and among international turbulence. With this realistic background, this analysis of the choices of foreign strategies of key small states is an important topic of international political research.
中美战略竞争加剧,"五眼联盟"中澳英加新四国在美国强压下趋于追美遏华.已有文献指出澳英加新四国追美遏华存在明显的差异,但既有研究未明确其中的具体机制.要理解澳英加新追美遏华的差异,在考虑美国压力作用的同时,四国国内政治的干预作用也不容忽视.澳英加新国内公众舆论的支持或反对,对来自美国压力起着强化或抑制作用,进而对四国追美遏华水平造成影响.但四国追美遏华水平的最终呈现,还取决于其执政精英对公众舆论的认知定位.本文称之为执政精英理念,这一因素将直接影响公众舆论对美国压力的干预作用.澳英加新的策略选择,为这一分析框架提供了经验层面的证据.
印度的太空事业起步较早,可以说是太空技术的"先行者"之一,但其主要围绕改善民生与经济发展等民用领域展开,通过独立研发与技术飞跃摆脱对发达国家的依赖.直至 21 世纪初,印度才逐渐考虑太空的军事用途,这与早期进行太空探索的国家形成了鲜明对比.印度太空战略的军事化转向主要受到体系与单元双层次因素的影响.一方面,体系层次压力下,为维护国家安全,印度亟须发展太空军事力量参与权力竞争.另一方面,单元层次的威胁感知、国家意图与太空硬实力基础为印度研发军事专用天基资产提供了内生动力.莫迪政府上台后,印度加快了太空战略军事化转型的进程,并将持续下去,此举将引发区域甚至是全球性太空军备竞赛,加剧太空治理困境,同时对南亚地区安全带来新的挑战.
东盟长期以来对地区安全事务有着浓厚的兴趣,在区域安全实践中也有所成就.在地区与世界局势呈现复杂化和不确定性的背景下,东盟认清地区与国际形势并紧扣东盟共同体建设,逐渐确立了"中心性"区域安全实践路径,希望维护与巩固其"中心性"地位,并在这一过程中维护好地区安全与和平."中心性"区域安全实践在路径上有延续和传承,但也有明显的路径转向,促使东盟开启了安全共同体建设的新征程,推动了"东盟规范"的与时俱进与"东盟机制"朝向务实性合作、以任务为导向的方向发展,拉开了在地区安全治理中建立以规则为基础和更为有效的地区安全秩序的进程.诚然,东盟通过"中心性"区域安全实践,增强了其在应对地区与国际形势不确定性、不稳定性的韧性与适应性,一定程度上也强化了其参与地区安全治理的有效性,但却在内部面临着平衡处理多样性和统一性的压力,在外部遭致大国竞争日益激烈所带来的挑战,更需要寻找在东盟框架下平衡中美等大国关系的政策选项.
在自由国际秩序面临内外危机之际,拜登政府的外交政策体现出了一种什么样的自由国际秩序观?在美国外交思想史上存在"进攻性"与"防御性"两种不同的自由国际秩序观,二者主要在"价值观与对外政策""单边主义或多边主义""国际承诺与国际领导"三个问题上存在差异.为了满足战略竞争的实际需要,拜登政府提高了外交价值观的地位,但其在本质上依然更看重利益而非价值;虽然展示出向多边主义靠拢的姿态,但对多边主义的支持有限甚至具有"伪多边"之嫌;为应对大国竞争对其领导地位的挑战,拜登政府实施收缩战略,通过"印太战略"将战略资源更多地集中于大国竞争.总之,拜登政府的自由国际秩序观总体上是"防御性"的.随着大国竞争议题的日益严峻,美国的外交政策只会更加现实主义,其自由国际秩序观也将趋向于实用主义.
作为南亚地区的大国,在区域认同方面印度有着自己的认知与看法.总体来看,印度的区域认同逻辑受历史、现实等维度的影响.就历史维度来看,文化与被殖民的历史对印度的区域认同影响非常大.从现实的角度来看,印度的区域认同面临着一系列的矛盾,左右着印度区域认同的发展与实践逻辑.印度区域认同的整体逻辑是在南亚主导、在印太领导并在全球争当一极.依据这一逻辑,在身份与利益的驱动下,印度的区域认同呈现出了各种各样的特点.客观来看,区域认同的合法性、妥当性还需要地区其他国家的认可.在这一方面,印度取得了一定的成效,但鉴于印度仍然没有能力向地区提供让其他国家普遍受益的公共产品,导致印度在自我认同与他者认同之间存在背离.印度如果想要在区域认同方面实现自己舒适度的目标,就必须对区域认同的驱动逻辑进行调整,尤为重要的是国家领导人的观念调整,究竟是追求融合共赢的区域认同,还是追求以极端自私利益为驱动的区域认同.
"北约印太化"是北约基于"冷战思维"扩展其全球影响力的集中表现.其实质是在俄乌冲突外溢效应的影响下,美国、北约的欧洲盟国以及日本、韩国等"印太地区伙伴"基于各自利益所做出的战略选择.在欧洲盟国看来,面对当下与日俱增的安全压力需要提升自身的防卫能力并且加强同美国的协调,美国则借机鼓励盟友分担更多防务以实现战略收缩,将更多力量集中到印太地区,同时联通大西洋和印太两个地区的盟伴体系以助力与中国的战略博弈.通过分析美国、北约的欧洲盟国和其"印太地区伙伴"国家各自的战略认知和动机,可以更加全面深刻地认识"北约印太化"的原因与趋势,从而更好地应对其可能对中国造成的影响.
17 世纪英国政府积极实行海洋主权政策的现象在英国历史上相当特殊.英国统治者对海洋安全的焦虑与应对是导致其选择海洋主权政策的主要原因.英国学者对海洋主权政策的论证以英国拥有周边海域所有权作为依据,引发了英国同荷兰、法国、丹麦、瑞典等邻国的争端.对海洋主权政策内容的分析表明,该政策实质上反映了英国统治者在海洋国防、海洋政治与海洋资源等方面的安全焦虑,促使其采取相应举措进行应对,并利用海军加以执行.作为海岛型国家,维持海上优势是英国海洋安全的根本所在,然而财政制度与海军建设的矛盾造成英国海军在 17 世纪上半叶长期颓靡,难以适应高度竞争化的国际海洋环境.海洋主权政策满足了英国与荷兰争夺国际商业资本主义主导权的需要,推动了海军解决财政问题.概而言之,海洋主权政策的研究揭示了资本主义的兴起对英国海洋安全的塑造,也显示了英国的国家机器如何嵌入到西方资本主义发展的历史进程之中.
澳大利亚的中国形象既关乎其对中国的认知,也映射澳大利亚自我身份的认同.自19 世纪中期以来,澳大利亚的中国形象在正面与负面两个方向交替出现.澳大利亚对中国形象的认知既是对西方中国形象谱系的延续和继承,也是在动态调整中构建澳大利亚国家身份,并通过运用西方为主体、中国为客体的二元框架,构建出符合澳大利亚以及西方在文明、政治、经济、安全等领域发展需求的"他者"中国,体现了国家形象建构背后话语操控服务国家利益的关系逻辑.
网络空间合作的开展基于国家间的互信建构与利益融合,难以脱离大国关系框架而发展.作为发展中大国与信息大国,网络空间合作日益成为中印两国的关注重点.在打击网络犯罪、网络恐怖主义以及相似的网络空间发展战略的共同驱动下,中印两国借助双边与多边合作机制,在网络安全、打击网络犯罪、数字经济等领域已开启部分合作.由于中印双边互信缺失,中印网络空间合作尚处于起步阶段,且面临心理认知、新兴技术与国际舆论层面多重因素的制约.尽管未来中印网络空间合作存在广阔机遇,但从目前的中印关系现状出发,两国开展网络空间合作的前景不容乐观.只有中印关系顺利恢复和改善,重新培育双边互信,两国网络空间合作才能取得实质性进展.
巴基斯坦自1947 年获得独立地位以来在政治上大体继承了英国殖民时期的政体"衣钵",作为一个新兴的民族国家,它本可以在借鉴他国经验的基础上不断完善适合本国国情的政治制度.然而,亲西方势力与反西方势力间的不断博弈,不仅模糊了巴基斯坦在建构民族国家之路上的制度设计,而且配套制度与主体制度之间的张力问题以及主体制度内部的矛盾也极大限制了这个国家发展前行的速度.本文一方面借助弗朗西斯·福山提出的国家建构理论学说厘清了巴基斯坦建构民族国家历程中的道路之争问题,另一方面探讨了争夺国家发展主导权的过程对其民族国家建构所造成的影响.
印度和德国的战略伙伴关系建立于 2000 年,并先后经历了初步发展期和拓展深化期两个阶段.2020 年以来,随着德国《印太政策指导方针》的推出,印德两国的战略伙伴关系趋于强化.一方面,两国都试图摆脱对华的经济依赖和制衡中国的国际影响力;另一方面,印度寻求借助德国深化与欧盟的关系,德国则希望通过加强与印度的合作来保障其在印度洋地区的海上安全.印德两国在经贸、军售等领域的合作将会进一步加强,但印度糟糕的市场环境、国防本土化战略以及两国的价值观分歧等因素也将对双方合作的深化形成一定制约.
在拜登政府的供应链安全构想中,价值观发挥着基础性作用.拜登政府通过价值观界定供应链安全的协调风险与中断风险,以价值观锚定供应链安全的各种议题,同时还以价值观设计供应链安全的合作机制.选择以价值观为基础是拜登政府综合考量的结果,面对内外双重经济压力,价值观有着低成本的优势.由于国内频发的民主危机与前任政府招致的信任损耗,重塑民主价值观吸引力成为拜登施政的基线之一.新冠肺炎疫情、乌克兰危机成为国家安全的扰动因素,中国的快速发展加剧了拜登政府的安全焦虑,也加强了拜登政府对价值观的重视.拜登政府以价值观壁垒塑造的供应链的本土化、集团化以及全球供应链面临的被动拆分,都加剧着国际经济秩序的失序.虽然由于动员能力的限制、现实利益的矛盾以及价值观联盟的脆弱性,价值观的工具效力降低,但一些新兴经济体国家尤其是中国,仍需采取前瞻性与系统性的政策予以应对.
红海地区作为一个完整独立的次区域概念正在学术界和国际政治实践中被构建起来.当前红海地区安全形势复杂,地区安全治理面临治理客体多元复杂,治理目标不统一,治理机制不成熟及地区国家治理能力不足等问题.中国参与红海地区安全治理的必要性在于能够更好地保障中国在该地区的国家利益,展现中国负责任世界大国形象,能够成为实践全球安全倡议的有效途径,也可以对接地区国家的安全战略需求.中国可以通过倡导"共同安全"的安全理念为红海地区国家提供更多公共产品,协助地区国家建立开放包容的地区安全治理机制等途径深入参与红海地区安全治理,推动地区最终实现共同安全和普遍安全.
在权力转移的背景下,制度竞争是大国竞争的一个重要形式.霸权国随着实力的相对衰落,制度收益受到侵蚀,需要进行制度调适以实现霸权护持.既有研究以权力转移理论和修正主义研究为基础,侧重于分析霸权国如何应对崛起国的改制要求,并对霸权国"退群"这一修正主义策略进行了剖析,但对于霸权国"不退群"时的制度调适策略关注不足.本文旨在回答霸权国何时为守成方,何时为求变方,以及霸权国分别采取何种制度调适策略.霸权国的制度目标决定其对既有国际制度的满意程度.当霸权国旨在维护制度权力优势时,霸权国对现状总体满意,属于守成方;当霸权国的目标是逆转物质利益损失时,霸权国则成为求变方.制度权力维度则进一步影响霸权国采取何种具体制度策略,霸权国的制度策略包括提供指定用途资金、应对改制要求、威胁退出制度和排外性多边主义四种.美国对联合国粮农组织、世界贸易组织、国际货币基金组织和万国邮政联盟采取的制度调适策略展现了上述逻辑.
在国大党一党独大体制崩溃的过程中,印度教民族主义在一些邦兴起,而印度次区域民族主义则在另一些邦兴起.国大党的民族主义及其依赖的"双层权威"结构的崩溃,是印度教民族主义和印度次区域民族主义兴起的前提.总体来看,印度次区域民族主义在落后种姓占据优势地位的邦兴起;印度教民族主义在传统支配种姓占据优势地位的邦兴起;落后种姓和传统支配种姓激烈斗争的邦则陷入了种姓政治的泥沼.传统支配种姓与落后种姓的分歧主要在权力集中模式方面,殖民主义现代化导致"高种姓支配"原则内嵌于印度国家结构是这一分歧的根本原因.泰米尔纳德邦的落后种姓制服了传统支配种姓,并构建出了包容泰邦各社会阶层的泰米尔民族主义,使泰邦成为次区域民族主义的典型邦.古吉拉特邦近代以来形成了围绕商业利益紧密团结的传统支配种姓联盟,这也使其成为莫迪的印度教民族主义政治的发源地.比哈尔邦则由于封建割据和种姓分隔的历史传统,没有一个社会力量能占据支配地位,因而成为种姓政治邦的典型.
Since Modi came to power,India’s relations with UAE have grown by leaps and bounds under the framework of “Link West”policy. Upgrading bilateral relations with UAE and other Gulf states is regarded by India as an important support for its strategic goal of becoming a“leading power”in the world and as a means to balance the influence of Pakistan and China in the region. India-UAE relationship is built on four pillars: trade and commerce,energy security,security and defense,and the well-being of the Indian diaspora. Energy cooperation,trade and investment are the priority areas; security and military are emerging fields,and cultural and people-to-people exchanges,as traditional field,is the important way for India to promote “soft power”diplomacy toward UAE. India’s relations with UAE have the characteristics of high-level leading path,diversified diplomatic approaches and prominent pragmatism. Due to the sensitivity of Middle East affairs,India must carefully balance its bilateral relations with UAE and other Gulf countries to maximize its own interests. However,due to the existing Pakistan factor and the spillover of Hindu nationalism into the diplomatic field,India-UAE relations also has a certain degree of vulnerability.
The Indian concept of “Indo-Pacific”has experienced a deductive process from vagueness to clarity, from debate to consensus, until finally Prime Minister Modi gave a complete policy elaboration at the Shangri-La Dialogue. In general,the “Indo-Pacific”policy of the Modi government has experienced a path from “freedom ” and “openness ” to “alliance ” and “confrontation ”. This article reviews the practice,effectiveness and limitations of Indian government’s “Indo-Pacific”policy in recent years. Restricted by India’s strategic capabilities and the tradition of its diplomatic autonomy,coupled with the balance behavior from“third party”,the Indian “Indo-Pacific policy”is still in a dynamic process of construction. Although India’s “Indo-Pacific”policy is still in the process of exploration,its negative impact on the order of the Indo-Pacific region,relations between major powers,and China ’s surrounding security environment has already emerged,and close attention must be paid to this phenomenon.
In September 2021,the EU released the EU Indo-Pacific Cooperation Strategy Report,which is a document of policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific region,marking the official launch of the EU’s comprehensive and holistic“Indo-Pacific Strategy”. The EU’s “Indo-Pacific Strategy”is based on the core principle of inclusive and effective cooperation,and focuses on four major areas: promotion of values,economic cooperation,security cooperation and governance cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. China,as the key country in the Indo-Pacific region,naturally becomes the focus the EU’s “Indo-Pacific Strategy”. In this document,although the EU continues its triple strategic positioning of partner,competitor and “institutional adversary”towards China,it emphasizes strategic autonomous capacity building in the four major issue,and its overall policy towards China tends to be conservative and defensive. This will have a negative impact on the smooth development of bilateral relations between China and EU,the security environment around China and China’s international influence.
Indonesia’s perception and stance towards China-U. S. competition are important variables that influences its strategy towards China. Indonesia believes that the trade war between China and the U. S. has provided opportunities for Indonesia in the fields of export and investment,striving for cooperation benefits in these two fields. The geopolitical competition between China and the U. S. has worsened the regional environment,which has put more diplomatic pressure and challenges on Indonesia,but Indonesia has also obtained certain strategic opportunities. Therefore,Indonesia insists on non-alignment policy and not taking sides,trying to actively manage great powers competition. In the context of China-U. S. competition,Indonesia’s China strategy is mainly manifested as: in terms of economy,Indonesia continues strengthening cooperation with China,and at the same time uses China-U. S. competition to persuade the U. S. to increase its economic support to Indonesia so that to avoids over-reliance on China; in terms of political security,Indonesia introduces American power in a limited way,carefully handles sensitive issues in China-Indonesia relations,and strives to strike a balance between alleviating domestic anxiety about China and not undermining the overall economic cooperation between China and Indonesia. In terms of regional strategy,Indonesia intends to incorporate China into the ASEAN-led multilateral mechanism,so that to manage and restrict China-U. S. competition,and to strengthen its own leading ability to build regional order. Based on Indonesia ’ s China strategy and to break U. S. anti-China attempt,China needs to further expand the areas of cooperation with Indonesia and establish a multi-field community of interests,to pay attention to the domestic political situation and the trend of public opinion in Indonesia,and accurately judge the direction of its policy. China also needs to actively participate in the ASEANled regional multilateral mechanism,strive to provide public products for it,and establish a credible image of China through practices.
