Joseph Raz nunca apresentou um argumento convincente para sustentar a tese de que promessas devem ser interpretadas como razões protegidas. Contudo, em um trabalho mais recente, ele estabeleceu a base necessária para esse argumento ao afirmar que a finalidade de prometer é oferecer ao promissário uma garantia normativa de que o ato prometido será praticado. Neste artigo, demonstro como uma concepção de promessas baseada no valor da garantia nos permite compreender o papel distintivo das razões para cumprir promessas como obrigações no raciocínio prático. Esse papel distintivo é precisamente o de uma razão de primeira ordem protegida por uma razão excludente. Ao analisar a função das promessas como fornecedoras de garantia normativa, podemos também enfrentar e resolver objeções conhecidas à consistência da própria noção de razão protegida.
Justification of the authority of Law and the duty of obedience has long been a central problem for theorists of political philosophy and law. In view thereof, this work is intended to analyze the underlying philosophical elements of Razian thought that justify the nonexistence of a moral right to civil disobedience and its consistency in the face of the impossibility to justify a general duty of obedience to the Law. Therefore, its investigation focuses on the reconstruction and evaluation of arguments brought in the works Practical Reason and Norms, The Morality of Freedom and The Authority of Law, in comparison and contrast with the specific objections of other authors, as Ronald Dworkin’s and Kimberley Brownlee’s. To do so, one firstly presents the main aspects of the idea of law as reasons for acting in Razian exclusivist positivism. Then, elementary aspects for the legitimating of political authority are recalled. Finally, one evaluates consistency of his arguments on the general duty of obedience to the Law and the admissibility of acts of political dissent.
This paper aims to shed light on a precise moment in Cassirer's intellectual path: the transition from his Berlin phase to the beginning of his Hamburg phase. This is perhaps the most striking transition in Cassirer's work, because it represents the beginning of the most important and productive phase of his entire career, in which the author conceives his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. But here we are going to focus on some aspects of this transition that relate more to the consolidation of the Berlin phase and that place us precisely on the threshold of the project of the philosophy of symbolic forms. Thus, we intend to capture the moments immediately preceding what Cassirer refers to in the preface to the first volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms as the expansion of the epistemological field from the critique of reason to the critique of culture. Thus, I intend to show the points at which the confluence of Cassirer's various research projects becomes evident and to point out the germination of his great work. In this way, we advocate assigning Cassirer's last work in the Berlin period, Kant - Life and Doctrine, the status of not merely an occasional writing, as the author himself suggests when he calls it a “volume of commentary and addendum” intended for those who are in the midst of studying critical philosophy; instead, we propose taking it as the most detailed study of the transcendental method applied to the reconstruction of the fundamental structures of the critical program. And therefore argue that this work is a precious philosophical and didactic legacy of the Marburg School. To this end, we will discuss how Kant - Life and Doctrine is structured around the transcendental method as the principle of reconstruction of the critical program and the guiding thread of the work's exposition.
O leitor encontrará aqui a tradução do terceiro capítulo, que contém o título acima, do livro de Ernst Cassirer, publicado em 1921: À teoria da relatividade einsteiniana. Considerações epistemológicas. Antes, trazemos um comentário introdutório, contendo uma breve apresentação da obra, do terceiro capítulo e a indicação das diretrizes que utilizamos nesta tradução.
Trata-se de uma tradução do artigo "Le langage et la construction du monde des objets" de Cassirer. O artigo foi reunido para tradução em língua francesa e posterior publicação no Journal de psychologie , número excepcional de 15 de janeiro de 1933. A matriz conceitual do presente artigo traduzido do francês se baseia em “Die Sprache und der Aufbau der Gegenstandswelt,” originalmente publicado em Bericht über den XII. Kongreß der deutschen Gesellschaft für Psychologie in Hamburg am pp.12.-16. April 1931. Im Auftrage der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Psychologie hg. von Gustav Kofka (Jena: Georg Fischer, 1932), pp.134–45. Posteriormente publicado em “Symbol, Technik, Sprache: Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1927–1933”, ed. Ernst Wolfgang Orth and John Michael Krois (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1985), pp.121 - 151. No artigo, Cassirer parte da premissa de que o espírito, na representação objetiva, não produz uma cópia como recepção e registro passivo de um mundo já dado, mas, como força criadora e original, atua na construção do mundo e desenha seu horizonte. A concepção de que a representação do mundo é uma mera cópia que repete no interior do espírito a realidade apreendida prejudica não só a compreensão da gênese do conhecimento teórico, mas também a dimensão do significado da representação na obra de arte e, por fim, nos faz perder o papel da linguagem na representação em geral, papel esse que não é secundário, mas condição de possibilidade da representação. Cassirer defende a tese de que a linguagem não é uma simples organização de palavras que se referem a objetos já dados e constituídos, não é um mero registro passivo, mas atua como mediadora na formação dos objetos.
In this article, we discuss some reflections of Charles Renouvier on the principle of non-contradiction. We present two views about this principle, one concerning the first phase of his philosophy, in which the contradictions present both in thought and the world are defended simultaneously, and the other concerning the second phase, in which he declares the need to choose one side of the contradiction. Throughout the discussions, we present a progressive delineation of the definition of the principle and its restriction to the meaning of words, by which Renouvier moves it away from opposities and brings it closer to the requirement of precision in terms of discourse.
The philosopher Nietzsche, having identified human decadence, recommended the overcoming of man, making known through Zarathusta ́s mouth himself the Übermensch (superman). Having making this clear that, we will trace a timeline of reasoning so that we can understand the reasons why the philosopher recommended or asserted that Man should be overcome, so with this comprehension, we can have a grasp of what the superman would be like.
Um dos problemas enfrentados pelo projeto de Cassirer em Filosofia das Formas Simbólicas é o problema da antinomia da cultura, ou seja, que cada dimensão ou esfera da cultura tende a apresentar-se e representar-se não apenas como parte da produção humana em vista do significado, mas tem pretensões de universalidade. Como fica evidente no pensamento de Cassirer, o problema da antinomia está no cerne do conceito de cultura, uma vez que esta deve ser não apenas uma descrição empírica e histórica dos produtos espirituais humanos, mas também pretende ser igualmente normativa, na medida em que uma concepção filosoficamente adequada da cultura deve fornecer um certo conjunto de regras pelas quais todas as esferas culturais devem ser capazes de se articular, a fim de preservar a existência e certa validade da cultura, cada uma delas, sem que se excluam mutuamente ou anulem as suas validades particulares. No entanto, para além da dimensão essencialmente teórica do problema, os efeitos da antinomia da cultura são perceptíveis ao nível pragmático da interação humana real que ocorre precisamente através da articulação plural destas esferas. Por outras palavras, os agentes humanos decidem com base no privilégio concedido a esta ou aquela esfera ou dimensão cultural em relação às outras. No mundo prático das ações humanas, isso significa que resolver certos problemas sociais ou políticos envolve o problema filosófico de como exercer uma meta-avaliação das diferentes postulações de importância ou relevância de certas esferas culturais diante de contextos ou problemas específicos. Assim, o problema da antinomia da cultura também está incluído no âmbito dos problemas da racionalidade pública. Este artigo visa, portanto, explicar o problema da antinomia da cultura como um problema teórico-pragmático que está na origem tanto dos problemas práticos — sociais, éticos e políticos — quanto do problema metafilosófico sobre o papel e a contribuição da filosofia.
The skeptical notion of nettoyer l'esprit, employed by Pierre Charron, and present, under different formulations, in the works of Montaigne and Descartes, is a central concept in modern thought. It plays a key role in discussions surrounding the pursuit of wisdom, the foundations of knowledge, the limits of reason, and the establishment of free and ethical human conduct. Beyond serving as a means of avoiding error, this idea functions as a method for purging the mind of dogmas and prejudices.
O artigo analisa o confronto ontológico entre as representações quânticas de Heisenberg e Schrödinger. Enquanto Heisenberg, alinhado com a interpretação de Copenhague, propõe uma visão antirrealista, acausal e probabilística da realidade microscópica, Schrödinger defende uma interpretação realista, contínua e visualizável da função de onda. A divergência entre os dois, no entanto, vai além do nível metodológico e revela tensões filosóficas sobre o status da realidade física. Heisenberg rejeita a representação pictórica em favor de uma formalização matemática abstrata. Schrödinger, por outro lado, insiste na inteligibilidade espaço-temporal dos fenômenos quânticos. O confronto expressa diferentes visões de mundo e permanece relevante nas discussões contemporâneas sobre o status da Mecânica Quântica.
The article discusses the centrality of the concept of recognition in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, challenging the view of authors such as Habermas and Honneth, who consider the category relevant only in Hegel’s early writings. We argue that recognition is fundamental throughout Hegel’s entire work, especially in the development of Objective Spirit in the Philosophy of Right. The analysis covers the three main sections of the Philosophy of Right: abstract right, morality, and ethical life. In abstract right, recognition manifests itself in relations between persons and property. In morality, it appears in the intersubjectivity of moral action. In ethical life, it culminates in the institutions of family, civil society, and state. We further seek to demonstrate how recognition permeates, within ethical life, the family through love and belonging, civil society through economic and corporate relations, and the state as political recognition between citizens and institutions.
Authors Cristiane Marinho and Alex Sousa are aware of their originality and pioneering spirit in writing and publishing the work History of Philosophy Teaching in Ceará. Literature on the subject is scarce, because if Brazilian philosophy is considered non-existent or unworthy of study, philosophy in Ceará is even more indigestible. Amidst the intellectual desert on the subject, the work of Adísia Sá, Ensino de filosofia no Ceará: subsídios (Teaching Philosophy in Ceará: Subsidies), a collection of articles dedicated to the theme of philosophy in Ceará, stands out like an oasis. Highlighted by the authors as the main reference on the subject, the 1972 work indicated the narrow paths to be followed in the search for the obtuse object of study. For the authors, without this work they would have had many difficulties. For historical contextualization purposes, the authors based themselves on the works of historian Airton de Farias, a reference on the subject of the history of Ceará, and to understand the consolidation of the Ceará education system, they leafed through Sofia Lerche's work, História da educação no Ceará: sobre promessas, fatos e feitos (History of education in Ceará: on promises, facts, and deeds). As a theoretical reference for the analysis of documents and interpretations of sources, the authors based themselves on the genealogical perspective of philosophers Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault. As a theoretical reference for the analysis of documents and interpretations of sources, the authors based themselves on the genealogical perspective of philosophers Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault.
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein suggests that doubting whether he “is a man” may exceed the limits of how our epistemic language-games function (§79). Since the certainty that things like “men” and “women” exist in the world is so deeply embedded in our world-picture (Weltbild) that it cannot be called into question, it might constitute a curious example of what the author calls a “hinge certainty”. However, the fact that our worldview is shaped by gender-related certainties should not be taken as immutable. In this paper, we argue that even if the gender binary can be considered a hinge certainty, this does not prevent it from being challenged and changed. To do so, we first contend that any interpretation of how hinges structure our epistemic language-games must prioritize at least one of the metaphors presented in On Certainty over the others. The selected metaphors would support either an anti-foundationalist or foundationalist epistemological reading. A foundationalist view of hinge certainties, we argue, is responsible for their supposed immutability, including gender-related hinge certainties. We then take the presumed immutability of gender certainties as a specific case study concerning the alleged immutability of hinge certainties. Here, we propose interpreting the gender binary as the foundation of our world-picture, whose “certainty” can be seen as a violent normative constraint. Through our anti-foundationalist reading of Wittgensteinian epistemology, we maintain that hinge certainties must be mutable, given their functional status — that is, their role or function should vary across different contexts. In defense of revising hinge certainties, we argue that our practices can serve as tools to challenge the hinge status of the gender binary.
Agostinho é tido como um dos grandes promulgadores da tradição cristã no início da Idade Média, suas obras se tornaram uma das bases para o pensamento cristão medieval, influenciando filósofos e teólogos. Nosso objetivo neste artigo é argumentar, e demonstrar, que Agostinho, em vista de sua importante obra, estabeleceu as bases de um paradigma ético-político formal, tendo como pilares: I – sua concepção de vontade; II – sua teoria política das ‘duas cidades’; por fim, III – a ruptura com o modelo clássico entre indivíduo e corpo político. Tal paradigma ético-político coloca em destaque o formalismo da autonomia da vontade em detrimento das contingências materiais. No campo político, esta perspectiva desloca o foco das necessidades concretas inerentes às relações políticas, estabelecendo uma predominância do ético sobre o político, do formal sobre o material. Em nosso itinerário, apresentaremos primeiro os fundamentos da vontade no pensamento agostiniano, em seguida, sua teoria política a partir da concepção de ‘duas cidades’, por fim, apresentaremos como este paradigma agostiniano, predominantemente formal, desloca o indivíduo da materialidade política para o formalismo ético, rompendo com os fundamentos da tradição clássica.
This paper introduces the concept of epistemic extractivism to criticize the way in which dissident knowledges (especially from the Global South) are appropriated by hegemonic theories (Western philosophy and psychoanalysis) without recognizing their decolonial radicality. This paper argues that this practice decontextualizes and neutralizes anticolonial critiques, transforming them into "academic commodities" in the service of whiteness.
Tradução do texto publicado originalmente em: Bericht über den XII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellchaft für Psychologie em Hamburgo de 12.-16 de Abril de 1931, em Deutschen Gesellchaft für Psychologie organizado por v. Gustav Kafka, Jena 1932, pp.134-145]
This article aims to explore, in the light of Paul Tillich’s reflections, the concepts of “existence”, “existential” and “existentialism”. It is essential to clarify in what sense these expressions are used and why, to a certain extent, they can be considered avoidable. It is vital to be aware of the multiple ambiguities that are, in many cases, inevitable. Furthermore, it is necessary to demonstrate how these terms relate to attitudes and actions of the past and present. Attempts to clarify these meanings are vast and often divergent; therefore, none of them can be considered as the absolute truth. A theology that places the correlation between existence and the figure of Christ as its central theme must justify the use of the term “existence”, pointing out both its philological origin and its historical development. The purpose of this study is to present one of the possible ways to determine the meaning of a word that, over time, has deteriorated, which is the etymological one; that is, to return to the original meaning of the term and seek a new understanding from these roots. For this investigation, we will use works by the German philosopher and theologian, as well as other scholars who have dedicated themselves to the subject.
There is a debate about the “pure ego” that begins with Paul Natorp and Edmund Husserl and their methodological differences arising largely from the heritage of their predecessors. This article intends to show how the construction of this initial debate provides support for the development of a second one within the phenomenological tradition itself, in which Aron Gurwitsch questions the "pure ego" as an element present in the sphere of pure consciousness in the Husserlian transcendental turn, from the Natorpian influence.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the terms of Hobbes' contractual obligation in relation to the will. To this end, it is based on the assumption that reason is not sufficient to make the obligation effective, as Gauthier states, not even as the main means of self-preservation. Obligation is based on the declaration of the will, by which it exercises bonds of obligation capable of creating sufficient conditions for the fulfillment and validity of agreements. This shows that the will plays an important role in the realization of the contract and, consequently, in the realization of the obligation. In view of this, it is necessary to point out that the act of binding oneself does not come from the fear of an irresistible power, but from the will expressed in the commitment to transfer a right. Therefore, the sign of the will to transfer a right represents the condition of obligation. In this way, by directly linking obligation and self-preservation, Hobbes offers a model of will that is coherent with the guarantee of reciprocity in the conditions for preserving life.
