Russia and Russian Civilization will enter the second phase of global redivision with a victor’s authority, but without the population or economy needed to compete as an equal with the U.S. or China. Russia’s task is to find partners for a vast technological-economic space that is necessary for development. Such partners are likely to be India and the ASEAN countries, which can rely on Russian resources and military power to maneuver between the U.S. and China, and which together with Russia may form a techno-economic bloc with capabilities matching those of the U.S. and China. In addition, the consolidated alignment of Russia and India (whose relations have historically been least prone to stress) may guarantee stability for the Greater Eurasian security system and generate new principles of world order.
The measures’ extreme cost indicates that, although the Chinese leadership advances optimistic conceptions like the Community of Common Destiny for Mankind and a “universally beneficial, inclusive economic globalization,” the leadership actually adheres to an extremely bleak outlook for the world in the 21st century. It is preparing—at the very least—for a severe military and political crisis, including the disruption of all normal economic ties and a slide to the brink of war. At worst, it is preparing for even more nightmarish scenarios.
Georgy Vernadsky pointed to the absence of “natural borders” between European and Asian Russia, which led him to the conclusion that “there are not two Russias—European and Asian. There is only one Russia—Eurasian, Russia-Eurasia” (Vernadsky, 2008, p. 7).
The foundations of U.S. hegemony have displayed cracks of many kinds. With a fractured and precarious society, growing challenges to its legitimacy and worldview, increasingly contested military power, and the rebellion of much of the Global South, the U.S. is not in the best position to impose its power on the world.
People, nations, and civilizations are united by their common commitment to respecting human dignity and recognizing the sovereign right to independently resolve their issues. Common to all humankind, not abstract, universalism is what unites all people around the world: Western Promethean consciousness and the collective imaginations of the Global South countries striving for modernization without Westernization and seeking harmony.
This epochal change in the structure of European international politics finally led to the conclusion of a Franco-Russian alliance in the early 1890s. However, this alliance proved insufficient to counterbalance unified Germany and its Austro-Hungarian satellite. In July 1914, the FrancoRussian alliance even contributed to the transformation of another Balkan crisis into a pan-European conflict, in which Russia suffered defeat while France achieved only a pyrrhic victory. The fatal character of the RussoFrench alliance, when concluded on an anti-German basis, only highlights what the Franco-Russian alliance could have been if concluded in the first half of the 19th century, i.e., before the structural changes brought about by the Crimean War (Vinogradov, 2005).
The emerging multipolarity and its acceptance by the great powers could recreate the conditions necessary for the functioning of international law and a relatively peaceful world. And the U.S. and other Western societies can benefit from this, too. Aris Roussinos is right that “just as the bipolar order of the Cold War world, by restraining liberalism’s inherent tendencies to radicalization and hubris, made the Western world safe for a tempered and moderate liberalism, so may the multipolar world we have entered save liberals from their own excesses. Beset by confident rivals abroad, and by the disenchantment of their voters at home, liberals will once again have to learn restraint” (Roussinos, 2024).
No matter how the Iran conflict ends, its outcome will have farreaching consequences. Is force almighty? How far is it ready to go to prove that it is almighty? And what will be left after that?
This article proposes a classification of military alignment along the axes of strategic orientation (overlapping interests to clashing interests), actual military cooperation (from minimal situational interactions to deep integration), and institutionalization (from informal to legally formalized). This classification yields various forms of cooperation, partnership, and alliance.
Moscow’s sharp pivot in late 2021–early 2022 was seemingly meant to finally change things. One can speculate about how events would have developed if Russia had achieved quick success in Ukraine. However, the conflict’s transformation into a protracted confrontation has once again revived the topic of Russia’s weakness and served as a key justification for Western military, economic, and political mobilization. The prospect of exhausting Moscow’s already limited capabilities strengthens the resolve of its opponents. The stakes have been raised most by the EU, seeking political and strategic agency in the unfolding struggle (Fabrichnikov, 2025). Defeat in Ukraine would be a painful blow to the West, but it would hardly force it to reconsider its attitude towards Russia, which is based on ideas critical to Western countries’ self-identification.
The peace treaty dialogue, suspended by Russia, could be revived, especially since both countries agree that it is necessary. President Putin stated in November 2024: “We are ready to develop relations with Japan for the ensuing five years and indeed the next fifty. Japan is inherently our partner, being our neighbor” (Kremlin, 2024b).
Russia possesses far greater capabilities to counter potential strikes on its territory. Nuclear deterrence aside, Moscow has the means to inflict significant damage across multiple domains and directions. Yet an adversary may deem that damage to be painful but acceptable. Even in the nuclear sphere, the pain threshold can shift. As political struggle intensifies, sensitivity to injury falls, something well-demonstrated by the 20th century.
The Iran nuclear issue has been on the international agenda for more than 20 years. Traditionally, diplomatic methods to resolve the issue have been favored, but June 2025 was a turning point, starting with the unprecedented Israeli-American attacks, followed by growing Western political and economic pressure. This article examines the motives for the June attack and assesses its regional and international implications, especially for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.
In the medium term, Russia is set to fall behind world leaders in the development of computing power, due to its lack of competence, production capabilities, and market size. Immediate attention is needed to prevent the gap from widening, threatening Russia’s strategic interests. Russia does have the resources and scientific-technological potential to remedy the situation, but this must be done quickly, given how fast the world is changing. Political disagreements must be cast aside, in order to focus on the urgent administrative and technological tasks before us.
NATO expansion was/is not a reaction to Russian assertiveness. In fact, the use (or at least immediate threat) of force-not diplomacy, compromise, treaties, etc.-has been the only thing capable of stopping expansion, and is likely to remain such insofar as the U.S.’s Cosmopolitan-Liberal and anti-Russian motives persist.
One of Russia’s most pressing geostrategic tasks is the construction of Greater Eurasia’s logistical network. Developing extant basic ideas for such a network, the authors consider the prospects for building the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and its significance for intraregional, interregional, and international connectivity. A comprehensive strategy will not only help create modern transport infrastructure but also enhance the involved territories’ human capital and their scientific, technological, industrial, and commercial capabilities.
Through the lens of securitization, this article analyzes the transformation of digital platforms into autonomous actors in international politics. The author proposes the concept of ‘two-level digital securitization,’ in which platforms are (1) agents whose moderation practices shape threat perceptions and the political agenda, and (2) objects of control by governments (e.g., the U.S., the EU, Russia, China, and India) that regulate content, algorithms, and infrastructure in order to reduce platforms’ influence and protect digital sovereignty. In the long run, states will likely shift from reactive regulation to the preventive defense of digital security.
Amid the radical transformation of Syria’s political landscape following the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 and the weakening of former centers of influence, Turkiye has found itself in a uniquely advantageous position to strengthen its regional standing and pursue long-held foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. This article analyzes the evolution of Turkiye’s post-Assad strategy and outlines the key vectors of Turkish foreign policy - ranging from military interventions and humanitarian engagement to diplomatic maneuvering and ideological influence. Special attention is paid to how Ankara seeks to consolidate its presence in Syria and integrate the new circumstances into its broader regional strategy. Through comprehensive analysis, the article explores both the tangible and potential gains for Turkiye, Ankara’s positioning in the Sunni world, its competition with other centers of power, and the risks it faces in the process of shaping a new Middle Eastern architecture.
The world order’s ongoing transition towards multipolarity demands consideration of the ideological principles on which it will be built. Unipolarity’s unsustainability has highlighted the crisis of liberalism as the basis of the world order. This article considers the possibility of establishing a postliberal order based on the principles of conservatism, some of whose postulates will have to be modified. As societies have different traditions that are often incompatible with one another, a conservatism-based multipolar order needs a ‘connective tissue’ that would make it universal and would facilitate global cooperation between different societies. Offering a critique of technofeudalism and transhumanism, this article analyzes social conservatism from the bottom up, as an ideology based on anthropocentricity and the preservation of man amidst rapid technological change.
American politics, in 2026, are a matter of trying to correct the mistakes that were made during the ‘end of history.’ Such mistakes are many; the U.S. set the global agenda and is principally responsible for the current situation. But unless another black swan throws everything into disarray, the Americans will take lessons from all this that are applicable to them.
