为什么一个大国会从"风险规避型"偏好向"风险承担型"偏好转移?大国风险规避或风险承担的战略偏好并不总是与实力对比或战略环境相匹配,有时在现状收益递减或相对权力优势最大化时选择克制战略,却在仍处于现状收益递增或权力劣势时选择冒进战略.对于解释风险偏好的这一不确定性特征,可通过对国家战略自主性、战略动机、安全困境和风险偏好惯性等进行关联性考察,采取兼具体系变量与单元变量的综合路径,探究非本意的系统效应结果.通过对近代欧洲多极体系与美苏冷战两极体系的结构性和进程性考察,验证了自利德尔·哈特到保罗·肯尼迪的目标—手段的动态平衡对大国应对战略风险的重要性,并在一定程度上丰富了战略自主性与风险偏好的惯性研究.
全球安全倡议根植于中华文明的连续性、创新性、统一性、包容性与和平性,并因此展现出以合作安全、开放安全、共同安全与多边安全为特征的理论逻辑.美国出于维护其全球霸权的动机,对亚太地区施加以竞争安全、封闭安全、分割安全和单边安全为特征的传统安全范式,导致该地区大国战略博弈日益加剧、安全阵营化趋势加快、安全困境螺旋上升和非传统安全竞争日趋升温,破坏了该地区的和平与稳定.全球安全倡议提供了一个新的安全范式,即以合作安全应对竞争安全、以开放安全对抗封闭安全、以共同安全替代分割安全、以多边安全超越单边安全.针对美国推行遏制中国的"印太战略",全球安全倡议为实现亚太地区的普遍安全和持久和平提供了实践路径,包括促进地区大国良性互动、完善以东盟为中心的地区安全机制、塑造地区国家间的相互信任,以及强化地区非传统安全合作.
防卫技术合作是日美同盟关系深化的重要体现,也是安全合作以及同盟管控的组成部分.日美防卫技术合作的进展受防卫技术合作的制度化水平和日本在同盟关系中自主化水平双重因素的影响.20世纪 80年代以前,受日本武器出口规范和技术能力的限制,日美之间的防卫技术合作以美国单方面援助日本为主.其后,日本在技术上取得较大突破,开始在对美技术合作与自主技术研发之间寻求平衡,但技术合作制度化水平较低,影响了两国的合作.进入 21 世纪第二个10年之后,日本在解禁"武器出口三原则"的同时,进一步加强技术研发能力、深化与美国的防卫技术合作,并寻求技术合作的多元化.通过日美战斗机研发合作的案例可以发现,看似日本对美国渐趋自主,但仍然难以摆脱对美防卫技术依存的困境.日美之间防卫技术合作的深度以及日本防卫合作对象多元化的广度将是影响日本未来防卫产业发展的重要因素.
零信任是一种专注于资源保护的网络安全范式,其前提是信任永远不会隐式授予,而是必须持续评估.这一安全范式是随着互联网、物联网、大数据、云计算等数字应用场景的拓展而产生的.零信任架构的核心原则是通用身份验证、访问分割、最小信任授权、加密无处不在以及持续监控和调整.美国政府加速推进零信任战略,既是美国传统网络安全系统失能、网络安全理念和技术迭代的要求,也是数字时代大国竞争的组成部分,同时还是美国国防数字战略现代化的需要.美国政府加强基于顶层设计的网络安全宏观布局,明确实施零信任战略的关键事项,并确立了联邦政府推动零信任安全体系的基本原则.零信任安全框架的核心领域是关键基础设施、国家安全系统和国防系统,美国确立了以网络安全和基础设施安全局为轴心的推动零信任布局的"全政府"架构.零信任不仅仅是技术的转变,还是一种文化.零信任架构从以网络安全为中心转向以数据安全为中心.零信任不仅是网络安全防御战略,也是进攻战略,即在稳固自身安全的同时,无所顾忌地向对手发起攻击.美国在网络安全领域攻击性的增强,将给包括中国在内的世界其他国家的网络安全带来更大的压力.在这种情势下,中国政府机构、企业、网络安全工作人员须共同努力,打造中国自主可控、安全便捷的现代化网络安全体系.
在国际技术竞争中,技术权威既非构建于利益交换关系之上,又不依靠强制胁迫的方式来维系,而是通过锁定技术发展轨道与治理规则路径赢得其他国家的自愿追随,由此形成非对称服从关系.技术权威可划分为知识型、监管型、辐射型与借力型四种类型,不同技术权威类型之间可通过技术跃迁与市场规模拓展来实现转换.在移动通信技术领域,拥有不同技术权威类型的国家分别通过实体路径、市场路径、制度路径与联盟路径参与国际技术竞争,借助技术领域中的锁定效应巩固其在国际技术竞争中的优势地位,直至出现颠覆性技术的突破.
分化联盟是改变国家间实力对比的一种重要方式.现有研究围绕"楔子战略"这个概念系统论述了分化对手联盟的方式和机制,并提出了"奖励型楔子战略"和"强制型楔子战略"两种主要类型,两者均强调借助物质力量进行分化,可统称为"物质型楔子战略".除此之外,由于联盟以竞争性安全理念为内核,而部分国家基于避免冲突和降低成本的考虑会在特定时期偏向合作性安全政策,因此分化国可以将差异化的合作理念作为切入点,即以"理念型楔子战略"实现对对手联盟的理念分化.理念型楔子战略旨在通过影响和改变目标国的安全理念来削弱其对联盟价值和功效的认知,从而间接促使其疏离联盟.当分化国对目标国不构成严重威胁,分化国在目标国关心的安全议题上具有较强的话语权,且目标国与部分第三方国家在该议题上持相似的政策立场时,分化国以理念型楔子战略为手段分化对手联盟.安全制度是实施理念型楔子战略的主要平台,分化国可以利用安全制度提出合作性安全倡议,或者提出解决目标国重视的安全问题的合作性方案,以此为目标国提供联盟之外的替代性安全手段,进而削弱联盟对目标国的战略价值并降低对手联盟的合作水平.苏联在冷战时期提出的欧安会倡议是实施理念型楔子战略的一次具体实践.
核潜艇合作是美英澳三边安全伙伴关系(AUKUS)的核心内容.关于这一核潜艇合作项目是否有悖国际核不扩散规范体系,国际社会存在尖锐的争论.既有研究主要探讨三边安全伙伴关系核潜艇合作与国际核不扩散规范的合规问题,但忽视了其对正在成长中的国际规范的冲击.从规范演化的角度看,违反规范的国家影响力越大,对既有规范的打击越沉重,规范退化的可能性越大.规范的正式程度越低,规范越脆弱,受到冲击后规范退化甚至衰亡的可能性也越大.美英澳核潜艇合作最主要的影响在于,三国利用其独特的影响力破坏了成长中的核不扩散规范.长期以来,由于已有的核潜艇合作活动都没有利用国际核不扩散规范体系中的军用核动力装置漏洞,使得规避利用该漏洞已经成为一个惯例或成长中的规范.然而,由于美英澳的核潜艇合作涉及大量武器级高浓缩铀的转让,且高调引用了军用核动力装置漏洞,这将对军用核动力装置转让、军民两用物项管制和核"突破时间"这三项成长中的核不扩散规范产生严重冲击.
网络空间正在成为信息化时代美国全球战略竞争的主要领域之一.为适应迅速扩张、充满不确定性的网络环境,美国将传统威慑理念引入网络安全战略领域,以网络威慑作为其追求安全利益、扩大竞争优势、重塑国际霸权的重要手段.美国的网络威慑战略不断调整,先后经历了被动应对、主动防御、攻势主导和立体威慑四个阶段,在网络霸权追求的驱使下呈现出威慑态势日益强化、威慑体系不断完善、攻防兼备且偏重实战等趋势.美国的网络威慑战略强化受到多种内外动因的影响,是安全—利益考量、权力—政治诉求、思想—文化根源以及社会—经济因素等变量叠加作用的结果.美国企图超越传统的战略逻辑,但其战略制定与实施并未单纯地停留在"安全"层面上,而是在激进特征的推动下进行战略的演化发展,其安全思维背后的霸权实质形成了一种战略悖论,不仅造成美国的内在逻辑困境,还将导致攻防相悖的脆弱安全环境并动摇国家间的战略平衡.
ChatGPT作为人工智能发展新的里程碑,在语言表达、自我强化等方面表现突出,展现出生成式人工智能的广泛运用前景,在多领域引起广泛关注,以 ChatGPT 为代表的生成式人工智能将会可预期地改变国家安全态势.在意识形态安全层面,对生成式人工智能的恶意运用使渗透方式更加多元,渗透效能更加显著.在国际舆论层面,对生成式人工智能的大规模使用将进一步使舆论场复杂化.在国家实力发展层面,生成式人工智能将继续拉大国家实力差距,国内公共权力与权威进一步分散.在军事安全层面,生成式人工智能赋能战场信息收集和战场指挥,国家之间的认知战对抗能力重要性日益提升.在法律规范层面,当前生成式人工智能的责任主体不明晰,现有法律法规难以约束基于该技术开展的犯罪行为.在社会稳定方面,生成式人工智能冲击劳动力市场,重塑人才发展模式.面对新技术冲击下急剧变化的新安全态势,应建立更多元协同的创新和应用体系,在国际上共享发展成果,完善法律体系,推动该技术服务于国家利益发展与人类命运共同体的构建.
拜登政府上台后发布了《新冠应对和大流行防范的国家战略》《国家生物技术和生物制造倡议》和《国家生物防御战略和实施计划》等聚焦生物安全的系列文件和倡议,标志着生物安全战略已经上升为美国政府的重要政策议程.新冠肺炎疫情对美国造成了史无前例的生物安全危机,拜登政府通过调整国内生物安全治理机制、加大生物安全领域的投资和开展卫生外交三种路径来推行其生物安全战略.该战略呈现出"全社会""伪多边主义"和"地缘政治化"等特点,其目标在于:以促进美国生物安全强化美国整体国家安全、以生物安全为议题重塑美国国际领导力、以发展生物产业巩固美国生物技术霸权.在美国已确立对中国实施全面"竞赢"战略的背景下,生物安全治理领域不可避免地成为中美竞争的场域.这种竞争主要体现在全球生物安全治理制度和生物技术经济两个方面.拜登政府基于地缘政治考量和以"竞赢"为基调的生物安全战略使得中美生物安全合作前景黯淡.
在当今复杂性时代,国家安全学研究与实践亟待复杂性科学助力.国家安全复杂学是不可或缺的国家安全学范式,开展国家安全复杂学的创建研究意义重大.其立足学科建设高度,从认识论、方法论与实践论三方面出发,论证国家安全复杂学的创建依据,即国家安全的复杂性.在此基础上讨论国家安全复杂学的七个学科基本问题,即学科的必要性与合法性、学科定义、学科属性、学科功能、研究对象、研究内容与研究方法.从认识论角度看,国家安全的本质是复杂巨系统安全;从方法论角度看,国家安全学方法论的内在要求是复杂性范式;从实践论角度看,国家安全实践的现实路径是复杂系统工程.国家安全复杂学是国家安全学与复杂性科学交叉领域势在必建的国家安全学的分支学科.国家安全复杂学的创建依据与学科基本问题厘定,为国家安全复杂学建设和发展提供了理论依据和整体性框架.从国家安全学学科建设和发展角度看,国家安全复杂学的创建有助于促进国家安全学与复杂性科学的深度融合,进一步丰富和完善国家安全学学科体系.
巴里·布赞的新综合安全分析框架提供了安全跨域外溢的分析方法,克服了不同领域的安全研究相互割裂的局限.文章基于新综合安全观的视角分析经济风险的战争效应,提出"二阶段论"的理论框架,将经济风险促成战争的过程分为经济安全和军事安全两个阶段.第一阶段通常是线性逻辑,经济风险通过影响一国经济基本面演变为经济威胁;第二阶段是复杂的多线程逻辑,经济威胁可能通过激励和诱发两种机制作用于军事安全领域,产生或加强实力—安全困境、破窗困境、存续困境和防御困境等四种困境,最终促成战争爆发.二阶段论在现实中有五种运行逻辑,分别是直接与军事安全相关、效率与安全的矛盾、货币霸权的衰落、经济依附和(国际)金融危机,历史案例为这五种逻辑提供了佐证.由此证明,二阶段论亦可作为新综合安全观在中观层面的补充与完善.
The Global Security Initiative（GSI） is a Chinese solution to global security dilemmas. The GSI has received enormous attention from the international community since it was put forward. Relevant analyses have made multifaceted interpretations of the background, significance, intentions, implementation steps, and challenges of the GSI. These analyses hold that the motivations behind China’s proposition of the GSI are either to build a new security order, open up more security opportunities, promote security discourse, or safeguard China’s own national security. Undoubtedly, the GSI can correct the imbalance of the international security order, promote the construction of a new international and regional security architecture, weaken the hegemonic position of the United States in international security affairs, and raise China’s voice in international security issues. At present, analyses at the international level have shifted from assessing China’s intentions to launch the GSI to evaluating its ability to put the initiative into action. On the whole, the international public opinions towards the feasibility of the initiative include positive responses, cautiously optimistic outlooks, neutral wait-and-see attitudes, and pessimistic views. The reasons are not only due to the limitations of Western geopolitical security theories as well as the hegemonic practices of the United States. There are both general reasons for the misreadings of international initiatives and special reasons for the misinterpretations of security initiatives. At the same time, there exist both external reasons resulting from deep-rooted security competition in the international community and internal reasons for the GSI to be further concretized. Based on the “public opinion-response” mechanism, China should treat the negative perceptions rationally, adopt targeted response strategies and eliminate people’s misunderstandings about the GSI. More efforts should be made to adhere to multi-directional communication, encourage more countries to join the GSI, create a security community, explore Chinese solutions to hotspot issues, and mitigate interferences from the United States.
After regional dominance wars, the behaviors of defeated states can be classified into four types: proactive revenge, stalemate confrontation, quiescent retreat and bandwagoning. Classical realist foreign policy theory argues that the discrepancies in their choices depend on the degree of leniency of the victorious state towards the defeated one in the process of negotiating a peace treaty. However, according to the findings of this study, the degree of leniency of the victorious state has no direct bearing on the differentiated behavioral choices on the part of the defeated one during the peace treaty negotiation process. The cumulative effect of the “structural factors” and the “circumstantial factors” is the incentive behind the differentiated behavioral choices of the defeated state. Specifically, the “structural factor” reflects whether the defeated state still considers itself to be at the same level of power with the victorious state, while the “circumstantial factor” reflects whether there are still other strategic adversaries around the defeated state that may contain its power projection. Within the framework of logical consistency, it is the diverse combinations of these two variables that have constituted the root cause for the plurality and diversity of the defeated state’s choice preferences. From the perspective of the victorious state, clarifying the causal mechanism behind the behavioral choices of the defeated state after a war for regional dominance can provide beneficial enlightenment for avoiding falling into the quagmire of periodic confrontation and revenge on the defeated state, encouraging the defeated state to move towards goodwill neutrality or follow a policy of bandwagoning, and predicting the trend of major country relations after dominance wars in a specific region.
Existing rationalist theories on the causes of war hold that the calculation of expected utility about future gains and losses of war plays a dominant role in states’ choices of conflict behavior. The inclusion of sunk costs and various past interactions into utility calculation is regarded as irrational under the above theoretical path. This theoretical bias limits the explanatory power of rationalist theories on the causes of war. In fact, concerns about sunk costs related to material and time lead to extreme sensitivity to relative gains when state actors interact with each other. In order to avoid the power imbalance caused by the excessive accumulation of relative material gains or time advantages of a specific party, the state that thinks itself to be in the frame of loss will from time to time claim retrospective compensations that cannot be accepted by the other party, so that the common ground on which the conflict settlement plan can be reached is greatly compressed. In addition, the cognitive gap between two parties when judging the decision-making framework of the other side increases the willingness to take risks and leads to an overestimation of the other side’s hostility and an underestimation of the other side’s determination to get engaged in the conflict, which increases the likelihood of the conflict escalating into war. The Ukraine Crisis and the pre-World War Ⅰ military mobilization can be regarded as two typical cases to demonstrate, respectively, the victim-perpetrator strategic interactions around the competition for material interests and the posterior strategy to gain a time advantage.
In recent years, the space security environment has been undergoing drastic changes with the accelerated pace of space militarization, the rise of the commercial aerospace industry, the increased space congestion, and the deepening of militarycivilian integration in outer space. Against this backdrop, in 2020, the United Kingdom launched a new space arms control agenda called “Reducing Space Threats Through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviors”, towards which the United States assumed a positive stance by trying to steer it towards an international agreement on the self-commitment to prohibiting earth-based kinetic anti-satellite testing, thus marking a significant shift in its arms control position. It is evident that the United States intends to exploit the agenda to achieve its own goals, namely interfering with its adversaries’ development of their asymmetric anti-satellite weapons, forging its space alliances, drawing “red lines” for space deterrence, and enhancing its argument about space debris. Now, the new agenda has produced significant influence on space security regimes in that it has not only given rise to political confrontations among major countries but also reflected the new trends in the development of international space regimes. In the new space security environment, international regimes for military and civilian security in space are witnessing an integrated development, and the regimes will have more open agenda models, more participants and more mainstream paths for controlling behaviors.
In the era of artificial intelligence, the general AI model represented by ChatGPT may impact the “subject responsibility system” in global security interactions, thus giving rise to a series of problems such as the fuzzification and lack of responsibility of security subjects, the discretization of security object responsibility and the difficulties in identifying accountability for security issues. Given that the technological development of artificial intelligence technology is featured by iterative evolution from being weak to being strong, the forms and degrees vary greatly concerning the “subjectivity crisis” and the “responsibility crisis” at different technological stages. In the era of weak artificial intelligence, the empowering effects of the low intelligence general large model may strengthen the responsibility of the marginal security subjects in the field of security interaction, where security interaction presents a mode featuring coexistence of multiple security subjects and the discretization of security object responsibility. In the era of strong artificial intelligence, the general model is designed as a “humanoid” subject, which is a new one among the existing multiple security subjects. The security interaction has taken on irregular forms. The existing security subjects may show the characteristics of over-reliance on algorithm and the erosion of subject power, while security objects may display the general features of shirking their responsibilities and the end of subject responsibility. In order to solve the above problems, we need to start at the “intersubjectivity” level of security subject interaction. In the era of weak artificial intelligence, blockchain and artificial intelligence technology can be utilized to form synergy and refine prior responsibilities. In the era of strong artificial intelligence, it is advisable to forge a “guardian” system based on coordination among major countries and the establishment of the “semi-subject” identity of intelligent agents so that global security practices can be carried out along the logic line of intersubjectivity.
Security is one of the core concepts in international relations. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been new developments in security studies that are diametrically different from the traditional security researches centered on national military security. In the 1990s, the constructivist theory of securitization was put forward by the Copenhagen School. Feminist security studies attach great importance to the relationship between gender and security, arguing that the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School fails to include a concept of gendered security and has no concept of gender-based insecurity. With the joint efforts of all stakeholders, the UN Security Council resolution 1325（2000） and its subsequent resolutions established the Women, Peace and Security Agenda（WPS Agenda）, and thus gender issues have been integrated into international peace and security agenda. Whether such gender issues as women’s participation, women’s rights and sexual violence are a matter of securitization or de-securitization is actually influenced by multiple intertwined factors. Under the comprehensive influences of different actors and various factors, the interactions and debates concerning the WPS Agenda among the members of the Security Council, especially its permanent members, have promoted the development process of securitization of gender issues, which not only demonstrates the complexity of “inter-subjective and socially constructed” securitization issues, but also regulates the degrees and limits of securitization under the Security Council’s voting mechanism. The prospect for securitization of gender issues is also featured by complexity and multiple possibilities.
National security research is a complex academic work that requires patient and meticulous analyses.Security is a state of freedom from threats or perceived danger.It is not a kind of isolation or guarantee on a purely physical level.National security has an exceedingly multi-layered and diverse composition with both external attributes and internal components.In the context of globalization and informatization,the definition and maintenance of national security are obviously different from those in former times,thus highlighting the importance of understanding their connections and distinctions.From the historical process of human’s thinking over security,a continuous evolutionary trajectory can be seen to be an important reference for establishing today’s security thoughts,objectives and actions.A better understanding of today’s national security situation in China and that of tomorrow is inseparable from a better absorption of the lessons and experiences of the past.Sorting out research types alone can help identify increasingly diverse exploration paths and tools.The comparison of their respective advantages and disadvantages is conducive to the construction of a balanced and reasonable security research framework that serves to meet the needs of the new era.At the policy level,maintaining a balance between security and development is the pivot point of China’s overall national security,of which particular emphasis should be placed on learning the lessons of some major countries.From an academic point of view,new ways of thinking and research tools,such as “layered” research paths,may help researchers expand more space in their work.
Climate change affects the possibility of violent conflict through direct or indirect ways,thus the causal transmission mechanism between climate change and violent conflict needs to be further explored.This paper tends to probe into the transmission mechanism between climate change and violent conflict from the perspective of vulnerability.Considering the complex and interwoven natural and social factors,as well as the independence and multiplicity of the links,the paper describes a three-level climate-conflict transmission mechanism and emphasizes the structural position of vulnerability in the composite transmission mechanism between climate change and violent conflict.Vulnerability is elaborated in this paper from such four aspects as ecology,economy,society and politics and its important role in the climate-conflict transmission mechanism is also fully analyzed.Climate change is an exogenous trigger of violent conflict,and vulnerability,as an endogenous social factor,serves as a protective screen against climate-conflict risks.Increased vulnerability will weaken the barrier function of the country against risks of violent conflict and give rise to a significant increase in climate-conflict risks.
